

CHINA, THE FAR EAST AND THE FUTURE

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THIS BOOK IS PRODUCED IN
COMPLETE CONFORMITY WITH THE
AUTHORISED ECONOMY STANDARDS

Introduction

Now that China's single-handed struggle against Japanese aggression has been merged in the general cause of the freedom front, there has been re-awakened a keen interest on the part of the peoples of the United Nations in China's recent history as a background for her long and grim resistance. Not a few attempts have been made by writers and journalists to provide an answer to the persistent question as to how a proverbially peaceful and peace-loving country like China could summon sufficient courage, five and a half years ago, to defy Japan's challenge to her sovereignty and independence, make the supreme resolve of never laying down her arms until final victory was achieved, and succeed in actually fighting to a standstill. While it is relatively easy to throw a general light on this question, I believe nothing short of a careful and detailed study of China's political development and her international relations throughout the past century can furnish a satisfactory elucidation of this historic phenomenon.

It is for this reason that I consider Professor Keeton's scholarly study of China and the Far East a timely contribution to this subject. It is a step in the right direction, as Professor Keeton does not rest content with a mere exposition of the current phases of China's resistance but goes back to the last century to provide a setting for the emergence of China as a factor in world affairs. Though it is premature to claim that historical sources and materials so far available permit a definitive history to be written of China's intercourse with the Powers, Professor Keeton's attempt to analyse the problems of contemporary China in the light of international politics in the Far East is to be welcomed. Within the limits of the sources open to him he has tried to be objective and impartial. I am sure this has been no easy task, because of the dearth of Chinese sources accessible to foreign writers, particularly concerning the early intercourse of China with the Western Powers. After presenting China's foreign relations since her contact with the outside world, the author discusses in a sympathetic way the political and social transformation of the country. He does not fail in this connection again to revert to the foreign influences at work which have had a close bearing upon China's internal development. Naturally, predominant attention is given to Japan, whose policy of aggression is traced historically with lucidity and in detail. The reader is brought

to the keen realisation that Japan's aggressive operations against China and the other Powers in the Far East are born of a deep-rooted ambition for aggrandisement and expansion, which finds expression in a consistent policy and in elaborate preparations throughout many years. The continuity and inexorableness of Japan's policy of conquest is thrown into bold relief, and one is left in no doubt that the attack on Pearl Harbour last December forms one of the links in the chain of the Japanese programme of aggression, in the same sense as Japan's attack on Mukden in 1931 and on Lukouchiao in 1937.

It is particularly fascinating that Professor Keeton, in addition to giving a picture of the general background of the situation in the Far East, offers constructive suggestions in the latter part of his book as to how a truly new order can be created in the Far East after the victory of the United Nations. These suggestions, formulated after a dispassionate analysis of the geographical and economic factors in the Pacific, should be interesting and stimulating to students of international affairs and no less to the statesmen who are bound to be called upon sooner or later to deal with the question. While opinions may well differ in matter of detail, the broad outlines of the author's conclusions cannot but prove thought-provoking to all those who wish to see the Pacific area reconstructed in the general pattern of peace and security in conformity with the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

I am glad I have been afforded the privilege of reading through Professor Keeton's book before it reaches the general public. I have no hesitation in recommending it for its informative and instructive character, particularly for the broad spirit in which it is conceived. It is my hope that this study will open the way for others who not only look upon the rise of China as the logical evolution of an ancient and revered state, but also wish to emphasise the significance of this development in the vortex of world politics.

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Preface

IN the following pages an attempt has been made to state the problem of the Pacific as a whole, and to show how it has come about that a major Pacific war has been added to the struggle to destroy Hitlerism. The next Peace Conference will be a turning-point in the development of the Far East, but some of the difficulties confronting the peace-makers are set out in the final chapter.

To assemble the material necessary for the preparation of this volume under war-time conditions has not been easy, and it has only been made possible by the efforts of my Research Secretary, Miss Marian Willard, to whom I take this opportunity of recording my indebtedness.

G. W. KEETON

PART ONE

The Rise of Chinese Nationalism

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CHAPTER I

CHINA UNDER THE MANCHU EMPERORS

IN the middle of the seventeenth century the power of the last of the native Chinese dynasties, the Mings, was broken in a succession of campaigns against invading Manchu armies, and eventually the entire Chinese Empire was brought under Manchu control. As is often the case, a wealthier and more numerous and more highly civilised people had been conquered by the comparatively small forces of a hardier but less civilised people, who, in turn, rapidly absorbed the higher civilisation of their subjects. The Manchus ruled China from 1644 until 1911, and the Revolution of 1911 may be considered, from one point of view, as the reassertion of the Chinese against their Manchu conquerors. To regard the Revolution as primarily or mainly engineered for this end, however, would be a serious exaggeration, for in the two hundred and seventy years which had elapsed since the conquest considerable intermixture of the two races had taken place, whilst except in Manchuria and Jehol, Chinese civilisation had almost completely obliterated the simpler manners of the Manchus.

The rule of the Manchu Dynasty also coincided largely with the period of foreign penetration of China, and the position of the foreigners cannot be properly understood until it is realised that the Manchus, though not illiberal, were suspicious of further alien elements in China, since their own control had been so recently established. A further point of some importance is that whilst the foreigners in the eighteenth century encountered Manchu authority in the flush of its early vigour, by the middle of the nineteenth century this vigour had spent itself, and the Manchus were then powerless to check foreign aggression as the Mings had been to prevent Manchu inroads. Had Japanese aggression manifested itself half a century earlier it is almost certain that the Japanese would have succeeded the Manchus as a ruling race, controlling

the whole of China. In the intervening half-century, however, the modern Chinese nation was born, and the Japanese realised too late that the time for the rapid and inexpensive conquest of China had passed. This miscalculation will decisively affect the future of the whole of the Far East.

At the time of the conquest the Manchus found themselves in possession of a vast and thickly populated empire, which had been settled for some thousands of years, and in which a complex and highly developed administrative system had survived successive conquests. The Manchus, therefore, stepped into the shoes of the Mings, but made few important changes in the administrative system, and still less in the social life of the Chinese. On the other hand, the Manchus, surrounded on all sides by a higher civilisation, and luxuries to which they had previously been strangers, quickly lost the vigour and simplicity which had characterised them at the time of the conquest, and ultimately, in spite of the warnings of some of their leaders, they were to a large degree absorbed by the conquered race. Even from the first days of the conquest the Manchus were compelled to rely not only on Chinese levies for the armies, but also upon Chinese administrators. In a number of the larger cities Manchu garrisons were established, and some effort was made to maintain the efficiency of these forces, and also to preserve their racial differences, but beyond this, and beyond the reservation of a few key posts in the Government for Manchus, official life after the Manchu conquest was as much open to Chinese scholars as it had been previously. Behind the official administration the life of the cities and villages continued exactly as it had done centuries before. Local affairs were in the hands of the village elders, and of the commercial guilds, administering customs of immemorial antiquity. The conquest was, in fact, no more than a change of masters, making no perceptible impression upon the daily life of the nation. The problem was not even complicated, as it was in India after successive invasions, by religious differences. The Chinese are traditionally tolerant in religious matters, and both the Chinese and the Manchus based their social customs ultimately upon ancestor-worship.

A number of points in connexion with Chinese administration must be borne in mind, for they not only exhibit striking differences, as compared with the administration of any Western State, but they also help one to understand the points in issue between the Chinese and the foreigners in the first two centuries of their intercourse. In theory, the Chinese Empire was an absolute monarchy, in which the Emperor, 'the Son of Heaven,' was the source of all governmental power. His edicts and rescripts were therefore at once the law of the Empire, and the basis of all

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public administration, to be varied by him at will. In fact, however, the Chinese had a considerable respect for precedent, as embodied in the laws and rescripts of earlier emperors, and even of earlier dynasties, and sudden change was unusual. There was no primogeniture in the Imperial succession, and Emperors were selected from the Imperial family, either by their immediate predecessor, or by the Imperial family itself, in council. In the early years of the Manchu Dynasty able members of the family were selected, but the system is obviously open to abuse, and in the nineteenth century the Emperors became the nominees of a powerful clique or, at the end of the century, the instruments of the widow of one of them, the powerful Empress Dowager.

The central administration of the Chinese Empire exhibited marked differences from any central administration in Europe, for it regarded its main function as controlling and checking the local officials, and not of initiating policy. The matter is very clearly put in a letter of Sir Robert Hart, who founded the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, in face of innumerable obstacles. He says:

‘There are, you know, a hundred things provincials ought to do which the central offices will never order them to do. The effort at centralisation is all right enough as regards great and grave international questions; but, even in them, local considerations are not fully weighed, and local authorities are not duly considered. The Chinese idea is for the locality to initiate, and for the central authority to (1) wink at; (2) tacitly admit; (3) openly allow; (4) officially recognise; and (5) crystallise. It is useless to attempt—except when outside force does it—to get the central offices to order the adoption of novelties.’¹

The actual business of the central government was, in the nineteenth century, divided amongst two Councils, the *Nui-Ko*, or Inner Cabinet, and the *Kün-Ki-Chu*, or Board of Strategy (the latter being the more active, making daily decisions on general policy), and six Boards: the *Li Pu* (Board of Civil Office), controlling appointments to all posts in the Imperial administration; the *Hu Pu*, or Board of Revenue; the *Lee Pu*, or Board of Ceremonies; the *Ping Pu* (Board of War); the *Hing Pu* (Board of Punishments); and the *Kung Pu*, or Board of Works, which controlled the maintenance and repair of official residences. Roads, canals, and bridges, however, were a provincial matter.

Below the central government was the provincial administration, organised from remote antiquity, and continuing to function practically unaltered, when the central government was swept

¹ Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, i, p. 6.

away by the Revolution in 1911. The provincial officials were expected to settle satisfactorily all problems arising within their jurisdiction, whether they were domestic revolts, floods, plagues, or even foreign aggression. There were important checks on the authority of the officials, and they were liable to exile or decapitation if they failed to deal adequately with matters arising within their jurisdiction. Not unnaturally, this was responsible for a system in which conservatism and lack of initiative were the most striking features, and where an unreasoning repression was regarded as a satisfactory remedy for most novel situations. Moreover, the intricate machinery of provincial and local government could only be made to work at all by the application of an elaborate system of responsibility, whereby blame for any untoward event could ultimately be attributed to someone. Thus, if *A* killed *B*, then in the first instance obviously *A* himself was responsible and must be apprehended. If he absconded, then his relatives were responsible; failing them, the local elders, and failing them, the most subordinate Imperial official, and so on, up to the provincial Viceroy himself. In this intricate system of interdependence there were no exceptions, and, as will be shown, when the foreigners reached Chinese ports for the purposes of trade, the same system was applied to them, and was the direct cause of a good deal of friction. The central government was able to retain control of the local administrations, partly by the application of this system of responsibility which, as will be seen, deflected attention almost completely away from the central government, except in some special emergency, such as an invasion; partly by the system of taxation, of which something will be said later; and partly also by the fact that all local officials were appointed from Peking, and only the central government could promote, transfer, or punish. Thus, every local official was compelled to maintain the closest possible relations with the central government, more especially as officials were usually appointed for three years, and although one reappointment in the same place was possible, that was the maximum period during which an official could stay in one place. In this way officials were prevented from strengthening their authority with the aid of local support; and the local inhabitants knew that if one official proved too friendly, his successor would almost certainly prove the reverse.

Another point to be remembered in connexion with the Imperial administration is the system of public examinations, success in which was the sole passport to official service. This meant that the ablest men of the Empire, irrespective of birth or place of origin, were attracted to the Imperial service, and being recruited on the threshold of manhood, they were moulded into a common

pattern. The examinations, ranging as they did through the Chinese classics, were designed to develop the more conservative qualities, at the expense of initiative, and so to influence the aspirant to public office towards those traditions which it would be his duty if successful thereafter to maintain. In this way the Chinese administration had much of the strength, and also much of the weakness, of the Roman Catholic priesthood in Europe during the Middle Ages. It was the cement which made the fabric a unified whole. It preserved a tolerable standard of efficiency, but that did not prevent it, at its lowest, from being corrupt, oppressive, or even actively vicious. When the chief qualification for the appointment of a commander-in-chief was his skill in the classics, coupled with his cultivation of influential officials of the central government, it is not surprising that his military skill, though adequate for repressing the barbarians of the frontier, should prove utterly unable to cope with the forces of the Western Powers in the nineteenth century. The Chinese have never been a military people; and contact with a higher civilisation quickly robbed the Manchus of those qualities of skill and daring which had won them the greatest Empire of the East with astonishingly slender forces.

The Imperial official, as we have seen, was intended to conform to a certain standard of public conduct, deviation from which would involve censure, and possibly also, in serious cases, exile or death. Within these limits, however, and within the limits of his jurisdiction, the official had a very wide discretion. Each possessed the power to issue decrees with legislative force, and since also each, with only a few exceptions, possessed judicial authority also, he was virtually a local sovereign. Western traders, accustomed to the separation of governmental powers, which had become almost universal in Europe after the Renaissance, found that this authority tended to be exercised irresponsibly as regards them, since the local officials had no conception at all of the foreign trade as a national question, and moreover, when the foreigners appealed to Peking, they were referred back to the local officials. As soon as the question of foreign trade proved too great for the local officials to deal with it, a trial of strength between China and some Western Power became inevitable. Looking back, one can perceive that many of the difficulties which arose were due to mutual misunderstandings. The foreigners sought to negotiate with Chinese officials in the ways in which they were accustomed to negotiate in the West. They could make no progress, however, because the Chinese were dealing with the foreign trade and the difficulties to which it gave rise in exactly the same way as they would deal with any other trouble—as a local problem. From the

Chinese point of view, the foreign traders enjoyed not only justice but a good deal of forbearance, whilst the foreigners, almost from the first, were seeking to establish a change in the Chinese outlook which was tantamount to social revolution. That changed outlook was achieved only after a century of struggle between China and the West.

Many of the difficulties arising out of the foreign trade were concerned with questions either of taxation or of law; and it is therefore necessary to say something very briefly concerning both. Here, again, the main difficulty was a lack of understanding of the differing view-points of the two races in dealing with these two important branches of governmental activity. At the time when foreign trade with China reached important dimensions, the main Maritime Powers had with difficulty established systems of taxation in which the public expenditure and revenues of the state were clearly distinguished from the private expenditure and revenues of the sovereign and his ministers, and in which the main principles of taxation were reasonably certain. There had been no similar development in China, where officials were still mainly reimbursed by fees and 'presents'—a system which had been universal in Europe in the Middle Ages. The foreigners therefore denounced as corruption and extortion methods of taxation from which they had only lately extricated themselves, and which were therefore closely associated in their minds with arbitrary authority. Thus, every Chinese administrative area returned a fixed sum to the higher authority, and the officials of that area then established their own taxes, and from the revenues paid both themselves and their subordinates. Only exceptionally, and for special purposes, would the central government contribute to local funds. On the other hand, even so obviously national a source of revenue as the Customs revenue was regarded essentially as a local revenue, although naturally the central government extracted a heavy toll from it; and when the foreign trade became concentrated in Canton, the Hoppo, or chief Customs official, was always a Manchu, and the profits from his office were so enormous that each occupant had to pay an increasingly large sum on appointment, a steadily mounting sum during his tenure of office, and a further huge fine on laying down his office. These sums passed mainly to the Imperial family and their relations, whose interest in preserving the system in force at Canton was therefore considerable. For this reason the imposts on the foreign trade became steadily more rigorous, although still very light, as compared with modern practice; but the foreign merchants, regarding the steady upward trend of the exactions, considered them to be one more proof of Chinese corruption and inefficiency.

The whole object of Chinese law was a similar source of difficulty to the foreign traders. Until recent developments on the continent of Europe temporarily interrupted it, the steady development of legal ideas in the West has been towards the progressive formulation and protection of individual rights, coupled with an insistence upon the responsibility of the individual for his own acts, in place of more primitive notions of group responsibility. Emphasis upon the importance and individuality of the human personality and its protection by the machinery of the law has been one of the most striking features of Western civilisation. Chinese legal philosophy, however, started from the opposite pole. Positing a theory of divine harmony, with which all human relations must therefore accord, it conceived the main object of law to be the achievement of uniformity, in consonance with this divine harmony. Chinese classics point out repeatedly that if the people are perfect they will need no laws at all, because this divine harmony will have been achieved. In form, therefore, Chinese law was repressive, ruthlessly punishing deviations from the desired pattern, and taking little or no note of motives or degrees of culpability. To the Westerner, however, ignorant of the purposes of this repressive code, it seemed to be unreasoning ruthlessness, especially as it incorporated to an extraordinary degree the principle of responsibility which has already been mentioned. In form, this penal law had been codified from earliest times, and the Manchus took over the Code of their predecessors with only minor variations. It was not regarded as exhaustive, for not only the Emperors but all major officials regularly issued decrees supplementing it. Besides these penal laws, there were also innumerable local and trade customs, but these were not reduced to writing or administered by the Imperial officials. Their enforcement was in the hands of the trade and craft guilds, and of the village or town elders. The towns, for these purposes, were considered simply as collections of villages, each with its own *tibao*, or headman, nominated by the magistrate, and responsible for the good behaviour of those within his village; within which, customs of the greatest antiquity and regulating a very intricate system of social relationships and land tenure were daily administered by the elders without any official intervention at all. Since, in many cases, the inhabitants of a village were closely related by ties of blood, and since also an individual still remained closely identified with his village, no matter where he might be, the invincible conservatism of Chinese life prior to the Revolution is easily understood.

The population of China, from earliest times, has been large. It would have been much larger but for periodic invasions,

CHAPTER II

FOREIGN PENETRATION OF CHINA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

THE first of the Western nations to enter into direct relations with China was Portugal, during the brief period of Portugal's world-wide expansion at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The earliest Portuguese expeditions were in the nature of piratical raids, in which there was a good deal of loss of life on both sides. Eventually Portuguese trading stations were established at Chinchew, Foochow, and Ningpo, but the foreigners were an aggressive and disorderly community, who eventually provoked the pacific and forbearing Chinese to reprisals, resulting in the destruction of these early settlements. In 1557, however, the Portuguese succeeded in establishing themselves at Macao, where they have since remained. During the period in which the foreign trade was confined to Canton, Macao was a flourishing and rapidly growing port, for the foreigners were not allowed to establish themselves permanently in the Southern capital, and so were compelled to withdraw at the close of each trading season to Macao. To-day, the commercial importance of Macao is negligible, and its fine water-front bears silent witness to a vanished prosperity which will never return.

Following the Portuguese came the Spanish, who established themselves in the Philippines in the middle of the sixteenth century. Their interest in China was predominantly religious, and although an extensive trade between the Philippines and China sprang up, it was in the hands of the Chinese, who settled in the Philippines in such considerable numbers that the Spanish became alarmed, and massacred them in 1603 and again in 1639. These episodes, like the Portuguese piratical expeditions, did little to increase Chinese confidence in the peaceful intentions of the foreigner.

The Dutch began to trade with the chief Chinese ports towards the end of the sixteenth century, but they were faced both with Chinese opposition and with Portuguese intrigue. They accordingly withdrew to Formosa, which they occupied until 1661, when the last of the Ming adherents, Koxinga, dispossessed them. Thereafter Dutch trade with China was intermittent, until they established a permanent factory at Canton in 1762.

The first appearance of the English in Chinese waters for trading purposes was in 1637, when Captain John Weddell reached Canton with five ships, after brushing aside Portuguese opposition. No

further expedition arrived until 1664, and from then until 1700 there were increasingly frequent attempts to trade. From 1715, the East India Company had a permanent factory at Canton, and the English soon obtained a predominant share in the trade, with the natural result that they also assumed the leadership in disputes with the Chinese. Besides the English and the Dutch factories at Canton, there were also at the end of the eighteenth century Danish, French, and American factories, and at various times also there were in Canton representatives of Prussian, Hamburg, Bremen, Belgian, Italian, and South American merchants. The Russian trade came overland to Peking, and was regulated by Sino-Russian treaties.

As was pointed out in the previous chapter, the Chinese regarded the foreign trade as essentially a local question, to be settled by the provincial officials. From time to time, however, the foreigners sent embassies to the Chinese Court, seeking amelioration of the conditions of trade. These embassies were only received at all after they had performed the *Kotow*, or ceremonial obeisance customary from tributary nations. They secured no practical advantages, and merely had the result that the foreign nations sending them were henceforth enrolled among the subordinate dominions of the Chinese Empire. When the second British Ambassador to China, Lord Amherst, in 1816 refused to perform the *Kotow*, he was treated with gross indignity, and was hastily hustled back to Canton. The truth of the matter was that, from the Chinese standpoint, China ('The Middle Kingdom') was the centre of the world's political system. All other peoples were ultimately dependent upon her, and the claim of the Western Powers to deal with her on a basis of equality was quite incomprehensible to her statesmen.

That it was the inability of the Chinese to conceive of diplomatic negotiations on a basis of equality, and not simply refusal to conform to Chinese ceremonial, which was the root-difficulty at this period, is shown by the fate of the Dutch embassies. These showed themselves eager—in fact, too eager—to conform to the most rigid requirements of Chinese Court etiquette, and of one of their missions, that of Titsingh and von Braam, in 1795, following close upon that of Macartney, a distinguished writer records:

'They were brought to the capital like malefactors, treated there like beggars, and then sent back to Canton like mountebanks to perform the three-times-three prostration at all times and before everything their conductors saw fit.'

Notwithstanding this excess of courtesy, the embassy failed to achieve any practical result, although, not unnaturally, it

confirmed the belief of the Chinese that even the most distant and barbarous peoples were eager to recognise their pre-eminence.

The practical consequence of this attitude was that the foreign trade was confined in 1757 to Canton, under such conditions as the provincial authorities might choose to impose. If the foreign merchants resisted or ignored these conditions, the Chinese temporarily closed the trade altogether until the foreigners were in a more amenable frame of mind. In actual fact, the conditions of trade in the period 1715-1839 were by no means unduly oppressive, but it was the precariousness of the trade and the inability to expand it, together with irregular and steadily mounting taxation, which the foreigner resented most. These conditions were due to the fact that the Chinese felt no great need of the articles of commerce which the foreign merchants brought, and they were therefore satisfied to keep the trade within moderate compass. Moreover, the presence of foreigners, with their turbulent habits, was a potential source of considerable difficulty from the standpoint of the doctrine of responsibility. If the foreigners suddenly chose to run amok, the Viceroy might well be disgraced, or even decapitated for it. To minimise this danger therefore, the authorities in 1702 characteristically appointed a single Chinese broker, named 'The Emperor's Merchant,' through whom alone the foreign trade could be conducted. Growth of the trade made such a single monopoly impossible, and in 1720 the Co-Hong, or guild of Chinese merchants dealing with the foreign traders, was formed. These were collectively responsible to the Chinese authorities for the behaviour of the foreigners, and for the payment by them of all just dues. The system worked both ways, however, for the guild were jointly responsible to the foreign merchants for the debts of a member, and these liabilities, which were at times very extensive, were faithfully discharged.

During the eighteenth century the foreign traders were all either members of monopolist companies, such as the English, French, and Dutch East India Companies, or else they were independent merchants who were permitted to trade only under the licence and control of these companies. It was therefore a comparatively easy matter to secure the proper behaviour of the small mercantile communities, who lived in the factories on the water-front at Canton only during the trading season, and who retired to Macao actually at its close. In the nineteenth century, with the growth of freedom of trade, these monopolies successively ended. That of the English East India Company—by far the wealthiest of these trading companies—ended in 1833, and thereafter the China trade was open to all comers. Not all of them were persons of virtue, and friction between the English and the Chinese authori-

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ties was incomparably more serious in the brief period between the termination of the Company's monopoly in 1833 and the outbreak of the first Anglo-Chinese War in 1839, than it had been at any previous time. So acute did the struggle become that the Chinese made a last feeble attempt to break off the foreign trade altogether. The attempt came a century too late, and China was condemned to a century of concession to the rapidly increasing demands of the foreigner, which themselves were the direct result of the opening of China to all comers in the first half of the nineteenth century.

One of the main issues complicating Sino-foreign relations in this period prior to 1840 was that of jurisdiction, especially in homicide cases. Of these, there were exceedingly few, if it is remembered that each trading season brought some thousands of foreign sailors to Canton after a long and trying voyage from Europe. Occasionally, however, there were affrays, in which a Chinese was killed and the Chinese officials promptly demanded the surrender of the culprit. Had the consequences of such a surrender been a trial in accordance with Western legal procedure, and a sentence of manslaughter, or its equivalent, there is no reason to suppose that these demands would have been strongly resisted; but Chinese penal law did not enquire into motives, and applied the principle of responsibility with such rigour that, if the incident were not satisfactorily settled, the Hong merchants, or even the Chinese officials themselves, would ultimately have been punished. For this reason, considerable pressure was put upon the responsible officials of the foreign merchants to surrender the guilty seaman and when they replied that in a general affray it was virtually impossible to pick out the actual slayer, the Chinese asked why it was necessary to take such pains to discover the real wrongdoer when the surrender of any foreigner would satisfy their law. On one occasion, at least, they explained that they would be content with the body of a sailor who had conveniently committed suicide at the time of the affray. The foreign officials, and especially the representatives of the English East India Company, declared themselves unable to assist in such travesties of justice, and consistently refused to surrender their men to the eccentricities of Chinese legal procedure. The jurisdiction issue, however, was never satisfactorily settled until the Treaty of Nanking, in 1842, introduced the system of extra-territoriality into Sino-foreign relations. The nature of this system will be explained in the next chapter, but it must be emphasised that, after the trade had been thrown open to all comers in 1834, the difficulties in dealing with Chinese officials over the jurisdiction issue was so greatly increased that a peaceful solution of it was in the long run impossible, so long

as the foreigners maintained their principle of individual responsibility, and the Chinese adhered to theories of group liability.

It will, therefore, be evident that in any circumstances the period of transition from monopolist to free trade would have been a period of extreme difficulty in Sino-foreign relations. Had the Manchu Dynasty been as powerful in 1840 as it had been two centuries earlier, when the first foreign trading establishments were being established in Chinese ports, it is not improbable that the results of the friction would have been the expulsion of the foreigners from China altogether. As it was, the weaknesses of the Chinese administrative and military systems were more and more clearly discerned, and the Chinese were compelled to give way, but only after a prolonged struggle, in which the foreigners, and especially the British, appeared to be taking up the untenable position that they wished to compel the Chinese to buy opium, when the Chinese Government was seeking to suppress the opium traffic.

Without resorting to any special pleading on behalf of the British Government, it can be unequivocally asserted that few questions have been so persistently misunderstood and misrepresented here and abroad as the Chinese opium question. It has already been mentioned that whilst the foreign merchants were eager to buy Chinese silks and teas, there was no corresponding eagerness on the part of the Chinese to buy European goods, and although the East India Company managed to induce the Hong merchants to take limited quantities of cotton fabrics, there remained, at the end of each trading season, a balance in favour of the Chinese. For this balance of exchange the Chinese required silver dollars, with the result that the foreign traders were often in some difficulties in their search for an adequate number of dollars to balance the account. In the second half of the eighteenth century, however, it was noticed that the Chinese themselves grew opium (and, in fact, had done for over a thousand years), and it was therefore suggested that Indian opium might be shipped to Canton to help to redress the balance of trade. Although the East India Company itself never handled the drug, it was shipped under their licence, and it is unquestionable that the traffic materially eased their trading problems. For some time the trade remained within fairly narrow limits, but at the beginning of the nineteenth century there was a steady expansion, and the profits on it, alike to foreign traders, Chinese merchants, and provincial officials, were enormous—so much so, in fact, that a great deal of smuggling took place, connived at by the local officials who, in this way, participated more generally in the traffic than would otherwise have been the case. The smuggling attracted only the more dubious and turbulent members of the foreign community,

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and affrays became frequent. Moreover, the provincial officials noticed, with growing alarm, that the flow of silver had now been reversed as the demand for opium grew, so that it appeared that China was being impoverished, simply because of the craving for the drug. For these reasons there was a constant stream of memorials from Canton to Peking debating the merits of controlling the traffic, or of abolishing it altogether. The result of this activity was an edict of 1800, prohibiting the importation of foreign opium. Thereafter, the opium trade continued to flourish, but outside the jurisdiction of the foreign companies and the Chinese merchants, and the local officials obtained even higher revenues than before, in the shape of bribes to ignore the clandestine traffic. Successive edicts from Peking failed to make any impression at once upon the traffic, and eventually the Imperial Government dispatched to Canton Imperial Commissioner Lin Tse-sü, with the amplest powers to stamp out the traffic. One of his first acts was to demand the surrender of all opium then under foreign control at Canton. This demand was supported by the imprisonment of the foreign community within the factories. Whilst this issue was being fought out in an atmosphere of increasing tension, a Chinese named Lin Wei-hi, was killed in an affray with British sailors, and the Imperial Commissioner demanded the surrender of the slayer. This was refused, and the British were compelled to leave, first Canton, and then Macao. They took up their headquarters at Hong Kong, inhabited at that time only by a few fishing communities, and towards the end of 1839 open hostilities between England and China began.

The extreme ease with which small bodies of British troops completely defeated massive Chinese armies, and occupied Chinese cities, was a revelation at once to foreigners and to Chinese of the extent of the internal decay of the Chinese Empire, realisation of which immediately changed the nature of the relations between East and West. In 1816, Lord Amherst, the British envoy, had been hustled away from Peking, and his requests for a reconsideration of the conditions of trade had been contemptuously rejected. In 1834, Lord Napier, who had been appointed British superintendent of trade on the termination of the monopoly of the East India Company, had been refused the status of an equal by the Viceroy of Kwantung, and in the period between 1834 and 1842 the British superintendents of trade had allowed themselves tacitly to slip into the position formerly occupied by the supercargoes of the East India Company. In fact, prior to the first Anglo-Chinese War, the Chinese declined to negotiate at all. It was for the Imperial officials to dictate the terms on which the foreign trade should continue. It was for the foreigner, in the terms of

Imperial edicts, to 'tremble and obey.' The Chinese officials were honestly anxious to secure peaceable and increasing foreign trade at Canton, but they were utterly unable to comprehend the terms which the foreigners would regard as satisfactory. For them, Chinese civilisation was universal, and China's political system was the hub upon which the entire world turned. Judged by these standards, they showed patience and forbearance to the foreign merchants, who were equally unable to comprehend the Chinese point of view. Behind the circumstances of the first Anglo-Chinese War, therefore, lay the entire question of the basis on which China and the West were going to deal. At this period, the West was simply claiming to have intercourse with China on a basis of equality, and this was secured, not for Great Britain alone, but for all the Western nations, in the Treaty of Nanking, in 1842, as a result of decisive British victories. For a time, the Chinese officials were slow to perceive how decisive was the change which had taken place. They sought to evade the terms of this and other treaties which China signed at this time; and this brought renewed foreign pressure, and eventually, between 1856 and 1860, further foreign expeditions to China. From 1860 onwards, however, there was a further change. The foreigners were no longer content with equality. They demanded a privileged position, and increasingly extensive concessions, until it seemed that nothing short of dismemberment would satisfy them. Then, at long last, the Chinese perceived the danger, and took the necessary steps to avert it.

The Treaty of Nanking was the first of a group of treaties—with the British, the French, and with the Americans—in which the main principles of Western intercourse with China were laid down. They marked the closing of one era, the era of precarious tolerance, and the opening of another, in which the threat of force was never far distant in dealings with the Chinese officials. It was a hard lesson which these cultured and conservative administrators had to learn, and before it had been fully mastered the Imperial system was in ruins. By the terms of the Treaty of Nanking, Hong Kong was ceded to Great Britain, as a haven for foreign merchants. In fighting the war, Great Britain had declared that she sought no exclusive privileges, and the proof of this is to be found in the concession of similar privileges by China to other Western states, and by the fact that foreign merchants of all nationalities have always been free to resort to Hong Kong which, in less than a century, grew from a collection of squalid fishing settlements to one of the world's busiest ports. Lord Palmerston, with his usual foresight, had suggested that Chusan, at the mouth of the Yangtse, should be ceded, but the British representatives on the spot, with

an eye on the Canton trade, preferred Hong Kong. Recent events in China have shown that Palmerston showed superior wisdom.

The treaty also provided that five ports—Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai—should be opened to foreign trade, and that within these ports there should be liberty for the foreigners to reside. Opening of these ports to all foreign traders also involved the abandonment of the monopoly of the Chinese guild-merchants. Free trade, in fact, had spread as far as China. In later treaties, more Chinese ports were opened to Chinese trade, some of them along the banks of the Yangtse, until their number exceeded forty. In these, the treaty port system described in the next chapter was established, with slight local variations. Moreover, consuls of the treaty Powers were appointed at the ports, and these not only had authority over their own countrymen, but also by treaty had the right of dealing with the local Chinese officials upon terms of equality. As a result, the local political influence of the consuls, backed up as it was by the armed forces of their country, became considerable, more especially as no foreign ambassadors were accredited to Peking prior to 1860.

One point of some importance in connexion with the first treaty settlement between Great Britain and China is that Great Britain exercised no pressure to secure the legalisation of the opium trade, and indeed the British representative offered British co-operation to the Chinese officials for the purpose of suppressing smuggling. The offer was not accepted, and smuggling continued—a circumstance which complicated Anglo-Chinese relations for some years to come.

Although the Chinese had been decisively beaten in the war with Great Britain, Nanking having narrowly escaped being taken by assault, it was obvious that only comparatively small Chinese forces had been engaged in the struggle. Moreover, except in the treaty ports themselves, the Chinese had no experience of the power of the foreigner, and no conception at all of the extent of his superiority in the art of war. Indeed, the sudden collapse of resistance had been due rather to panic in Peking than to any loss of spirit in the Chinese themselves; and it is by no means improbable that if the war had continued, the English would have encountered more serious difficulties than they had done up to the advance on Nanking. As soon as the treaty was signed, therefore, Chinese confidence returned, and attacks on foreigners were frequent. These were particularly violent in Canton itself, which in pre-treaty days had seen remarkably little anti-foreign feeling, as a result of firm measures taken by the provincial officers. These, however, now connived at anti-foreign outbursts, until the British were compelled to abandon their undoubted right, secured by the Treaty of Nanking, to establish themselves in Canton. This,

coupled with the gradual reassertion by the Chinese of superiority, was the main reason for the outbreak of the second Anglo-Chinese War in 1856. This time, however, the British did not fight alone. The French were also interested in extending the orbit of foreign rights in China, whilst before hostilities were concluded Russia was also pressing the Imperial Government for additional concessions. Already by 1860, therefore, China had become the field for the prolonged diplomatic struggle which came so near to disrupting her, and her feebleness was emphasised still further by the outbreak of a rebellion which threatened to overturn the dynasty completely. This, the Taiping Rebellion, was crushed only after ten years of warfare, and with foreign assistance.

CHAPTER III

THE TREATY PORT SYSTEM

THE Treaty of Nanking in 1842 inaugurated the treaty port system in China, a system which survived, with successive extensions, down to 1928. This system had been found by experience to be a necessity, since the Chinese had refused to open up their country to foreign trade in the manner in which the Western nations had hoped it would be opened, whilst the difference in the view-points of the Chinese and the foreigners was too profound for any less radical system to be adopted. The consequence of establishing the system was that the foreigners remained a distinct and separately organised community, concentrated in the great ports of the Chinese coastline, and enjoying an increasingly favoured position. Because of their special juridical status, however, they were not allowed to roam as they pleased through the Empire. They were confined, as a community, to the immediate vicinity of the ports opened to foreign trade.

At each of the ports opened to foreign trade, other than Canton, there immediately arose the problem of the accommodation of the foreign merchants and their establishments. Except at Canton, no serious opposition to the entry of the foreigner was offered, but they themselves found it difficult to live comfortably in the closely packed areas adjoining the water-fronts, within the city walls. Accordingly the British consuls, and in some cases the consuls of other nations also, leased land favourably situated outside the city boundaries, and on these sites there were established the houses, shops, and warehouses of the foreign merchants. At

Shanghai, which rapidly became by far the most important centre of the foreign trade, the total area within what was first known as the British, and later as the International, Settlement, eventually amounted to nearly 500 acres, whilst another 200 acres was leased to the French, whose establishment at Shanghai has always remained distinct from that of the other foreign Powers. The International Settlement developed from the amalgamation of the British and the American settlements, although merchants of all other nationalities were allowed to live and trade there without discrimination. Some slight confusion has sometimes arisen from the use of the words 'concession' and 'settlement' to describe the foreign establishments in China. Theoretically, a concession was an area of land leased directly to the foreign Consul, and by him sublet to the foreign merchants. In a settlement, the land was let directly by the Chinese to the foreign merchants. It was merely reserved by the Chinese officials for the foreigners. This distinction, however, was not always strictly maintained. Thus, technically, the French establishment at Shanghai was a settlement, with exactly the same status as the International Settlement, but the French always referred to it as a concession.

The foreign establishments varied very greatly in size, as more and more ports were opened to foreign trade. Thus, in 1924, the International Settlement at Shanghai had a population exceeding half a million, and this assembly of people had far overflowed the limits of the Settlement itself, into the neighbouring countryside, with the result that the question of the control of this area outside the Settlement limits was a troublesome and unsolved one between the Settlement authorities and the local Chinese officials.

The growth of the foreign communities in the Chinese treaty ports is an interesting experiment in international co-operation and improvisation. In the smallest establishments, all of which were concessions, the appropriate consul alone exercised authority, in the sense that he made regulations for the good government of the community. As will be explained, these could be enforced against residents only in the court of the nationality of the resident, offenders being therefore handed over to the nearest appropriate consular officer. But in the largest communities, and especially in Shanghai, something very like international free cities sprang up. From the very beginning, it was necessary to make provision for the building, repairing, and lighting of roads and bridges, and for other amenities of modern urban life, and here there were two distinct problems to be solved—the relation of the foreign community to the Chinese officials, and the status of the foreign residents in respect of the settlement authorities. The first problem was settled by drawing up 'land regulations,'

which provided that the foreign community should have power to undertake works of the type which any Western civic authority would be empowered to do. These regulations were approved by the foreign consuls and the local officials, and thereafter constituted the basic law of the Settlement. The problem of internal government was more difficult. At Shanghai, a popularly elected Committee of Roads and Jetties, under the Chairmanship of the British Consul, levied a modest impost for public works, but missionaries objected to paying for public jetties, since they took no part in trade, and merchants who had constructed private jetties also refused to pay for public jetties. Ultimately, however, as a result of successive meetings of land-renters, it was decided to establish a Council, elected by land-renters, to provide the necessary municipal services. The bye-laws of the Council were enforced against defaulters, in the appropriate consular court. As to the Council itself, that was answerable in law only to the Consular Body as a whole. There was not, as in the West, any superior governmental department, or national court, to which this tiny organ of international government could be made answerable.

It had at first been decided that the Settlements should be set aside for the exclusive residence of foreigners, and in the earliest land regulations at Shanghai, Chinese were expressly excluded. This disability continued until the Taiping Rebellion spread to the Yangtse Valley in 1854-5, culminating in the capture and pillaging of the Chinese city of Shanghai. From these excesses a steady stream of Chinese fugitives, many of them wealthy merchants, sought refuge within the International Settlement which, as in all crises prior to the Japanese invasion of China, had been able to preserve its neutrality. The prohibition was therefore rescinded, on condition that each Chinese resident gave an undertaking to conform to the land regulations, and to pay any general assessments which might be imposed. Residence, however, gave the Chinese no right, as it did to other foreign residents, either to representation on the Municipal Council, or even to the franchise. The admission of Chinese to the Settlement also created a complicated problem of jurisdiction, which was the subject of prolonged discussion between Chinese and foreign officials.

The exclusion of the Chinese from the International Settlement had been due, not so much to any reluctance to have Chinese merchants as near neighbours, as to a determination to exclude all Chinese officials from it. The foreigners, as will be explained shortly, remained under the jurisdiction of their respective consuls, but the Chinese could be answerable only to their own provincial authorities. With the rapid influx of Chinese refugees during the Taiping Rebellion, it became necessary to make provision both

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for the apprehension of wrongdoers, whose punishment was desired by the Chinese, and for the consideration of cases, both civil and criminal, in which Chinese resident within the Settlement were the defendants. With regard to the first class of cases *i.e.* those in which the Chinese provincial authorities required the surrender of Chinese fugitives from justice who had taken refuge in the Settlement, the municipality made good its claim that surrender could be demanded only from the Settlement authorities themselves. That is to say, the officials of the provincial government were excluded from the Settlement. For the second class of case, it was obviously necessary to create some Chinese Court within the Settlement itself. Equally obviously, this could not be the ordinary Chinese Court, with its judicial torture, its confusion of administrative and judicial functions, and its application of a system of law in which the death penalty was imposed for upwards of 3000 offences. On the civil side, moreover, there was available no Chinese law, in the sense of a system of rules, promulgated with the authority of the Imperial Government. A way out of this difficulty was therefore found by the establishment of the Shanghai Mixed Court, before which were brought all cases, civil or criminal arising within the Settlement and in which a Chinese was defendant. The judges of the Court were Chinese officials, nominated by the provincial authorities, with the approval of the municipality. They sat with assessors, nominated by the consuls of the treaty Powers, and they applied a species of simplified Chinese penal law, but with methods of procedure akin to those existing in the consular courts. On the civil side, the law applied was frankly modelled on the commercial law of the treaty Powers. The existence of this court, and the popularity which it enjoyed among both Chinese and foreigners, proved a powerful incentive to the Chinese for law reform, although no great progress was made in this direction until the beginning of the present century.

On the outbreak of the Revolution in 1911 the Shanghai municipality was placed in a difficulty so far as the Mixed Court was concerned, for following its traditional policy of neutrality, it was reluctant to allow any of the contending parties to appoint any of the Chinese magistrates to the court. The result was that from 1911 until 1927 these magistrates were appointed by the Municipal Council, a practice which the Chinese regarded as a usurpation of authority, and accordingly, in 1927, negotiations were initiated for the retrocession of the court, and this was achieved a few years later. Little by little foreign influence at the court declined, although this was no longer a matter of concern, since the promulgation of new Chinese Codes, incorporating some of the best features of modern Western Codes, coupled with a sharp differentiation

between judicial and administrative functions, had removed the main reasons for the establishment of this special type of court. Already before the outbreak of the war with Japan in 1937, therefore, the Shanghai Mixed Court had been reabsorbed into the Chinese judicial system.

Jurisdiction over foreigners in China depended upon the system of extra-territoriality, which was first established in the Regulations Supplementary to the Treaty of Nanking, and which was then conceded by the Chinese to every foreign Power seeking to enter into treaty relations with them, until the close of the War of 1914-18, following which the privilege has been granted to no other Power. It was rightly regarded by the Chinese as the key to the privileged position of the foreigner in China, for without it the other rights conceded would have been largely illusory. The jurisdiction issue arose between the Chinese and the foreigners during the earliest years of the foreign trade, and the foreigners resisted Chinese claims to exercise jurisdiction over their nationals mainly because Chinese theories of responsibility were greatly at variance with those universal in Europe. Moreover, the Chinese had no system of judicial proof. They relied upon judicial torture (including the torture of witnesses), in order to secure a confession of guilt. Further, the Chinese confused the administrative and the judicial functions, and they conceded a limited legislative power to their officials, whilst corruption and inefficiency were widespread in those areas of China where the foreigner traded. The two attitudes of mind, in fact, were so much in conflict over the question of legal responsibility that no compromise was possible. Either the foreigner had to trade purely on Chinese terms, and expose his agents to the uncertain rigours of Chinese legal procedure, or he must withdraw his nationals in China completely from Chinese jurisdiction. The first Anglo-Chinese War decided this issue in favour of the second course. The foreigner in China could never be tried by a Chinese Court. If he committed an offence he must be handed over to his consul for trial and punishment.

The essence of the system of extra-territoriality was that in all cases, civil and criminal, in which a foreigner was a defendant, he could be tried only in the court of his own country. If an Italian sued an American, the forum was the American Consular Court. Similarly if a Chinese sued an American. If an American sued an Italian, it was in an Italian Consular Court. If he sued a Chinese, it would be in the local Chinese Court. Thus, the clue to jurisdiction in China in the period of the treaties was always the nationality of the defendant. The system had certain obvious defects. It was extremely cumbrous. There were far too many

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small foreign courts in China, and it would have led to great efficiency and simplicity if all the consular courts could have been fused into a single foreign jurisdiction. Again, jurisdiction was in the hands of the consuls, who were given special power for this purpose; but this led to an association of judicial with administrative (and sometimes also with legislative) functions which was one of the grounds for complaint in respect of Chinese jurisdiction. Not being profound legal scholars, the consuls sometimes confused their powers under various heads, and gave decisions of doubtful legality. When these were quashed in an appellate court in some remote colony, or even, in ultimate appeal, in the capital of treaty Power, the Chinese sometimes complained of denial of justice, when the real fault was lack of judicial training of the consul. As might have been expected, the system worked reasonably well among the greater treaty Powers, which made genuine effort to secure consuls with adequate legal training. Two of them, Great Britain and the United States, went further, and established Supreme Courts for China, presided over by fully qualified judges, possessing no administrative functions. In smaller treaty Powers, on the other hand, appointed consuls were not only not trained lawyers, but in some cases were merchants, still actively engaged in trading, and it is almost superfluous to add that the Chinese complained, and with justification, that there were frequent miscarriages of justice, and that in some cases the system was a cover for flagrant abuses.

Not every foreign state whose nationals traded to China enjoyed extra-territorial rights in virtue of a treaty, but where no treaty existed these foreign traders placed themselves under the protection of one of the greater treaty Powers, and they were then forthwith treated in China in the same way as nationals of that treaty Power, without protest on the part of the Chinese, who were anything, well satisfied to be relieved of the responsibility of bringing them to account.

A second key institution upon which the position of the foreign trader in China depended was the Chinese Maritime Customs Service. It has already been noticed that the absence of a fixed tariff and the inefficiency and corruption which accompanied the levying of dues upon the foreign trade were among the main causes of foreign dissatisfaction, prior to the first Anglo-Chinese War. The Treaty of Nanking sought to remedy this by the substitution of a uniform five per cent. tariff for the multiplicity of duties exacted by the Canton officials. One result of this change was that the foreign merchants were for the first time brought into direct contact with the Chinese officials. Previously all dues had been levied through the Hong merchants. The Chinese officials, however

were both incompetent and corrupt, and the less honest trader did not find it unduly difficult to strike a bargain with the appropriate official, to the detriment of his more scrupulous competitor, and the frequency of such bargains need evoke no comment from those who are familiar with the traditional Chinese methods of taxation, dependent as they were upon the farming of taxes, and the liability of inferior officials for fixed yields only. The levying of customs-dues was therefore a cause for complaint from the first days of the treaty port system. Finally, when the Taiping Rebellion disorganised the Imperial administration, it became necessary for foreigners and Chinese together to evolve some new system. For a short time the foreign consuls themselves collected the dues and transmitted them to the local officials, but this plainly could not continue indefinitely, and in 1854 the British, French, and American consuls at Shanghai agreed with the provincial authorities that the customs on the foreign trade should be levied by a new service, controlled by foreign officials, termed Inspectors of Customs, operating under the control of an Inspector-General of Customs who, until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, was always an Englishman. The first Inspector-General was Captain Thomas Wade, who was succeeded in 1853 by Mr. H. N. Lay, a young man of considerable ability and force of character, but conspicuously lacking in tact. He was dismissed by the Chinese Government in 1863, and was followed by Mr. (later Sir) Robert Hart, who was in a very real sense the creator of the developed Maritime Customs Service. The position of the Inspector-General was a peculiar one. A foreigner, and dealing primarily with the foreign trade, he was nevertheless a Chinese official of steadily increasing importance, partly because of his connexions with the diplomatic corps in China, and partly because, as the revenues of the Maritime Customs steadily increased under efficient administration, they became a natural security for foreign loans to China. Moreover, the creation of this modern and efficient service was a standing criticism of the traditional Chinese methods of administration and, in the long run, a powerful inducement to general administrative reform.

No account of the system of foreign rights in China can ignore those of the missionaries, who have been one of the main forces in bringing about the revolutionary change in outlook out of which Chinese Nationalism has grown. In the years immediately prior to the assumption of power by the Nationalists, when the official foreign attitude was still mainly negative, the missionaries endeavoured to dissociate themselves as much as possible from prevailing foreign opinions, but without a great deal of success. It was not only that the missionary owed his position in China to

the 'unequal treaties' which he now condemned, but it was also that in the minds of the Chinese the missionary was spreading knowledge and religious beliefs which had their origin in the West, and the acceptance of which necessarily involved a renunciation of Chinese civilisation in favour of that of the West. Missionary teachings were therefore regarded with suspicion as denationalising, whilst the missionary himself, even apart from his own inclinations, was of en a source of difficulty to the Chinese officials. In his person and property he was protected by the system of extra-territoriality, without which his position would have been untenable, whilst it was only to be expected that he would use his influence to protect converts from injustice and oppression—a circumstance which was sometimes maliciously stated to be responsible, in no small measure, for the rapid spread of Christianity in China. Attacks on missionaries in the interior (where they alone of the foreign community were allowed to travel freely) were not infrequently the cause of diplomatic controversies, and sometimes of punitive action by a foreign Power.

Missionary activity in China was widespread long before treaty days. St. Francis Xavier died at Shang-chuan, near Macao, in 1552, and following the Portuguese came Spanish Augustines, and later, Dominicans and Jesuits, some of whom attained positions of eminence in Peking. Until the nineteenth century, missionary activity was confined mainly to the Spanish, French and Italians, and was consequently almost exclusively Roman Catholic. Shortly before the first Anglo-Chinese War, however, several English and American Protestant missionaries, some of them men of outstanding ability, established themselves in China, and from that time onwards it can be said, without in any way minimising the important work accomplished by Roman Catholics, that the lead in educational and social activities has been taken by Protestant missionaries, who have built up in China an achievement of which any community can justifiably be proud. By the early treaties, missionaries obtained the right to reside and erect churches in the treaty ports. By the treaties of 1858-60 Chinese who embraced Christianity were protected from persecution, and foreign missionaries were allowed to travel, to lease land, and to build churches, and in the second half of the nineteenth century missionaries were active in all parts of China. Eventually, Article xiv of the American treaty of 1903 defined their status afresh, with particular reference to the difficulties which had arisen since 1860. The article reads:

'No restrictions shall be placed on Chinese joining Christian Churches. Converts and non-converts, being Chinese subjects, shall alike conform to the laws of China, and shall pay due respect

to those in authority, living together in peace and amity; and the fact of being converts shall not protect them from the consequences of any offence they may have committed or may commit after their admission into the Church, or exempt them from paying legal taxes levied on Chinese subjects generally, except taxes levied and contributions for the support of religious customs and practices contrary to their faith. Missionaries shall not interfere with the exercise by the native authorities of their jurisdiction over Chinese subjects, nor shall the native authorities make any distinction between converts and non-converts, but shall administer the laws without partiality so that both classes can live together in peace. Missionary societies of the United States shall be permitted to rent and to lease in perpetuity, as the property of such societies, buildings or lands in all parts of the Empire for missionary purposes and, after the title deeds have been found in order and duly stamped by the local authorities, to erect such suitable buildings as may be required for carrying on their good work.'

By the operation of the 'most-favoured-nation clause' this article became applicable to the missionary activities of every treaty Power.

On this treaty foundation the missionaries in China built up schools and missionary universities, as well as medical and other badly needed social services. To these main activities there were added many ancillary services, such as publishing, the foundation of scientific and popular journals, the teaching of crafts, and even of agriculture, engineering, and commerce. For every Chinese who went abroad, a dozen were taught at the mission schools and colleges, and they built up the reform movement, whose insistence on Westernisation eventually brought about the collapse of the Manchu Dynasty, and the growth of Chinese Nationalism. Missionaries, therefore, have played a most important part in the creation of modern China, and whilst to-day Chinese education looks increasingly to Chinese sources for inspiration, the methods by which it utilised this material are essentially Western in origin, and they have been adopted through the instrumentality of the pioneer labour of the missionaries. Although the missionary schools and colleges lost their pre-eminence during the period of reconstruction, following the re-unification of China by the Nationalists in 1928, they have good reason to be content with the results of a century of disinterested effort.

Besides the main rights, here briefly described, the foreigner in China enjoyed the benefit of a host of other rights, gained under a large number of treaties and agreements, national or local. A very important group of these rights were commercial. When China was fully opened to foreign enterprise in the second half of the

nineteenth century, her most urgent need was the rapid development of her resources. This could be achieved only with foreign capital, and through foreign enterprise. Foreign capital was made available in various ways. In the first place, there were the loans raised by the Chinese Government itself, or by provincial governments, from foreign financial interests—usually banks—acting with the approval of their respective Governments, and often serving as the instruments for further foreign penetration of China. Loans were secured by the hypothecation of China's revenues, primarily the foreign customs revenue, but latterly also the salt *gabelle* and *likin*, or internal tariffs on the transfer of goods, and even provincial revenues. In order to protect the security thus offered, the foreign Powers sometimes insisted upon a certain degree of foreign control of the services pledged. The necessity for this was obvious enough, if the chaotic conditions of Chinese administration in the second half of the nineteenth century is remembered, but equally it can be appreciated that thoughtful Chinese regarded these transactions as equivalent to progressively signing away China's independence. It was only to be expected therefore, when a body of patriotic Chinese sought to restore their country's integrity, that the primary object of policy would be to secure the restoration to Chinese control of these services. The final stage in China's financial dependence was reached in 1912, with the establishment of the Six Power Consortium, between British, German, American, French, Russian, and Japanese financial interests, whereby they established a monopoly in respect of all future administrative (as distinct from industrial) loans to China; to be shared by the Six Powers to the exclusion of all others. The consortium had only a brief existence, however, for in 1913, on the initiative of President Wilson, the American bankers withdrew from the consortium, which was contemplating advancing a large sum to the New Chinese Republican Government for reorganisation. The United States, it would seem from President Wilson's pronouncement on this occasion, was anxious concerning the general trend of Western capitalist enterprise in China. 'The conditions of the loan,' he said, 'seem to us to touch very nearly the administrative independence of China itself, and this Administration does not feel that it ought, even by implication, to be a party to those conditions. The responsibility on its part which would be implied in requesting the bankers to undertake the loan might conceivably go to the length in some unhappy contingency of forcible interference in the financial, and even the political, affairs of that great Oriental State, just now awakening to a consciousness of its power and of its obligations to its people. The conditions include not only the pledging of particular taxes, some of them antiquated and burdensome, to

secure the loan but also the administration of those taxes by foreign agents. The responsibility on the part of our Government implied in the encouragement of a loan thus secured and administered is plain enough and is obnoxious to the principles upon which the Government of our people rests. The Government of the United States is not only willing but earnestly desirous of aiding the great Chinese people in every way that is consistent with their untrammelled development and its own immemorial principles. The awakening of the people of China to a consciousness of their responsibilities under free government is the most significant, if not the most momentous, event of our generation. With this movement and aspiration the American people are in profound sympathy. They certainly wish to participate and participate very generously in the opening to the Chinese and to the use of the world of the almost untouched and perhaps unrivalled resources of China.'

Here, therefore, a halt had at last been called to the increasing foreign financial domination of China. The outbreak of the War of 1914-18 and the collapse of the Russian Empire for all practical purposes ended the monopoly, but some years had yet to elapse before a Chinese Government would be in a position to ask for loans on terms materially different from those which prevailed in the second half of the nineteenth century. Meanwhile, in 1920, the United States secured the establishment of a new Four Power Consortium, between herself, Great Britain, France, and Japan, with the object of controlling foreign loans to the Chinese Government, whilst not unduly fettering China's efforts to re-establish her international position. This new consortium extended not only to administrative loans, but to many for industrial purposes also.

Loans for industrial purposes, and especially for the construction of railways, have also played an important part in the development of China under foreign control. In return for the loan for the building of the railway, foreign interests would secure an agreement which, amongst other things, would permit them to control the manner of construction of the railway, and would give them a monopoly of the purchase of materials and rolling stock. Further, they would control the actual operation of the railroads until the debt had been repaid. Had China's reorganisation been a comparatively peaceful transition, the earlier and more onerous loans would now have been repaid, for the potential profits of railway development are considerable. Instead, not only has the principal not been repaid, but in many cases there has been default on interest payments also, so that the burden has become much greater than was originally anticipated. Consequently, in recent years, China has approached the problem of railway

development with very much greater caution, and has refused to sign contracts hypothecating her railways for many years ahead.

The railway agreements did not stand alone, however. There were also agreements relating to telegraph, telephone, cable, and wireless services, very similar in nature, and having the general effect of placing the overwhelmingly greater part of China's internal communications under foreign control for an indefinite space of time. Added to this, foreigners enjoyed extensive rights of trade along the great inland waterways of China—a right which in most countries is either reserved exclusively for nationals of that country or else is granted to foreigners only under the most stringent restrictions. Further, after the Boxer Rebellion in 1901, the treaty Powers obtained the right to station permanently in China at certain strategic points bodies of troops for the protection of their nationals. Moreover, even before Japanese intentions towards China became apparent in 1931, Japan had gone far beyond her treaty rights, and was retaining in China extensive garrisons and police establishments—to such an extent that it was impossible to resist the inference that she regarded China as possessing semi-colonial status only. ¶

CHAPTER IV

HALF A CENTURY OF HUMILIATION

It has been said that China was defeated in the first Anglo-Chinese War, without her immense resources of man power and the undoubted bravery of the Manchu troops ever being put fully to the test. Consciousness of this made the Chinese extremely reluctant to admit the consequences of the war, or to recognise the necessity for an entirely altered demeanour towards the foreign Powers. This inability to perceive the dimensions of the problem with which she was faced was in no small degree responsible for the successive humiliations which China was called upon to undergo, and which brought her, by the end of the nineteenth century, to the verge of dismemberment. Her hitherto complete, self-sufficient, and static civilisation, which had been for so long the predominant and almost the sole cultural force in Eastern Asia, was now brought face to face with a younger, more virile, and incomparably more aggressive civilisation, before which it faltered, and eventually collapsed completely. Chinese civilisation, in fact, for all its great traditions and past achievements, was as out-of-date as the tactics and equipment of the Manchu armies which

bravely, but quite ineffectively, sought to repel the compact but disciplined forces of the advancing foreigners. Yet so strong a hold did Chinese tradition, and the assumption of intellectual superiority, have upon the Imperial administration, that a change of attitude was delayed until it seemed utterly impossible for the Chinese to extricate themselves from the morass into which they had fallen.

In fighting the first Anglo-Chinese War, Great Britain had declared that she sought no exclusive privileges, and that she was fighting the battle of the foreign traders as a whole. This was understood both by the foreign merchants and by the Chinese, who freely conceded to other nations who asked for treaties rights which they would have contemptuously refused before the war. The treaties had many elements in common, and since the inclusion of the 'most-favoured-nation clause' became the general rule, what was gained by one Power was automatically available for all. This was unquestionably due to the fear of further displays of force, but in their day-to-day dealings with the foreigners the Chinese displayed the same arrogance and procrastination as they had done before the war, in spite of the warnings of one or two far-sighted officials, the majority of whom were Manchus with greater knowledge of the foreigners than their fellows. These, however, were in the long run sacrificed to the overwhelming anti-foreign clamour, which was thus responsible for a number of anti-foreign outrages, which occurred at the treaty ports, and especially at Canton, in the early years after the war. Successive warnings from foreign Powers, and in particular from Great Britain, were rejected, whilst the Imperial Government emphatically declined to admit foreign diplomatic representatives to Peking, where a number of the difficulties might have been capable of adjustment.

The early treaties were due for revision in 1854, but it was apparent some years previously that the Chinese were in no mood to grant even redress of existing grievances, altogether apart from further concessions to foreign trade. The Crimean War prevented Great Britain and France from taking any effective action until 1856, when the murder of a French missionary, Chapdelaine, in peculiarly brutal circumstances, coupled with the illegal seizure of the British-registered *lorcha Arrow* at Canton, were responsible for a joint expedition being despatched. Once again decisive successes were gained with very small forces, and this time Canton was captured and occupied by an Anglo-French expedition, the fanatically anti-foreign viceroy and High Commissioner, Teh, whose ineptitude and arrogance had done much to provoke the war, being taken prisoner and exiled to Calcutta. Further allied expeditions advanced up the Yangtse, and reduced the Taku forts, thus opening the road to Tientsin. Faced with so direct a threat,

the Imperial Government sued for peace, and negotiations were opened at Tientsin. They were marked by an extremely significant episode. One of the first Chinese statesmen to appreciate the changed international position of China, and the necessity for reaching a genuine understanding with the foreigners, was Kiyong, an Imperial clansman, who had negotiated the Treaty of Nanking. After some years of wise and conciliatory rule as viceroy at Canton he was removed and disgraced. At a difficult point in the negotiations at Tientsin in 1858, however, he reappeared, claiming that he had been appointed an Imperial plenipotentiary. Whether this was in fact the case, or whether his intervention was a voluntary effort to secure better terms for China, is not clear, but he was not received by the foreign representatives. Instead, the aged statesman was conducted into the presence of the two Chinese plenipotentiaries, who themselves were being subjected to remorseless pressure by the British ambassador, his secretary, Mr. Bruce, and the leading interpreter, Mr. Lay. The latter, it has already been mentioned, was an able young man not distinguished for tact, and the Russian ambassador had already privately remonstrated with his British colleague on Mr. Lay's insulting attitude to the two distinguished Chinese representatives—albeit this intervention was not entirely altruistic. On this occasion Kiyong found himself in the presence not only of his fellow-officials but of the assertive Mr. Lay, who abruptly produced a memorial written by Kiyong himself at the end of 1850, and couched in bitter anti-foreign terms. This violation of all diplomatic usage left the white-haired old statesman completely speechless, and he hastily withdrew, not only from the conference, but from Tientsin. Kiyong's intervention was not only futile, but it completed his own ruin. On the ground that he had left his post without authority, he was disgraced a second time and ordered to commit suicide.

The negotiations were a revelation to the Chinese of their political impotence, for the demands of the English and French plenipotentiaries were backed up by the broadest hints of renewed hostilities, and one by one every foreign demand was conceded. Nor was this all. American and Russian envoys, though careful to dissociate themselves from the hostile operations of the English and the French, were nevertheless abundantly willing to profit to the full from China's helplessness. Accordingly, new treaties were signed, not only with Great Britain and France, but also with Russia and the United States. Whatever might be the particular rivalries of the Powers in other spheres, there was a common front where pressure on China was concerned.

One of the main points in issue between the Chinese and the foreigners had been the demand of the latter to maintain permanent

diplomatic establishments at Peking. It was urged by the Chinese plenipotentiaries that in the present state of the Imperial Government, little good could be achieved by the establishment of permanent embassies, which would be regarded with hostility by the Chinese officials. On this point, therefore, the allied representatives compromised, by agreeing that envoys should be sent only from time to time. However, the rapid deterioration in Chinese goodwill following the conclusion of the Treaties of Tientsin led the British to require the Chinese to receive an envoy forthwith. This was refused, and hostilities broke out afresh, only to conclude in 1860 with the occupation of Peking, and the looting and burning of the Imperial palaces at Yuenmingyuen, treasure-houses of works of art, compared with which the finest pieces of European museums are of small account. In less than twenty years a civilisation with an unbroken tradition of thirty centuries had been shaken to its foundations, and the feelings of the cultured Chinese on surveying the ruins of the Imperial palaces must have had much in common with those of the cultured European on seeing the destruction wrought by indiscriminate bombing during the present war—except that the Chinese might have some reason to suppose that his own share of responsibility for the devastation was small. After all, he asked for no more than to be left alone in a universe which afforded him satisfaction, however effete it might appear to the predatory foreigner.

From now onward the foreigners were no longer negotiating, even nominally, on a basis of equality. China had been opened by force, and her fundamental weaknesses had been fully exposed. In threatening further action there was henceforth little risk, and the certainty of great profit. As the foreigner's demands became more comprehensive, so did his interference in China's internal affairs to secure their complete observance. If an official showed marked anti-foreign bias, then a demand for his removal must be complied with. If there was an anti-foreign outrage, there were indemnities and further concessions. Against this advancing tide patriotic Chinese statesmen struggled in vain, whilst the ordinary official took refuge in a realm of make-believe, remote from the dreary facts of daily existence in a disintegrating Empire.

Military weakness and administrative inefficiency were not exclusively responsible for China's helplessness, however. The Manchu Dynasty itself was threatened from within by a series of rebellions, which culminated eventually in that of the Taipings. For the greater part of the second half of the eighteenth century China had been governed by Kienlung, an Emperor of exceptional ability. After his abdication in 1796, the control of the central government over the outlying provinces weakened, and some of

the stronger secret societies, with which Imperial China was honeycombed, ventured to rebel. The weakness and corruption of the Imperial officials during the reign of Kiaking, Kienlung's son and successor, prevented any effective steps from being taken to stamp out this internal menace, and although his successor, Taokwang, made some genuine efforts to restore order, they were ineffective. On his death, in 1850, he was succeeded by Hsien Feng, another weak and ineffective Emperor, during whose reign civil disorder threatened the integrity of the Empire itself. In the period from 1820 to 1850 there had been serious revolts in provinces so greatly separated as Shansi, Kwangsi, Formosa, Szechuan, and Hunan, some of them of such formidable proportions that the rebels had defeated large Imperial forces. No common purpose united these successive outbreaks, although a number of them were nominally directed against the Manchu Dynasty; but they all expressed a steadily growing feeling of discontent against existing conditions, quite unconnected with foreign penetration, which at this period was unknown in nearly all the provinces where the revolts had occurred.

Out of the welter of local uprisings and raids of marauding bandits, which afflicted the provinces of Kwangsi, Hunan, and Kwangtung without intermission from 1830 onwards, there eventually emerged, round about 1850, the widespread insurrection of the Taipings, led by two brothers, Hung Siu-tsuen and Hung Ta-tsuen. The former had been an unsuccessful candidate for the official examinations, and was thus one of the vaguely discontented class of young *literati*, with which China abounded. He was undoubtedly a person of more than average ability, with something of the mystic about him. At the time when he was an aspirant for office he came in contact with some American missionaries, and, though never formally baptized, he accepted the basic principles of Christianity, although as success extended the range of his ambitions, his religion assumed an increasingly peculiar appearance until he claimed a place in the Divine Trinity as the 'Heavenly Younger Brother.' On first raising the banner of revolt in Kwangsi in 1849, however, Hung (or Tien Wang, as he was commonly called) communicated a good deal of his own enthusiasm to his earliest followers and, what is more, exacted a degree of obedience and discipline from his armies which was unusual at that time, even among the Imperial forces.

During 1849 and 1850 Tien Wang overran Kwangsi and parts of Kwangtung, defeating successive provincial and Imperial forces which were hastily summoned to oppose him. During 1851 and 1852 he stormed many of the chief cities of the interior provinces south of the Yangtse, until, at the beginning of 1853, he conducted a victorious campaign along that waterway, capturing in quick

succession Hanyang, Wuchang, Kiukiang, Wuhu, Taiping, and finally Nanking, where the entire Manchu garrison and their families were massacred. By the end of March of the same year Chinkiang, Yangchow, and Kwachow had fallen, and from this point, being astride the Grand Canal, he turned northwards towards the capital. During the remainder of 1853 the Taiping advance continued, one city after another falling to them amidst scenes of indescribable savagery, but Tien Wang seemed reluctant to attack Peking itself, preferring instead to ravage Shansi and Chihli, where the Imperial forces at last succeeded in inflicting some reverses upon him. The Taipings therefore turned southward again, and for the following six years firmly established themselves along the Yangtse. Here some kind of regular administration was established, and a system of laws, based remotely upon the laws of the Old Testament, was promulgated. In several respects, the Taipings were the first to spread Western influences in China, especially their curious form of Christianity, which led them to destroy temples of all kinds, and with them the treasures of many centuries. Their military organisation was very complete, and at one time their armies exceeded a million, many of them women, who were organised into separate regiments. Discipline was at first strict, opium, tobacco, and wine being completely forbidden. After some years of success, however, organisation deteriorated and licence spread.

Tien Wang had been converted to Christianity by a sturdy American Protestant missionary, the Rev. Isaac J. Roberts. In 1861 he was induced to visit Nanking, where the Taiping leader surrounded himself with such state that the missionary was not even admitted to his presence. In his report on the conditions in the rebel capital at the time of his visit he records:

‘I. As to the religious opinions of Tien Wang, which he propagates with great zeal, I believe them in the main abominable in the sight of God. In fact, I believe he is crazy, especially in religious matters, nor do I believe him soundly rational about anything. . . . He calls his son the young saviour of the world, and himself the real brother of Jesus Christ. As to the Holy Spirit, he seems to have left him out of his system of the Trinity, and to understand very little of his work in the conversion of men.

‘Their political system is about as poor as theology. I do not believe they have any organised government, nor do they know enough about Government to make one, in my opinion. The whole affair seems to consist in martial law, and that, too, runs very much in the line of killing men, from the highest to the lowest, by all in authority. I became perfectly disgusted by the sights of slaughter. On the way from Soo-chow to Nanking in 1860 I saw

from fifteen to twenty dead men on the way by the roadside, some of whom had just been murdered, not by their enemies, but from among their own people. . . .

'Then they still disgusted me further by setting traps to catch men and slay them. One was a proclamation that short-haired men should not come into the city. Ere they were aware, from fourteen to eighteen were caught in this trap and slain; perhaps some of them had never heard of the proclamation! . . . And to cap the climax, the other day two of the writers in the rooms below where I stay, when writing documents to Tien Wang, made a mistake of one character each; and they were both condemned by Tien Wang himself to be murdered, without even a hearing, and in three days were beheaded! This proves to my mind that he is crazy; nor can I believe that any good will arise out of the rule of such a wicked despot.

'He wanted me to come here, but it was not to preach the Gospel of Jesus Christ and convert men and women to God, but to take office, and preach his dogmas, and convert foreigners to himself. I would as lief convert them to Mormonism, or any other ism which I believe unscriptural, and, so far, from the devil.'

From 1853 to 1864 the Imperial forces conducted a desultory siege of the Taipings in Nanking, but there were clearly understood limitations on both sides, illustrating the utter inefficiency of the Imperial administration at this time. An experienced observer commented on it early in 1861:

'The siege of Nanking was certainly kept up in a strange manner. An outlet through which the Chang-maos (long-haired rebels) might have ingress and egress without much difficulty was kept open towards the south. Along this line a kind of fair was held. The Government stores of rice, etc., were here sold to the insurgents at high prices. By this passage, too, came the deserters anxious to become good men, but many more entered by it into the city anxious to become bad. Here it was that the braves of the Tien Wang gambled with the soldiers of Chang Kwo-liang, and exchanged their spoils of silver for arms, powder, opium, and women. Sometimes the general would push his authority, and several rebels would be taken and immediately executed, but these were generally such as had excited the hatred of their besiegers by cheating at play, or refusing to pay for favours received. The rebels always retaliated, so the loss was the same on both sides. Suddenly (in May 1860) a sortie was made from Nanking. The works were stormed and taken. Consternation seized the Imperialist commanders, who fled before the coming storm. Seventy thousand of the Emperor's soldiers are reported immediately to

have joined the rebels. Opposition melted away like a cloud. Like a flood the victorious insurgents rushed down the valley of the Grand Canal, and cities surrendered at the very sight of them.'

The root of the difficulty in dealing with the Taipings was their extreme mobility. Cities were taken by assault, and their wealth plundered, but an effort was made to hold only very few of them, unless the conditions were overwhelmingly favourable. The dislocation in national organisation was therefore tremendous. Thus, Wuchang was taken and retaken no less than six times between 1853 and 1856, and as often as the rebels were driven out of one province they reappeared in another. Moreover, the Imperial administration was reduced to such a condition of panic that general after general, whether competent or incompetent, was degraded for failure to suppress the revolt. Even the desperate expedient of summoning to their aid Seng Ko lin tsin, the Mongolian Prince of Korsin, with his marauding horsemen, though it checked the Taiping advance, failed decisively to defeat the rebels.

The problems of the Chinese Government were increased by two additional circumstances. The Taiping Rebellion was not the only internal difficulty with which it had to contend. Other adventurers, profiting by manifest weakness of the Empire, established themselves in control of widely scattered areas, defying whatever local levies could be assembled against them, whilst the chaotic conditions and increased taxation which the Rebellion had caused, induced even the long-suffering Chinese people to resist, more especially in the Southern provinces. The second circumstance was the interest of the foreign Powers in the progress of the revolt. These were already exasperated by the inability of the Imperial officials to recognise that the conditions of intercourse had entirely changed in a couple of decades, whilst at first the influence of the missionaries was exclusively on the side of the rebels. Inasmuch, therefore, as it was represented in England and America that the Taiping Rebellion was securing millions of Chinese converts to Christianity, and that its ultimate aim was to expel the intractable Manchu Government, and replace it by a Chinese dynasty and administration, those two Powers, and to a lesser degree France, were at first inclined to give their covert support to the rebels. As a result of closer enquiry, however, they became less certain of the lofty character of the movement, and a strict neutrality was maintained until the later stages of the revolt when, a settlement having been reached between the foreign Powers and Peking, foreign influence and a limited degree of foreign help were thrown into the scale against the rebels.

It was not until July 1864 that the power of the Taipings was

broken by the recapture of Nanking by the Imperial troops, and the execution of their principal generals. Even then, this had become possible only through the organising ability of Tseng Kuo-fan, Viceroy of Liang Kiang and Imperial High Commissioner, who had raised and equipped new and better-disciplined armies, with the assistance of a small body of foreigners, one of whom was Gordon, who was appointed to command a body of 5000 troops which became known, from its record, as 'the Ever-Victorious Army.'

For fifteen years the Chinese Government had struggled to suppress a rebellion which had made the most serious inroads upon the social fabric of the Empire since the Manchu conquest or even earlier. During its progress more than six hundred cities and towns had been destroyed, and the loss in life and material wealth had been incalculable. Its progress had shaken confidence in the administration, had exhibited the decadence and corruption of the Manchus, and had crippled China at the time when foreign pressure on her was threatening her security. Had the Rebellion resulted in a determination to reform the entire Imperial system it would have served some useful purpose, but once the threat was removed, the complacency of the central government returned. Nothing had been learned—not even the insecurity of the regime—and once again the foreigners found that the Chinese Government had signed a collection of treaties which it had no real intention of executing. Once again, therefore, it was necessary to exert pressure, but this time there was an important difference. Foreign envoys were established in the capital itself, and the perils of procrastination were therefore considerably increased.

One of the most serious weaknesses of the Chinese system of this period was its resistance to change of any kind. That the Taiping rebels had at long last been destroyed was in large measure due to the ability and energy of Tseng Kuo-fan, who thereafter, until his death in 1872, occupied a unique position in Chinese official life. Tseng undoubtedly had a sound view of the difficulties with which China was faced, and he sought to establish among the Chinese officials with whom he came in contact a similar point of view. Amongst those whom he raised to high office were Tso Tsung-tang, Li Hung-Chang, Lin K'un-i, Pêng Yü-lin, and several others, all of whom played an important and enlightened part in the affairs of China in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Unfortunately, their efforts failed to make any appreciable impression upon the system, although individually each was responsible for a number of reforms. It was the same in other fields of public life. The Chinese Maritime Customs Service failed to convince Peking that a reform of civil administration was inevitable; and even the Taiping Rebellion failed to bring home

o the Chinese the necessity for the most sweeping changes in military organisation. In the seventies, arsenals were built at Foochow, Canton, and several other cities, and as early as 1863 a flotilla of eight gunboats was purchased from England, with English instructors to train the Chinese; but the impulse to establish a modern navy disappeared, the gunboats were never used against the Taipings, and eventually they were sold as scrap. In a similar fashion, in the period 1860-75, there were many projects for a national system of railways, but the matter was eventually left entirely to the initiative of foreigners, even after the great famine in Shansi in 1878, in which between ten and thirteen million persons perished, had demonstrated the necessity of a modern system of communications. Little by little the more enlightened Chinese officials began to appreciate that unless there was a fundamental change, China was doomed. Characteristic of this was the last memorial to the throne of Tso Tsung-tang, written immediately before his death in 1885. In it he pointed out the necessity for immediate and comprehensive reforms, to include the construction of railways, the establishment of a modern navy, mining and manufacturing enterprises, a modern system of finance, and the despatch of Chinese students abroad for purposes of the study of foreign institutions. As yet, however, the predominant party at Peking saw no need for such changes, and the memorial was ignored, except in so far as it dealt with the navy and coast defence. Here a number of steps were taken for the construction of modern fortifications, and a squadron of ironclads was bought in Europe.

In the sphere of foreign affairs, however, China's path continued to be one of humiliation. Annam, Tonquin, Burma, and Siam were at this period still nominally tributary states, although China made no effort to interfere in their internal affairs. Even the tribute-bearing embassies had formal functions only, for the envoys were accustomed to return with presents of far greater value than they had brought. In practice, therefore, China's suzerainty expressed itself simply in cultural influence (each of the states had codes modelled upon the Chinese penal codes, and their literatures were derived from the Chinese classics) and the duty to protect the tributary state in the event of external pressure. In the period 1880-83 the French began to exert pressure upon the Kingdom of Annam, and the Annamese appealed to China for assistance. This was given, and after some initial successes the Chinese troops offered the customary fate when they came into contact with better-equipped and disciplined troops. By the Sino-French treaty of 1885 the Chinese were compelled to renounce all claim on Annam and to pay the usual indemnity. In the following year the Burma Convention between Great Britain and China was

signed, by which Chinese suzerainty over Burma was renounced, to be followed immediately afterwards by the British annexation of Burma. Already, some years before, the Japanese had seized the Loochoo Islands, and had unsuccessfully sought to expel the Chinese from Formosa. This period, therefore, saw China lose nearly the whole of her surrounding tributary states. If Korea remained for the moment, it was simply that Japan was steadily gathering her strength for the struggle which she realised could not be long delayed. When war between China and Japan over Korea broke out in 1894, the world was astonished at the rapid strides which this Asiatic Power had made in no more than quarter of a century.

CHAPTER V

THE COLLAPSE OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE

THE Taiping Rebellion was defeated by the efforts of a few public-spirited Chinese officials, led by Tseng Kuo-fan, by the decision of the foreign Powers to support the Manchu Dynasty in preference to the rebels, but most of all by the rapacity and incompetence of the Taiping leaders themselves. Amongst them were to be found several with a high degree of military ability. Had there been one with political insight, and the capacity to organise, the Manchu Dynasty would have been driven out in the years immediately following the fall of Nanking. As yet, however, few if any Chinese, whether official or rebel, had any appreciation of the real significance of the foreign inroads, and neither made any genuine effort to enlist foreign support, or to understand the foreign point of view. Early foreign sympathy with the Taipings—the result of missionary advocacy—was entirely neutralised by subsequent anxiety for the foreign trade. Similarly, the Taipings had nothing whatever to contribute to the task of politically regenerating the Empire. They merely wished to secure control of the creaking and unwieldy administrative machine for their own enrichment. Whilst fear of the Taipings was the dominating sentiment in Peking, it was possible for Marquis Tseng and his colleagues to initiate some reforms. During this brief spell of activity the first railways were built, and telegraph services were established. Once the danger had been removed, however, the Imperial officials were prepared to resume the time-honoured game of make-believe, until fresh friction with the foreigner compelled them to make further concessions, the effects of which were carefully concealed

from all except those directly implicated. Nevertheless, to an increasing number of thoughtful Chinese, it was apparent that a civilisation was disintegrating before a cruder but more efficient competitor, and that before long, if policy continued to drift, even the national independence of China would no longer nominally survive.

The lesson was more widely appreciated at the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894. Humiliation at the hands of the Western Powers had by this time come to be accepted almost as a routine matter, and inasmuch as the astute officials had realised that in the interplay of Western rivalries the Manchu Dynasty would for the present be permitted to survive, fresh foreign demands no longer aroused undue anxiety. This was true even when the tributary states were lost, since the link with them was essentially cultural, and not political. Defeat by a neighbouring Oriental Power was an indication that China's primacy, even in the Far East, had ended, and that her territorial integrity now faced a more menacing threat than that offered by any Western Power, with the exception of Russia. The defeat was regarded as a national humiliation in which every Chinese participated, for it had been suffered at the hands of a race whom the Chinese traditionally despised, and who had borrowed much of their culture from the Chinese. Moreover, it involved the loss of China's suzerainty over her last tributary state, Korea—the only state within the Chinese orbit in which China's political influence had been a real thing.

For many centuries Korea had accepted the status of a Chinese vassal. At some periods overlordship had been nominal; at others it had approximated to genuine control. In the sixteenth century Japan, in an expansionist mood under its energetic dictator, Hideyoshi, had overrun Korea and penetrated into Manchuria, but on his death in 1598 the Japanese withdrew, and thereafter Chinese suzerainty was unchallenged for four centuries until, after the Imperial Restoration in 1868, Japan began to regret her abandonment of the peninsula, and suggested to the Korean Regent that the kingdom should recognise afresh the Japanese overlordship which had existed at the end of the sixteenth century. The Koreans proved entirely unresponsive. Equally, they resisted the efforts of Western Powers to open commercial and diplomatic intercourse with them. However, in 1876, after the Koreans had fired on a Japanese gunboat, the Japanese, by a display of force, obtained trading privileges, and following the Japanese example, other foreign Powers obtained similar concessions between 1882 and 1886. During this period the international status of Korea was insecure. The Chinese asserted suzerainty, but disclaimed all responsibility for the acts of the Korean Government. The foreign

Powers in general elected to regard Korea as an independent state, but went to considerable lengths to avoid formal denial of the Chinese claim to overlordship. In actual fact, the policy of the Chinese resident at Seoul was at this period paramount.

In 1882, and again in 1884, riots in the Korean capital, originating in domestic intrigues, in both cases culminated in attacks on Japanese citizens and legation guards, with Chinese complicity. Japan was not yet strong enough to go to war, however, and agreed to sign the Convention of Tientsin in the following year, the most important provision being that both China and Japan agreed to withdraw all troops from Korea. This was an obvious Japanese gain, since it was at this period directly in the interest of Japan to emphasise Korea's independent status. The Koreans, for their part, in the ten years between the Convention of Tientsin and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, flirted in turn with Japan, Russia, and the United States in their effort to turn their nominal independence into a reality. The only result of a good deal of minor intrigue was to arouse the ambitions of both Russia and Japan, and to convince the United States that undue interest in the affairs of Korea was in the highest degree dangerous. American interest in the 'Hermit Kingdom' accordingly evaporated.

To a delicate international situation there was added the growth of a subversive movement, the Tong Hoks, resembling in its doctrines that of the Boxers. By 1894, armed bands of members of this movement were in open revolt, proclaiming that their main objective was the expulsion of the foreigners, and in particular of the Japanese. As the Korean Government failed to take adequate steps to suppress the revolt, China sent troops across the frontier, at the same time assuring Japan and Russia that they would be withdrawn as soon as the rebellion was crushed. Japan replied by despatching a rather larger force, ignoring the Chinese claim that she was intervening as suzerain, and demanding a complete reorganisation of the Korean Government, free from Chinese tutelage. A conciliatory Chinese attitude failed to induce Japan to abate her demands, and war accordingly broke out in July. For this war Japan had prepared steadily for some years, with the result that both on sea and land the Chinese were decisively defeated, and South Manchuria was successfully invaded. The complete incapacity of Chinese commanders to face Oriental armies trained on the European model left the Imperial Government no alternative but to sue for peace. The terms were severe. They included:

- (1) Recognition by China of the complete independence of Korea.
- (2) Cession to Japan of that part of Manchuria which is known as the Liaotung Promontory, with the adjacent islands, as well as Formosa and the Pescadores.

(3) Payment of a war indemnity of 200 million taels in six annual instalments.

(4) The opening of additional Chinese ports to foreign trade.

Having been completely defeated in a brief campaign, China was compelled to accept these terms, and a peace treaty was accordingly signed at Shimonoseki, on 17th April 1895.

In demanding the cession of territory on the Chinese mainland Japan had overreached herself. Russia had for some years been casting covetous eyes upon this same area, whilst France and Germany also felt that the Japanese claim was an unnecessary complication. The three Powers, therefore, sent a joint note to Japan, inviting her to restore Liaotung to China, and this was accordingly done, an additional indemnity of 30 million taels being secured as compensation. Memory of this rebuff had a decisive effect upon Japan's future policy, however.

The Sino-Japanese War created in the minds of the Chinese Government a lively sense of alarm. Her military operations had met with unbroken disaster, partly because of the cowardice and incompetence of her commanders, but more because of obsolete equipment and methods of training. The efforts to build up a modern navy had proved to be entirely unavailing, and coastal fortresses which had taken years to construct had been reduced in a few hours by the armies of a state whom China had hitherto regarded as of little more account than her vassals. In future, it was clear that China could offer no resistance to any modern state. Her only hope was to play off their mutual jealousies; but this was a policy attended by a high degree of risk, and in the long run it could avail her nothing. The plunderers might eventually quarrel over the booty, but they would take good care to reduce it into possession first; and the primary result of the war was that Japan was admitted into the charmed circle of those who would profit from the disintegration of the Chinese Empire. Meanwhile, the existing Chinese administration had been revealed as corrupt, inefficient, and powerless, whilst as yet there was no stirring of any national feeling which gave promise of better things. China's position, indeed, seemed entirely hopeless, and it was obvious, even to the most complacent Chinese official, entirely out of touch with the rest of the world though he might be, that new and more far-reaching concessions to the foreigners were imminent. Abroad, the leading foreign Powers recognised that at any moment they might be faced with complete disintegration, and busied themselves with marking out the areas which they desired to control, and with obtaining a foothold in them.

Germany was the first to profit from China's helplessness. For some years she had been seeking a naval station along the China

coast, and it was not long after the close of the Sino-Japanese War that she secured her opportunity, and with it the reward for her intervention, together with Russia and France, to secure the relinquishment of Liaotung by Japan. In 1897 some German missionaries were murdered in Shantung. Germany promptly landed a battalion of marines, and seized Tsingtau. In the demands which she formulated Germany included, besides the customary articles for financial redress and the dismissal of responsible officials, the cession of a naval station at Tsingtau. The demands were accompanied by much sabre-rattling in Berlin, and the despatch of a squadron from Hamburg. At the farewell banquet to its commander, Prince Henry of Prussia, the Kaiser issued ominous threats. 'May every one in those distant regions be aware,' he declared, 'that the German Michael has firmly planted his shield with the device of the German eagle upon the soil of China, in order once for all to give his protection to all who ask for it. . . . Should anyone essay to detract from our just rights or to injure us, then up and at him with your mailed fist.' The Chinese prevaricated, and sought to invoke the assistance of other Powers, but to no purpose. Tsingtau was leased to Germany for ninety-nine years, and with it railway and mining rights in Shantung.

The next Power to make a forward move was Russia. The Chinese Government had confidently looked to Russia to protect them, first against Japan, and then against Germany, and shortly after the Sino-Japanese War, Li Hung-chang, China's only first-rate statesman, had been sent on a European mission, the main object of which had been to strengthen the ties binding China to Russia. As a neighbouring land Empire, Russia seemed to be close at hand, whilst the aid of the United States and Great Britain appeared to amount to little more than vague promises. It was true that Russia had taken the initiative in securing the return to China of Liaotung, but only because Russia herself had ambitions in this region. When China appealed to Russia against the German demands, however, Russia turned a deaf ear. Although she herself had designs on Shantung she was in no position to oppose Germany so directly. Besides, she was already committed to support of Germany, who had responded to her invitation to intervene against Japan. Within a week of the German occupation of Tsingtau, therefore, Russian warships had arrived at Port Arthur, and the usual lease of that port, with Talienwan and a piece of adjoining land, followed. Japanese indignation was intense, for the full purpose of the three-Power intervention was now apparent. Her determination to control this area, and with it South Manchuria, only stiffened.

The third interventionist Power, France, now claimed her

reward. In February 1898 the French Minister for Foreign Affairs was still protesting that France 'had not the slightest intention of imitating Germany in seizing a naval base in China,' but by April a ninety-nine-year lease of the Bay of Kwangchowwan had been arranged.

The British Government had been greatly disturbed by these successive alienations of bases which were obviously intended to serve as jumping-off points for further penetration of China. Great Britain would have preferred to maintain in China her traditional policy of equal opportunity for all, an attitude which was shared by the United States, whose own foreign trade was rapidly expanding. Both Powers failed to see, however, that their principal rivals were thinking in terms of political domination rather than in terms of commercial expansion. They also failed to see that this was the necessary consequence of their policy in opening the China trade by force. Those Powers who could only compete commercially on unfavourable terms would seek to minimise this disadvantage by marking out areas for exploitation, and the partition of China was inevitable, unless the Chinese entirely changed their outlook, and for the first time since 1842 took control of China's internal development. In the meantime, Great Britain took care not to fall behind in the race for concessions, more particularly since her position in Europe was at this time an isolated one. She secured a lease of 350 square miles of the Chinese mainland opposite Hong Kong, and also a lease of Wei-hai-wei, facing Port Arthur in the Gulf of Pichili, for so long as Port Arthur remained in Russian hands. As always, Russia was the ultimate bugbear, so far as the British Foreign Office was concerned, and Great Britain's isolation in the Far East and elsewhere had enabled Russia to ignore Lord Salisbury's openly voiced anxiety concerning Russian policy.

The grant of these naval bases was by no means the full extent of China's humiliation, however. The Powers provided for the day of final disaster by marking out spheres of influence, which might one day turn into colonies, but within which one Power alone should be active. Thus, Manchuria was marked out as a Russian sphere, the Yangtse Valley as a British sphere, and Yunnan as a French sphere. Within these areas the favoured Power and its nationals alone sought commercial concessions, and the agreements between the foreign Powers themselves were reinforced by agreements with China, whereby China undertook not to surrender any part of the territory within the sphere to any other foreign Power. Moreover, at the principal treaty ports, additional foreign concessions were obtained.

The extension of the general scramble for Chinese bases brought a new-comer upon the scene. In February 1899 Italy demanded

the cession of a naval station on Sanmen Bay, in Chekiang. The attitude of Great Britain, France, and Germany was one of passive approval, but both Japan and Russia were covertly hostile. The Chinese were therefore encouraged to resist, and the demand was not pressed. From this the Chinese Government obtained a shred of comfort, and a little more was forthcoming from the favourable replies of the Powers to a note addressed to them by Mr. Hay, the American Secretary of State, asserting America's concern with the maintenance of the 'open-door' policy in China. If the Chinese imagined that in this fortuitous fashion they had at length put a term to their humiliation, however, they were deceived. In the words of the historian of her international relations in the nineteenth century:—

'In the world's history no country, with so vast an extent of territory and so large a population, under one Government, as China—no country with a tithe of its area or population—had ever been subjected to such a series of humiliations, or to so many proofs of the low esteem in which it was held, as China had been subjected to in the six months from November 1897 to May 1898; and, it may be added, no country had so thoroughly deserved its fate: no country had ever shown itself so incapable of correcting admitted abuses in its administration, or of organising the resources of an exceedingly rich territory, inhabited by a sturdy race with many good qualities. This was felt by some patriotic Chinese; but, though many realised the facts of the situation, there were few who saw a way out; and those few could exercise no influence on the nation until it had been subjected to yet deeper humiliation. Foreign Powers were now contemplating with complacency the impending break-up of China; she was yet to reach a stage of abasement so deep that the foreign Powers would fear her break-up and provide against it.'¹

The immediate consequences of this period of abasement were two. There was a sudden and ill-conceived programme of reforms; and there was an immediate and widespread intensification of anti-foreign feeling.

In the course of her long history China has been faced with many strange situations, but there has rarely been a stranger one than that which existed in the second half of the year 1898. A young and inexperienced Emperor, escaping for a brief spell from the tutelage of one of the great women of the world's history, initiated a headlong series of reforms, without prior consideration, with little real conception of what was needed, and with no backing, either from the Imperial administration or from the

¹ H. B. Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, iii, p. 127.

people as a whole. It was a gallant gesture, but no more, and it involved the Emperor in ruin, without profiting his people appreciably. In order to understand this episode, however, it is first necessary to know something of the Emperor, and of the Empress Dowager, whose personality is written so deeply into the misfortunes of the Empire at this period.

The Emperor Kuang Hsü had ascended the Imperial throne in 1875, at the age of four. In personality the new Emperor, even after reaching man's estate, was weak and ineffective, although given to sudden enthusiasms. Up to this time, however, he had exercised no appreciable influence upon public affairs. In the early years of his reign the control of the Empire had been in the hands of the widows of two former Emperors, Tz'u Hsi and Tz'u An. The latter was the widow of the Emperor Hsien Feng, who died in 1862, and the former was the mother of Hsien Feng's successor, T'ung chih. To these two forceful women there would normally have been added in the regency the Empress Chia Shun, the widow of Kuang Hsü's immediate predecessor, T'ung chih (1862-75), but she died within ten weeks of her husband, probably by poisoning, and the joint regency continued, unaffected by the accession of Kuang Hsü, until Tz'u An died in 1881. For the next eight years Tz'u Hsi (generally known to foreigners as 'the Empress Dowager') ruled alone. In 1889, however, Kuang Hsü came of age, and in theory replaced the Regent. In practice, the Empress Dowager remained in control, exactly as she had been before, and behind her was the power of the Imperial clan, now fighting desperately to preserve the Manchu inheritance in the face of growing internal unrest and increasing foreign aggression.

For the educated Chinese with any appreciation at all of China's international position, the Sino-Japanese War was the writing on the wall, and innumerable Reform Societies, some of them including high Imperial officials, came into existence. From 1895 there were many memorials to the throne, and there was for the first time a widespread recognition of the fact that radical changes would have to be undertaken before China could expect to stem the cataract of disaster which was threatening to destroy her. The movement was most active in the treaty ports, and especially in Kwangtung, where the virile and intelligent Cantonese came most frequently in contact with the foreigner, and from which province, in the nineteenth century, there had gone out a constant stream of emigrants to the Straits Settlements, to the Dutch East Indies, to Australia, and to California. From this province, too, there came the two most important leaders of the reform movement, Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Kang Yu-wei. In outlook and methods Dr. Sun was a revolutionary. Born in 1867, he was educated at

missionary schools, and later at the Hong Kong College of Medicine. Shortly after starting to practise in 1892 he became closely associated with the chief revolutionary movements in Kwangtung, and after various attempts to organise insurrection he was compelled to take refuge first in America and then in England. It was whilst he was in London, in October 1896, that he was kidnapped and imprisoned in the Chinese Legation, and was only released on the personal intervention of Lord Salisbury, at the instance of Dr. James Cantlie, Dr. Sun's former medical teacher in Hong Kong. Thereafter he travelled unceasingly in Europe, America, and Asia, organising revolutionary movements, with agents of the Imperial Government determined on his destruction never far behind him. At this period, Dr. Sun had a lively enthusiasm for the political structure of Great Britain and the United States, and he desired to overthrow the Manchus for the purpose of establishing a democratic republic, based on adult suffrage. The process of transition was to prove longer and far more difficult than Dr. Sun imagined, however, and when a unified Republic was at last achieved, the great revolutionary was no longer there to see the fruits of his life-long struggle.

In contrast with Sun Yat-sen, Kang Yu-wei advocated the path of constitutional reform, seeking to bring about in China a change similar to that which had recently proved so strikingly successful in Japan. For a time it seemed that this path would be the more hopeful one. All the younger officials were at long last ready for change—were, in fact, eagerly demanding it, although in many cases with no clear idea of what kind of change was needed. Into this excited atmosphere the Emperor himself now ventured. Through the Imperial Grand Tutor, Weng Tung-ho, Kang Yu-wei was introduced to Kuang Hsü, and the young Emperor, who had already made use of every available means of extending his knowledge of foreign countries, read with enthusiasm the reformer's two chief works, the one dealing with the Westernisation of Russia in the time of Peter the Great, and the other with the more recent changes in Japan. Without delay, even for the preparation of a complete programme, the Emperor placed himself at the head of the constitutional reformers and proceeded to initiate a revolution by a succession of edicts.

Amongst those who most vigorously supported the Emperor in his policy was Chang Chih-tung, at this time Viceroy of Wuchang. For many years Chang had been closely associated with various reform movements. Now, on the very eve of far-reaching changes, he published a volume, written in faultless classical Chinese, entitled *Learn*, of which more than a million copies were bought within a few months, and which served as an inspiration for the

efforts of the reformers. So impressed was the Emperor with it that he issued an Imperial rescript, enjoining that all the higher officials of the Empire should read it and draw inspiration from it. Though parts of this essay show insufficient knowledge of Western affairs and the Western outlook, there are others showing remarkable insight, and scattered through the book are passages of great acuteness. In one of them the author points out that the countries of Europe 'were opened up at a late period in history, fresh and vigorous. Surrounded by strong neighbours, they were always in circumstances of desperate competition, stripped for a fight and ever striving to escape destruction. Continual apprehension produced determination, and determination begat strength. Of all countries China alone has for these fifty years proved herself almost irreclaimably stupid and not awake. Many of the officials and people are proud and indolent. They contentedly rest in the belief that the old order of things will suffice for these dangerous times, and in the end become the easy prey of outsiders. But China is not lacking in men who have begun to arouse themselves for their country's deliverance. How different are these patriots from that class who are blinded to the situation, and, regardless of the welfare of the country, hold that if China is partitioned by foreigners it will not affect their wealth and position. And so they take advantage of the crisis to fill their own pockets, in order to form partnerships with foreigners when the crash comes, be "Western merchants" themselves, or be naturalised abroad. These disgruntled people go so far as to assert in a vicious manner that China is incapable of action, and that the Holy Religion is effete. They are willing to cast off their own friends and associates, to affiliate with foreigners and adopt foreign ways. They rest in the hope that China will change in some manner, and that they will be protected by aliens. Good patriots consider such men rebellious. Intelligent men regard them as fools.'

Evidently China at the end of the nineteenth century exhibited many of the features apparent in Western Europe during the second World War. Nevertheless, it will be plain that Chang's essay reflects an entirely new patriotism, born of China's imminent danger, and that he advocated nothing less than a cultural revolution. The Imperial administration must be retained, but the entire country must be transformed. There must be modern universities, a modern army and navy, mining, railway, shipping and banking companies, and other necessary instruments of Westernisation, but the mainspring of the whole movement must be the scholars, and they will have to anticipate opposition from three classes—the conservatives, who are stuck in the mud of antiquity, the slow bellies of Chinese officialdom, who in case of

reform would be compelled to bestir themselves, and lastly, the hypercritical, who criticise everything, for every conceivable reason. In one of the concluding chapters he says trenchantly: 'China is really not in the comity of nations, and it is useless to prate about International Law. Disarmament is an international joke, and International Law a deception. There is nothing for it but to seek help in ourselves.'

If the reform decrees of the Emperor are scrutinised, it will be found that they have the object of securing the kind of state to which both Chang Chih-tung and Kang Yu-wei looked. The construction of railways was to be hurried forward, agricultural, medical and other schools and universities were to be founded, the army was to be reorganised and trained on Western lines, new ministries for the new activities were established, and a beginning was made in the huge task of reorganising the administrative system.

The first reform decree was published on 20th June 1898, and the last on 16th September of the same year. From first to last, therefore, there were exactly a hundred days of reform. Political disturbances of the last half-century have made us familiar with reforms sponsored from above, intended to take the sting out of unrest, without probing too deeply into its causes. It was a brave effort to do in the space of a few months what ought to have been achieved progressively from 1880 onwards. It was unsuccessful because neither Kuang Hsü nor his most experienced advisers saw clearly the implications of the changes they introduced. They failed to see that the change over to a Western outlook necessarily implied that the foundations of China's political fabric would have to be laid afresh. They also failed to educate a sufficiently large body of public opinion in support of the reforms; a task which would have been possible had they been spread over a larger period of time. Finally they failed because they inadvisedly aroused the bitter enmity of the Empress Dowager and her entourage.

The Empress Dowager and the Court party had been by no means hostile to the early reforms. In the period prior to the war with Japan, she had directed Chinese affairs with considerable skill, and it was only when impatience with the existing state of affairs expressed itself in the form of resentment against the dynasty that she began to rely increasingly upon more reactionary advisers. When, however, it became evident that the reforms would progressively threaten a wide class of officials whose utility was no longer apparent, and in particular the hereditary privileges of the Manchus, these gradually rallied to the Court of the Empress. The success or failure of the reform movement depended ultimately upon control of the army, and the army was commanded by Junglu, a strong partisan of the Empress, but this advantage was

to a considerable extent neutralised by the fact that one of his principal lieutenants, commanding the only foreign-trained division in the Empire, was Yüan Shih-kai, who was regarded as a reformer and an adherent of the Emperor. By September a clash between the two parties was imminent, and Yüan Shih-kai was given a special commission to reorganise the army. He was also privately instructed to decapitate Junglu, arrest the Empress, and to secure control of Peking.

Had the plan succeeded, the reformers would have controlled the nation, but on this occasion, as thirteen years later, Yüan Shih-kai betrayed the Empire, and warned Junglu of the danger in which he stood. A council of the Empress Dowager's supporters was hurriedly called, and immediate action was decided on. The Emperor was taken prisoner, and his life was spared only as a result of the intervention of the foreign envoys. Few of the reformers survived the triumph of the Court party, although Kang Yu-wei was able to escape to Hong Kong, avoiding assassination only through the intervention of the British Government. On 22nd September the Empress Dowager resumed the regency, and reaction was everywhere triumphant. Next to the Empress Dowager herself, Junglu was all-powerful, and kinsmen of the Empress Dowager occupied the chief positions in the state; whilst all the officials whose posts had been abolished in the hundred days of reform were restored to office. Even the military reforms were abandoned, and Manchu regiments resumed the centuries-old system of training in horse and foot archery, weight-throwing, and the brandishing of swords.

If the Court party were now all-powerful, it could not be asserted that China was peaceful. The reform movement had been destroyed, and its leaders were either dead or in exile, but in every province there was discontent and spasmodic insurrection. The causes of discontent were varied. In some provinces it was directed against the dynasty, and this was especially the case in Kwangtung, where the reform movement had been strongest. In others it was due to starvation, or was directed against the extortions of unpopular officials. In a number of provinces, however, hatred was directed against the foreigners, and more particularly against the missionaries and their converts. In the prevailing temper of the Chinese Government it is not surprising that in many districts local officials were by no means zealous in suppressing such outbursts. This was particularly the case in Shantung, where the Germans had just established themselves, and where the viceroy, Yü hsien, was openly accused of favouring anti-foreign outbreaks. When the legations demanded that energetic measures should be taken to suppress disorder, the

Peking officials returned evasive answers; and when at length, as a result of foreign insistence, Yü hsien was recalled, he was rewarded with honours—a circumstance which boded ill for the safety of the foreigners.

In place of Yü hsien there had been appointed as Governor of Shantung Yüan Shih-kai, and it was hoped by the foreigners that under his rule conditions would improve. As a pupil of Li Hung-chang, Yüan was progressive in outlook, possessed extensive knowledge of foreign affairs, and was by no means unfavourably disposed to the foreigners. It quickly appeared, however, that the new governor was either unwilling, or unable, to run counter to the prevailing sentiment at Court, and the situation remained ominous. In other provinces, and especially in Chihli and in Shansi, it was very much worse. Attacks upon Chinese Christians occurred almost daily, Chinese government troops deserted to the Boxers and the desertions were connived at by Imperial officials, whilst the Court continued to stamp out the last remnants of the reform movement, and to toy with schemes for the expulsion of all foreigners from China. In this atmosphere, at the beginning of 1900, the wildest rumours were current, and Chinese who were friendly with foreigners were unanimous in advising them to leave the country.

By the end of May almost the whole of North China was in ferment. The railway from Peking to Tientsin and Paotingpe had been destroyed, and the foreign legations in Peking were temporarily cut off from the outside world in a city which became more menacing hour by hour. At this stage the legations appealed to the foreign naval forces at Tientsin for help, and a mixed force, numbering about four hundred, comprising American, British, French, Italian, Japanese, Russian, and German marines was despatched to Peking. It was this little force which, with the legation staffs and a number of other foreign residents in Peking, defended the legations against repeated attacks from the beginning of June until an allied relief force of 20,000 men forced an entrance into Peking on 15th August. During that period foreigners and Chinese converts north of the Yangtse had been mercilessly massacred, in a number of cases with the connivance or active assistance of Imperial officials. South of the Yangtse, however, the steadiness of the provincial viceroys had prevented any serious outbreaks, and their conduct, coupled with that of Chang Chih-tung and Liu K'un-i, viceroys of provinces in Central China, and of Yüan Shih-kai in Shantung, undoubtedly saved China from even deeper humiliations than she suffered at this period.

As it was, however, the consequences of this summer of madness were almost fatal to the existence of the Empire. The entire world was astounded by the flagrant attack upon the foreign legations,

whose inviolability is sanctioned by centuries of international intercourse. Moreover, the German ambassador had been murdered, immediately prior to the siege of the legations, whilst on his way to an audience with the Imperial officials. In any circumstances, such conduct would have been worthy of the severest condemnation, but coupled as it was with the massacre of foreigners and Chinese Christians throughout North China, and carried out, as it demonstrably was, with the connivance of the Court and the active assistance of Chinese troops and minor officials, the rebellion seemed to be evidence that the entire administration of China had temporarily taken leave of its senses. In the circumstances in which China then was, this was a course which was perilous in the extreme. With troops of every Power with considerable interests in China quartered in the capital, and with a Court which had fled in panic as the relief force neared Peking and was now wandering aimlessly from province to province, it appeared that partition of the Empire could scarcely be averted.

Had it been possible for the main treaty Powers to agree upon their aims, partition would certainly have taken place, more especially since there was some delay before Li Hung-chang and Prince Ch'ing were appointed to negotiate with them, and some further delay before the foreign Governments were prepared to recognise them. This interval, short though it was, proved to be unexpectedly favourable to the Chinese, for during its continuance Russian ambitions in China became transparently evident. A Russian proposal to the other allied Powers that they should all withdraw now that the legations had been relieved was recognised as an invitation to leave China to Russian domination, and was promptly rejected. It was followed by the occupation of all the important strategical points in South Manchuria by Russian troops. At the other extreme, the United States, having participated in the relief of the legations, now wished to restore the *status quo* as soon as possible, and in the meantime maintained an extremely reserved attitude towards the other treaty Powers. A purely negative attitude was completely useless, however, as events at Tientsin towards the end of 1900 showed. Prior to the Rebellion there had existed British, French, German, and Japanese concessions. An American concession existed in theory, but was united with that of Great Britain. On 6th November, however, the Russians demanded a concession there, and this was rapidly followed by demands for Belgian, Italian, and Austrian concessions, and for extensions of the German, French, and British concessions.

Of the other treaty Powers, France alternately supported Germany and Russia, taking care to exact tangible returns for the price of her support, whilst Japan, with an inherent distrust of

Russia, tended to support British policy, which was obviously opposed to Russia's territorial ambitions. Unfortunately, British policy was by no means so strong as it might have been, since the South African War was absorbing a good deal of British energy. Moreover, the South African War had temporarily placed Great Britain in an isolated position in Europe, and relations even with the United States were not so cordial as might have been wished. It was therefore plain that Great Britain alone could not take the initiative in opposing Russian expansionist aims. That left only Germany, who was seeking the opportunity to play a leading part in Chinese affairs, and who therefore found herself in strong opposition to Russian influence at the Chinese Court. The result was that on 16th October an Anglo-German agreement was signed, affirming (1) that Chinese ports should remain open to the trade of all countries without distinction; (2) that the two Powers would not make use of the present position to seek territorial advantages for themselves but, on the contrary, would seek to maintain the territorial integrity of China; and (3) that if any third Power should seek to obtain territorial advantages, the two signatories should consult together on the appropriate steps to be taken. The agreement was obviously directed against Russia, and Italy, Austria, and Japan, on being invited, acceded to the declaration as it stood. The United States Government replied that it was in full agreement with the first two points, but did not feel called upon to express any opinion upon the third, and France replied in similar terms. The publication of the agreement, however, was sufficient to make Russia pause, and shortly afterwards she expressed her willingness to evacuate Manchuria, although a sufficient military force to protect the Russian-controlled South Manchurian railway system remained.

The terms which were eventually agreed upon, and accepted by China, were severe, but were no more harsh than the Imperial Government, in the circumstances, could have expected. A monument was to be erected to the memory of the German minister on the spot where he had been murdered, and an Imperial prince was to go to Germany to express the Emperor's regrets. A second mission was also sent to Japan to express regret for the murder of the secretary of the Japanese legation within a few days of the murder of the German minister. A number of princes of the Imperial clan and ministers, named by the foreign representatives, were to be punished, most of them by decapitation. All provincial examinations were to be suspended for five years in areas where massacres had occurred, thus depriving residents of the opportunity to compete for entry into public life. Permanent legation guards were to be stationed in Peking, and a

line of communication between Peking and the sea was to be permanently guarded, so that help should in future always be available to the legations in an emergency. An indemnity of 450 million taels was to be paid to the treaty Powers, to be apportioned in accordance with losses, whilst the importation of arms of all kinds into China was prohibited for two years. Finally, the Tsungli Yamen was to be reorganised into a modern Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the last remaining marks of inferior status were removed from the foreign representatives in their audiences with the Emperor.

Beyond this, China for the moment escaped. Manchuria was not formally ceded to Russia, although the Russians obviously increasingly dominated the province, and no other territory was alienated. But the indemnity, to be paid in annual instalments extending over forty years, was a serious burden upon China's as yet undeveloped resources. Foreign troops were to be stationed permanently in the capital and between the capital and the sea, whilst the dynasty and the Imperial clan had been convicted of participation in a brutal and senseless outrage upon international intercourse, as well as of the suicidal folly of allying themselves with a terrorist organisation whose only method of getting rid of foreigners was to murder them. For this, the dynasty suffered the supreme humiliation of sending special ambassadors, one of them nearly related to the Emperor, to foreign courts to apologise for its incapacity, and was compelled to degrade, banish, and decapitate officials who had previously possessed the complete confidence and support of the Empress Dowager and her entourage. It was indeed obvious to all who cared to read the signs that the dynasty itself, through the fatal policy of the Empress Dowager, was in the highest degree responsible for the events of that ghastly summer, and whilst the suppression of the Rebellion convinced the Chinese that they could never get rid of foreign domination by crude force, it left open only one other path—that of reform, and the Empress Dowager herself had taken the initiative in destroying the reform movement. Accordingly, Chinese opinion gradually crystallised into resentment against the Court and everything for which it stood. Although the dynasty survived until 1911, in reality its fate was sealed by the Boxer Rebellion and the ensuing humiliations. For the moment, however, affairs in China appeared to be quieter than they had been since the outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion. In fact, it was no more than a brief lull before the outbreak of the storm.

It was not until January 1902 that the Court ventured to return to Peking, from which all the foreign troops, except the legation guards, had long since withdrawn. The return was symbolic, for after the hardships of lengthy journeys by road during the months

of exile, the Empress Dowager returned to the capital, swiftly and in comfort, by train. It was as though in this way she gave tardy recognition to the Western ways which she had previously either despised or ignored.

That the Empress Dowager ('the Old Buddha' to her contemporaries) was a woman of great force of character cannot be denied. She dominated all with whom she came in contact, uniting the Court faction and the Manchus in a solid phalanx to preserve their own order in the cataract of disaster which had descended upon the Empire. A contemporary of Queen Victoria and, like her, small and impetuous, she possessed great charm of manner which could upon occasion prove as effective as her wrath. Foreigners in spite of themselves were often deceived by it. Her chosen ministers, and in particular Junglu and Yüan Shih-kai, served her with unswerving fidelity, and even those who opposed her paid tribute to her greatness. That she possessed unusual political insight is disproved, however, by the disasters which fell upon the Empire and the dynasty in the last days of her rule. She had more than her share of feminine vanity. On one occasion she confessed that she had read much of the life of Queen Victoria, but had reached the conclusion that the English Queen's life was neither so interesting nor so eventful as her own, and she was convinced that she was a far abler ruler than her English contemporary. Equally, her attractive exterior concealed a good deal of ruthlessness and dissimulation. Her enemies were struck down with relentless severity, often before they were even aware that they had incurred Imperial disfavour. In the humiliation and confusion which followed the entry of the allied troops into Peking, the Old Buddha alone retained her presence of mind. Dressed in the common blue clothes of a peasant woman, she summoned the remnants of the Court who still remained, and informed them that they were about to leave the capital in three farmer's wagons. The imperial concubines, however, she grimly declared, would remain behind. To this the Emperor's favourite, known as the Pearl Concubine, suggested that if that were the case, then the Emperor himself should remain behind. Immediately the eyes of the Empress Dowager flashed fire. 'Throw that wretched minion down the well,' she commanded fiercely; and although the unhappy young Emperor himself fell on his knees in supplication, the order was carried out, 'as a warning,' the formidable old woman commented, 'to all undutiful children, and to those birds who, when fledged, peck out their own mother's eyes.' What Queen Victoria, whom the Old Buddha held in such slight esteem, might have done in similar circumstances, remains a matter for conjecture.

It was inevitable that frequent comparisons should be drawn

between the Empress Dowager and Queen Victoria, but a closer parallel is with Queen Elizabeth. Proud of her youthful appearance to the last day of her life, abounding in energy, fond of display, of the theatre, and of pageants, she nevertheless had a thriftiness which enabled her to leave an immense fortune to her relatives. Though the victims of her policy during the troubled years of her ascendancy were innumerable, it can yet be said that she ruled with impartiality, and that the same ruthlessness which signed a decree authorising (during the Boxer Rebellion) the execution of every European in the Empire also led her to condemn her kinsmen to the block when their counsels involved the Empire in further disasters. In the long-drawn-out story of the collapse of the dynasty, Tz'u Hsi's colourful and eventful career stands out as the one vital episode, unsuccessful though it ultimately proved to be. In the long line of great Chinese women the Old Buddha's place is for ever secure.

China, as a result of the peace treaties following the Rebellion, had now sunk to such depths of humiliation that she retained scarcely one of the attributes of a foreign state. Her trade was controlled by tariffs which the foreigner alone enjoyed the initiative to alter, her greatest river was patrolled by foreign gunboats, and foreign troops were quartered in her capital and along strategic points leading to it. Everywhere the foreigner went he occupied a privileged position, and outside China's greatest ports foreign-controlled areas attracted an increasing quantity of China's commerce, which thereby was lost to the Chinese treasury, hard pressed as it was to find the funds to pay the indemnity and the interest on the growing bulk of the foreign loans. There was yet one more humiliation to come. In 1905 a major war between two great Powers was fought on Chinese territory, and China was unable to do anything about it. Meanwhile, the Court had at long last learned its lesson. To challenge the foreigners by open force was the height of folly, and would only bring fresh humiliations. If China was to continue to exist as a nation, and if the dynasty was to survive the rapidly rising tide of resentment, there must be reforms of a more far-reaching character than had yet been undertaken.

The Empress Dowager applied herself to the problem with customary vigour. The foreigners had obtained the punishment of the officials who were primarily responsible for encouraging the Boxers. The Empress Dowager now went further, and decapitated or banished the principal reactionaries whose policy had created the situation in which the Rebellion was possible. On 1st February 1902, the day on which she received the ladies of the diplomatic corps, she also issued two Imperial decrees, the first assimilating

Chinese and Manchus, and the second initiating various educational reforms. Once again reform was the order of the day. The only question now was whether reforms could be achieved sufficiently rapidly to save the dynasty.

Whilst the Empress Dowager lived, and whilst her able personality controlled the reforms, it was always possible that China would escape major political changes, even though revolutionary movements, led by Sun Yat-sen, were widespread, especially in South China. The course of the Russo-Japanese War, however, in which one of the greatest of European states was decisively beaten by an Oriental state which forty years before had been in a situation directly comparable with China's, produced the most marked reactions amongst the Chinese. The entire population appeared to have learned the lesson of the war, and to have decided that at all costs, and without delay, the Chinese must learn from the West as the Japanese had done, so that the day would come when China, too, could recover her international self-respect. As an initial manifestation of the newly awakened national spirit, a boycott of American trade spread through the treaty ports in the summer of 1905. The movement originated amongst the Chinese in San Francisco, as a protest against the restriction upon the immigration of Chinese into the United States, and it was fomented by the Chinese student body in the treaty ports, now for the first time a community of some political significance. The movement waned with the summer, but it was an interesting forerunner of many later anti-foreign boycotts, in which the same influences were always discernible.

The general enthusiasm for reform manifested itself in many other ways. Schools of all kinds, technical colleges, and universities were founded in rapid succession, so that by the end of 1910 the total number of government schools was 35,198, accommodating 875,760 students. With the spread of literacy came the foundation of newspapers, both in Chinese and in foreign languages, whilst in 1905 the age-long system of examinations for public office, based on the classics, was swept away, and a modern system of examinations was instituted. During this period, too, a comprehensive scheme of army reform was prepared. It was promulgated by an Imperial edict of January 1905, and the scheme was to be completed by 1922. Long before this date, however, the scheme had been forgotten in the turmoil of the Revolution, and the modern Chinese armies are the creation of the Nationalist Government, mostly undertaken since the beginning of the present Sino-Japanese War. Internal communications also were rapidly extended after the Russo-Japanese War, and finally the Chinese Government, in association with Great Britain, at last took important steps

towards suppressing the opium traffic, by drastically cutting down both domestic cultivation and the import of foreign-grown opium.

These are impressive developments, typical of many others which were undertaken at this period; but far-reaching as the reforms were, they did not touch the steadily growing demand of increasing numbers of Chinese for the abolition of the traditional system of absolute and irresponsible government, and the substitution of a modern Western system. In response to this demand five Imperial Commissioners were appointed, and early in 1905 they were sent to Europe, to the United States, and to Japan to study and report on the forms of Government in force there. After their return in September 1906 an Imperial edict was issued foreshadowing a most comprehensive reform of the Imperial administration, and announcing that full constitutional government would be introduced as soon as the people should be ready for it. Meanwhile, national and provincial consultative assemblies were set up, and were intended to serve as advisory boards for the national and local administrations, and also as training grounds for the future national and provincial Parliaments. Finally, a decree of 27th August 1908 provided that there should be progressive constitutional reform over a period of nine years, at the end of which a Parliament, popularly elected and with full legislative powers, should be summoned. In the meanwhile, an elected National Assembly, but with advisory powers only, was to assemble in 1910. Elected Provincial Assemblies, also with consultative functions only, were to meet a year earlier.

In ten years, therefore, partly as a result of the Boxer Rebellion, but more because of the Russo-Japanese War, the outlook of the Court and of the officials upon reform and Westernisation had completely changed. Now no Western custom was too trifling to be adopted. An entire nation—one-fifth of the human race—put itself eagerly to school, impatient to recapture lost opportunities. Even at this date, however, the reforms were misconceived. A nation with a tradition stretching back unbrokenly for forty centuries could not change its outlook by a few strokes of the pen. Nor could legislators and administrators of the Western type be produced by a few years' intensive training in the social sciences. A change in outlook so revolutionary as was desired must originate in the determination of the people as a whole. The reforms of the decade following the Boxer Rebellion were still imposed on the country from above, and left the fabric of the national life substantially unaffected. After centuries of repression, or conservatism, and of uniformity, the Chinese were now being told to think for themselves, to govern themselves, and to educate themselves almost overnight. The task was too great for them to undertake,

and the surprising thing is, not that it was not successful, but that it was so nearly successful. Had the Empress Dowager lived a few years longer, her strength of character, and the unifying influence which she exerted, might have prevented a revolution which lacked direction from the outset. Even had the Revolution broken out, her abilities and the loyalty she aroused in those who came in contact with her would have been sufficient to suppress it. Most unfortunately, however, the Empress Dowager died on 15th November 1908. Only twenty hours earlier the shadowy Emperor, Kuang Hsü, had also died, almost completely forgotten by the subjects he had sought to lead in the path of reform ten years before. Inasmuch as virtually all the elder statesmen who had habitually advised the Empress Dowager had also died a few years before, China was left, at one of the turning-points in her history, in comparatively inexperienced hands, which rapidly lost control. As if to emphasise the perilous position of the dynasty, the Empress Dowager's last act had been to nominate Pu-yi, the three-year-old son of Prince Chun, of the Imperial family, to be the new Emperor, and this child accordingly ascended the throne as the Emperor Hsüan T'ung. To-day the last Manchu Emperor of China is the first Emperor of Manchukuo, the complacent puppet of the Japanese invader.

Almost immediately the absence of a strong guiding hand manifested itself. The Manchus monopolised the bulk of the highest offices of state, and on the formation of a single Privy Council, to be the chief executive body of the Empire, early in 1911, as its President, and consequently the Prime Minister of the Empire, there was appointed Prince Ch'ing, an adopted kinsman of the Imperial family, then in his seventy-fourth year, a man of mediocre abilities, irresolute and corrupt. Not by such instruments could the dynasty be saved. Indeed, it almost looked as if the Manchu princes had abandoned all hope of saving it, for they openly trafficked in the highest offices of state, enriching themselves with feverish haste, as if they knew the deluge was at hand.

Beneath the surface unrest increased and the demand for an entirely new governmental system became widespread. The Provincial Assemblies had met for the first time in October 1909. Although they had no real power, a demand from the whole of them that a national Parliament should be assembled within two years was the plainest evidence of the political temperature which was obtainable. The demand was rejected, but it was repeated by the consultative National Assembly when it met in January 1910. This time the Court gave way, and agreed to summon a Parliament in 1913. In the short interval, however, national feeling had intensified, and the Assembly demanded that a Parliament should

be assembled immediately, and further, that the Imperial administration should be subordinated to it. Once again the Court took fright, prevaricated, and finally prorogued the Assembly in January 1911. Its second session was to begin in October 1911, but the spring and summer had been full of rumours, and revolutionary outbreaks. In April the Tartar General at Canton was assassinated, and three weeks later a revolutionary uprising was suppressed with great barbarity. Order was with difficulty restored in the South, only for revolt to break out again in Szechuan. On 11th October there was fighting at Wuchang, and on the following days it spread, first to Hankow and Hanyang, and then, sporadically, along the Yangtse. It was more in the nature of a collection of local revolts, due to various causes, than a revolution, and a show of firmness could have suppressed it. The Manchus, however, were quite unprepared for such a situation, and whilst they remained irresolute, the revolutionaries found a leader in Li Yuan-hung, an able officer of the Imperial army, whom prejudice had kept in a subordinate command. Under his direction the revolution acquired method, and an army was quickly organised. With the capture of Hanyang, an Imperial arsenal was in the possession of the revolutionaries, and the possibility that they could be speedily suppressed passed.

In desperation the Court recalled Yüan Shih-kai, who had been in retirement since the death of the Empress Dowager, and to him was given the command of the Imperial forces, and the task of saving the dynasty. Yüan, however, had no desire to perpetuate the corrupt rule of the Manchu princes, and although he drove the revolutionaries out of Hanyang without undue difficulty, it was evident that they were gaining strength along the Yangtse and also in wide areas of South China. Moreover, at the end of October the navy, summoned to Hankow, to assist in the attack on Wuchang, went over to the revolutionaries. Yüan's attack on Wuchang was therefore never delivered. Instead, the revolutionaries, encouraged by the irresolution of their opponent, captured Nanking at the beginning of December, and Yüan, realising that the moment for repressive measures had passed, assumed control of the Imperial Government, and opened negotiations with the revolutionaries. The Manchu Dynasty had not been overthrown; it had crumbled through internal decay. When its hour at length struck, not a single person of any ability or eminence could be found to conduct the struggle on its behalf, and the chattering horde of gilded parasites who swamped the Court were swept aside, without opposition and almost without animosity. They had ceased to have any relevance to China's future, and were immediately forgotten.

CHAPTER VI

THE FAILURE OF THE FIRST REFORM MOVEMENT

AT the moment when Yüan Shih-kai opened negotiations with the rebels the revolution was successful, and the Manchu Dynasty was at an end. Although for a short time Yüan attempted to secure the establishment of a limited monarchy, the advocates of such a course were always in a small minority, and the proclamation of the Chinese Republic, with Sun Yat-sen as its first President, at Nanking early in 1912, forced Yüan's hand. The choice being between acceptance of the Republic or the prosecution of a civil war on behalf of a cause which was already lost, Yüan declared in favour of the Republic, and on 12th February 1912 the Manchus renounced their privileges. The Republic was an accomplished fact, and in order that no divisions should impede the efforts of the reformers, Sun Yat-sen resigned the Presidency in favour of Yüan Shih-kai.

To all outward appearances the Revolution had been completely successful. A corrupt and inefficient dynasty had been removed, and the way was now clear for progressively more far-reaching reforms. The Revolution had been conducted, not by doctrinaires or adventurers, but by practical men with a talent for public affairs. The foreign Powers were neither alarmed nor antagonistic. Everything therefore seemed to augur well for the new regime. In reality, however, all the essential problems had not been faced at all; and China had still to learn that something much more far-reaching than a change of masters was required. The whole tradition and method of Imperial rule required replacement, but as yet the Chinese had no clear idea what ought to be put in its place.

The Manchus, as we have seen, inherited a system of administration which had endured for at least twenty-five centuries, and which had survived successive dynasties, native and foreign. To this system the Manchus came as representatives of a lower civilisation, but hardy, efficient, and free from corruption. Their small numbers never permitted them to be more than a military aristocracy, but so long as they preserved the Empire from internal disorder and external aggression, their rule aroused no resentment at all. The early Manchu Emperors, in the eighteenth century, had been men of unusual ability, under whom China had enjoyed peace and a considerable degree of prosperity. Their successors in the nineteenth century were men of little character, dominated by palace

cliques. Meanwhile, even the military efficiency of the Manchus had disappeared under the influence of a luxuriant and tolerant civilisation, and successive defeats at the hands of the foreigner, coupled with the disastrous Taiping Rebellion and innumerable lesser rebellions, proved that the reality of power had already passed away from the dynasty. In ordinary conditions the Manchus would ultimately have given way, through sheer incapacity, to a usurping dynasty, possibly of Chinese origin. As it was, the impact of new ideas destroyed them in favour of theories of constitutional government borrowed from the West and only imperfectly understood.

From one point of view, therefore, the Revolution was a Chinese uprising against a foreign dynasty; from another, it was the overthrow of traditional Chinese theories of administration by those of the West. From yet another point of view, it was the disintegration of one of the most complex systems of administration which has been devised. In a country such as China, where vast distances and a complete absence of good roads made the swift transport of troops an impossibility, public order could only be maintained by the delegation of authority to the provincial viceroys, coupled with a rigorously exacting system of responsibility for all public acts. In practice, therefore, the province was an autonomous unit, responsible for its own public works, for justice, and for the equipment of sufficient provincial troops to defend itself from external attack and internal disorder. All these services were paid for out of provincial revenues and, in addition, the province sent a specified quota of money and grain to the Imperial treasury. If the central authority weakened, therefore, its control over the provincial dues became precarious. On the other hand, such a system of provincial tribute required a greater knowledge of provincial conditions than Peking possessed if it was to work without inflicting hardship and causing unrest. In the nineteenth century the increasing corruption and inefficiency of the officials had already placed a strain upon the provincial machinery, and this was increased when to this rapacity was added the necessity of finding additional revenue to pay the foreign tribute. The result was increased discontent. It was therefore evident that a necessary preliminary step to reform must be the reorganisation of the financial system, and the substitution of fixed national and provincial budgets for the ruinously inefficient system of farming out the taxes which had prevailed from time immemorial. Such a change involved a revolution in the outlook of the official class, and quite evidently it could only be carried out with extensive foreign help, and over a considerable period of time. An attempt was made to reform the financial machinery of the state along these lines after the Boxer Rebellion, but the effort came too late, foreign assistance was not forthcoming

on the required scale, and the official class as a whole was not prepared to relinquish the unlimited opportunities for speculation which the old system afforded. There were also other difficulties. In spite of the fixed tariff, imposed by the treaties, the Customs revenue had steadily become an increasingly important item in the Chinese budget, emphasising that in the impact of East and West it was the treaty ports, and the Chinese mercantile classes who lived there, which increasingly dominated China's relations with foreign states. The mercantile classes, however, were the principal opponents of the power, the inefficiency, and the corruption of the officials, and the student classes of the treaty ports, with their enthusiastic, if uncritical, enthusiasm for Western political organisation, were fanatically anti-Manchu. The Revolution may therefore also be regarded as the result of the introduction of Western commercial methods into a carefully organised self-contained static economy, based on agriculture. It was, in fact, as much an economic as a political collapse.

For the moment the political barometer seemed to be set fair. China's destinies were being guided by Yüan Shih-kai, the ablest and most experienced of her statesmen, with whom the most brilliant and most practical of her revolutionaries, Sun Yat-sen, was co-operating. This association, however, could not long conceal the fundamental divergencies of outlook which lay just below the surface. To the enthusiasm for democratic government of the reformers, Yüan opposed craft, guile, corruption, and sometimes the more sinister methods of political assassination. Fundamentally, Yüan had no belief in either democracy or republicanism, and he had no love of Western civilisation. He wished to preserve as much as possible of the traditional Chinese ways, and he wished at all costs to preserve a strong, autocratic, central administration. He had compromised with the Republicans because he appreciated that it was the only way to save the country from a disastrous civil war, but having made his own position secure, he set to work to extend his authority and to repress all disruptive forces. This led him to attack the Parliamentarians, who were seeking to put into force a democratic constitution, and later, to proscribe Dr. Sun and his adherents, the *Kuo min tang*. For Yüan, the Revolution was simply the substitution of a more efficient control of the central authority for the corrupt inefficiency of the Manchus. When he had finally decided that it was impossible to restore the Manchus, even as puppets, he took the usual course of the military dictator, first extending his Presidential authority to the farthest possible limits, and then organising a movement aiming to confer the Imperial dignity upon him. All preparations were made for the proclamation of Yüan as Emperor at the beginning of 1916, but

the opposition which the plan aroused was so widespread that it was abandoned, and Yüan himself died in June 1916, worn out by incessant efforts to prevent the disintegration of the Empire.

By this date the early promise of the Revolution had disappeared. Since Yüan and his advisers had no real grasp of the proportions of the task which they must undertake if China was to possess a modern administration, it followed that their authority was commensurate only with their own prestige. Although Yüan's prestige steadily declined, it nevertheless remained sufficiently high to preserve at least the outward semblance of unity, but already at the time of his death six provinces—Yunnan, Kweichow, Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Chekiang, and Szechuan—had proclaimed their independence. These were the provinces where the influence of Sun Yat-sen was strongest, and the next step was to establish a confederacy of the Southern provinces, with a military council whose seat was Canton. The age-long antagonism between the quick, commercially minded and progressive Southerners and the more conservative peoples of the North now found expression in a struggle between the reform movement and the traditionalists. It was a struggle in which neither side could make a great deal of headway, however, for provincial separatism, and the lack of any deep-rooted belief in any particular form of government by those who controlled the military forces, paralysed the efforts of both sides, and gradually reduced China to a collection of independent provinces, which only the foreign Powers continued to treat as a separate unit, since they were afraid of the consequences of the unrestrained scramble which would result from open recognition of China's disintegration. Moreover, if that disintegration were recognised, the entire foreign investment in China—the railways, the banks, the loan services, and the concessions—would be placed in jeopardy. Thus it came about that the foreigners whose penetration in the nineteenth century had unquestionably accelerated the downfall of the Empire were now afraid of the consequences of their handiwork, and went to the length of even denying that those consequences had in fact occurred.

The progressive decline in the central authority necessarily meant that the provinces, or sometimes two or three of them, became independent units. Within their boundaries the machinery of administration continued to function with steadily declining efficiency, but there were two important differences as compared with the Manchu period. Provincial officials were no longer selected and controlled by Peking, and the provinces no longer sent any part of their revenues to the central government, unless superior military force temporarily compelled them to do so. As a result of the second circumstance, the Peking Government became

the plaything of one or other foreign interest, depending for survival mainly upon the surplus revenue of the Maritime Customs, but also increasingly upon foreign loans. It followed that under these conditions there was neither the money nor the power to organise developments and reforms of any kind. All these had apparently been indefinitely abandoned. In consequence, too, of the decay of the central authority, the provincial governments came completely under the control of military leaders, whose one object was to obtain the maximum revenue, and to extend their authority as far as possible. In the decade following the death of Yüan Shih-kai, therefore, China became the scene of a kaleidoscopic and unending civil war, in which province fought against province, and militarist overthrew militarist, apparently for no reason at all. Meanwhile, under these steadily deteriorating conditions the lot of the mass of the people became steadily worse. They were plundered by successive war-lords, whilst the ordinary civil administration of the country was replaced over wide areas by military law, under cover of which every kind of ruthlessness was perpetrated on what is probably the most patient peasantry in the world.

The decay of the central government had yet more ominous consequences. Yüan Shih-kai had enjoyed the support of the foreign Powers generally, because he seemed to be the only barrier to disintegration. Sun Yat-sen was dismissed as a visionary, and to some extent there was reason in this foreign outlook, since at this period Dr. Sun and his adherents were under the impression that if Western constitutionalism were introduced forthwith, it would be able to control China in the extremely difficult period of transition through which she must now pass. Unfortunately, very few besides Dr. Sun and his immediate associates had any real conception of what constitutionalism meant, and there can be little question, even if Yüan's differing political outlook had not barred the way to a democratic regime, that any democratic system which had been established at this period would have failed to control the country. Disintegration would then have occurred sooner than it actually did, and the wars of the rival militarists would have been of longer duration. Moreover, after Yüan Shih-kai's death there was no longer any national figure to serve as a rallying-point. Yüan was succeeded as President by Li Yuan-hung, but he lacked any real force of character, and though he restored the original Republican constitution and recalled Parliament, he was soon in such difficulties with it that he was compelled to dissolve it and to invoke the aid of General Chang Hsun, the military governor of the Yangtse Provinces, and one of the greatest reactionaries in China, to restore order. Chang Hsun's solution of the political problem was to compel the President to take refuge in the Japanese Legation, and

to make an effort in the summer of 1917 to restore the Manchus. Events had moved rapidly since 1911, however, and this course was as little to the liking of the northern militarists as a democratic regime. When this attempt failed, therefore, the most adroit of the northern militarists, Tuan Chi-jui, managed to unite them into a clique which is generally known as the *Anfu* Party, which first drove the forces of General Chang Hsun out of Peking, and then forced Li Yuan-hung into retirement, in favour of one of their own nominees. For the next few years the central government was manipulated by this clique, which supported itself financially by Japanese loans, and domestically and internationally by covert but steadily increasing Japanese support. So long as the War of 1914-18 continued, no other foreign Power was able to resist this increasing Japanese domination, and even though Japan, at the Washington Conference in 1922, was compelled to relinquish some of her more extreme pretensions in China, the Conference left Japanese control of the most important of the northern militarists quite untouched.

A month after the failure of Chang Hsun's attempt to restore the Empire, China declared war on Germany. The motives which led to this step were entirely practical, and over-rode the extensive sympathy for Germany which had existed at the beginning of the war, and which was due largely to the belief that Germany would assist China to resist pressure from Russia and Japan. One important factor in China's decision was a desire to make her relations with the United States still closer than they were. She therefore followed the American lead in entering the War. Another was that Japan now favoured this step, although previously she had opposed it. But the third, and probably the dominating factor, was the desire to obtain a place at the Peace Conference, so that the whole question of the position of the foreigner in China, and especially the question of the Japanese in Shantung, would be adequately considered from the Chinese point of view. At the beginning of the War Japanese forces, with limited British assistance, had captured Germany's leased port, Tsingtau, and since that date Japan had remained in occupation and showed every intention of making that occupation permanent. Moreover, Japanese activities were extending far beyond Tsingtau, through the entire Shantung Peninsula.

From the Chinese point of view the Versailles Conference was profoundly disappointing. The special rights of Germany and Austria in China disappeared, but that was all. Nothing whatever was done to indicate that the special rights of the other foreign Powers would ever be abandoned, or even modified, nor was the question of the Boxer Indemnity even considered at all, whilst the German rights in Shantung were simply transferred to Japan. Filled with disappointment, the Chinese delegation withdrew from

the Conference, and China made a separate peace with Germany on 15th September 1919.

Internally, the failure of China to improve her international status at Versailles brought about the destruction of the power of the *Anfu* clique, with its dependence on Japanese support. In 1919 there was a general strike of the student class which, with the support of the merchants, turned into an anti-Japanese boycott. There were widespread riots, during which the houses of unpopular politicians were attacked. The riots showed plainly enough that the existing leaders had lost all popular support, even in the North, and accordingly a combination of northern generals outside the *Anfu* Party, Generals Tsao Kun and Wu Pei-fu, with Chang Tso-lin, who controlled Manchuria, overthrew the *Anfu* leaders without serious difficulty, and established a government of their own. There was no permanence in the new arrangement, however, since by 1922 Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin in their turn were making war upon each other, and this process of arranging new combinations of allies for new civil wars continued without intermission north of the Yangtse until 1927.

In the South affairs appeared to be in no better state. A separate Government, not recognising the authority of Peking, had been established at Canton ever since Yüan Shih-kai had parted company with the revolutionaries. Apart from the indefatigable personality of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who in April 1921 was elected President of the Chinese Republic in Canton, it was not an impressive collection, and on more than one occasion it lost control even over its capital at Canton. Moreover, although there was a notable improvement in municipal administration in the capital, there was little evidence of real progress towards constitutionalism. For one thing, the Southern Government, denied for many years any share of the Maritime Customs revenue, and prevented from raising foreign loans, had little money available for education or social development, without which democratic government could never be a reality; whilst the necessity for being constantly organised to repel the attacks of some neighbouring militarist involved the adoption of government by martial law over wide areas, more especially as the Canton Government was weakened by successive revolts and withdrawals. In these circumstances it is not altogether surprising that during those difficult years the torch of constitutional progress should appear to have grown dim, or that the foreign Powers should have failed to see in the Canton Government anything more than a provincial government with some high pretensions. Nevertheless, this refusal to assess Sun Yat-sen as anything more than an impractical local leader and the refusal to grant his Government any status at the Washington Conference in 1922

was directly responsible for Dr. Sun's despairing appeal to Russia for aid, and the consequent embitterment of relations between the Chinese Nationalists and the foreign Powers in the following years.

Looking back on the quarter of a century of confusion, revolution, and disintegration which intervened between the Boxer Rebellion and the rise of the Chinese Nationalists, it is plain that the Empire was overthrown before anyone had a clear idea of what could replace it. The revolutionaries had imagined that China could be transformed from an Oriental despotism into a Western democracy in a few years, through the instrumentality of a succession of comprehensive decrees. Only experience proved that when the central authority was overthrown a horde of petty despots would usurp authority and reduce China to chaos. Only experience, too, could show that the sole chance of a swift transformation of Chinese social life was by means of reforms imposed by a strong central government to which the official classes would rally. This had recently happened in Japan, and there was a chance that under an enlightened ruler, or under a group of enlightened statesmen, a similar transition could be brought about in China, although the task would be greater and incomparably more difficult. The Revolution destroyed this last chance, slender though it was, and thereafter reunification of China was always a condition precedent to the continuation of reform. Nevertheless, the habit of effecting paper reforms never died out. A good illustration of it is afforded by the proceedings of the Extra-territoriality Commission in 1926. The treaty Powers had promised at the Washington Conference to appoint a Commission to examine the progress of law reform in China, with a view to deciding whether extra-territoriality could be abolished, or at least modified. Just before the Commission reached China the Peking Government of the day published an impressive collection of codes on the Western model. No attempt was made to put these codes into force over any considerable area. Indeed, in many places, even the code of the Manchu Dynasty had been replaced by martial law, and whilst the Commission was actually sitting in Peking a number of persons accused of offences under military law were arbitrarily shot without trial by order of the military authorities. There was, however, considerable disappointment in China when these codes were not accepted abroad as convincing evidence that China was making great strides in the task of law reform. The outside observer may perhaps venture a further criticism of these codes, however. They were for the most part adaptations, or in some cases even paraphrases, of recent Western codes. Even had it been possible to make a comprehensive effort to put them into force, that effort would not have been successful, for they represented too

violent a break with traditional Chinese life and customs to be willingly accepted by the bulk of the people, without intensive preparation for them. When the Nationalist Government, some years later, resumed the task of codifying and restating Chinese Law, it found that it was necessary to depart extensively from the Western models, and to retain in the body of the laws many of the traditional features of Chinese social life.

Exactly the same was true of other aspects of the first Chinese reform movement. In the political sphere, China was quite evidently not yet ready for full democratic institutions, though the early reformers had hoped to see China governed by a Parliament of elected representatives, making and unmaking administrations as early as 1912. Even to-day China has not yet progressed so far, and the primary task of the Nationalist Government since 1927 has been one of political education, in preparation for democratic institutions which will really work. In the sphere of education there were similar defects. Putting aside the fact that the continuance of the civil war prevented any real extension of educational effort from being undertaken (so that in 1919 there were only 4,500,000 scholars in state schools, as compared with 3,850,000 in 1914, and less teachers were employed in 1919, as compared with 1917), the education itself was borrowed mainly from the West without undue reflection upon its utility. To a considerable extent this was due to the Government's desire to compete with the excellent schools and universities established by the missionary organisations in China. The Nationalist Government, when it came into power, established new educational curricula, which paid greater attention to the needs and environment of the Chinese student, and the result has been that there have been trained increasing numbers of young students who look to China's educational resources rather than to the West, and who derive inspiration from the remarkable educational renaissance which has accompanied the accession to power of the Chinese Nationalists.

CHAPTER VII

THE ORIGINS OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

EARLY in June 1925 the present writer paid a visit to Canton. The atmosphere was heavy with rumours. There had just been some anti-foreign riots in Shanghai, in the course of which some Chinese students had been shot whilst demonstrating near a foreign-

controlled police station. Canton was outwardly quiet, but there were powerful undercurrents. Chinese who normally abstained from all discussion of politics talked of 'British imperialism.' In the background hovered a corps of Soviet instructors, preparing the Cantonese for resistance, although to what no one quite knew. Sun Yat-sen had died a few months before, and a comparatively unknown young soldier, General Chiang Kai-shek, now led the Chinese Nationalists. According to foreign mercantile opinion, General Chiang was no more than a Russian nominee, but that was not as serious as might have been feared, since Chinese Nationalism was no longer making headway. Indeed, now that Sun Yat-sen was dead the movement would disintegrate through internal dissensions. For all that, it was not advisable to take risks, and the foreign community on the Shameen (the little island in the river on which the foreign establishments were concentrated) was wiring itself in against the possibility of riots fomented by Russian agents. Three years later the Nationalist Government controlled the whole of China inside the Great Wall, and foreign Powers were rivalling each other in their haste to be friendly to it. What had been responsible for this astonishing change of fortune? Why had the Nationalists succeeded in reunifying China where so many others with similar ambitions, and some with extensive resources and foreign support, had failed? To answer these questions adequately it is necessary to look a little more closely than has yet been done into the origins and meaning of Chinese Nationalism.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen has done for four hundred millions of Chinese what Kemal Ataturk has done for Turkey, what Lenin and Stalin have done for Soviet Russia. He has provided them with a programme of social regeneration to which the bulk of the people have rallied. He has given them a sense of unity and a mission, and he has restored national self-respect. Yet when he died he appeared to have miscalculated every one of the political forces with which he had to deal, and in consequence to have failed in everything he undertook. Actually the precise converse is the case. But for Dr. Sun's unremitting efforts through the *Kuo min tang*, nothing could have arrested the progressive disintegration of China, which eventually, during the economic crisis and the rise of the Nazis in Germany, would have fallen under Japanese domination with scarcely a struggle.

Paradoxically, the outbreak of the Revolution in 1911 was not in any way due to Dr. Sun's efforts. It had a purely local character, and arose amongst discontented troops at Wuchang. Yet in the revolutionary outburst, revealing so quickly and so clearly the weakness of the Imperial position, Sun thought he was about to find

the realisation of all his hopes. The revolutionaries themselves regarded him as their natural leader, and it was therefore only in the natural order of things that he should be elected first President of the Republic. Without military force, however, his position was untenable, and there is thus no reason to suppose that Sun's retirement in favour of Yüan Shih-kai was simply an act of disinterestedness. Equally, the withdrawal to Canton and opposition to Yüan Shih-kai might have been foreseen. Canton was the original home of the revolutionary movement, and its people traditionally thought and acted differently from those of the North. Furthermore, it was evident that Yüan Shih-kai had no belief at all in the principles upon which the Republic was founded, and that he aimed to continue the old order of things without the Manchus. That being so, Sun Yat-sen realised at last that the transition to constitutionalism in China must be a gradual one, and that he would not be in a position to make his point of view prevail until he had created first a party with a national appeal, and secondly an army with a loyalty to China and to his party, as distinct from the purely personal loyalties of the armies of the militarists to their leaders.

It was one of the most serious handicaps of the Chinese Nationalist movement in its early days that it grew up at a time when the rest of the world was engulfed in war. Its significance was therefore for the most part overlooked. So long as Yüan Shih-kai lived, foreign diplomatists who had known him in the days before the Boxer Rebellion as one of China's coolest and ablest administrators gave him their confidence, more especially as he refused to subordinate himself either to Japan or to Russia. Even when Yüan was dead, the bias in favour of Peking still continued, partly from fear of the consequences of disintegration, and partly because the Peking politicians had tactfully ranged China on the side of the victorious Allies at precisely the right moment. The significance of what had been happening in China for the past thirty years was still minimised abroad, and it was thought that a group of northern militarists could control the country efficiently, if only they received foreign support and could be persuaded not to fight one another. Even on the eve of the victorious march of the Chinese Nationalists to the Yangtse there was no appreciation at all among the foreign community in China, or among their Governments in Europe and America, that the *Kuo min tang*, the one organisation capable of uniting a people of four hundred millions in the struggle for a new civilisation and for national self-respect, had now reached maturity.

Indirectly, the inability of the Chinese delegation to win a hearing at the Peace Conference greatly assisted the Nationalists, who

for some time had been losing their earlier enthusiasm for indiscriminate Westernisation. The failure to recover Shantung made it clear that no escape from recurring humiliations was possible so long as China was ruled by petty war-lords subservient to Japan. The *Kuo min tang*, on the other hand, stood for independence from external control, and more and more Chinese who looked for the end of foreign domination turned to it. Necessarily, it possessed the allegiance of the student class. The significance of the boycotts of 1919 and 1920, directed as they were against the *Anfu* clique, lay in the fact that the powerful mercantile classes of the treaty ports were by no means hostile to the Nationalists. From this time onwards they turned increasingly to Canton, where, in due course, there was an internal struggle between the Right Wing of the Nationalist movement, backed by Chinese banking, commercial, and shipping interests, and the more radical Left Wing depending upon Moscow.

After the rebuff sustained by the Southern Government in its exclusion from the Washington Conference, Dr. Sun turned finally away from the Western Powers. This, too, might easily have been foreseen, for in the forefront of the programme of the Nationalists was placed the determination to get rid of foreign rights in China at the earliest possible moment, unilaterally if necessary. It was therefore scarcely to be expected that the treaty Powers would cordially participate in the destruction of their privileged position, until events compelled such a course. On the other hand, the Russian Revolution showed that giant new forces had been liberated even in the West, and it was by no means clear that these forces would be confined to their existing limits. This suggested to the observant Nationalists that the Western system, after all, might not be the final solution of political and economic problems. Moreover, one of the main objectives of the Soviet was to assist nations in precisely China's position to shake off the chains which strangled their development. In Communist parlance, China was a semi-colonial nation, fighting a nationalist war to regain its freedom. Help was therefore available if China chose to make use of it. As evidence of her intentions, Russia had renounced all her special rights in China, thereby, incidentally, placing the considerable number of Tsarist *émigrés* in China within the jurisdiction of Chinese courts. Finally, Russia, whether Tsarist or Soviet, necessarily pursued in the Far East a policy hostile to Japan. Inasmuch as Japan had now become the chief threat to China's integrity, *rapprochement* between Russia and China was clearly in the interests of both.

There were also domestic reasons why Dr. Sun should turn at this time to the Soviet. After the suppression of the anti-Japanese

boycott and riots in 1919, a number of Chinese students had gone to Moscow, and had there founded the Chinese Communist Party. In this way there had already been extensive Soviet penetration in China, and it was evident that unless Dr. Sun came to terms with the Communists he was in some danger of being superseded by them. At no time had his position appeared to be so weak. In reality, nevertheless, his party was still the only possible unifying factor in a distracted nation.

Early in 1923 the Soviet and the Chinese Nationalists reached a close understanding, and shortly afterwards Soviet supplies and instructors were reaching Canton in a steady stream. At their head was the experienced revolutionary Borodin, and before long Russian advisers controlled every strategic position within the Nationalist movement, which was reorganised on the Soviet model. The Communists were naturally admitted to the Nationalist Party, and their influence in its counsels, thanks to Russian support, was entirely disproportionate to their numbers. The foreign communities in China, and the Governments who supported them, now took fright. For years Dr. Sun had been belittled and ignored. Now it seemed that his movement, in alliance with the Soviet, was about to become a world menace. The consular body in Shanghai was reporting that the student movement there was falling a ready prey to Communist propaganda, and although the better-known agitators were expelled from the International Settlement, it was plain that the underground movement was increasing in force. It had extended to Tientsin, and even to Peking itself, under the very eyes of militarists, who felt that the ground was slipping from under their feet, without knowing quite what to do about it. As a last card, Marshal Chang Tso-lin, the Manchurian war-lord, who was temporarily in control of Peking, invited Dr. Sun to come north at the beginning of 1925 to discuss the possibility of collaboration. Dr. Sun came, and died in the northern capital in March. The foreign diplomats concealed their anxieties and paid their respects to the corpse of a great national leader. No doubt they thought that with his death the *Kuo min tang* would disintegrate, and that China would return to her former quiescent state. In reality, the nation was about to find itself for the first time. With Dr. Sun's death, a new chapter of China's struggle for freedom began.

The opening episodes, however, seemed to fall within the traditional plan. The heat of the summer often produces friction and disturbances in the treaty ports, and the summer of 1925 was no exception. In May there were student demonstrations against the foreigner in the International Settlement at Shanghai. During one of them the Settlement police opened fire, and a number of students of both sexes were killed. The immediate result was to transform

the general anti-foreign feeling into a complete anti-British boycott, for Great Britain was the Power chiefly responsible for the administration of the Settlement. For the moment there appeared to be no more than local disturbances. True, there were further student riots in Tientsin, but these were directed, not against the foreigners, but against the northern militarists. At Canton, however, all was for the moment quiet—almost too quiet, in the opinion of the older residents, who hailed the unobtrusive arrival of additions to the extremely slender defence forces of the Shameen with undisguised relief. Meanwhile, the city itself was the scene of ceaseless preparations, although few as yet knew for what purpose all these activities were being undertaken. On 23rd June, however, there was a monster demonstration of between twenty and thirty thousand persons, many of them students and members of the workmen's guilds, and this developed into an anti-foreign procession past the Shameen, the rear of the procession being composed of fully armed Chinese troops under the command of Russian officers. As this part of the procession came directly opposite the Shameen a single shot was fired from the Chinese side, and this was quickly followed by an irregular volley from the demonstrators, who quickly scattered and took cover. The fire was returned by the garrison of the Shameen, and was continued for an hour, when both sides broke off. There were nine casualties among the foreign community on the Shameen, and there were many more among the Chinese demonstrators and students. The whole episode merely added one more to the unfortunately long list of disturbances in the treaty ports that summer, but it was used to focus hostility more particularly upon the British community, with the result that a general boycott of British trade was organised in South China, which lasted, with varying intensity, for over eighteen months.

The Shameen incident had also emphasised to a disturbed foreign community how closely the Chinese Nationalists were co-operating with the Soviet. It was now no longer possible to overlook the real significance of Chinese Nationalism, but it seemed to be the case that the indifference of the treaty Powers towards the Nationalists, which was in the main due to their desire to safeguard the foreign position which had been built up on the treaty system, and which the Nationalists had made it their primary objective to demolish, had forced the Nationalists into a disastrous alliance with Communism, in open hostility to the Western Powers. For the time being, at any rate, the Left Wing of the *Kuo min tang* appeared to be all-powerful, and the second half of 1925 and the early months of 1926 saw feverish activity among the principal northern war-lords, at foreign instigation, with the object of

keeping Nationalist propaganda away from North China and, if possible, confining the activities of the *Kuo min tang* to Kwangtung. To meet this ominous threat from the South, Marshal Chang Tso-lin, the war-lord of Manchuria, was induced to take control at Peking, and it was hoped to range the principal northern generals under his banner. Unfortunately for the hopes of northerners, one of the astutest of these, Feng Yu-hsiang, declared himself at this time strongly in favour of the Nationalists. As he controlled large areas in the north-west and, in addition, possessed a comparatively well-trained and well-equipped army, this not only weakened the northerners' flanks, but also linked up the areas under Nationalist rule with Russia, by way of the Mongolian Republics. In the spring of 1926, therefore, the outlook for the foreigner in China seemed blacker than at any period since the Boxer Rebellion. In the North it was idle to pretend any longer that China was a unity. It had fallen completely under the domination of a group of militarists, whose regime lacked popular support, unity, or stability; whilst in the South a regime was in power which seemed to be completely under the control of the Soviet. It was a curious position for a party which had been created by an enthusiast, the whole of whose early efforts had been directed to the transformation of China into a parliamentary democracy of Anglo-American pattern.

As if to emphasise the unreality of the situation, a conference of representatives of the foreign Powers recommended that China should be permitted to levy increased duties on certain classes of imports, whilst another commission of foreign experts wandered ostentatiously through northern China seeking evidences that modifications in the system of extra-territoriality could safely be recommended. With some lack of tact the northern generals ordered a number of civilians accused of offences against martial law to be shot without trial outside the walls of Peking, whilst the commission was actually prosecuting its enquiries within the city. The Nationalists, on the other hand, ignored the commission altogether—a plain hint that in their opinion the time for academic discussion had gone by. So threatening had the situation in the South become by this time that Great Britain, as the treaty Power with the greatest interests, and also as the Power most directly attacked in Nationalist and Communist propaganda, prepared for a possible clash. It was generally recognised that the real test would come if the Nationalists secured control of the Chinese city of Shanghai. When that occurred, the position of the International Settlement would be precarious. The British Government therefore decided to accede to the calls for aid of the Shanghai Municipal Council, and sent out a Defence Force amounting to a division, for the

purpose of resisting any attack which might be made upon the Settlement. It was strictly enjoined, however, to refrain from provocative acts of any description unless, and until, a direct attack should be made. It was in such a threatening atmosphere that the most decisive chapter in China's modern history opened, and that the Nationalist leaders showed qualities of real statesmanship, which have moulded the whole course of China's subsequent development.

CHAPTER VIII

THE VICTORY OF THE CHINESE NATIONALISTS

WHEN the Chinese Nationalists set out on their northward march from Canton in the summer of 1926, few would have been bold enough to predict that within two years they would be in effective control of the whole of China proper, and that their relations with the treaty Powers would be, if not cordial, at least well on the way to becoming so. Expeditions for the North had often set out from Canton since 1911. Some of them had won considerable successes, but as the distance between them and Canton increased, dissensions had broken out; troops had shown unmistakably that they wished to return to their native province, whilst the hostility of local inhabitants, coupled with the threat of co-operation between possible rivals, had at last compelled the expeditions to retreat, as the only alternative to dissolution. There seemed to be no reason to suppose that this expedition would enjoy any better fate. It was true that the Nationalists talked of the reunification of the country, but then so had every other expedition. It was also true that these were trained troops, but others had possessed such troops before, and in greater numbers. As against this, the Nationalists appeared to many foreign observers (some of them by no means hostile to Chinese aspirations) to be no more than the tools of the Soviet, without resources, and without experienced leaders. Among Chiang Kai-shek's commanders in this northern march, however, were to be found many of the leaders who have since borne the brunt of the struggle against Japanese aggression.

The early phases of the expedition were sensational in the extreme. There was little fighting. On all hands the troops of local militarists deserted to the Nationalists, whilst innumerable cities

and villages hastened to declare their support of the advancing armies. At long last the Chinese had found a cause to which all could rally. Moreover, the march demonstrated with considerable force the value of the propaganda which Nationalists and Communists alike had been energetically spreading. Ideas proved far more potent than bullets, and the small and well-disciplined forces with which the expedition had been undertaken rapidly swelled to a vast and for the most part undisciplined horde. The Nationalists would no doubt have preferred steadier progress, for the problem of feeding, billeting, equipping, and paying this great host was a serious one. There was, in addition, the ever-present anxiety of the attitude of the treaty Powers. The march had already been accompanied by much destruction of foreign property. If these attacks were not repressed, a point might be reached when the foreigners would intervene with overwhelming force. The Nationalists were anxious at all costs to avoid such a trial of strength, although it might well be that their Russian advisers were less reluctant. At any rate their propaganda was directed to emphasising that the hour of deliverance was at hand, and that each Chinese must do what he could to hasten the collapse of the foreign regime.

By the end of 1926 the Nationalist armies had reached the Yangtse, and the occupation of the triple city of Wuhan (Hankow and Wuchang) lying astride the river, marked a definite stage in their progress. All serious opposition south of the river had now been overcome. To the north, the various minor militarists hastily ranged themselves under the banner of Chang Tso-lin, in preparation for a final struggle in defence of their usurpation. For this final contest the Nationalists proposed to make further preparations, and accordingly devoted some months towards the task of consolidating what they had won. In the first place they established their government provisionally at Hankow—the first Chinese Government with any real claim to speak for the country as a whole since the death of Yüan Shih-kai. Moreover, there was an exceedingly delicate situation with Great Britain to face. Spurred on by extremist propaganda, large bodies of Chinese had sought to take possession by force of the British Concession, and for several days British bluejackets with fixed bayonets stood stolidly on guard at the boundaries of the Concession, exposed to every conceivable type of provocation, and a good deal of violence, without any kind of retaliation. It was a critical moment, more especially as the Shanghai Defence Force would soon be available if the situation became too difficult. Neither side wished to go to extremes, however, and force gave way to negotiation. It was already evident that Great Britain was prepared to acknowledge the significance of recent

events, and shortly afterwards Sir Austen Chamberlain prepared a statesmanlike memorandum on British policy in China, in which, after declaring plainly that Great Britain was not prepared to capitulate to threats and displays of force, he explained that Great Britain was prepared to recognise the importance of recent developments, and to adopt a sympathetic and helpful attitude towards the Nationalists. In particular, this implied that Great Britain was prepared to negotiate concerning the return of some of the Concessions to Chinese control. As it was stated that this offer included the British Concession at Hankow, tension eased considerably.

In March 1927, however, relations with Great Britain again became critical, following the capture of Nanking by the Nationalists. Once again difficulties can be traced in some measure to anti-British propaganda of Russian origin, operating on a swollen horde of troops, the majority of whom were strangers to discipline and only recent adherents to the Nationalist cause. Nanking, in the past century, has suffered greatly from occupying forces. The Taipings sacked it on more than one occasion, and the Imperial forces were in no way their inferiors when they at length recovered it by assault. Similarly the occupation of the city by the Japanese during the present Sino-Japanese War was followed by indescribably revolting atrocities committed by the Japanese upon the hapless civilian population. In 1927 it was the turn of the Nationalist troops, and the looting of Nanking in March 1927 adds one more chapter of misery to the history of that much assaulted city, and remains the one serious blot upon the military record of Chinese Nationalism. Moreover, the occupation of the city was accompanied by the most direct attack upon foreigners and their property which had yet taken place, and only the courage and coolness of units of the British Navy in extricating the foreign community from a situation in which their lives were in peril prevented an incident which it would have been impossible to settle peaceably.

The Nanking incident was taken as a danger-signal by the Nationalist leaders, however. Steps were taken to reduce the swollen ranks of their armies to more effective control, so that when the Chinese city of Shanghai was taken a month or two later, although there was much disorder in the city itself, there was never any serious threat to the foreign Settlement, and on the improvement of the situation the Shanghai Defence Force was ultimately able to withdraw without ever having fired a shot. Meanwhile, since it had become apparent that some, at least, of the foreign Powers, and in particular Great Britain and the United States, whose interests were the most extensive, were prepared to

negotiate with China's new rulers, the Nationalists felt themselves strong enough to dispense with their Russian advisers. These were driven out, and the Nationalist movement itself expelled its Communist members. These withdrew into Central and Western China, after attempting for a time to set up a rival government at Hankow. The elements expelled at this time eventually formed the rallying-point for the Chinese Communists, who established themselves firmly in some of the central and western provinces, and who, after 1928, were the only serious opposition with whom the Nationalists had to contend. They raised and, with Russian assistance, equipped large armies which were well led, had extreme mobility, and which showed remarkable aptitude for the long-drawn-out and exhausting guerilla warfare which China has been fighting against Japan since 1937. When, on the outbreak of this war, the Communists made common cause with the Nationalists against the invader, the existence and experience of these armies proved of great value in China's fight to preserve her national existence, and the collaboration of the two wings of the Chinese revolution has proved to be one of the greatest miscalculations which Japan has made. It is now paralleled by the collaboration of the United States and the British Commonwealth on the one hand and the U.S.S.R. on the other, against the forces of Fascism and international lawlessness in Europe.

The extrication of the Nationalist movement from Russian control, and the expulsion of Communists from the ranks of the Chinese Nationalists, coupled with a consolidation of the position along the Yangtze, occupied valuable months in 1927, during which the puppet-government in Peking, at the dictation of Chang Tso-lin and his associates, made last-minute attempts to organise a strong coalition to form a barrier to further progress on the part of the Nationalists. The tide was now running strongly in their favour, however, and the delay served only to weaken the position of the militarists still further. The country as a whole instinctively felt that the Nationalists alone could restore unity to the Chinese Empire, and now students, merchants, officials, and country gentlemen alike could rally to their cause, since the menace of Communism had been removed. In these circumstances the result of the campaign was a foregone conclusion. When the drive against the North was resumed in 1928 the militarists could offer no effective resistance. Driven back from one position after another, Chang Tso-lin made a last effort to hold Peking in the summer of 1928, and when that failed he attempted too late to withdraw into Manchuria, in the hope of maintaining himself there in an area which he had governed, by no means too badly, but with Japanese support, since 1911. As the Nationalists occupied the northern

capital, Chang Tso-lin and his suite were retiring by train to Mukden. The journey was never completed, however, for a bomb exploded on the train, killing the rugged old militarist, and with him passed any remaining hope of stemming the Nationalist conquest. By whom the assassination was organised has never been established, but there is reason to suppose that the Japanese were not devoid of complicity, hoping to find some more tractable tool than the Marshal had proved to be. If that was in fact the case, it was a miscalculation, for the Marshal's son, Chang Hsueh-liang, succeeded to the control of the northern provinces, and he proved to be far more receptive to new ideas than his father had been. When, in 1929, the new ruler of Manchuria, instead of renewing the civil war, declared his adherence to the Nationalists (who had transferred the capital from Peking to Nanking), Japan's hold upon Manchuria appeared to be more precarious than it had been since the Russo-Japanese War, and the rapid permeation of Manchuria by Nationalist ideas between 1929 and 1931 is one of the main explanations of Japan's forward move in the latter year. At that moment Japan declared her uncompromising hostility to China's efforts to secure national unity and regeneration.

The immediate problems facing China's new rulers in 1928 would probably have caused many European statesmen to look to the future only with despair. The Chinese, however, are probably at their best in adversity, for they possess patience, tenacity, humility, a habit of getting things done, and a genius for compromises which seem to the outsider utterly illogical, but which somehow work. Two other qualities are of great value in time of trouble—a sense of humour and the capacity to take long views. When the Nationalists established their government at Nanking the Treasury was completely empty and China's credit was at its lowest ebb. Moreover, there was no reason to suppose that foreign Powers would be unduly willing to advance loans except on terms which would perpetuate China's dependence on them. To add to the immediate difficulties there were disastrous floods in the Yangtse valley, causing widespread ruin, pestilence, and desolation, and the effects of these floods were undoubtedly increased by the ruinous decay into which the dykes had been allowed to fall. In the sphere of external affairs the Nationalists wished to see China's semi-colonial status ended by the abrogation of the unequal treaties, but the only thing she could offer in return was the promise of stable government, and therefore of increasing trade in the future—promises that had been offered often enough by others in the past, but which had never been fulfilled, and about which foreigners could therefore legitimately feel sceptical. Even Russia was not disposed to be unduly helpful, for the expulsion of

Chinese Communists and Russian advisers represented a severe set-back, and whilst the Soviet wished to see some Chinese Government sufficiently powerful to offer a check to Japan, she would naturally have preferred to see the Chinese Communists, allied with the Left Wing of the *Kuo min tang*, dominating the new Government. The resolution and skill of Chiang Kai-shek and his associates had prevented that.

The new Government had other and equally serious problems to face. All effective opposition, except from the Communists, had for the moment ceased, but very large armies still remained under the control of militarists who paid only a nominal allegiance. If the authority of the Nationalists was not to go the way of that of all their predecessors, the most urgent immediate task was to disband these armies, and at the same time to create a compact, well-trained, and well-equipped force in its place. Disbandment could not take place, however, unless money could be raised to restore these very large numbers of soldiers (well in excess of two millions) to civil life, and this, in a country so poor as China, where wealth is still derived preponderantly from agriculture, strained the national resources to the uttermost, more especially as the militarists themselves were disposed to argue over terms, in order to delay diminution of their power. The solution of this problem involved much delicate negotiation, many disappointments for the central government, and a good deal of 'face-saving' by the creation of high-sounding posts, with little power; but it was achieved at last, and with its solution the most obvious menace to the new Government disappeared.

Even when this was done, fresh problems of first magnitude appeared on every hand. The railroads had become ruinous through years of civil war, and had ceased to earn sufficient revenue to pay the foreign bond-holders. Additional sums would have to be found to put them in good order again, but these could be raised only by Chinese efforts. In the constitutional field there were the problems of preparing the Chinese people for self-government, the preparation of a workable constitution, and the achievement of central control over provincial governments which in the years of chaos had become accustomed to regard themselves as so many independent sovereignties. Beside such Herculean tasks, such matters as the preparation of a new code of laws; the training of a new judiciary; the improvement of agriculture; the establishment of a modern and national system of education—elementary, secondary, university, and adult; extensive afforestation; and the expansion of China's industry and commerce, may perhaps have appeared somewhat simpler. Above all, there loomed the fact that none of these reforms could be undertaken without money, and that

money could be raised only by borrowing or taxation. If borrowing was adopted, the danger of increased foreign control was considerable. If fresh taxation was resorted to, the difficulty was to find adequate sources of revenue, but in any event, the result could only be a decline in the popularity of the new regime. Undismayed either by the vastness of the internal problem, which affected the lives of no less than one-fourth of the human race, or by the increasingly menacing attitude of Japan, the Nationalists began their prodigious task.

To have achieved the progress in reconstruction which occurred between 1928 and 1937, when the Japanese invasion brought all schemes to an abrupt end, suggests that the Chinese Nationalists enjoyed leadership at once resolute and far-seeing. Just as the Soviet Union to-day is indissolubly connected with the personal fortunes of Stalin, just as the England which narrowly escaped obliteration, caused by evasion of its main social and international problems, is to-day forging a new social order under the virile leadership of Mr. Churchill, and just as the new United States, its worship of ease, money, and isolation cast aside, is being steered to a far greater future than any American dreamed of a generation ago, so the new China which has been created in a couple of decades bears unmistakably the impress of Marshal Chiang Kai-shek's own personality. He not only controls and directs; he initiates and experiments. The parallel with Stalin is perhaps closer than the parallel with any other leader of the United Nations. Stalin gave practical form to ideas elaborated by Lenin, and in the same way Chiang Kai-shek has secured objective realisation of the ideals of Sun Yat-sen. In both cases the founders of the national revolution died in the hour of success, but without Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek the work of neither would have proved enduring. In both cases, too, the successors have added something of themselves to the new political structures which have been created. Again, it is possible to detect common characteristics in the make-up of Lenin and Sun Yat-sen. Both were warm, impetuous, receptive to new ideas, and were also born revolutionaries. By contrast both Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek appear mysterious, cold, and aloof. Both, too, were ranked rather less highly than other possible claimants for the succession, but both have outdistanced all competitors because of a relentless tenacity which is now directed towards the destruction of external enemies, but which a few years ago was directed with equal rigour against disruptive elements within their own following. It may well be that the greatest and most fruitful phase in the careers of both leaders is yet to open, but the achievements of both have already been sufficient to give them an enduring place in world history.

The main episodes in the eventful career of Sun Yat-sen have already been briefly mentioned. What kind of a man was he, that his life has made such a deep impression upon Chinese history? Above all, how is he to be regarded? As a visionary, a prophet, a statesman, a leader, or a failure? When he died in 1925, before the force of Chinese Nationalism had made itself apparent to the world at large, it was customary to regard him as substantially a failure—an impractical visionary, who had achieved nothing of value. When a considerable number of people, more especially of such a practical people as the Chinese, give their unreserved allegiance to one man, it is always rather dangerous to write him off as a failure. Sun Yat-sen knew his people; he knew at once their strength and their weaknesses, and his political and economic doctrines were so framed that they attracted adherents from every rank of Chinese society, although the mainstays of his party were always the returned students, who to-day occupy the leading positions in the Nationalist movement. Exactly as the veneration of Lenin fills the void in Russian life left by the obliteration of God and the Emperor, so the veneration of Sun Yat-sen fills a similar void in Chinese life, left by the disappearance of the Son of Heaven.

In origin Sun Yat-sen was a Cantonese, of poor but scholarly family. In personality he was warm, generous, and impulsive, with a gift for immediate friendship with those of similar outlook to himself. Europeans who knew him well became as completely attached to him as his Chinese associates. He was twice married, once in his student days to a woman with a background similar to his own, possessing the quiet strength of many Chinese women, but indifferent to politics. She lived to an advanced age at Macao, being converted late in life to Christianity, and becoming in consequence absorbed in good works in that unrighteous port. There were three children of this marriage, a son and two daughters. The son, Dr. Sun Fo, has occupied a number of important ministerial posts in the Nationalist Government. He is a man of ability and a convinced democrat, combining some of his father's political genius with a constancy and moderation which are probably derived from his mother.

Sun Yat-sen's second marriage is regarded by many as the turning-point of his career. Following the collapse of his plans for a Chinese parliamentary republic on the fall of the Empire in 1911, Dr. Sun withdrew to Shanghai, where he renewed a longstanding friendship with Mr. C. J. Soong, a Shanghai merchant and a Christian. For a time the eldest of Mr. Soong's accomplished and beautiful daughters, Ai-ling, acted as Sun Yat-sen's secretary. When Ai-ling left, her sister, Ching-ling, succeeded her, and the

two became so deeply attached that they were married in 1915, Dr. Sun having previously separated from his first wife.

The three daughters of Mr. Soong are probably more familiar to Western peoples than any other Chinese figure, for their doings have long been included amongst the world's top-line news. All three possess beauty, poise, and vivacity, whilst all three have married leaders of the Chinese Nationalist movement, for Ai-ling married H. H. K'ung, who has held many influential posts at Nanking and Chungking, whilst the third sister, Mei-ling, married Chiang Kai-shek, as the Marshal's second wife. In addition, the brother, Mr. T. V. Soong, is universally regarded as China's leading financier, and his brilliance alone has steered China safely through the financial quicksands which have loomed up continuously since 1927. In view of the brilliance and influence of the Soong family and their connexions, some writers have spoken of the 'Soong dynasty' as the present rulers of China, but the suggestion that China is really governed by the three sisters, through their husbands, brother, and cousins, is as fantastic as it is picturesque. Each of the sisters possesses a pronounced individuality, and their political outlook is by no means identical. In the last ten years of the life of Dr. Sun Yat-sen he received from his wife support, understanding, and inspiration, and her enthusiasm probably influenced him considerably in the last phase of his political development. After his death, Dr. Sun's widow joined the Left Wing of the party, and for a time was keenly critical of the policy followed by Chiang Kai-shek and her brother. Of the three sisters the eldest, Ai-ling, could be most directly identified with the family outlook, although this has not prevented keen rivalry between her husband and her brother. Of Madame Chiang Kai-shek it is at this date almost superfluous to write anything. The indomitable supporter of her husband, the accomplished hostess, the shrewd counsellor, the initiator of innumerable activities contributing to the success of the cause, her political insight is as extensive as her courage, which manifested itself in her flight to the headquarters of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang at Sianfu to procure her husband's release in 1935.

Finally, what estimate can be formed of Chiang Kai-shek himself? In recent years writer after writer has attempted to give an appraisal of his qualities, his personality, and his abilities, and estimates are so widely different that they bewilder the reader. Thus, that outstanding American writer on international affairs, Frederick L. Schumann, in his recently published book, *Design for Power*, has described the Marshal as 'this cold and callous Christian who was changed from rebel to tyrant, from conqueror to weakling, from China's hope to China's grief, and then from grief to hope

once more despite himself.' To describe Chiang as cold and callous is natural to one who looks at the Chinese scene from a distance, detached from the events which he describes. Chiang has faced and survived difficulties which would have destroyed lesser men. Of poor birth, he was trained by a widowed mother to appreciate the virtues of frugality and industriousness. These habits have remained. In his tenure of office he has trod warily between Left and Right, satisfying neither. In particular, he retained the confidence and support of Russia, when the Western Powers were deaf to appeals for aid, whilst at the same time energetically and relentlessly pursuing the Chinese Communists. Similarly, whilst convinced of the inevitability of war with Japan, he defied his own war-party in his determination to postpone the outbreak of war as long as possible, in order to prepare as fully as time permitted for a struggle which he knew would be long and relentless. In opposing the war-party he risked his entire political future, and both his personal popularity and the prestige of the Nationalists declined during the years of appeasement. Chiang lacks the impulsive warmth of Sun Yat-sen. He is neither a prophet nor a mystic, but an extremely able man of affairs. He is not patient with inefficiency, he does not suffer fools gladly, he is not prolific in confidences, and he does not always explain his policy very clearly. Nevertheless, the Japanese regard him as their principal obstacle in their march through Eastern Asia, and they would give untold sums to know that he was dead. In this they are right. Chiang is the personification of Chinese defiance, and he symbolises the Asiatic order of to-morrow—an Asiatic order in which Japan's place will be a relatively unimportant one. Chiang has harnessed time and space to the Chinese war-machine. He sows dragon's teeth in the path of the advancing Japanese, and he is as relentless as he is tenacious. One of the five greatest of living leaders of men, he is suspicious of all extremes, though it is perhaps in the natural order of things that his son, General Chiang Ching-kuo, was trained in Russia, and is now a Communist. At the end of the present war Chiang Kai-shek will be the unchallenged leader of 450,000,000 persons, who will have liberated the whole of Eastern Asia from the threat of Japanese domination by their efforts. He will hold the key to the future of something like 700,000,000 people in his hands. It is possible that power such as this may be abused; but the indications are that Chiang is concerned with one thing, and one thing alone—the freeing of the Chinese people from external interference, and the improvement of their conditions of life which can only come from peaceful co-operation. In that is to be found one of the surest signs of future peace in the Pacific which we possess.

CHAPTER IX

THE CHINESE RENAISSANCE

IN 1928, when the Nationalists began their work of reconstruction, China was scarcely even a nation. It was simply a collection of individuals (the vast majority of them living only just above the starvation line) speaking several different dialects differing as considerably as English, French, and German, and regarding their obligations to their family, their village, and their district as far more important than those to their province and country. But for the jealousies of the principal Far Eastern Powers, China might have been allowed to disintegrate, for in 1928 even the security of foreign financial interests had gone. If China had disintegrated, no doubt all the outlying provinces would have passed under foreign control, whilst some kind of puppet government would have purported to govern some of the central provinces, mainly those along the Yangtse. By 1937, when the present Sino-Japanese War began, and in spite of an earlier war with Japan in 1931, China could already be regarded as a second-rate Power with very considerable potentialities. By the summer of 1941, with comparatively little foreign help, and after losing every port of importance, the bulk of her railway system, many cities, and the lower reaches of her vast inland waterways, the Nationalists had fought Japan to a standstill, the Chinese people were more united than ever before in their history, and the Chinese Government still governed a continuous stretch of territory, occupied by between two hundred and two hundred and fifty million people. The subsequent development of world affairs has brought people to realise increasingly that China is potentially one of the most important states in the world, and that to speak of a world 'peace-front' of the British Commonwealth, the United States, the Union of Soviet Republics, and China, is to link together states which between them hold the key to the world's future progress. China to-day is potentially a very Great Power indeed, at a time when Great Powers are fewer than they have ever been before. In fact, the length, intensity, and scope of the present struggle necessarily imply that the Great Powers who win it will be the only Great Powers for some time to come. When Germany and Japan are defeated, as those who misrule both nations clearly perceive, whatever policy towards them may be adopted, their influence outside their own borders will be at an end. The development of modern warfare neces-

sarily implies that defeats are more disastrous than they have ever been before. China is now a most important unit in the democratic world front. When Japan collapses, China will replace her as the leading Power in the Orient, in all probability as the centre of a ring of states with common defence arrangements, and with cultures owing much to the achievements of Chinese Nationalism. That is the measure of what Chiang Kai-shek and his colleagues have done in the few short and troubled years at their disposal. Under them, the Chinese have become a resolute, confident, and able people. They have steered a careful line between extremes either of the Right or of the Left. They have sought to cultivate cordial relations with every state except Japan, where such efforts would manifestly be wasted, but they have become the dupes of none. Their foreign relations have been conducted with firmness and adroitness, but with an obvious legality, and with an often proclaimed desire for a stable international order; whilst in their domestic revolution they have sought, not the interests of a class, but of the whole people, showing a tremendous capacity for improvisation and a seemingly inexhaustible receptivity to new ideas. For half a century the restlessness, disintegration, and weakness of China seemed to be the result of no directive force. To-day the Chinese are probably clearer about their objectives, and the means by which they are to be achieved, than any other people, not even excepting the Russians. It is also characteristic of the Chinese that they should have developed a political philosophy, which they have never attempted, either directly or indirectly, to transmit to foreigners, but which Western political philosophers and statesmen would do well to study with some care, for it contains the answers to some of the questions which they so frequently ask. It is equally characteristic of their clearness of vision that when Japan made her dastardly attack upon the United States and Great Britain on 7th December 1941, China immediately declared war upon Germany and Italy.

Something has already been said of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and of his Three People's Principles which, as Mr. Paul Linebarger points out,¹ 'form an ideology with more legal adherents than Marxism and National Socialism and Fascism combined.' To-day every party and every movement in China—even the Chinese Communists, and the tattered remnant of the *Kuo min tang* which followed Wang Ching-wei into treacherous subservience to the Japanese, claim to be interpreting, developing, and applying Dr. Sun's teaching. Dr. Sun's personality is stamped ineffaceably upon the Chinese political life—a fact which is emphasised by his designation as the only (and perpetual) Leader (Tsong-li) of the *Kuo*

¹ *The China of Chiang Kai-shek*, p. 246.

min tang. Chiang Kai-shek is Chief (Tsung-ts'au) only. Nor is this too high a tribute, for Dr. Sun provided a new starting-point for all phases of Chinese social activity. He has provided a new social ethic, as well as a new political and economic creed. All significant activity, therefore, must be related to his teaching. The instrument for putting this into practice is the *Kuo min tang*, but in so far as other parties may be claiming to do this also, the Chinese have reached a typical compromise. China is, at the moment, a one-party state. All parties other than the *Kuo min tang* are therefore technically illegal, but they exist, and are neither prosecuted nor persecuted. On the contrary, their abler members are woven into the fabric of government in a manner which will be described later.

The extent of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's influence upon Chinese civilisation can be adequately appreciated only when it is realised that for 2500 years all Chinese culture has been based ultimately upon Confucianism, which has given it its stability, its balance, and its resistance to Change. Confucianism was designed to produce a scholar class whose learning and abilities should make Chinese civilisation secure, both internally and externally, and whose brilliance should arouse the admiration and homage of the 'outer barbarians' upon whom some stray gleams might chance to fall. Over twenty-five centuries, however, the zeal of prophets changed imperceptibly into the querulousness of pedants, with consequences which have already been indicated. For all that, tradition proved stronger than recognition of the urgent necessity of reform, and Confucianism remained the basis of Chinese life even after the destruction of the Empire. But for Dr. Sun it is highly probable that it would still be barring the path to the great future which Destiny promises to the Chinese Race. The Three People's Principles is therefore neither a text-book of politics nor an interpretation of history as Marxism is. It is intended to be a philosophy of living appropriate to the Chinese. It has never occurred to them that other nations might prove suitable media in which to test this new way of life. There are no Chinese 'Fifth Columns' in any foreign country—not even in those territorially adjacent. The Chinese have never dreamed of a world union of *Kuo min tang* Republics. With sturdy common sense they realise that every vigorous people must achieve its own philosophy of living. But with unfaltering political instinct they have ranged themselves consistently on the side of the progressive and pacific peoples of the earth. They have taken the long view and are building for the distant future. They are applying themselves with unspectacular thoroughness to the task of forging a weapon which will destroy Japanese militarism and the assertion of crude racial superiority for ever; but even their most Nationalist publicists have never claimed

foreign territories as part of their *Lebensraum*, or have argued that Japan can only prosper if it is governed by puppets controlled from Nanking and supported by a Chinese army of occupation. Such political maturity is rare—more especially when it is remembered that, historically, China has strong claims to numerous neighbouring territories now under alien control, and that the status of these will require most careful consideration at the peace conference. This, indeed, is a problem of some complexity, which will be discussed in a later chapter.

The Three People's Principles themselves require a word of explanation: These principles, which Dr. Sun considered ought to provide the basis of all reconstruction of Chinese life, are nationalism, democracy, and the people's livelihood. Nationalism, for Dr. Sun, involved the idea of cultural bonds between all members of the Chinese race. For that reason both the Party Congress of the *Kuo min tang* and the popular assembly which appears in the Draft Constitution contain representatives of overseas Chinese. There is, however, no hint of racial superiority in Dr. Sun's doctrine. It would, indeed, be in conflict with Dr. Sun's philosophical and political outlook, which accepted the necessity for the peaceful co-operation of all nations, but on a footing of complete equality. For that reason Dr. Sun denounced the economic exploitation of China by Imperialist Powers, and welcomed Russian aid to end it. In more recent years his followers have sought to achieve the same end by diplomatic means, and have now, for all practical purposes, been successful. Dr. Sun was conscious of the fact that until the advent of the foreigners, China had been 'the Middle Kingdom' of a loosely associated group of Eastern Asiatic states which derived their culture essentially from Chinese sources, and whose existence and immunity from external attack depended ultimately upon Chinese military strength. These states, nevertheless, were free to shape their national lives according to their own inclinations—a circumstance provocative of a great deal of difficulty with the foreigners in the nineteenth century. Dr. Sun hoped that in the future some international system with some of the features of this peaceful group of states could be established. The end of the present war may very well see this aspiration realised, and China taking her proper place in a stable international system.

Democracy with Dr. Sun was not so much a question of political form as of social reality. All authority, in the last resort, proceeds from the Chinese people, defined in accordance with the principle of nationality. But it implies social stability (to be achieved through the application of the third principle), and the evolution of a system of government which will permit the people to achieve real, as distinct from nominal, control of their leaders. This is based

upon his famous distinction between power (*ch'üan*) and ability (*neng*). In other words, the instruments of government must be popularly elected, and also democratically controlled after election. For that reason the Draft Constitution prepared by the *Kuo min tang* included such modern political devices as the initiative and the recall of ministers who have forfeited popular confidence.

The third principle, of the people's livelihood (*min sheng*), is the most characteristic contribution of Dr. Sun to political and economic theory. The whole current of Chinese thought is remote from any purely materialist interpretation of history, and for that reason, as well as for others, Dr. Sun rejects Marxism, whilst perceiving (somewhat earlier than many Western thinkers) that the whole drift of modern society is towards increased collectivism. Dr. Sun takes as his starting-point the individual consciousness, and attempts to relate it to the necessity for human association in large groups. There is much that is essentially Chinese in the discussion of this part of his thesis, but its practical aspect may be summed up as an affirmation of the necessity for social justice and economic democracy. This must be achieved in China by the termination of the Imperialist regime, based upon the system of the 'unequal treaties' and by a development of China's resources by general effort, with state encouragement, but within a general plan for the common good. Under stress of the second World War, Great Britain and the United States have now reached a similar position. The whole drift of Dr. Sun's argument is an illustration of the Chinese distrust of extremes and of mechanical formulae, and it affirms the basic principle that the state and society exist for the fuller realisation of human happiness. The third principle, equally with the second, is thus an emphatic repudiation of Nazi and Fascist conceptions of the state.

The instrument through which the Three People's Principles are to receive practical application in China is the *Kuo min tang* Party, and the organisation of this party, with its relation of the Chinese state and people, forms an excellent and revealing commentary upon modern Chinese political methods. Officially, China is a one-party state, and other political parties are illegal. For a time, as will be pointed out later in this chapter, the Nationalists attempted to suppress the Communists altogether, but the Communists had established too firm a hold upon some parts of China for the attempt to be successful, and now under stress of war, with Japan the acknowledged enemy alike of both parties, Nationalists and Communists co-operate for a common victory. Until recently the alliance has been an uneasy one, but it has held, thanks to the statesmanlike qualities of Chiang Kai-shek, and the unquestionable abilities and integrity of the chief Communist leaders. Now that

China, Russia, the United States, and the British Commonwealth are united in a common front against Nazism, Fascism, and racial intolerance throughout the world, it may reasonably be expected that the alliance will become a more cordial one, more especially since, as the war progresses, Chinese Communism acquires an increasingly distinctive character. In a number of fields of activity there is no fundamental conflict of aims between the two parties. It is merely that the Communists claim to be doing the same things as the Nationalists, only more thoroughly. This is particularly the case in the sphere of agrarian reform and of co-operative enterprise in Chinese industry. In the sphere of foreign policy there now exists no perceptible difference. Prior to the summer of 1941 Communist foreign policy emphasised the need for the closest accord with Russia, to the exclusion of Great Britain and the United States, whilst the Nationalists were prepared to receive help from every Power that could give them aid in their struggle with Japan. Japan's desperate venture in December 1941, coupled with the Nazi attack upon Russia, and Russia's alliance with Great Britain, have now made these former differences meaningless.

Whilst all parties other than the *Kuo min tang* remain officially illegal, no action is taken against them, and their leading members are invited to collaborate with the Chinese Government—but as individuals, not as leaders of other parties. Apart from the Communists, however, there is no party of any real importance. The National Salvation Movement, founded in 1935, has some following among professors, students, and young intellectuals. It was formed with the object of ending the civil war between Nationalists and Communists, and of stiffening opposition to Japan. It has little in the way of formal organisation, and politically the movement stands between the two main parties. In the areas where guerilla war between the Chinese and the invader ebbs and flows, the National Salvation Movement is a real force, and because of its deep patriotism and the high character of its leaders, a good deal more may be heard of it in the future. Beside this movement, there exist The Third Party, which inherits the tradition of the Left Wing of the *Kuo min tang*, which broke away from the main body in the summer of 1927, and for a time established a rival government at Wuhan. This party is notable mainly because it includes Madame Sun Yat-sen and Dr. Eugene Chen, who was Foreign Minister of the Nationalists in the early phases of the Revolution. Its main difference from the *Kuo min tang* is that it emphasises the last phase of Dr. Sun's political philosophy which, because of his collaboration with the Soviet, was naturally closer to Communism than his earlier writings.

When the *Kuo min tang* secured control of China in 1928 it visualised the realisation of the programme of Dr. Sun in three

stages. The first stage was the period of party dictatorship, rendered inevitable by the years of civil war and disintegration and by the backwardness of the Chinese people. During this period the *Kuo min tang* took charge of every sphere of public life, and the regime was as dictatorial as any government of China can ever be. This phase of political development lasted for a few years only. It was followed by the period of political tutelage, during which the *Kuo min tang* made cautious experiments in representative government, and prepared the people for a fully democratic government. In view of the vast scale of the tasks to be undertaken, the time assigned for this transitional stage was also surprisingly short, for it was generally assumed that by 1941 the third and last stage of the programme—the phase of democratic government and control—would have been reached. The outbreak of war with Japan in 1937, however, has retarded progress in this sphere, and in spite of periodic discussions and resolutions in the Party Congress, it is in the highest degree improbable that the transition to a full democratic regime will be made until the second World War is concluded. When it is, and the Japanese have been expelled from the Asiatic mainland, the political education of the Chinese people will have progressed so far, and national consciousness and social reconstruction will have developed to such an extent, that it is reasonable to suppose that China will effect the transition at the earliest possible moment, even though, under the new constitution, the *Kuo min tang* will still maintain a privileged position.

The relation of the *Kuo min tang* to the Chinese state is peculiar, for the governmental machinery is regarded as being derived from the Supreme National Defence Council of the *Kuo min tang*. In consequence, there is a complex duality between the organs of government and the organs of the party, and there are even signs of a triple control, the third element being the Military Affairs Commission, which has shown a tendency to set up governmental departments of its own. The link between all three is the Generalissimo himself, who is at once Party Chief, Chairman of the Party and of the National Defence Council, as well as of the State Council, the supreme governmental organ of the Chinese Republic, from which the various state departments are in turn derived. In formal structure the *Kuo min tang* is markedly democratic, and it is certainly as responsive to the main currents of Chinese opinion as the major parties of Great Britain or of the United States. The Supreme National Defence Council (which for war purposes has superseded the Central Executive Committee) is a large and representative body, elected by the Party Congress, and containing all the chief leaders of the party. Shifts of power within the party occur very much as they do in British or American parties—

through the emergence of some leader of outstanding ability, who attracts a following, or through the temporary association of groups or cliques, for which the Chinese politician has always shown a warm affection. Since the establishment of the *Kuo min tang* at Canton in 1924 six Party Congresses have been held—in 1924, 1926, 1929, 1931, 1935, and 1941. From this it will be evident that the real control of the *Kuo min tang* resides in the Supreme Defence Council, or in its Standing Committee, of which General Chiang is again Chairman.

As has already been pointed out, the various organs of the Chinese Government emanate from the Supreme National Defence Council of the *Kuo min tang*. At the head of all departments of state is the State Council of the National Government of China, which is the channel through which the commands of the Supreme National Defence Council includes, besides party leaders, high military officers, as well as a number of other persons, some of whom are not even members of the *Kuo min tang*. In times of emergency the Council may transmit its commands directly to the appropriate organ of government, instead of through the State Council, which for the most part includes persons holding no other important office, and thus lacks the main attribute of a supreme governmental council. Its chief function, besides being a channel through which the commands of the Supreme National Defence Council are transmitted, is to settle any issues which may arise between the main organs of government.

Western political philosophy divides governmental power into three spheres—legislative, executive, and judicial. In China, following the teaching of Dr. Sun, the division is fivefold—into executive, legislative, judicial, examination, and control. The last two are traditionally Chinese departments of state, and they maintain continuity with the chief organs of the Imperial Government. The three ordinary spheres of activity require little comment. Within the executive *yüan* all the main ministries are organised, and the heads of these departments assemble in a *yüan* meeting, which is, in substance, a meeting of the Chinese Cabinet. The Cabinet, however, can frame policy only within the terms of the general commands of the Supreme National Defence Council. The legislative *yüan*, as its name implies, prepares legislation. Members, numbering between fifty and one hundred, are appointed by the Supreme National Defence Council for a two-year term. During the war there is little work for it to do, beyond drafting the Permanent Constitution, under which its functions would naturally be enlarged, and its members would be popularly elected. At present there exists a People's Representative Council, outside the ordinary structure of government, which acts as a

channel, through which popular opinion can be transmitted to the National Defence Council. The People's Representative Council really is representative of all sections of articulate Chinese opinion, and it includes several well-known Communists. The judicial *yüan* controls not only the ordinary courts and the administrative courts, but also the Commission for the Disciplinary Punishment of Public Officers and the Ministry of Justice, which is, in fact, the organ through which the criminal law is set in motion. The examination *yüan* may perhaps be regarded as a survival from the traditional Chinese method of public administration, and its importance is obviously less than that of the other *yüans*. Finally, there is the control *yüan*, which is clearly the successor of the Imperial Board of Censors, and as such, plays a most important part in Chinese political life. In the first place, it includes the Ministry of Audit, but its main political function is to scrutinise official acts, and to impeach or suggest the prosecution of officials who fail in their duty. During the war the functions of this sphere of government have naturally diminished, but it potentially supplies the answer to the difficult problem of the control of those in possession of authority, which the long history of Chinese public administration suggests will be used in the future.

Thus, China possesses a complete framework of government, operating in response to the general commands of the Supreme Defence Council. In addition, there is a most complete Party Organisation, which duplicates to a very considerable extent the functions of government, although the party's essential role is to frame policy for the consideration of the Supreme Defence Council. Finally, there is the Military Affairs Commission, independent of both and also progressively extending over wider fields of national activity—a necessary development in view of the nature of the war which China is fighting, and the length of time which will be required for complete victory. The link between all these overlapping activities is General Chiang Kai-shek himself, and it is obvious that so long as Chinese political life continues to be organised as it is at present—that is to say, until national liberation and reorganisation are complete—his authority must continue to grow. More, therefore, depends upon the life of the Chinese leader than upon any other single person in the world. He is at present fifty-three. If he lives the normal span he will have piloted his country from chaos and international insignificance into the progressively smaller circle of Great Powers. There is every indication that he will do it.

Side by side with the comprehensive party organisation of the *Kuo min tang* there exist many extra-political movements, seeking to accomplish some special aspect of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's policy. Fore-

most amongst these is the New Life Movement, of which General Chiang is also Chairman. This important widespread movement aims to supply an ethical basis for the programme of the *Kuo min tang*. Its foundation dates from 1934 only, but it continues and extends the work of the Officers' Moral Endeavour Corps, founded in 1927. The chief efforts of the movement are directed towards eradicating some of the main weaknesses of the Chinese character, and the development of self-discipline and a sense of responsibility. What is contemplated, therefore, is a complete change both of social behaviour and of moral outlook. Once again there is a clear link with Confucian ethics, but the outlook is essentially modern. Thus the movement has done pioneer work in civic service, ranging from the organisation of mass marriages, to avoid the chronic debt which results from extravagance on these occasions, to the promotion of more cleanly methods of preparing and serving foods in shops and restaurants.

There are two other national movements of major importance—the National Spiritual Mobilisation and the Mass Mobilisation, both linked with the *Kuo min tang*. The National Spiritual Mobilisation is essentially a movement for the maintenance of moral in the prosecution of the war. The Mass Mobilisation is a product of the Military Affairs Commission, and its primary object is to unite the population of the occupied areas in resistance to the invader.

In the years prior to the present war with Japan the Nationalists had achieved an educational revolution of the very first importance. Even during the years of chaos and civil war, between 1916 and 1927, educational progress had never wholly ceased, since the demand for Western education was a growing one, which even the extension of mission schools and universities was unable to satisfy. Provincial, local, missionary, and other educational institutions were all incorporated in a national scheme of education after 1928. Great numbers of primary schools were opened and there was a marked extension of secondary and university education. Great new universities, in modern and spacious buildings, were founded, and in the few short years of peace they attained very high standards. The result has been a remarkable rise of literacy, and a steady diffusion of culture. Even the Japanese invasion has been unable to arrest this, for universities moved lock, stock, and barrel before the invader, to find new homes in free China, in some cases hundreds or even thousands of miles away from their original home. Temples, and even caves, have been hastily adapted to house lecture-rooms and libraries. The result has been that, after five years of war, the number of institutions of higher education, and the number of students attending them, have both increased substantially since the outbreak of war. More important still, the

conditions of the war, and the necessity for strengthening national unity, have made it necessary for the Chinese Government to pay increasing attention to mass education. There is a vast field for educational endeavour here, which the Ministry of Education is steadily surveying. Of China's estimated population of 450,000,000, no more than 90,000,000 even to-day are literate, and the adults for whom mass education is planned total 165,000,000. For these instruction can obviously only be of the most elementary kind, but although actual teaching is as yet entirely inadequate, it is supplemented by broadcasting, public meetings, and similar devices, with the result that even in the remotest villages there is to-day some consciousness of the world struggle which is now in progress, and of China's part in it. The Chinese have always been fond of listening to, and taking part in, political discussions. To-day these are directly related to China's future, and the part which villager and worker will play in it. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Education, in spite of financial stringency and the continuance of the war, is heroically pressing on towards its declared objective of one nucleus school for every village.

Upon the progress of law-reform in China little emphasis need at present be placed. Prior to the establishment of the Nationalist Government, it was not so much the absence of modern law courts as the lack of an independent judiciary and executive enforcement of judicial decrees which barred the way to the abolition of extra-territoriality. Prior to the present war with Japan the Chinese judicial *yüan* had prepared new codes, which would satisfy the most exacting juristic tests, and the task of training a modern judiciary was well advanced. Moreover, the control which the Nationalists now have over Free China make it clear that the problem of enforcing judicial decrees has largely disappeared. The only remaining problem is therefore the independence of the judiciary—a difficult question in a state constituted as China now is. On the other hand, the experience of Great Britain and the United States in two World Wars shows that the Rule of Law must necessarily abdicate in total warfare, and there seems to be no more reason to suppose that the province of the judiciary will not be clearly established in China when the war is over as there does in Great Britain or the United States. There is no good reason for retaining extra-territoriality in China when the war is over, and it has now been relinquished. Its existence represented a phase of China's relations with the West which is now ended. In the future the only possible basis for China's relations with Great Britain and the United States will be equal partnership in the maintenance of the peace.

Two developments dating from pre-war days have increased vastly in importance as a result of the war. They are the carrying

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out of rural reconstruction, and the spread of Chinese industrial co-operatives. China's main source of wealth is still agriculture, upon which some 350,000,000 are directly dependent. For the most part the farms are of smallest size, cultivated in traditional ways which progressively impoverish the soil. In many cases only a bare subsistence can be obtained, and bad years necessarily imply debt, and even loss of the holding, starvation, and the sale of children. The Chinese Mass Education Movement, starting originally with an educational bias, has now set itself to revitalise the entire structure of rural life. This involves encouraging a new type of rural magistrate, and enlightened landlords. It also involves experiments with more progressive methods of agriculture, as well as the development of rural sanitation, and care for rural health. The tasks of this movement have not always been easy to achieve. They have encountered prejudice, conservatism, corruption, and extortion. There are the usual difficulties with minor local officials under the domination of neighbouring wealthy land-owners, but the movement has struggled on, and to-day attracts increasing support.

Most well known abroad of all China's war-time developments, however, are the Industrial Co-operatives, which may be regarded as China's answer to the capture of the main industrial centres. Co-operation in some ways comes naturally to the Chinese, for in their villages, from time immemorial, they had practised it. In this way they had established village schools, or had tided one another over lean years. It had also proved the basis for the simple handicrafts, without which even an agricultural economy cannot continue. To link these traditions of simple joint-endeavour with the revolution which was made necessary by the transfer of the centre of all public activities into the interior was a stroke of genius which may profoundly affect the future of the world. Western China was formerly remote, backward, and conservative. To-day it is a hive of activity of all kinds, great and small, in which the most modern ideas receive the widest application. In proving that she can survive without access to the treaty ports, to the sea, or to her railway system, China has furnished most impressive proof of her strength and tenacity, and has given a stern lesson to all who would seek in the future to subdue her. Just as Stalin's transfer of Russian industry into Asia has enabled the Soviet Union to survive the terrible onslaughts of the Nazi *Wehrmacht*, so China's transfer of her productive centres into Western China has permitted China to survive five years of war with Japan, and with relentless patience to forge a military organisation which will eventually destroy one of the most sinister and dangerous threats to human progress that perverted ingenuity could ever devise.

The object of the Chinese Industrial Co-operatives is to make China self-sufficient for war purposes by the rapid growth of an all-embracing system of decentralised industry throughout Free China. The proportions of the movement may be gathered from the fact that in its first phase, which is now well on the way to completion, it aims to establish thirty thousand separate co-operatives. This, however, is only a beginning, and whether the war continues or not, the movement is now so well established that its effect can only be to turn China into a fully industrialised state, dependent upon co-operative enterprise, but operating within a national plan. Thus, once again, China has absorbed ideas recently current elsewhere, but aims to avoid the extremes of monopoly capitalism on the one hand and communal ownership on the other. It is a characteristic compromise, showing once more the curious similarity in outlook between ourselves and the Chinese, and the success of the experiment indicates a healthy vitality in Chinese life which their endurance in the present war has confirmed. It is therefore not without significance that the person who was primarily responsible for the inauguration of the movement was Mr. Rewi Alley, a New Zealander, whose proposals were submitted to General Chiang through Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, the British Ambassador. Established in 1938, the movement works under the general superintendence of the executive *yüan*. In conception, activities are divided into three zones. In the first, which is situated in the war area, or behind it in Japanese controlled territory, activities are concentrated upon the creation and distribution of war-time necessities—i.e. weapons, ammunition, medical supplies, and clothing. The second zone is situated in the outlying areas, exposed to frequent Japanese bombing. Here the emphasis is upon light industry, having the three characteristics of small capital outlay, mobility, and easy concealment. In the third zone, which is farthest from Japanese attack, heavier industries are established. When the transition from war to peace is made, Chinese industry will be spread through the entire country, and the evils of slums, overcrowding, and artificial increases in land values in industrial areas will have been in large measure avoided. Moreover, although the development of a class of industrialists is probably inevitable, it will be large in numbers and limited in wealth.

The changes in local life which have been brought about by the movement have been startling. Many of the conveniences of modern life, such as matches, tools, lamps, tinned foods, clothing, and many other products, have appeared in areas where previously nothing but the coarsest fabrics were spun, and no other manufactures of any kind were attempted. Paper-manufacture and printing

are particularly widespread, with obvious and far-reaching effects upon the spread of knowledge. Most important of all, however, has been the rapid growth of the armament industry. To-day China manufactures increasing quantities of guns, rifles, and ammunition. From this stage to the manufacture of tanks and aeroplanes is a less fundamental step than that which has already been taken.

Originally the Government loaned the Chinese Industrial Co-operatives five million dollars to finance new enterprises. Negotiations with the banks have increased this sum to thirty million dollars, and further increases of credit are contemplated.

In a recent article Mr. K. P. Liu, Secretary-General of the Chinese Industrial Co-operatives, described the method of establishing a new industry as follows:

‘When a depot is first set up the depot-master advertises the objectives of the C.I.C. by posters and speeches. But as soon as a few workmen get to know about its activities there is no more need to advertise. There are always plenty of workers who will prefer the security and freedom of a co-operative to unemployment or to working for a master.

‘The number of men needed to form a co-operative is at least seven, but there is no upper limit. They first come to talk things over with a C.I.C. organiser, present their plan for setting up a factory or workshop with proof of their qualifications and a tentative budget showing how much loan capital will be needed to start work. The organiser explains to them the co-operative system of self-government, Chinese co-operative law, and the C.I.C. Model Constitution. Then they take some descriptive literature home and discuss among themselves whom they want as their officers.

‘Meanwhile, their plans are talked over by the depot-master, accountant, organiser, and engineer, and modifications suggested. If, as often happens, it turns out that they are only merchants anxious to get rich quick and not *bona fide* workmen ready to work hard, the plans are rejected.

‘If all is satisfactory, a meeting is held for the election of officers, determination of capital, voting of wages, and work begins as soon as the loan is put through. At least one-quarter of the subscribed share capital must be paid up immediately, and the total loan—long-term or short—cannot exceed twenty times the ratio of the subscribed share capital. . . . The actual ratio of share to loan capital averages about 1 to 6.’¹

At present, textile co-operatives far outnumber those of any other industry, but chemicals, mining, and engineering are growing fast. When the number of co-operatives in any area is considerable, they

¹ Cited Linebarger, *The China of Chiang Kai-shek*, pp. 226-7.

are organised into federations. The chief functions of the federation are the supply of materials, and the marketing of products, although in some cases they form a useful reservoir for additional capital. When the war is over and foreign manufactures flow into the country again there will be difficult problems of transition, which have already been foreseen; but the co-operatives have built up a community of skilled workmen, who will be of the very first importance in the period of development which lies ahead. The co-operatives are a practical realisation of Dr. Sun's third principle of the People's Livelihood—which would repay study by those western societies whose economy has been uprooted by the war, and which are not prepared to take the decisive step of changing to state socialism upon the Russian model.

No sketch of Chinese life, and the changes which have taken place in it since the advent of the Nationalists to power, would be complete without some reference to the Chinese Communists and their achievements. Communism made a good deal of headway among the Chinese student classes in the period following the Russian Revolution, and the abandonment by the U.S.S.R. of all its special rights in China. It was an emphatic protest at once against the corruption, oppression, and opportunism of Chinese life, and of foreign imperialism which exploited it. As Dr. Sun, following repeated rebuffs from the treaty Powers, turned increasingly towards Russia for aid, an alliance between the Nationalists and the Communists was in the natural order of things. This alliance existed from 1922 to 1927, and in its early stages there was a real danger that the Communists would secure control of the *Kuo min tang*. The danger was averted by Chiang's purge of the Communists, and his dismissal of his Soviet advisers, following the march to the Yangtse, but only at the cost of seeing a rival government of Communists and Left Wing *Kuo min tang* dissidents establish itself for a time at Wuhan. The Nationalist Government survived this threat, however, and in due course the Left Wing of the *Kuo min tang* broke away from the Communists, who were driven from the Yangtse by Chiang Kai-shek as soon as his control of China was secure.

Deprived of the possibility of governing the whole of China, the Communists established their authority in wide areas of the provinces of Kiangsi, Hupeh, Honan, and Anhui, where they organised the Chinese Soviet Republic. The relations of the Soviet with this Republic were equivocal. The continued existence of the Nationalist Government of China was so obviously necessary in the interests of Russia's anti-Japanese policy that Chiang continued to receive Soviet support in spite of his determination to suppress the Soviet Republic. On the other hand, the Chinese Soviet

Republic itself received Russian support, provided this did not too seriously weaken Chiang's authority, so long as it was directed to preserving China's integrity from Japanese aggression, for Communism in China has many Chinese characteristics, as well as a strongly defined patriotism.

The military forces of the Communists comprised the armies of three generals who revolted at the time of the split between the *Kuo min tang* and the Communists, together with guerilla troops, raised and trained by the Communist leaders. For ten years these slender forces resisted successive attempts by Chiang to destroy them, and in their resistance in the mountainous and forested hinterland they undoubtedly perfected tactics which to-day are of the utmost value in wearing down the Japanese. At length, in 1934, Nationalist pressure increased to such an extent that the Communists were compelled to evacuate Kiangsi, and they organised the Long March, through Hunan, Kweichow, and Yunnan, and thence across Szechuan, on the fringes of Tibet. Traversing Kansu, they settled in Northern Shensi, one of the wildest areas in the Chinese interior. The total distance covered was over six thousand miles, much of it over the most difficult country in the world. The march was accomplished without any system of supplies other than that which could be carried in packs, and it was undertaken not only by trained troops, but also by families, schools, banks, and industrial undertakings. Once again one can trace in this march, which is undoubtedly worthy to rank among the great marches of history, the tactics followed by the Chinese people in re-establishing themselves in Western China after the Japanese conquest of the coastal areas.

Re-established in Shensi, in closer proximity to Russia, the Chinese Communists again defied Chiang's efforts to force them into submission, and at the same time their advocacy of resistance to Japanese aggression became steadily greater. They offered to put themselves at Chiang's disposal if only he would declare war. The Generalissimo, however, was postponing the moment of decision as long as possible, in an effort to build up his resources, and steadily resisted the mounting clamour. Then occurred a picturesque and significant episode. There was stationed in Southern Shensi General Chang Hsueh-liang, son of Chang Tso-lin, the former war-lord of Manchuria. His troops had been expelled from Manchuria by the Japanese, and it was therefore natural that they should reciprocate the desire of the Communists to renew the war. The result was a secret understanding between Chang Hsueh-liang and the Communists, which led to the kidnapping of General Chiang Kai-shek at Sianfu by General Chang Hsueh-liang and the Communists early in 1937. For some days

there was the most acute anxiety concerning the General's fate, which was terminated by his return to Nanking and his reconciliation with the Communists. Although no authoritative version of the proceedings at Sianfu has been published, it is a reasonable inference that the basis of the reconciliation was a common front against the Japanese.

Since the outbreak of the war the Communist armies have taken their share in the fighting, and their experience and training make them peculiarly suitable for the guerilla warfare which China is now waging. They have two leaders of outstanding eminence—Chu Te, a military leader fully worthy of comparison with Chiang Kai-shek, who led the Long March to the North West, and Mao Tsê-tung, the principal political leader. So perfect a combination do these two form that they are often described together as Chu-Mao. A third leader, Chou En-lai, is an adroit liaison officer with the National Government at Nanking.

The present status of the Chinese Communists in China is peculiar. They have no official existence, since China is a one-party state, but they occupy and administer a large area as an independent state, and their relations with the Nationalists are virtually those of an independent government. It is idle to deny that there is friction between the two sides of the Chinese Revolution. It flared up so recently as the summer of 1941, but was quickly ended. It also cannot be denied that the Communists include many able men of unimpeachable integrity, a number of them drawn from the student classes. Their achievements, both in guerilla warfare and in reconstruction in the areas under their control, are impressive. Whilst the development of a world front comprising China, Russia, the United States, and the British Commonwealth has probably simplified collaboration between Nationalists and Communists, it has not solved the problem of their post-war relations. Prediction for one who is not a Chinese is perilous. The Communists themselves say that if Chiang wins the war his prestige will be so great that it will be impossible to challenge it, or, with it, the *Kuo min tang*. Yet they show no signs of accommodation, seeking to interpret the phases of the struggle in Marxian ideology, the formalism of which is as alien to Chinese thought as its materialism. Perhaps this problem is now only one phase of the world problem of seeking a common accord between democracies and Communists. If it is, the *Kuo min tang* is ideologically well equipped to take a leading part in solving it. Its policy has obvious affinities with President Roosevelt's New Dealism. It will not be for lack of experience, effort, and goodwill if the problem remains unsolved, but if it should do so, the outlook for the post-war world is dark.

PART TWO

Russo-Japanese Rivalry in the Far East

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CHAPTER X

RUSSIAN EXPANSION IN EASTERN ASIA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

CHINA's relations with Russia, prior to the fall of the Manchu Empire in 1911, were always markedly different from her relations with other European states. The other foreigners came by sea, in comparatively small numbers, and their activities were limited to treaty ports which were comfortably remote from Peking. It was therefore possible to treat their relations with China as a local problem, for which the appropriate provincial viceroy (after the middle of the eighteenth century the Viceroy of Kwangtung and Kwangsi) could be held responsible. There was little or nothing which the Chinese required from the foreigners who came by sea, and until the middle of the nineteenth century there prevailed at Peking the most profound ignorance of the status of the various foreign Powers. For some time, indeed, the Imperial officials at Peking seem to have confused the Dutch with the English, and later, to have confused both with the Americans. After a time the Imperial administration appears to have discovered that the English were really the principal problem, and suspicion of them was intensified by the fact that English domination of India was substantially unchallenged by the time of the Napoleonic Wars, when the negotiations of the Indian Government with Nepal, a state over which China claimed a shadowy suzerainty, caused some anxiety in Peking, about the time when the first two British Embassies, that of Earl Macartney in 1796, and that of Lord Amherst in 1816, reached the capital. This circumstance, indeed, had something to do with the failure of both missions to secure any improvement in the conditions of trade of Canton. Until the conclusion of the first Anglo-Chinese War, however, there was no realisation whatever that it was necessary to treat the Maritime Powers upon a basis of equality. They remained simply 'outer barbarians,' extremely unruly in their behaviour, who somehow,

in previous centuries, had failed to come within the civilising orbit of the 'Middle Kingdom.'

From the beginning of intercourse between the two land Empires, however, the Chinese treated the Russians differently. The Romanoffs established themselves as 'Tsars of all the Russias' in Moscow in the sixteenth century. For some time they found that expansion in the West was barred by powerful rivals, and in particular by Sweden, Poland, and Turkey. It was therefore not unnatural that they should seek to push their ill-defined eastern frontier as far eastward as circumstances permitted. So it came about that Russia and China came into conflict in the early part of the seventeenth century, when both Imperial dynasties were in their first vigour. Two Russian embassies had already visited Peking to explore the position, one as early as 1567, and another in 1619, but as neither brought tribute, they were not received by the Emperor, and they returned to Moscow having achieved nothing. Russian interest in the Far East persisted, however, and in 1643 a small Russian expedition explored the Amur River as far as the Sea of Okhotsk. It brought back such favourable reports that further Russian expeditions followed, one of which in 1650 established a fortified post at Albazin, which was intended to serve as a rallying-point for Russian colonists. Sooner or later a collision with the Manchus was inevitable, and there were minor skirmishes in the following years. Neither side was at the time prepared to engage in large-scale activities, and the Russians sent a further embassy to Peking in 1633-4. Once again the lack of tribute proved a decisive obstacle to negotiations, and the embassy returned with nothing achieved. The Manchus themselves made the next move, sending an embassy to Moscow in 1670. Apparently there was in Moscow at this time no method of translating the despatches, so that yet another embassy proved abortive. As the Russians were reluctant to abandon negotiations, they sent a further representative with the returning Chinese envoys, but again none of the essential points in issue between the two Empires was cleared up.

It appeared that nothing remained but hostilities, for which the Manchus made thorough preparation. Frontier towns were fortified, and ten posting stations between Manchuria and the Amur River were established for the army which was being raised, whilst a fleet of junks was built for operations along the river. The war began with a demand for the surrender of Albazin, a demand which was of course refused. The post was defended by only a small garrison, however, and after a valiant resistance Albazin was evacuated and destroyed. An attempt to reoccupy it failed, and by 1686 both sides were prepared to negotiate. The Treaty of Nerchinsk, signed in 1689, ended the war. This was the first treaty

ever concluded between China and a foreign state, and it was a significant development, in view of China's claims to universal overlordship. Its main terms were that Albazin was to be demolished, regulations for trade across the frontier were drawn up, and arrangements were made for the surrender of offenders across the frontier to their appropriate authorities for trial and punishment. The frontier between the two Empires was declared to be the River Gorbitza, a northern tributary of the Amur, and the mountain range in which this river has its source. The boundary as defined by this treaty remained unchanged until 1858, when Russia associated herself with Great Britain and France for the purpose of extracting concessions from an empire whose weakness was already apparent.

Throughout the eighteenth century Russo-Chinese relations remained entirely peaceful. The irritating frontier problem was settled, and neither side was disposed to reopen it. Russia was at this period absorbed in her European problems, whilst the Manchus, having completed their conquest of China, were vigorously extending their authority, first in Mongolia, and later in Tibet and Turkestan. To have violated the peace, it would have been necessary for both sides to prepare for war on a substantial scale, and the issues involved did not appear to either side to be worth the effort. Accordingly, Russian embassies appeared from time to time at Peking, and were courteously treated. More rarely, a Chinese embassy visited Moscow, and all outstanding questions were settled by amicable negotiation. But the Chinese had formed the impression that whilst the foreigners who came by sea were remote and comparatively insignificant, so that they could be treated firmly, the Russians possessed a vast Empire and great resources. Being neighbours, it therefore behoved the Chinese to treat them with caution and forbearance.

The Treaty of Nerchinsk was followed by a second treaty between the two Empires, at Kiakhta, in 1727, regulating the frontier trade which was conducted at that place. For many years this trade was carried on by great caravans which wound their way slowly over the Siberian plains, from Moscow to Peking and back again, but in 1762 this trade was transferred from Peking to Kiakhta, and further conventions regulating it were signed in 1768 and 1792. On the Chinese side, the chief exports were silk and tea, whilst the Russians offered skins, coarse broadcloths, and furs. The trade was conducted entirely by means of barter. In addition to the trade carried on by way of Siberia there was also a second route through Chinese Turkestan, the main markets being at Kuldja (called by the Chinese Ili, a favourite place for the banishment of distinguished Chinese offenders) and at Tarbagatay. In

1851 a convention was signed at Kuldja for the purposes of regulating this trade.

By this date the period of peaceful commercial relations was rapidly drawing to an end. Although the Treaty of Nerchinsk had appeared to cut off Russia from the Pacific, this was a solution which could only be preserved so long as the power of the Manchu Empire remained formidable. By the middle of the nineteenth century defeat by the British in 1840, followed by the disastrous Taiping Rebellion, and further unsuccessful hostilities against Great Britain and France, had amply demonstrated the extent of its decay. Systematic encroachment on the part of the Russians eventually culminated in 1858 in the Treaty of Aigun, by which China surrendered to Russia all the territory north of Amur, whilst the question of ownership of the land on the south bank of the river between Ussuri and the sea was left for future settlement—a settlement which, in view of the way in which events were shaping at Peking, could only be in favour of Russia. In order to prosecute her advantage still further, Russia also sent an envoy to co-operate with the British and French delegations which were then seeking to end their joint hostilities in China, and although no Russian forces took part in this war, Russia benefited to the full in the resulting peace settlement. In the intervening months the inability of the Chinese administration to recognise the weakness of their position had brought upon them the further humiliation of an allied occupation of Peking, where peace was at length concluded in 1860. The Russian emissary, General Ignatieff, remained apart from the British and French envoys, and was successful in obtaining from the Chinese an agreement to the cession of the territory on the south bank of the Amur between Ussuri and the Pacific, thereby completing the eastward extension of Siberia, and stabilising the frontier between the two Empires.

At the other extremity of the long frontier between Russia and China, in the years following the Taiping Rebellion, relations between the two Empires reached the brink of war. Sinkiang ('The New Dominion') is bounded by Russian Turkestan on the west, by Kashmir on the south-west, on the south by Tibet, on the east by Kansu, and on the north by Mongolia. It has thus at all times been a barometer of Chinese stability. When China has been weak, Sinkiang has been a centre of revolts, sometimes fomented by China's neighbours, but when the government of China has been vigorous this distant territory has been brought effectively under Chinese control. In the eighteenth century the early and able Manchu Emperors subdued a number of risings in Sinkiang, which enjoyed firm and vigorous government until the nineteenth century. Even during the Taiping Rebellion there was little dis-

affection in the western provinces, but between 1864 and 1866 a series of local risings took place, resulting in an independent Mohammedan government proclaiming itself in Ili, whilst Yakub Beg renounced Chinese overlordship in the western part of Sinkiang. In the eastern districts and in Kansu still a third revolt culminated in the subjugation of these areas by the Dangani tribe. To subdue this triple revolt, one of the ablest of Chinese generals, Tso Tsung-tang, was despatched in 1867 with an adequate army. Between 1867 and 1875 Tso recovered the whole of Kansu and eastern Sinkiang, and having extinguished the last embers of revolt there, in 1875 he turned his attention to Yakub Beg, over whom he won a succession of victories, which proved decisive when Yakub Beg died, or was poisoned, in May 1877.

At this point, however, China and Russia found themselves in almost open conflict. Russian trade with China by way of Ili had assumed considerable proportions by the middle of the nineteenth century, and had been regulated by the Treaty of Kuldja in 1851. During the disturbances in Ili, Russia had occupied Kuldja, at the same time assuring the Chinese government that the territory would be evacuated when the Chinese were in a position to maintain order there. By the middle of 1878 it was evident, from General Tso's steady and successful reoccupation of the revolted territories, that the Chinese were in a position to maintain order, and they accordingly sent an ambassador to negotiate. The terms presented to Chunghow, the Chinese envoy, were severe. By the Treaty of Livadia, of 15th September 1879, Russia agreed to restore only the eastern (and poorer) part of the occupied territory. The remainder was to be incorporated into the Russian Empire. In addition, Russia obtained wide trading privileges in western China, and was to receive five million roubles in payment of her expenses during the occupation.

The Chinese Government signified its disapproval of these terms by disgracing the ambassador, whose life was saved only on the intervention of the foreign ambassadors in Peking. For a time it seemed that war between Russia and China was inevitable—a war in which General Tso would have begun hostilities with 60,000 troops, well equipped and experienced in local fighting. Eventually, more peaceful counsels prevailed, and whilst the Treaty of Livadia was left unratified, a further Chinese Embassy was sent to St. Petersburg, and this embassy succeeded in recovering the greater part of the territory which the earlier treaty had ceded. On the other hand, the sum which China was called upon to pay as 'compensation' was increased from five to nine million roubles.

Thus by 1870 the Russians had already acquired extensive and valuable additions of territory at China's expense, both in Turkestan

and on the Pacific coast. From the moment that they secured a foothold upon the Pacific further pressure was inevitable. Already there had been some preliminary reconnaissance in Manchuria, which being no part of China proper, and inhabited at this time mainly by Manchus, and which also was rich in resources, seemed an obvious field for further penetration. Moreover, Manchuria's southern coast-line, extending along the Gulf of Pi-chi-li, possessed several first-class harbours, which might obviously serve as sites for the desired ice-free port and naval base. Control of Manchuria would automatically bring Russia to the frontiers of Korea, a kingdom nominally subject to Chinese suzerainty, but upon which several foreign Powers were already casting covetous eyes. To secure control of these two regions in face of fierce foreign competition would not be easy, but Russia, pursuing an energetic forward policy, determined to make the attempt. Before the end of the century valuable railway, mining, and other concessions had been obtained in Manchuria, and a foothold had been secured at the Court of the Emperor of Korea. At the same time, Russia took care to dissociate herself from the Maritime Powers, and particularly from Great Britain and the United States in her diplomacy at Peking, with the result that the Chinese began to rely upon the Russian envoy to assist them in warding off fresh claims from the other foreigners. It was a dangerous policy, for Russian armies along the long common frontier represented a more constant and more serious menace than foreign naval units. For all that the Chinese decided to run the risk.

The situation in Korea seemed ideally suited for a policy such as Russia had chosen to follow. A decadent people, a corrupt court, and an obsolete army, together with shadowy Chinese claims to overlordship which could be used or ignored as circumstances indicated, were all extremely favourable. There can be little question that Korea would have followed Burma and Indo-China, and would have been incorporated into the Russian Empire before the end of the century, but for the unexpected intervention of Japan, and her decisive defeat of China in 1894. This was an unwelcome surprise for Russia, causing her to draw back and take a fresh view of the situation. By this time, however, events were moving fast, and the primary consequence of China's defeat was that she relied increasingly upon Russia in opposition to Japan. When the last Tsar, Nicholas II, was crowned in 1896, China's ablest diplomat, Li Hung-Chang, represented the Manchu Empire at the ceremony, and whilst there achieved a secret understanding with the Russian Government. The terms were harsh, but China accepted them, although they remained undisclosed for some months, and officially they were never acknowledged. Very

extensive railway and mining concessions in Manchuria were granted, Russian officers were to reorganise the Chinese army, and Russia was to obtain leases of Kiaochow (dominating Shantung) and of Port Arthur and Talienwan, dominating South Manchuria, although the transfers were not to occur until war broke out in the Pacific. At the same time Russian pressure on Korea increased, Russian officials controlling key posts in both the civil and military organisation of the Empire. In face of mounting Japanese hostility, Russia found it expedient to withdraw a little, and Germany, who had formerly been associated with Russia in compelling Japan to relinquish her most valuable acquisition after the Sino-Japanese War, now forestalled her former associate, and secured a lease of Kiaochow for ninety-nine years in 1898. Seeing that she was likely to lose many of the things which she had lately compelled the Chinese to agree to cede, Russia immediately replied by taking a lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan. Seriously alarmed by these forward moves, Great Britain secured a lease of Wei-hai-wei, across the Gulf of Pi-chi-li, whilst Japan accelerated her preparations for a conflict with Russia which she now regarded to be inevitable. Upon the result of that conflict rested the answer to the question whether Russia or Japan should acquire Manchuria and Korea, and with them domination of the tottering and corrupt Chinese Empire.

CHAPTER XI

THE BLOODLESS REVOLUTION IN JAPAN

A QUARTER of a century ago the 'bloodless revolution' in Japan in the second half of the nineteenth century used to be cited as a model of what a revolution in the life of an Oriental people should be. Conversely, the Chinese Revolution, beginning in 1911, was considered to furnish an illustration of a revolution which had completely failed. To-day, when Japan, having failed after five years of war to defeat China, and to control any substantial and continuous area of China proper, has now flung herself against the United States, Great Britain, and their many and powerful allies, it is obvious that this former judgment must be reversed. It is the Chinese Revolution which is significant, and which is not only placing China on the high road to national regeneration and a place among the Great Powers, but which furnishes lessons which can be studied with profit by all free peoples. Japan's revolution, on the other hand, is seen to be no revolution at all, but simply a

transformation by means of which a ruling class has maintained its oppressive rule over an amazingly docile people. Docility in the past, however, has coincided with a successful foreign policy. Japan's social problems to-day are probably the acutest of any state of considerable size. Defeat in the present war will not only reduce Japan overnight to a third-rate state, but it will coincide with the release of all those repressed forces underneath the mechanical structure of existing society. Revolution in Japan will have unpredictable consequences. It will not stop at the half-way house of any 'liberal' capitalist regime. It will be, in the most literal sense, a new beginning, dominated by influences of which the Western observer has little accurate knowledge. It will sweep away the dynasty, for the dynasty symbolises the whole current of Japan's development since 1868. It will sweep away the military and naval castes whose relentless ambition and limitless vanity have caused them to involve their country in a desperate adventure, which can only be compared with Hitler's. It will produce a mood of profound self-abasement, and it will disrupt the present fabric of Japanese industry. If Japan is not to become a new Eastern plague-spot, it will probably have to be placed under some form of international supervision—a development which will call for vision and forbearance from the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and China. Without such supervision it is by no means impossible that Japan will break up as China did, and that some of her too-abundant millions will starve. Further, it is only through international control that Japan's exclusiveness and racial arrogance can finally be broken down, for they have been characteristics of the Japanese people for centuries.

Contrary to general impression, there is little if any racial affinity between the Chinese and the Japanese, and Japanese civilisation is of comparatively modern growth. The Japanese race was probably formed from a mixture of Mongolian, Malayan, and Indonesian elements. Japanese mythology traces the foundation of the Empire back to the first Emperor, Jimmu Tenu, in 660 B.C., but there are few authentic records prior to the fifth century A.D., and from this time until the twelfth century Japanese history records simply internal strife and scanty progress, largely because Japan's isolation from the Asiatic mainland shut the country off from new ideas, from continental invasions, or from religious and other conflicts. There was a good deal of intercourse with China and Korea, and it is from the Chinese that the Japanese derived the main elements in their civilisation, including writing, improved methods of agriculture, and Buddhism. The Japanese language itself, however, is a native product, having no connexion with any other known tongue. In the early period, too, Japan welcomed

aliens, especially from China and Korea, principally because they were specialists and had much to teach the Japanese. Thus at the time of the Nara civilisation (A.D. 700-800) no less than 381 out of 1177 noble families were of Korean or Chinese descent.

Until this period it would be difficult to say that Japan was a single state. The Japanese had by no means subdued the Ainu, the original inhabitants. In addition, there were incessant inter-clan wars. Eventually, however, one or two great clans (backed by the Buddhist hierarchy) secured an ascendancy over Court and Government. The result was that the authority of the Emperor steadily declined. The logical conclusion of this policy was reached between 1600 and 1868, when the Emperor was deprived of all authority, which was exercised by the Tokugawa clan. During this period, too, all foreigners were expelled from Japan, all foreign trade was prohibited, and foreign influences (including Christianity) were eradicated. Thus Japanese society petrified in a feudal pattern for over two and a half centuries, but although the authority which the feudal overlord exercised over his subordinates was extensive, his influence in the conduct of public business was very small. He was encouraged to consume his substance in extravagant pleasures at Court, so that his wealth was dissipated, whilst he himself remained under the observation and control of the ruling clan. Meanwhile the ruling clan minutely regulated every aspect of Japanese life, and by an extremely elaborate system of supervision prevented any serious rival to their authority from emerging.

The continuance of such a system necessarily depends upon its ability to exclude new and alien influences. The Tokugawa shogunate was therefore doomed when its powerlessness in face of foreign pressure was apparent. Once foreign influences had forced an entry, Japanese intelligence was able to detect the weaknesses of their civilisation, and the peril in which they stood, both internally and externally. Describing conditions as they existed in the middle of the nineteenth century, Mr. J. Ingram Bryan writes:

‘When Japan was obliged to enter into diplomatic relations with Western nations during the years following 1854, civilisation had reached about the same stage of development as in twelfth-century Europe. Society was rigorously, and only too often unfairly and cruelly, divided into superiors and inferiors, in complex gradations, with no system of justice higher than force or tradition to decide rights and relations. The population, which, owing to war, pestilence, and famine, had increased by only 4,000,000 in the previous three centuries, at this time totalled roughly about 33,000,000, all under 270 feudal lords, who lived in pomp and luxury in imposing castles, surrounded by bands of *samurai*, who

saw to it that their master's word was law. It was not uncommon to see headless trunks of ordinary people lying by the roadside, testifying to the keenness of the *samurai* sword, swift to avenge the slightest insult, real or fancied. The people were without rights, privileges, or freedom, in the modern sense. Justice was for the strong; the prisons were infernos of foulness and misery unspeakable, where fiendish torture was a daily occurrence or scores of prisoners executed for the most trivial offences. At the top were power, pride, privilege, luxury, and sensuality; at the bottom were oppression, poverty, disease, starvation, and the slow rotting of millions. Any who deem this picture overdrawn must be referred to reliable histories of the period, or to the witness of men still living. And when suddenly the test came, this rigid and unjust military system was unable to defend itself against foreign aggression. The nation then had a rude awakening from its policy of trying to ignore the present by idealising and transforming the past.¹

These facts must be remembered when Japan faces defeat. The remembrance of the former vicious system is still vivid. The justification for the system which was introduced in 1868, and which has survived with periodic shifts of emphasis from 1868 until the present time, is that it has ended corruption, inefficiency, and decay, and has won Japan a foremost place among the Powers of the world. If it should be found that the present regime has done none of those things, the vengeance of the Japanese people will be sudden, ruthless, and complete.

It was Commodore Perry's expedition to Japan in 1853, with the object of securing more humane treatment for American sailors shipwrecked on the Japanese coast, that opened the door to intercourse with the West. Some show of force was necessary before the shogun would agree to the preparation of a treaty. When it was signed in 1854, the treaty period in Japan had begun, and in a short space of time practically all the Powers with treaty rights in China had secured similar rights in Japan. The whole apparatus of foreign trading—concessions, extra-territoriality, foreign gun-boats and foreign police, and the hypothecation of Japan's resources—was imposed upon a people who a few years before had been ignorant that such foreign peoples even existed. Accordingly, there were frequent outbursts of anti-foreign feeling, whilst the shogun was equally unpopular because he had not only been responsible for the signing of the treaties, but had done so directly, without adopting the empty pretence of obtaining Imperial ratification. The Imperial Throne thus escaped popular resentment, and came to be regarded increasingly by a perplexed people as a

¹ *The Civilisation of Japan*, pp. 213-5.

rallying-point. So, while foreign navies bombarded Japanese ports and demanded indemnities for foreign traders who had been assassinated, and whilst revolution became daily more imminent, the last Tokugawa shogun made the decision to resign his monopoly of government, and with it his family estates, to the Emperor. This event, which ended one epoch of Japanese history and began another, occurred in 1867, and the shogun's example was followed by the entire body of 270 feudal lords.

After a lapse of two and a half centuries, during which Imperial authority was non-existent, the Emperor now found himself in control of the government. It was a situation which called for the exercise of a great deal of foresight. Although the feudal lords had resigned their privileges, their power was by no means destroyed. The southern clans, who had been excluded from all participation in the government by the Tokugawa clan, rallied to the Emperor, but this only gave colour to the suggestion that the Tokugawas had been forced to abdicate, and that this was merely a phase in a clan struggle. Tokugawa adherents therefore rallied to end the influence of the southern clans, but the Imperial forces won a great victory at Fushimi, and all armed resistance thereupon collapsed. On the other hand, Japanese opinion was sharply divided upon many points. There were those who wished to expel the foreigners and return to isolation. Others, however, believed that foreign trade and knowledge of foreign civilisation would ultimately prove most valuable to Japan. There were conservatives who wanted to restore the governmental system which existed prior to 1600, whilst others advocated widespread reforms, and the adoption of a modern, Western constitution. Only Japanese pride of race prevented a complete disaster, for a spread of anarchy would no doubt have made Japan a field for the interplay of foreign diplomacy. Even as it was, Russia and Germany were prepared to intervene to restore the shogunate. Anglo-American influence, on the other hand, was strongly in favour of the Imperial restoration, and of modernisation and constitutional progress; and it was the liberals whose views eventually prevailed. The outstanding difference between the effects of foreign penetration in China and their effects in Japan was that in China the monarchy was identified with reaction, impotence, and unsuccessful resistance to the foreigner. In Japan the monarchy was identified with reform, vigorous modernisation, and collaboration with foreign nations. Making all due allowance for the native shrewdness of the Japanese Imperial family, they can, nevertheless, be accounted lucky that in 1868 they had been superseded for two and a half centuries by the Tokugawa clan. Few other dynasties have had such an excellent scapegoat.

The predominating foreign influences in the sweeping reorganisation which now took place were English and American. This was only natural, since English and American trade far exceeded that of the other treaty Powers, whilst English and American philanthropic institutions were the only ones of importance to extend their activities to Japan. Thus the influence of Anglo-American civilisation, by way of commerce, literature, education, and science, has been profound, and the present war may perhaps be regarded as the last attempt of the Japanese to shake themselves free from this influence, and to base their civilisation upon their own achievements of the past. This is not surprising, since Anglo-American influence is closely associated with that liberalising method of thought which Japan's rulers have sought during the last decade to eradicate. It may be that in addition to the profound miscalculation which the Japanese made in respect of Anglo-American policy they have equally miscalculated the extent to which liberal thought has secured a hold in Japan. For years the Japanese authorities have shown a morbid fear of progressive doctrines (comprehensively lumped together as 'Communism') which can spring only from weakness. Just as consciousness of what took place in Japan in the last quarter of the nineteenth century aroused the Chinese to embark upon a policy of Westernisation, so China's heroic struggle and national renaissance in the period since 1924 will not be without far-reaching influence upon the Japanese in their hour of defeat and humiliation.

Once the decision to Westernise was taken, it was put into effect with extreme thoroughness. Japanese scholars were sent abroad in considerable numbers to study Western civilisation and foreigners were invited to Japan. Schools and universities were established, railways were built, and industrial enterprises of all kinds were initiated. Whilst lacking the more original qualities, so strikingly manifested in the Chinese character, the Japanese has an abnormal imitative capacity. The revolution in Japan therefore occurred with unprecedented speed. Huge commercial cities such as Kobe, Osaka, Yokohama, and Nagasaki sprang up, reproducing all the less desirable features of Western industrialism, and Japanese manufactured goods were soon formidable competitors of those of the foremost Western industrial nations, and they were carried by a mercantile marine which rapidly acquired a leading place among the merchant navies of the world.

The development of so much commercial and industrial activity provided an adequate outlet for the energies of Japan's former feudal lords. With no conscientious scruples concerning the worthiness of trade, they took a leading part in new enterprises, and some features of the old feudal regime have been carried over into com-

mercial and industrial life. This has had two important consequences. In the first place, the real source of power in Japan has not shifted decisively since the Imperial restoration in 1868, although the monopoly of the Tokugawas has been replaced by that of a number of other clans. In the second place, as a necessary consequence, Japan has never been a democracy at all, not even formally. When the country adopted a modern constitution, the model chosen was that of Imperial Germany, whose rise to power in Europe seemed to display some points of similarity with Japan's rise to power in the Far East. Accordingly, the Executive was largely emancipated from Parliamentary control, whilst the members of the Japanese Parliament were elected on a very restricted franchise, which was retained when most of the rest of the world had adopted manhood suffrage. Characteristic of Japanese thought, however, was the decision to give the Emperor a special place in the constitution, assigning him semi-divine attributes, whilst the constitution itself was regarded simply as a concession from the Throne. As such, it could be withdrawn or modified without popular mandate.

Since, therefore, the real interplay of forces occurred outside Parliament, and since also the members of Parliament had little active share in the process of government, it was not unnatural that individual members and also political parties were corrupt and venal. Whilst Japanese industry and commerce continued to expand, this was tolerated, but after 1931 commercial depression brought a general dissatisfaction with the corrupt system, allied with considerable interest in totalitarian experiments in Italy and Germany, which appeared to have solved the problems of internal unrest and foreign expansion. When, therefore, the army increasingly assumed control of public business there was little protest, and Japan's experiment in sham-democracy forms an object lesson in the dangers of allowing popular institutions to fall into decay and disrepute. Japan's constitutional experiments, taking place behind a framework which formally has changed little since it was adopted, supply a running commentary upon Western political development during the last seventy years. From the curious compromise which was embodied in the constitution of the Second Reich, whose rising influence in Europe was duly noted, Japan progressed after the destruction of this Empire in 1918 to the nearest approach to really representative government she has ever possessed, in response to the influence of the now dominant Western democracies. During this period, too, her foreign policy was one of peaceful collaboration. Authoritarian experiments in Europe produced an immediate response in Japan after 1930, and this changed to open imitation of Nazi-ism after Hitler's accession to power appeared to presage the return of Germany to a dominant

position in Europe. Whatever happens in the future, Japan will not return to sham-democracy. It belongs to an imitative phase of development which has brought her to her present position. When she is forced to relinquish her conquests of the past half-century, and to confine her activities to the Japanese islands, she must either form a unit in some international organisation or face the most serious internal disorder. In either case her choice will be between democracy and Communism. On the day that Japan is defeated, control of the country either by the feudal magnates or by the military cast will be an anachronism; and Japan's social revolution will be resumed, with added impetus, at the point where it was artificially arrested in the years following the Restoration of 1868.

Japanese civilisation has not been founded upon any underlying religious sentiment as that of the West has been. The same criticism can be made in respect of China and Russia, but the absence of religion in China has been supplied by an unusually strong ethical system, which has now been reshaped by the genius of Dr. Sun for the needs of a modern community. Russian Communism is founded on Marxian materialism; and the civilisation of Japan is based upon an aggressive racialism which makes it closely akin to Nazism. When the myth of racial superiority is exploded, and national pride has been reduced to depths never before plumbed (for Japan has yet to be defeated in a major war), then it is reasonable to assume that the imitative mind of the Japanese will turn to Russia, and will accept Marxism as a means of salvation. There can be little doubt, if the police reports of Japan for the last ten years are studied, that considerable elements of the Japanese student class are attracted to Communism, whilst the feudal classes are too closely allied to the capitalist regime for them to be able to recover power yet again—at any rate without foreign intervention. Moreover, the compromise which is now being worked out in China will be impossible in Japan, which has passed directly from a completely feudalised society to modern capitalism, with its extremes of wealth on the one hand and its acute poverty on the other. None of Japan's fundamental social and economic problems has yet been solved. Trades Unionism, which made some progress between the end of the last war and the annexation of Manchuria, has been severely repressed since. Hours of work are long, and rates of pay incredibly low. Sweated juvenile and female labour is widespread, and there is a steadily increasing drift from an impoverished countryside to the towns. For some years an army of over a million men has been stationed abroad, under conditions seriously prejudicial to morale. Now they have been called upon to face a ring of powerful adversaries, equipped with the most modern weapons of war. Japanese morale will be hard to break,

but when it does, the break will be complete. On the morrow of defeat the Japanese will find themselves friendless, bankrupt, and aimless. All their most cherished illusions will have been exploded, and their traditional leaders will be utterly discredited. Yet alone among the Great Powers Japan can disappear without creating difficult problems among her neighbours. Something of this may be suspected by the Japanese leaders, and may possibly explain their present policy.

CHAPTER XII

JAPAN AS AN ASIATIC POWER

THE far-reaching changes in Japan's political structure which followed the Imperial restoration soon produced its effect upon Japanese foreign policy. Prior to 1853, Japan had had no foreign relations, and no object but to remain isolated. It had not always been so. In the earliest days of the Japanese state there had been semi-political expeditions to China and Korea, and for a time Korea appears to have paid tribute to Japan. In the sixteenth century one of the most dynamic figures in Japan's history, Hideyoshi, organised an invasion of Korea and North China, but on his death the armies were withdrawn, and thereafter the Tokugawas put an end even to commercial intercourse with these areas. Now that Japan was compelled to play a part in international affairs, however, memories of these earlier expeditions revived. Almost immediately the Japanese reasserted over the Loochoo Islands a vague overlordship, which had nominally existed since 1609, and began to look still farther afield towards Formosa. In 1873 an expedition was actually despatched there, and the Chinese replied by sending an army to protect the island. Hostilities were averted only through the intervention of the British Minister to China, but the Japanese obtained some tardy satisfaction by the formal annexation of the Loochoo Islands in 1875. The episode had proved unexpectedly profitable to Japan, for in spite of the presence of foreign instructors in the Japanese War Office, the Japanese army was as yet in no condition at all for war—a fact which was so well known to the Japanese Government that at one stage of the Formosan difficulty they had sent an envoy to Peking with instructions to extricate Japan on any terms. A decisive rebuff had indeed been averted only through the friendliness of Great Britain, France, and the United States, who saw in Japan at this period a model Far Eastern state, eager to Westernise and to extend international

trade, but not strong enough to be an embarrassment. Could they have looked seventy years ahead there would have been less complacency. The significance of the Japanese occupation of the Loochoo Islands, however, dawned upon no one at this period, and the suggestion that the Japanese considered themselves a people with a heaven-sent mission to dominate the world would have appeared amiable lunacy.

The same difficulties which had arisen between China and Japan over Formosa and the Loochoo Islands arose at a slightly later date over Korea. China's relations with all the neighbouring territories—the Loochoo Islands, Formosa, Korea, Annam, Siam, and Burma—had been similar, and in the period of Chinese strength had been a source of peace and prosperity. China defended these kingdoms from external aggression, but she rarely interfered in their internal affairs. Tribute-bearing embassies appeared at Peking at irregular intervals, and successions to the throne required Chinese confirmation. There were practically no special customs barriers between the countries (although both in China and the dependent kingdoms there were numerous local imposts) and there was extensive cultural interchange, in which China was the dominant partner. Thus, the laws of all these states were more or less directly derived from the Imperial Chinese laws, which the Chinese therefore had some justification for regarding as suitable for universal application if only people were civilised enough. It was a system which reflected China's pacific attitude, and it made for stability, until the irruption of Western nations into the Far East demonstrated that China's military power was a thing of the past. The tragic thing was that although the foreigners destroyed an international system under which Eastern Asia had proved relatively stable, they had nothing to put in its place, except their own system of power politics, which had failed to provide a satisfactory basis of intercourse in the West, and the ultimate goal of which in the Far East appeared to be the establishment of unwieldy colonial empires. The unsatisfactory nature of this system received added emphasis when Japan first proved an apt pupil, and then sought to destroy the teachers.

When China was faced with the problem of anti-foreignism in the kingdoms over which she claimed suzerainty, consistently with her own attitude to them, she disclaimed responsibility for their internal affairs, but at the same time she claimed that she must be consulted when the foreign nations sought to deal with these kingdoms directly. To the foreigner this appeared to be no more than prevarication. In fact, it was the application of principles to which the foreign nations were strangers, and which were reasonable so long as China had the force to maintain them. When she had not, the Far Eastern application of the theory of regional security dissolved.

In Korea the position in the second half of the nineteenth century was particularly complex. The Korean Empire had evidently reached the last stages of decay. Being nearer to the Chinese capital than the other kingdoms, it was more openly subject to Chinese influence. It was also a magnet for the Maritime Powers, and its strategic importance to both Russia and Japan, if these Powers were to follow expansionist policies, was manifest. For a time the Korean administration sought to play off suzerain and foreign Powers against one another, and they also seem to have nourished the delusion that in a serious emergency the United States would come to their rescue. When that moment arrived, however, the United States remained completely non-committal, and from that moment the doom of the 'Hermit Kingdom' was sealed.

Between 1870 and 1885 most of the foreign Powers with trading interests in the Far East signed treaties with Korea, establishing the 'treaty-port' system which already existed in China and Japan, and the main features of which have been described in earlier chapters. Meanwhile, the Japanese had established several trading stations there, and were already active in Seoul, the Korean capital, where not unnaturally they found themselves in conflict with the Chinese representatives, and also with the Russians. Showing their usual tactlessness in their dealings with foreign peoples, they incurred extreme unpopularity, of which their subtler Chinese antagonists were not slow to take advantage. On several occasions Korean mobs attacked not only Japanese traders but also the Japanese Legation, and there was some loss of life. The only result of these riots was that Japan obtained the right to station legation guards at the capital. In reply, the Chinese also placed troops in the capital, and these, during a riot in 1882, opened fire upon the Japanese. The matter was not allowed to proceed further, however, as China was already in difficulties with France over Tongking.

In the twelve years between 1882 and 1894 the Chinese Resident at Seoul was Yüan Shih-kai, whose part in the Chinese Revolution has already been described. As the nominee of Li Hung-chang, at this time all-powerful in Peking, his instructions were to make Korea, in fact as well as in name, a Chinese dependency. In view of the weakness of the Korean Government this was by no means a difficult task, and it was facilitated by the fact that the Korean customs were administered as a service subsidiary to the Chinese Maritime Customs, in preparation for a complete union of the two services. Between 1882 and 1889 Yüan Shih-kai had to face not only obvious Russian designs upon Korea, but also the progressively more menacing attitude of Japan. Russia considered it expedient to abate her more far-reaching pretensions, in face of

hostility from Great Britain, France, and Japan, preferring to let the Chinese make their hold effective, in the hope that their influence at Peking would ultimately prove decisive. This left China and Japan as the protagonists, and when in 1894 the Tong Hok Rebellion—the Korean counterpart to the Boxer Rebellion—proclaimed a vendetta against all foreigners, hostilities could no longer be averted. To meet the threat of internal disorder in Korea, China despatched reinforcements to the troops already in Korea, declaring at the same time that they would be withdrawn as soon as order was restored. The Japanese countered this by sending much larger forces. Meanwhile, the Korean army, without assistance from either China or Japan, had broken up the Tong Hok Rebellion. The occupying forces, however, were withdrawn by neither China nor Japan, and the latter Power now made a demand which subsequent events have now shown to be characteristic of Japanese technique—that Korea should be recognised as independent by China, but that Korea should reorganise her administration with Japanese ‘assistance,’ their representatives at the same time behaving in an overbearing manner to Koreans, Chinese, and foreigners, with equal impartiality.

Later techniques were still further anticipated by a Japanese *coup* whilst negotiations with Peking were still in progress. Japanese troops stormed the palace of the Korean Emperor, and bore away the Empress and her children as prisoners. This was on 23rd July 1894, and on that day Korea’s independence really ended, even though formal annexation occurred only after the Russo-Japanese War. The immediate result of the Japanese assault was that the Regent, conveniently nominated by Japan, declared war upon China, and called upon his Japanese ‘allies’ to expel Chinese forces from the peninsula. On 1st August there were mutual declarations of war by Japan and China.

The Japanese aims in making war at this time were not a matter of speculation. Reorganisation of Japan’s army and navy had proceeded at remarkable speed. As yet, however, the extent to which Japan’s power had grown was recognised by no other Power. The Japanese had correctly assessed the extent of China’s decline, and desired to demonstrate their own superiority to the world at large. An undertaking which would have proved disastrous in 1873 could now be carried out with every prospect of success. Here military policy exactly coincided with political foresight. The ultimate enemy to be encountered in Korea was not China, but Russia, and Japan was determined to demonstrate in unequivocal fashion that Korea fell within her sphere of activities. As between Japan and Russia, the sympathies of Great Britain, France, and the United States were wholly in favour of Japan. All three

Powers would have preferred either the genuine independence of Korea or Chinese control. Failing that, Japanese control was preferable to that of Russia or Germany. The chief reaction in London to the outbreak of war was anxiety that Japan might be defeated, but British sympathies with Japan were unmistakably demonstrated by a treaty signed on 16th July 1894, whereby Great Britain promised to relinquish extra-territoriality in Japan at an early date, and to modify various other treaty-rights. An American treaty followed on 22nd November of the same year.

The unvarying and swiftly achieved successes of the Japanese over superior Chinese forces, culminating in the closing weeks of the year 1894 with an invasion of Manchuria, proved a shock, not only to the Chinese, but also to the foreign Powers. With the occupation of Port Arthur and Tulienwan by the Japanese forces, Russia saw all future attempts to expand in Manchuria towards an ice-free port finally blocked, and it may well have been these operations which demonstrated to Russia the urgent necessity of seeking to put an end to the expansion of this audacious new-comer to the ranks of foreign Powers with ambitions in China.

The attitude of the Japanese towards any peace-terms was known to be a severe one, and the unbroken successes of their forces made them by no means disposed to break off hostilities until Chinese pride had been completely humbled. By March 1895 Li Hung-chang had been appointed ambassador-extraordinary to secure the best peace-terms possible, and his difficult mission was unexpectedly assisted by an attack upon him by a fanatical Japanese on his return from a preliminary conference on Japanese soil. So profound was the disgust abroad at an outrage upon one whom all the laws of international intercourse and hospitality alike regard as sacrosanct, that the Japanese made haste to recover the foreign sympathy they had lost by moderating their attitude. Even so, the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed on 17th April 1895, was stiff enough in its terms. China was compelled to recognise the complete independence of Korea, and to cede in full sovereignty to Japan the Liaotung Peninsula in Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores. In addition, China was to pay an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels, and Japanese participation in Chinese trade was to be on exactly the same footing as that of any other foreign Power.

Japan's continental expansion was now well under way, but its rapidity had disturbed many of the foreign Powers with Far Eastern interests. Russia ordered her Mediterranean fleet to the Pacific, and at the end of April, before ratifications of the treaty were exchanged, a joint note from Russia, France, and Germany 'recommended' that the Liaotung Peninsula should be restored

to China. Japan accepted the stern hint, but with an ill grace. On the other hand, the 'independence' of Korea deceived no one. In October there was a fresh revolt in that unhappy land, and many prominent persons, including the Empress, were murdered by the triumphant revolutionaries, who had Japanese support. When the American minister took steps to intervene, in concert with the representatives of other Powers, he was tersely informed by the State Department that intervention in Korean politics was none of his business, and he received a stern rebuke for having failed to recognise the special position of the Japanese minister. It was already evident, even at this date, that the Sino-Japanese War was not the last war which would be fought over Korea—and the United States was taking all necessary precautions not to be dragged into any.

In the two years following the war, hostilities between Japan and Russia appeared to be very close. The Russians lost no opportunity to assert themselves at the Korean capital, and secured the appointment of Russian officials to many key positions. These measures, however, were regarded with suspicion, not only by Japan, but by the other treaty Powers, especially by Great Britain. Not wishing, therefore, to expose herself to hostilities at a time when she was consolidating her position, both in Manchuria (where she secured control by way of lease of the Liaotung Peninsula) and also at the Chinese Court, Russia withdrew temporarily.

The lesson of Japan's success and her war with China was not ignored by the Western Powers. Maintenance of special foreign rights in Japan had become precarious in the extreme. Moreover, their object could now be regarded as achieved, for Japan wished to extend her contact with the West, and it was obvious she could properly protect foreign merchants in Japan. By 1900, therefore, the treaty-port regime in Japan had vanished, and a further stage in Japan's progress towards full equality of status had been accomplished.

Still a further stage was achieved at the same period. In 1900 the foreign legations in Peking were besieged by the Boxers. The forces which could immediately be assembled for their relief were small, and an early attempt to cut a way through from Tientsin failed. In this extreme emergency the British Government, on 22nd June 1900, appealed to Japan for strong reinforcements for the joint forces which were being organised to relieve the legations. Smarting under the diplomatic rebuffs which had followed the war with China, Japan made no haste to comply with the appeal, seeking to capitalise the extremity of the treaty Powers to the maximum degree. Eventually, even Russia was induced to join in the request for aid, and at length Japan complied, on receiving a British guarantee for the financial outlay involved. Her hesitations were not without justification, however, for Russia had taken

advantage of the prevailing disorders to strengthen her forces in Manchuria, and at this date she was occupying several of the main cities. By the time the legations were relieved, Russian forces were in actual military control of the whole of Southern Manchuria. There was every appearance that the control was intended to be permanent, for Russian officials supervised the customs, using the receipts for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the army of occupation.

The diplomatic situation following the relief of the Peking Legations was delicate in the extreme. In addition to the occupation of the whole of Southern Manchuria, Russia now proposed that the treaty Powers should forthwith withdraw their forces from Peking. Since this would have been equivalent to surrendering the control of Chinese affairs to Russia, this suggestion was refused. Unfortunately there was no unanimity between the treaty Powers other than Russia, some of whom now imagined that the moment for realising their territorial ambitions in China had arrived. France, whose ambitions in Yunnan dated from her annexation of Indo-China, gave general support to Russia. The United States, on the other hand, was anxious to withdraw as soon as possible from joint-activities which appeared to have such dubious objects. Great Britain, still in the throes of the Boer War, was compelled to make an accord with Germany directed against Russian aggression, to which Japan, Italy, and Austria acceded. The agreement was a German rather than a British success, however, for it was evident that Germany had renounced none of her claims on Shantung. The urgency of stopping the Russian advance, however, could scarcely be questioned. At the end of 1900 Russia and China signed a convention whereby control of Southern Manchuria was surrendered to Russia, and although, when news of this leaked out, Russia was compelled to abandon some of her more extreme claims, it was evident that Russia could not now be expelled from Manchuria without a war. With inexhaustible patience Japan methodically set herself to prepare for the war.

CHAPTER XIII

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

IT has been shown that Russia used the pretext of the Boxer Rebellion to establish herself in Southern Manchuria. Of the various Powers who regarded this step with disapproval, only Japan and Great Britain were prepared to take any step to counteract it.

Anglo-German hostility in Europe was too deep-rooted for anything but occasional co-operation in the Far East to be possible, and although there were many ties between Japan and Germany, Japan coveted Shantung, which was already under German domination. Accordingly, as Russian occupation of Manchuria continued long after the Boxer Rebellion had been suppressed, *rapprochement*, between Great Britain and Japan was inevitable, and it ripened into a full alliance in 1902, as soon as the long-drawn-out Boer War was concluded. The alliance provided that each Power should take such action as was necessary to protect its interests in China and Korea, and that if, in taking such action, either Power were attacked, the other should use all possible efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in the hostilities against its allies. If a third Power should come in, then the ally also would intervene. The object of the treaty was obviously to set a limit to Russia's encroachments. It was particularly useful from the British point of view, since Japan would clearly take the initiative in Manchuria, and in this way Great Britain would be spared the necessity of strengthening her military and naval forces in the Far East at a time when their concentration in European theatres of war to meet the growing German menace was urgently required. For Japan the treaty set the seal upon her claim to rank as a Great Power, and closed and guarded her back-door upon the day when she challenged Russia for the control of Manchuria and Korea.

The first result of the Anglo-Japanese alliance was the conclusion of a Russo-Chinese convention on 8th April 1902, by which Russia agreed to the establishment of Chinese authority in Manchuria. Some progress towards Russian withdrawal was made, but although Russia had agreed to evacuate the key-port of Newchwang by 8th April 1903, that date came and went with Russia still in possession. As a preliminary to further evacuation, which could clearly be construed as a sign of weakness, in face of Japanese pressure, Russia prepared a 'convention of seven points,' to be accepted by China. The seven points were that (1) no new treaty ports or foreign consuls in Manchuria were to be permitted; (2) no foreigners other than Russians were to be employed in the public service in Northern China; (3) the status of the administration of Mongolia (already under Russian influence) was to remain unchanged; (4) the receipts of the Newchwang customs were to continue to be deposited in the Russo-Chinese Bank; (5) the sanitary commission at Newchwang was to be controlled by Russians; (6) Russia was to remain in possession of the telegraph line from Newchwang to Mukden; and (7) no territory in Manchuria was to be alienated to any Power.

These points, and more particularly the first two, evoked protests

from Great Britain, the United States, and Japan. As before, Russia denied the authenticity of the convention, but no one was deceived, and China was urged to resist the demands. The result was that once again the convention was allowed to drop, and in September of the same year a new convention was proposed. To this, which also included an agreement by China not to alienate any territory in Manchuria to any third Power, Japan again objected; whilst Great Britain remained unimpressed by any Russian protestations, so long as Russia remained in occupation of Newchwang, and obstructed the opening of Manchurian ports to foreign trade.

The diplomatic phase of Russo-Japanese relations was now rapidly drawing to a close, however. Japan had made her decision to fight, and hastened the preliminaries. At the beginning of 1904 she demanded that Russia should evacuate Manchuria, and should recognise her dominant position in Korea. When this was rejected, Japan proposed that a line should be drawn across Northern Korea, the territory south of the line being recognised as within the Japanese sphere of influence, and the territory north of it within Russian influence. To this Russia returned a dilatory answer. On 8th February, therefore, Japan severed diplomatic relations. The same night, without a declaration of war, which followed two days later, the Japanese launched a torpedo attack upon the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur, which was so devastating in its effect that it ensured the control of the Pacific by Japan during the ensuing months. In consequence Japan was able to transport her troops to Manchuria without serious interruption, thus ensuring victory. On 7th December 1941 Japan delivered a precisely similar blow, with a similar object, against the American Fleet in Pearl Harbour, Hawaii. Unfortunately the United States had forgotten the precedent of 1904, and the damage done was sufficiently serious directly to affect the balance of power in the Pacific. Parenthetically, it may be noted that the *Blitzkrieg* is not the invention of the Nazis, having been employed with decisive effect by Japan against Russia in 1904. But then, to spring upon an enemy unawares whilst he is negotiating is one of the oldest tricks in warfare. Unfortunately, its effects against more scrupulous peoples do not diminish.

Once again, third parties expected that Japan had been too audacious. Events quickly proved how erroneous these judgments were. By the middle of March Japan had landed over 100,000 troops in Korea, and by 1st May they had forced the crossing of the Yalu River. A second and a third army were then landed, and by a succession of battles at the end of May the Russian forces defending Port Arthur were separated from the main body of the

Russian forces to the north. Taliewan was occupied on 30th May, and Port Arthur was besieged. It held out until 1st January 1905. Meanwhile, in a succession of pitched battles in Manchuria, the Russians were defeated and driven back, Mukden being entered by the Japanese on 10th March 1905. To complete the story of Russian reverses, the Russian Baltic Fleet (which had been despatched in October 1904 to redress the balance of naval forces in the Pacific, and which had nearly involved Russia and Great Britain in war by firing on the British fishing fleet off the Dogger Bank) arrived off Tsushima on 27th May 1905, where it met the Japanese Fleet under Admiral Togo, and was practically obliterated.

Few major wars have been so swift or so decisive in their results. The whole plan of campaign by the Japanese was to strike a crippling blow at Russia's Asiatic Fleet before reinforcements could arrive, and then to push the campaign in Manchuria before military reinforcements from European Russia could be summoned. Both objects were completely achieved. Competent critics have suggested that the operations up to the end of May 1905 represented Japan's maximum effort. Thereafter she would have shown increasing signs of exhaustion. Russia, however, was in no condition to continue the war. There was serious internal unrest, whilst Germany's growing strength in Europe threatened both Russia and France, and strengthened the French plea that the war with Japan was an unnecessary complication. An invitation by President Theodore Roosevelt to the belligerents to consider terms of peace was therefore accepted. The plenipotentiaries met at Portsmouth, in New Hampshire, where a peace treaty was signed on 5th September 1905. The terms, though brief, were far-reaching in their implications. Russia recognised Japan as the dominating power in Korea. She also undertook to evacuate Manchuria. The Liaotung Peninsula was ceded to Japan, and with it Russia's railway, mining and other rights in Southern Manchuria. The railways in North Manchuria, and in particular the Chinese Eastern Railway, remained under Russian control. No indemnity was asked for, and a claim to Northern Sakhalin was not pressed. In this Japan was wise. The war party at St. Petersburg was still influential, and overmuch pressure would have tipped the scale in favour of renewed hostilities. Moreover, Japan had gained every point of importance. Korea was now under her unchallenged control. So was Southern Manchuria. The Russian march, which only a few years before had seemed irresistible, was now ended. Japan could therefore wait for a favourable turn of events in order to complete the destruction of Russian power in Eastern Asia.

The attack on the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur on the night of

8th February 1904 supplied the world with an object-lesson in Japanese methods of making war—a lesson which was strangely overlooked. Shortly after the Russo-Japanese war Japan took control of Korea's foreign relations, and in 1910 annexed that Empire altogether. The history of that unhappy country under Japanese rule furnished an object-lesson in Japanese conceptions of empire—which again, most unfortunately, was ignored. At the end of the nineteenth century the Korean Kingdom was even more corrupt and degenerate than the Chinese Empire, yet the Koreans had memories of an extremely high civilisation, having close affinities with that of China. The impact of the foreign treaty system upon Korea had awakened similar aspirations among the Koreans as among the Chinese. A few Korean scholars had gone abroad. There were proposals for reform, for a Western trained army, and for Western educational institutions. The customs service was already being reorganised. The Koreans were certainly not more decadent than the Siamese or the Annamese, but their lot, compared with that of the more southern dependencies of China, has been an appalling one. All efforts at national revival have been checked. Koreans have been unable to travel abroad, except to Japan, and even there they have been kept under close police supervision. Education is completely under Japanese control. The treaty-port system was ended on the annexation by Japan, and with its disappearance foreign interests were systematically expelled from the country, to be replaced by Japanese enterprise. In spite of this open violation of the principle of the 'open door,' foreign commercial interests learned nothing, but sought to compromise with the invader, when he struck in Manchuria, quarter of a century later. Finally, every symptom of Korean nationalism has been ruthlessly stamped out by the Japanese overlords, sometimes with revolting cruelties. A traveller in Korea some years ago reported seeing young Korean patriots crucified by the roadside; whilst the Korean population was deliberately demoralised by methods, such as the spread of opium, which Japan has since used on a larger scale in China, and its standard of living, never high, has been still further depressed by Japanese exploitation. When Japan's interest in Manchuria became paramount, over a million Koreans emigrated to South Manchuria, where they undercut even the Chinese labourer, so creating anti-Korean sentiment among the Chinese which the Japanese exploited to the full. A 'Hermit Kingdom' before the middle of the nineteenth century, Korea after its annexation became a forgotten land. Foreign Powers ostentatiously disclaimed any interest in it, whilst the very ruthlessness of Japanese oppression prevented any real knowledge of the extent of misgovernment

from spreading abroad. One of the main tasks facing the victorious Allies at the end of the war in the Pacific will be the rehabilitation of Korea. Under modern conditions Korea is probably too weak to stand alone, and its independence will have to be guaranteed by the Allies, but there is a most important work of reconstruction to be carried out in Korea itself as well. It is important that in that work of reconstruction nineteenth-century jealousies should not be revived, and the frankest exchanges of views on policy must be given by China, Russia, Great Britain, and the United States if future difficulties are to be avoided.

The effect of the swift and complete Japanese victory over Russia upon world opinion was profound. Japan could no longer be regarded simply as an Asiatic Power. She was a Great Power of the first rank, with rapidly expanding Imperial interests. For that reason her attitude towards the approaching clash between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente assumed increasing importance, more especially as the Japanese navy had proved its quality so plainly in the war with Russia. Here the Anglo-Japanese alliance proved the decisive factor, in spite of German blandishments. It is true that in the Far East Great Britain and Japan frequently found themselves in opposition to Russia and France, but Far Eastern affairs were less and less important to the European Powers after 1905. French policy was steadily bringing Great Britain and Russia closer together, and although there was no cordiality, former misunderstandings were smoothed out, and future difficulties were meticulously avoided. Japan was not greatly interested in the European problem (indeed, the extent of her detachment is shown by the fact that after the failure of the Allied offensives in France in 1916, the Japanese thoughtfully took soundings in the immediate vicinity of Hong Kong), but there were obvious disadvantages in a German victory so far as Japan was concerned. German methods too closely resembled her own for their purport to be misunderstood, and in any case, Japan had ambitions in Shantung, which German predominance there effectively blocked. Accordingly, the enemies of 1905 were brought into uneasy association in the Grand Alliance against the Central Powers. The Japanese contemplated this alliance with cynical detachment. They had no objection to the whole of Europe exhausting itself in a war of attrition. It would make their ultimate mastery of the Pacific easier of achievement, more especially as they had no intention of participating in the struggle beyond the point where German interests were expelled from Shantung.

There was one other state which was greatly affected by the events of 1904-5. The entire campaign had been fought on

Chinese soil, and China, though not a belligerent, had been completely powerless to influence the course of events. She had declared her neutrality, and wherever possible she had asserted it, but a discerning eye, investigating the various instances of assertion, could without difficulty trace a desire not to offend her powerful Asiatic neighbour in her prompt internment of Russian ships of war, and similar acts. When peace negotiations were opened, China made a feeble effort to assert her right to participate, but both parties contemptuously ignored this claim, which even President Roosevelt, for all America's traditional attachment to China's territorial integrity, does not seem to have taken seriously. The peace treaty transferred Chinese territory and extensive rights in Manchuria from Russia to Japan, and even the formality of asking China's consent was overlooked. China, in fact, had sunk to such a degree of impotence that she appeared to be rather the object of international activity than a member of the international community. For the Chinese, however, this was not the last word. If the Japanese, whom they traditionally despised, could join the charmed circle of the Great Powers, in spite of the poverty of her resources, then so could China. If the Imperial dynasty barred the way to the necessary national regeneration, then the dynasty must be swept away. In the decade following the Russo-Japanese War more Chinese students went to Japan to study than at any other time. Amongst them were Dr. Sun Yat-sen and General Chiang Kai-shek. If the Japanese had solved the problem of successful Westernisation, then the Chinese would go to school with them. As yet, the Chinese had no suspicion that Japanese ambition was so inordinate that it aimed at nothing less than the subjugation of the whole of China.

The Russo-Japanese War, therefore, accelerated the fall of the Manchu Dynasty. For the time being Japan was watchful, but afraid to commit herself. If China had shown signs of a powerful national awakening in 1911, Japan would no doubt have embraced the earliest opportunity to intervene, as she did in 1931 and again in 1937. It seemed, however, that the Chinese were simply continuing their process of disintegration, only no longer behind the façade of the Empire. That being so, there was no cause for anxiety, and the Chinese Revolution could be welcomed with suitably florid expressions of sympathy. One precaution, however, the Japanese took at the earliest opportunity. The disintegration of China was, in itself, a good thing, from the Japanese point of view. The opportunities to intervene were considerably increased. But beyond a certain point, increasing disorder might prove a threat to steadily expanding Japanese interests in Southern Manchuria. Japan, therefore, took the necessary steps to avert this

danger. Among the Chinese volunteers who had fought on the Japanese side in the Russo-Japanese War was a young Chinese soldier named Chang Tso-lin. During the Revolution Chang raised an army, and freed Manchuria of Imperial troops. Thereafter, until his death in 1928, whilst retreating from Peking before the Nationalist armies, Chang ruled Manchuria from his capital at Mukden, for all practical purposes the head of an independent state. For all that Chang had spent some years of his eventful career following the not unremunerative profession of banditry, his rule in Manchuria was by no means unenlightened. There was little internal disorder, and taxation was less arbitrary than elsewhere in China. The result was that there was a steady influx of Chinese into Manchuria between 1911 and 1928. Non-Japanese foreign interests were protected, and there was some development of Manchurian industries. Externally, therefore, all seemed well, and Chang basked in the favour of several foreign Powers. No doubt he appreciated the position as only a Chinese can, for later events have emphasised what was tolerably plain even at the time—that Chang was little more the real ruler of Manchuria than the puppet Emperor is to-day. Behind Chang was the menacing power of Japan, and whenever he showed signs of restlessness revolts mysteriously sprang up, and trusted lieutenants revolted. It was a situation in which Chang and the Japanese Government understood one another perfectly. How unstable it was, was demonstrated when the Nationalists reconquered China in 1929, and sought to extend their power to Manchuria. At that moment Japan unequivocally showed that in her opinion the days of Chinese rule north of the Great Wall were over.

One final word must be added on Japan's international position between the Russo-Japanese War and the first World War. The alliance with Great Britain, it has already been noticed, was the pivot upon which her relations with Europe turned. It was renewed in 1905, in 1910, and again in 1911, and it was only in the natural order of things that the Anglo-French *entente* should be followed by a Franco-Japanese treaty of 1907, by which the two parties agreed to give each other mutual support in preserving their interests in China, adjacent to their possessions. This necessarily made the question of relations with Russia, France's main European ally, one of urgent importance. Exactly as in Europe France brought Great Britain and Russia together, without over-much cordiality on either side, so in the Far East Great Britain and France set themselves the task of removing some of the outstanding causes of friction between Japan and Russia. In view of the increase in Germany's military strength, Russia was disposed to accept her defeat in 1905 as final—at any rate until Germany

was defeated. Accordingly, by an agreement of 1907, Russia and Japan agreed to respect their respective possessions and interests in China and (by secret clauses) their respective spheres of interest in Manchuria, Korea, and Outer Mongolia. Into this network of mutual understandings the United States unwarily blundered in 1909, when she made a proposal for the neutralisation of the Manchurian railway system, which she suggested should be controlled by an international syndicate in which the United States would naturally be represented. The proposal was prompted by the steady development of events in Manchuria which, as the United States saw, would soon have reached the point where American enterprise was excluded altogether. But both Russia and Japan drew closer together to repel the intruder, and in 1910 they signed a convention whereby, if their interests in Manchuria were to be threatened by any third party, Japan was to take the necessary steps to preserve them. It was also agreed in the negotiations at this period that the western half of Inner Mongolia was to be regarded as within the Russian sphere of interest, whilst the eastern half fell within the Japanese sphere.

Japan's international position was now so strong that, in addition to the annexation of Korea, she was able to turn Southern Manchuria, under Chang Tso-lin's complaisant rule, into something approaching a protectorate. By a treaty of 1905 with China she forbade China to build in Manchuria any railway or branch line which would be prejudicial to the railways under her control; and in 1906 the South Manchuria Railway Company, with a capital of £20,000,000, one-half of which was furnished by the Japanese Government, was formed to take control of the entire system. With the operation of the railways went complete police and administrative control of the 'railway zone' extending nearly twenty miles on either side of the railways. Simultaneously, all efforts of nationals of other treaty Powers to open new industrial enterprises in Manchuria were systematically blocked. Japan, it was evident, had come to stay.

CHAPTER XIV

THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS, 1915

ON the night of 18th January 1915 the Japanese Minister to Peking, Mr. Hioki Eki, secured a private interview with the President of the Chinese Republic, General Yüan Shih-kai, and in the course of the interview he presented a document known as the

Twenty-One Demands. The mode of presentation was in the highest degree improper, for it should have proceeded through the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but it will be noted that here, as in other things, Japan was experimenting with a technique which the Nazis have since perfected. Significantly, the paper upon which the Demands were recorded was watermarked with dreadnoughts and machine guns. In the course of the interview the Japanese Minister uttered a number of threats concerning General Yüan's own position, and at the same time stressed the importance of keeping the whole affair quiet. It was also emphasised that the Demands were not the subject of negotiation. They must be accepted as a whole, and that without delay. The Demands were the clearest possible indication of Japan's policy towards China, and as such they were understood by all Chinese. They are an illustration of the Japanese acceptance of the rule of force, without any of the attractive trappings in which it is normally disguised. In the last two decades of the nineteenth century Russia had frequently sought to extract from China her acceptance of various conventions having an object similar to that of the Twenty-One Demands, but her intentions were not so crudely or so completely expressed. As the Chinese Government unavailingly pointed out to Japan, the Demands were quite unprecedented in their nature. They would have been harsh, even if presented by a military conqueror to an opponent who had surrendered at discretion, for their clear intention was to reduce China to the status of a Japanese protectorate. Appeals to mercy, then as later, proved completely futile. They made no impression whatever upon the Japanese Government, and although in response to foreign intervention some of the Demands were modified, the revised version was presented with an ultimatum on 7th May, and the Chinese had no option but to accept on the following day.

To understand how the Demands came to be presented it is necessary to recall the position of the principal Powers with interests in China at this time. Of China herself, it is sufficient to say that the initial impulse towards reorganisation generated by the Revolution had died away. Ambitious militarists were already consolidating their hold upon various provinces, and Yüan Shih-kai was dreaming of the restoration of the Empire, with himself as the founder of a new dynasty. There was nothing here that could impede Japan's ruthless onward march. The checks on her conduct prior to 1915 had been imposed by fear of a hostile combination, not by any moral scruples. Little assistance was given by Japan to the Allies, beyond the initiation of operations in Shantung, leading to the occupation of Kiaochow leased territory. In spite of a Chinese reminder that this territory remained Chinese, Japan

plainly manifested her intention of remaining in occupation, and of making it a base for the eventual domination of the Shantung peninsula.

Seen through Japanese eyes, the first World War was merely a suicidal struggle between the chief Western Powers, during which Japan could quietly gather strength, and take up a position in the Far East from which it would be impossible subsequently to dislodge her. From the first moment of her forward policy she had never doubted that in the long run she would dominate the whole of China, and from that advantageous position reach out towards even remoter lands. These pretensions were not taken seriously enough in the West, and we are to-day paying the penalty. To the outside world there seems to be something distinctly humorous about Japanese claims to race-superiority, clothed as they are in the uncouthest of language. The Japanese themselves have never seen it in that light, and they have shrewdly assessed the effect of each step before they have taken it. Here, again, they anticipated Hitler's technique of diplomacy by *coup d'état*. Because their activities were confined to the Far East, Western foreign offices minimised their significance. History's judgments upon those who under-rate first-class opponents is, however, a harsh one.

When Japan took the decisive step of presenting the Twenty-One Demands, she had long meditated it, and merely awaited a suitable opportunity. The opportunity came when China innocently asked for the return of Kiaochow. The avowed aim of all Japan's patriotic organisations was to establish a monopoly area in Eastern Asia. They differed only concerning the speed with which it was to be accomplished. There was remarkably little difference of opinion over the presentation of the Demands in 1915, however. The European War was quite clearly going to be a long one. It would possibly end in a stalemate. In any event, it would exhaust the resources of the protagonists and generate feuds that would not quickly heal. Japan was therefore protected against a united front such as had deprived her of the most valuable spoils of her war with China in 1895. The only Power to be watched was the United States, whom Japan already saw as a potential enemy. The United States, however, was increasingly concerned with events in Europe. It could not risk a major war in the Far East alone, whilst Great Britain and France were nominally allies, albeit embarrassed ones. It was a suitable—almost a perfect—moment to enlighten the Chinese upon the implications of Far Eastern co-operation.

The Demands were divided into five groups, and their details have little present significance. Their general tenor, however, indicates the nature of Japanese aspirations, for which she embarked

pon the second Sino-Japanese War, twenty-two years later. The first group, containing four Demands, related to Shantung, pledging China in advance to any arrangements Japan might make with Germany, forbidding China to alienate any part of Shantung to any third Power on any pretext, and securing China's agreement to the building of a railway by Japan from Chefoo or Lungkow to join the Liaochoo-Tsinanfu Railway. The second group, containing seven Demands, confirmed and extended Japan's control of South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Within this area Japanese subjects were free to lease and own land, travel, and engage in commerce and industry of any kind, including the opening of mines. It was also agreed that Japan should be first consulted before China employed any foreign political, financial, or military advisers in this area. The third group, of two Demands, regulated the affairs of the Hanyehping Company, a Chinese company under Japanese control. The fourth group contained only one Demand—that China should not cede or lease to a third Power any harbour, bay, or island along the Chinese coast.

The fifth group of Demands were the most far-reaching. They were as follows:—

(1) The Chinese Central Government shall employ influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial, and military affairs.

(2) Japanese hospitals, churches, and schools in the interior of China shall be granted the right of owning land.

(3) Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and the Chinese Government have had many cases of dispute between Japanese and Chinese police to settle, cases which caused no little misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the police departments of important places in China shall be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese or that the police departments of these places shall employ numerous Japanese, so that they may at the same time help to plan for the improvement of the Chinese Police Service.

(4) China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount of munitions of war (say 50 *per cent.* or more of what is needed by the Chinese Government), or that there shall be established in China a Sino-Japanese jointly worked arsenal. Japanese technical experts are to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased.

(5) China agrees to grant to Japan the right of constructing a railway connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and Nanchang, another line between Nanchang and Hangchow, and another between Nanchang and Chaochow.

(6) If China needs foreign capital to work mines, build railways, and construct harbour-works (including dockyards) in the Province of Fukien, Japan shall be first consulted.

(7) China agrees that Japanese subjects shall have the right of missionary propaganda (for Buddhism) in China.

The terms of these seven Demands were deliberately vague. They were plainly the starting-point of unending pressure upon the unfortunate Chinese Government. By the terms of the Demands, Fukien, Shantung, Southern Manchuria, and Inner Mongolia could be regarded as finally ceded to Japan. The remainder of China was to become colonial territory, organised to strengthen Japan.

Japan's mode of making known the terms of the Demands to foreign Powers was attended with characteristic duplicity. First of all she denied their existence completely. Some weeks later she admitted their existence, but communicated eleven Demands only, excluding the fifth group, as well as some of the more far-reaching of the others. Such double-dealings were practised, not on potential enemies, but on allies in the first World War, and upon the United States. There is nothing in the black record of Germany which exceeds in immorality such cynicism and contempt for the usages of international society. It emphasises the dangers of founding international intercourse simply upon the strength of the participants, and the need for a reaffirmation of international morality as a guarantee of international order when the present war ends. Universalism in the international sphere has been bought in the recent past at the expense not only of security, but of decency.

Several months of negotiation brought little further clarification of the extent of Japan's ambitions in China, although in one or two instances some of the vaguer Demands were reframed with increased precision. Following China's acceptance of the Demands (albeit in the case of Group v, with certain reservations) treaties were drawn up and signed on 25th May. Ratifications were exchanged on 8th June. Some of the Demands, and the treaties embodying them, clearly infringed the 'open door' principle which, since 1900, was regarded as governing the relations of the treaty Powers with China. Accordingly, the United States addressed a note to both China and Japan, stating that 'it cannot recognise any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States, and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the open-door policy.' Japan's European 'allies' were unable to permit themselves to go even that far. Their embarrassed silence remained unbroken.

The immediate effect of the Twenty-One Demands was for

China to lean more strongly upon the United States than she had one before. The United States was not the ally of Japan. She had extracted no territorial concessions from China, and she had one more to indicate her disapproval of Japanese policy than any other Power. Unfortunately the United States was at all times reluctant to back up her Far Eastern policy by force, and this was particularly the case at this time, since relations with the Central Powers were becoming steadily worse. However, American participation in the first World War at length appeared to offer China a possible way of escape out of her dependence upon Japan. If China also entered the war she could obtain a seat at the Peace Conference, where she would be able to focus attention upon her own position. There were numerous questions which she wished to see discussed. First and foremost, there were the Twenty-One Demands, with the allied question of Shantung. There was also the question of the Boxer Indemnity, the annual payments of which were a heavy burden upon China's strained finances; and there was also the question of extra-territoriality, as well as various other matters. Thus, when the United States declared war upon Germany in April 1917 China immediately followed suit, although there were not lacking those who expected Germany to win the war and who found the prospect of being upon the same side as Japan extremely unpleasant.

There was soon added cause for misgiving. Japan and the United States were now fighting on the same side. Relations in the Far East remained equivocal, nevertheless, and it became desirable to improve them. The result was the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 2nd November 1917, which was one of Japan's few outstanding diplomatic triumphs. By this agreement 'the Governments of the United States and Japan recognise that territorial proximity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the Government of the United States recognises that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.' It is true that the Agreement included a reaffirmation of the principle of the 'open door,' but the implications of the agreement were unmistakable. The Japanese made haste to communicate the agreement to the Chinese Government, implying that the United States had now conceded to Japan pre-eminence in China. The Chinese Government made a dignified protest, and the United States attempted to minimise the importance of what had been done, although without success.

The Treaty of Versailles was a severe disappointment to the Chinese, for it brought no appreciable improvement in their international status. Germans and Austrians lost their extra-territorial rights in China, but the other treaty Powers retained them. Ger-

many also lost her concessions in Chinese cities, and these were restored to the Chinese—but no other foreign concessions were returned. On the cardinal question of Shantung, the Treaty simply transferred all German rights to Japan, in spite of the opposition of President Wilson. The Allies were bound by secret agreements with Japan to concede Japan's claim in return for naval assistance in the Mediterranean. China, therefore, refused to sign the Treaty and made peace separately with Germany.

The loss of Germany's special foreign rights in China was by no means an unmitigated loss to Germany. In the first place, as far as the rights themselves were concerned, a breach had been made in the foreign front. If Germans could be subjected to Chinese jurisdiction, so could other foreigners, at the appropriate time. In order to hasten that time, China made a point, on the whole, and in spite of some miscarriages of justice, of treating Germans with forbearance. The main point, however, was that Germans and Chinese now dealt with one another on a basis of equality. Political considerations did not enter into every private bargain, as they did with the other treaty Powers. The result was that Chinese trade with Germany showed a marked increase. Even politically, China and Germany were in sympathy, for the leading treaty Powers were now the victorious Allies. Had the German Republic been more alive to the possibilities of the Far East it could have played a bigger part in the affairs of China in the post-war years than it did, but by this time China was showing every sign of complete disintegration, and Germany let the opportunity pass.

Meanwhile, Japanese dominance at Peking steadily increased. Successive Chinese Governments merely represented reshufflings of the *Anfu* clique, who were progressively more subservient to Japan, since they were compelled to rely increasingly on Japanese loans. Political servitude culminated in 1917 in the notorious Nishihara loans, which, although nominally granted by private Japanese interests for purposes of development in China, were in reality subsidies to the *Anfu* leaders, in return for a complete control of China's industrial resources by Japan. Other foreign Powers might disapprove, but they could do nothing effective. On the other hand, the Chinese student movement could, and did. Stirred into activity alike by the implications of these loans and by the award of German interests in Shantung to Japan at Versailles, they organised an anti-Japanese boycott in 1919, which swept away the *Anfu* clique in a formidable outburst of popular indignation for its pro-Japanese policy.

CHAPTER XV

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

THE armistice of 11th November 1918 merely called a halt to fighting between Germany and her adversaries. It did not clear up the confused situation in Eastern Europe, which only resumed nominal stability with the conclusion of Poland's war with the Soviet in 1921. Still less did it make any material difference to the position in the Far East.

It has been pointed out that in the period following the Russo-Japanese War, Japan and Russia gradually found methods of reconciling their interests in Manchuria and Mongolia, and of working together. Whilst neither side was in any doubt concerning their ultimate relations, it was clearly expedient for both to exclude any other foreign Powers from these areas. It is therefore not surprising that, following the Twenty-One Demands, Russia and Japan in 1916 signed a further convention, pledging themselves to come to one another's assistance if war resulted from any measures which they might take to safeguard China from the political domination of any third Power. But for the Russian Revolution, therefore, the world might have been treated to the interesting spectacle of a Russo-Japanese front in China after the conclusion of the World War, the object being the destruction of other foreign interests in China, and the partition of the country between them. In any such partition it is fairly safe to assume, from the Twenty-One Demands, that Japan would have obtained the lion's share.

The Russian Revolution put an end to any such interesting possibilities, at the same time opening others. The Maritime Province of Siberia, and particularly the naval and air base of Vladivostok, are the Achilles heel in Japan's scheme of defence. To secure control of this province has long been an object of Japanese policy. The Japanese saw in the Russian Revolution a heaven-sent opportunity to achieve it. The end of Russian resistance to the Central Powers had left valuable Czech contingents in a perilous position in Russia. With consummate skill they extricated themselves and withdrew to Siberia, where sundry White Russian Generals had established a Far Eastern Republic. In order to circumscribe Bolshevik activities the Allies decided to send military support to this ephemeral creation. Although British, French, and Chinese contingents participated, the bulk of the allied forces were Japanese, and little trouble was taken to

disguise the fact that the real object of the expedition was the annexation of Eastern Siberia. The expedition was by no means the triumphal march which had been expected, however. The incompetence of the leaders of the Far Eastern Republic led to its final disintegration in 1920, and even before this date Great Britain and France were tired of the ill-conceived adventure, whilst the United States was definitely hostile. An attempt by Japan to secure control of the Chinese Eastern Railway—the North Manchurian counterpart of the South Manchurian Railways, but under Russian control—had been thwarted by the establishment in 1919 of the Inter-Allied Railway Commission, but in 1920 Japan occupied the Maritime Province, and shortly afterwards Northern Sakhalin. These movements coincided with the withdrawal of the other allied contingents, and Japan remained alone in occupation of these areas until 1922, when she withdrew from the Maritime Province, although Northern Sakhalin was not restored to Russia until 1925. The adventure had been costly and unsuccessful. The effect on Japanese internal politics was that the military party were discredited, and comparatively liberal forces became dominant. Abroad, Japan had become more suspect in her foreign policy than Russia previously had been. It was on these factors that the United States counted in taking the initiative in summoning the Washington Conference at the beginning of 1922. The Washington Treaties represent the high-water mark of American diplomacy, in relation to the Far East. They were also the most decisive rebuff which Japanese expansionist policies had so far suffered. As a result, a major war in the Pacific was postponed for nearly twenty years.

The Conference had three main problems before it for settlement. The first was the problem of China, the second the question of disarmament, and the third was the general security of the Pacific. All three were closely linked. The Washington Treaties form a powerful commentary upon the truism that if you establish the necessary preliminary political situation, technical problems of disarmament can be solved without any serious difficulty. If, on the other hand, you fail to establish the necessary preliminary political situation, you will never get any agreement upon any important question of disarmament at all. The Washington Treaties secured a substantial measure of naval disarmament which lasted for fourteen years because the political problem was settled first. The Disarmament Conference promoted by the League failed because the parties to the Conference had no intention of settling the underlying political problem at all.

As is often the case with successful conferences, the decisive moves were made before the Conference opened. Increasingly with the

exposure of Japan's far-reaching designs in Eastern Asia, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was causing deep uneasiness, both in the United States and in the Dominions. Great Britain was therefore induced not to renew the alliance, and Japan found herself once more confronted at the Conference with an association of Western Powers. It was knowledge of this fact, and this alone, which was responsible for her moderate attitude, for now there was no longer either Russia or Germany as a possible ally. There were also other factors. The Japanese navy had increased formidably during the World War; but the British and American navies had also greatly expanded. Now the United States threatened a vast new navy programme, in which aircraft carriers and 50,000-ton battleships occupied a prominent place. Great Britain laconically replied to this by stating that she would build ship for ship with the United States. In any event, more ships of the *Hood* class were already on the stocks. The object of this naval race was not the usual one. No one considered it to be a possibility that the two navies of the English-speaking Powers could be used against one another. The combined threat was one with which Japan could not possibly compete, and she sulkily gave in.

There were one or two other features concerning the Conference which should be noted. China was represented at the Conference, but it was the China of the northern militarists, threatened by the menacing shadow of Japan, and tied hand and foot to the main treaty Powers. Dr. Sun's government at Canton asked for separate representation, which was refused. As a result he looked increasingly to Russia. Further, although this was a conference to settle the affairs of the Pacific generally, Russia was not invited to attend. At this date, apart from the bad odour in which the Soviet was with the rest of the world, her prestige in the Far East was at a very low ebb. It would be easy to condemn Great Britain and the United States for lack of foresight over these two matters; but in 1922 both decisions seemed natural, and statesmen are not prophets. Besides, the record of Imperial Russia in the Far East was a bad one. Its final phase had been participation with Japan in the dismemberment of China. What was known of Soviet policy in the Far East in 1922 seemed extremely menacing; but the consequences of Russia's omission have been very important indeed. It allowed Japan to play upon the fears of the Western Powers that China would 'go Communist.' It embittered the early years of Nationalist relations with the Western Powers, and it tolerated Japan's aggression in Manchuria as a necessary evil, which would nevertheless check Soviet aggression. The latter, however, mysteriously failed to materialise.

With the exception of Russia, all the Powers with interests in the

Pacific were represented at the Conference, viz. the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Portugal, and China. These signed the Nine Power Treaty, to which there afterwards adhered Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Mexico, and Bolivia. These five Powers all had treaty rights in China, and would necessarily follow the lead of the Powers with greater interests in the Pacific. In order to soften the rebuff to Japan which was implied in the denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Great Britain, the United States, Japan, and France signed a treaty on 13th December 1921 whereby it was agreed that any controversy regarding any Pacific problem which might arise between them, and which could not be settled by ordinary diplomatic methods, should be submitted to a conference of the four contracting Powers. An accompanying statement agreed upon at the same time was careful to point out: (1) that the assent of the United States did not involve an assent by the United States to the Japanese mandates in the Pacific, and (2) 'it is distinctly stated that the controversies to which the Treaty refers do not embrace questions which, according to the principles of international law, lie exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the respective Powers. Illustrations of questions of this sort are immigration and tariff matters, so far as they are unaffected by existing treaties.' The Japanese had pressed for inclusion within the Covenant of the League of a declaration of racial quality. This had been refused, and they were now precluded from raising the immigration question at any Pacific Conference—a fact which they resented all the more, since the United States in 1923, under pressure from the Western states, passed a general exclusion law. The Dominions had already adopted immigration policies of a similar kind.

In two other matters the United States exploited her strong position to the utmost. First, the American Delegation to the Conference presented a severe indictment of Japan's policy in Siberia, not from any affection for Russia, but because the northern tip of the Maritime Province closely approaches Alaska. Second, when the Chinese Delegation presented a strong plea for the abrogation of the Twenty-One Demands, the American Delegation warmly supported it. In neither case could any action be taken, except in so far as the Nine Power Treaty impliedly put an end to those Demands which violated China's integrity and the principle of the 'open door'; but the Japanese were left in no possible doubt concerning the trend of American policy.

One of the main problems before the Conference was that of Shantung. By the Treaty of 25th May 1915, embodying the Twenty-One Demands, China had agreed to any future disposition of German rights in this province to Japan, and by the

secret agreement of 1917 for naval assistance Great Britain and France had accepted the Japanese claim. The Treaty of Versailles heretofore awarded Kiaochow to Japan. This settlement was never accepted by China, and when, at the Conference, fresh negotiations were instituted under the superintendence of Great Britain and the United States, the result was a Sino-Japanese treaty of 4th February 1922, whereby Japan agreed to return Kiaochow to China within six months, to withdraw all Japanese troops, and to surrender her control of the Shantung Railway. This settlement was a bitter blow to Japanese pride, and it was scarcely softened by Great Britain's promise to return Wei-hai-wei to China.

It has been shown that in the period prior to the conclusion of the first World War, Russia and Japan had sought the partition of China, and the establishment of closed areas under their exclusive control. This attitude was in direct conflict with that of Great Britain and the United States, both of whom sought to preserve China's territorial integrity, but to open up the whole of the country to the competitive enterprise of all nations in which they would obviously have the greater share. The 'open door' principle, as enunciated by Senator Hay at the time of the Boxer Rebellion, was nothing more than a redefinition of the British attitude, as enunciated immediately prior to the first Anglo-Chinese War. The Conference produced an emphatic reaffirmation of the Anglo-American principles, and so, for the time being, put an end to territorial aggression. The whole of the Powers at the Conference pledged themselves to the following principles governing their relations with China:

(1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.

(2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.

(3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the policy of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.

(4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states.

The 'open door' principle was explicitly defined in the Nine Power Treaty in the following terms:

'With a view to applying more effectually the principles of the Open Door or equality of opportunity in China for the trade and

industry of all nations, the Powers other than China represented at this Conference agree—

‘(a) Not to seek or to support their nationals in seeking any arrangements which might purport to establish in favour of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of China;

‘(b) Not to seek or to support their nationals in seeking any such monopoly or preference as would deprive other nations of the right of undertaking any legitimate trade or industry in China or of participating with the Chinese Government or with any local authority in any category of public enterprise, or which by reason of its scope, duration, or geographical extent is calculated to frustrate the practical application of the principle of equal opportunity.’

These engagements remained the basis of foreign activities in China until the Japanese onslaught in 1931. During this period liberal elements in Japan, allied with big business, and looking to rapid industrialisation and commercial expansion, were dominant, and the forward drive on the Asiatic mainland was halted.

A number of special problems relating to China were also settled at the Conference. The delegates of the totally unrepresentative Peking Government had expected that far-reaching changes in China's international status would result from the Conference. In particular, it had been hoped that some of the special foreign rights would disappear. No foreign Power was prepared to advance so far in 1922, but a number of modifications were cautiously suggested. Thus, in 1902 and 1903, Great Britain, the United States, and Japan had agreed to relinquish extra-territoriality as soon as improvements in China's legal system permitted. The Conference Powers therefore agreed to set up an Extra-territoriality Commission to investigate whether any modifications in consular jurisdiction could be contemplated. The assembly of the Commission was delayed by the non-appointment of a French delegate until China had settled a financial controversy with France in her favour. It did not assemble in China until 1925, when China was already in the throes of the disorder out of which Chinese Nationalism emerged as the sole authority in China. Inasmuch as the Canton Government boycotted the Commission, its report, which appeared in 1926, was still-born. In any event, because of the disorder, it could recommend no important changes.

A similar procedure was adopted with regard to the Chinese customs tariff. This had been fixed at 5 *per cent. ad valorem* in early treaty days, and had remained unchanged ever since. Lack of

money was a perpetual shortcoming of Chinese Governments, and the concession of full tariff autonomy was therefore asked for. A Commission was appointed to investigate the question, and it was contemplated that China should be allowed to levy additional surtaxes of 2½ *per cent.* on wide classes of goods. With the advent of the Nationalist Government to power, however, full tariff autonomy was quickly recovered.

With the problem of China settled by the Nine Power Treaty, the way was clear for consideration of the problem of naval disarmament. The Washington Conference considered only the question of capital ships, considering that if agreement could be reached upon the question, it would be comparatively easy to secure agreement upon the limitation of tonnage of lesser vessels at some later date. Whatever the ultimate verdict upon the limitations imposed at Washington, the fact remains that they represent the most considerable measure of disarmament voluntarily agreed upon in a system of power politics. The circumstances were extremely favourable, for with the scuttling of the German Fleet at Scapa Flow in December 1918 Great Britain's principal European naval rival had ceased to exist, and Great Britain was as predominant in European waters as she had been after Trafalgar. The passage of time had compelled us to abandon the policy of keeping the Navy up to a standard where it could ace the combined navies of the next two naval Powers. Instead, we substituted the principle that the British Navy should be second to none, but that it should exceed in power that of any two European navies. These were, in 1922, the navies of France and Italy, and the Washington Conference conceded Italy parity with France—a serious mistake, galling to French pride, for the French contended, with some show of reason, that they had tended to neglect their navy for the army after the conclusion of the Anglo-French *Entente*. It was particularly unfortunate, too, in view of Mussolini's seizure of power, and his persistent anti-French policy.

For Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, the 5 : 5 : 3 ratio was established, and no Washington Treaty Power was allowed to build capital ships of more than 35,000 tons. The Japanese bitterly resented this inferior status which, however, accurately represented the existing naval situation, which could scarcely have altered in Japan's favour had a naval race begun. They argued that not only was their strength inferior to that of both Great Britain and the United States, but also they were faced with the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and the prospect of increasing Anglo-American co-operation in the Far East. Against this Great Britain and the United States pointed out that such a ratio really gave Japan predominance in the Far East,

because the Japanese would operate close to their own bases, the United States had to maintain an Atlantic as well as a Pacific fleet, whilst the main strength of British naval power would naturally have to remain in European waters. However that might be, there was never any prospect that Japan would renew the Washington Treaties on naval disarmament when the ten-year period for which they were signed expired.

In one important particular, however, Japan received reassurance at Washington, for it was agreed that Hong Kong and the Philippines should be demilitarised—an undertaking for which we are to-day paying a heavy penalty. This gave Japan complete security in home waters, and it marked a serious change in Anglo-American naval policy. Coupled with the undertaking to give the Philippines complete independence at an early date, it appeared to indicate that the United States intended to remain on the defensive in the Pacific, making Pearl Harbour in Hawaii her main naval base. Similarly, the demilitarisation of Hong Kong, following the retrocession of Wei-hai-wei, was an obvious shortening of Great Britain's line of Far Eastern outposts. Two years after the conclusion of the Washington Treaties Great Britain began work upon the military and air base at Singapore, which was intended to be the main pivot on which the defence of British interests in the East would in future turn. With it went the development of Darwin, on the northern extremity of the Australian Continent. These measures aroused serious criticism in Japan, being declared to be a threat to Japan's security. Inasmuch as Singapore is as far from Tokyo as Gibraltar is from New York, Singapore could be a threat to Japan's security only if Japan meditated aggression which would bring her into the Dutch East Indies, or farther.

CHAPTER XVI

THE SOVIET AND CHINA: 1917-1931

NO understanding of the Soviet's policy towards China and the Far East generally since 1917 is possible without considering the Soviet's attitude towards world affairs as a whole, for Russia's Far Eastern policy is merely an illustration of this general policy in action.

It has already been shown that in the period between the Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Revolution, Russia and Japan, without resolving the fundamental antagonism between them in

he Far East, had gone some way towards composing their differences in so far as Manchuria was concerned, primarily with the object of excluding the United States and Great Britain, as the principal advocates of the 'open door,' from Manchuria, so reserving that region, either for partition between them or for domination by the stronger. The Russian Revolution put an end to this period of limited collaboration. Altogether apart from the fact that the Japanese felt themselves ultimately threatened by the doctrines propagated by the Comintern—doctrines which had a particular application to Japan, where all the main problems raised by rapid industrialisation and capitalism existed in an acute form—the Russian Revolution appeared to afford Japan the opportunity of acquiring the Maritime Province of Siberia, and in this way rounding off the defensive zone which Japan claimed to be necessary for her own security. Furthermore, this could now be achieved with the approval, or at least the acquiescence, of Japan's Western allies in the first World War, since these Powers were threatened by the breakdown of the Eastern front against Germany, as well as by the spread of Communism through such wide areas in Europe and Asia. In the allied expedition to Siberia, therefore, to strengthen the Far Eastern Republic, Japan played a leading part, and she persisted in this adventure for two years after the other Powers had withdrawn. Not only was the expedition completely unsuccessful, but its failure led to the temporary replacement of Japanese militarists by more 'liberal' elements, mainly representative of 'big business,' as the dominant party in Japan, and so led to a period of collaboration between Japan and the Western Powers, lasting for nine years. Since one of the first acts of the new leaders of Japan was to participate in the Washington Conference, and to accept the 5 : 5 : 3 ratio (a sign of inferiority in Japanese eyes, and therefore fiercely resented), their eventual replacement by more warlike leaders, when war weariness had passed, was assured.

For Russia, the Revolution brought temporary obliteration in the field of Far Eastern politics. Quite clearly, recovery of Siberia must be secured as a condition precedent to the resumption of any activities at all. Even such plainly defined rights as Russia's control of the Chinese Eastern Railway were temporarily lost—in the case of the railway to an allied commission, nominally under Chinese control. Nevertheless, one step of very considerable importance was taken during this early period. In 1919 the Soviet Government renounced all special rights and privileges obtained during the Empire. This included not only valuable commercial concessions, but also the rights secured by the treaty system generally, and in particular extra-territoriality. The most important immediate

effect was to place the many 'white Russians' who had taken refuge in Manchuria and China after the Revolution within the jurisdiction of the Chinese authorities—although Chinese control would have been necessary in any case, as the Soviet had deprived these refugees of Russian nationality—but the step inflicted considerable hardship upon an unfortunate and helpless class. Judged by its ultimate consequences, however, the step was an astute move, for it sharply differentiated Russia from the other Powers with whom China had to deal, and caused the Chinese Nationalists to look upon the Soviet with increasing favour, more especially after 1924, when a treaty between Russia and China confirmed this renunciation, at the same time restoring full diplomatic relations between the two countries. The treaty also cleared up the status of the Chinese Eastern Railway, restoring it to Russian control, but without the administrative rights which Russia had formerly possessed, and which had made the railway an instrument for the political domination of North Manchuria by Russia. Finally, the treaty recognised the autonomous status of the Republic of Outer Mongolia, which in this way became a Soviet dependency, although the fiction of Chinese sovereignty was preserved. Since 1934 Russia has undertaken automatically to defend Outer Mongolia if she is attacked.

The attitude of the Soviet to China at this period may have been an astute piece of far-seeing diplomacy, but it was undeniably also an expression of general Soviet policy towards the outer world. The Soviet regarded itself as the potential victim of a grand alliance of capitalist states, which had already attempted to suppress it by armed intervention. The Soviet must therefore at all times attempt to combat this threat. Although this implied an exceedingly active policy in world affairs generally, it did not necessarily imply that war with the capitalist Powers was imminent. It meant, however, the promotion of the anti-capitalist drive by propaganda, and subterranean activities wherever circumstances permitted. No more favourable soil for such activities could be found than China, where resentment against Western 'imperialism' and the 'unequal treaties' was rising rapidly and where, not unnaturally, all domestic ills were ascribed to foreign intervention.

In Communist ideology, as expressed by the Comintern, wars, whether civil or international, fell into three classes—imperialist, national, or revolutionary—according to the character of the states or peoples fighting them. An imperialist war is one fought by an imperialist Power for its own ends; a nationalist war is waged by a people or state formerly dependent upon some imperialist Power, the object of the war being the achievement of its own independence of external control; whilst a revolutionary war is one in

which a people seeks to overthrow the capitalist structure of society, replacing it with Communism of the type established in the U.S.S.R. Strictly, the Soviet is concerned only with wars of the last type, but recognising that all peoples may not be prepared immediately to embrace the principles of the Russian Revolution, it has also extended its aid to all peoples fighting national wars. Of these, the people who have profited most extensively are the Chinese.

Two other general points in connexion with Soviet foreign policy must be noticed. The first is that a distinction must be drawn between the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. as reflected in its diplomatic activities, and the external activities of the Third International. The object of the official foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. is naturally to promote Soviet interests abroad. The object of the external activities of the Third International is, through world revolution, to promote the establishment of the World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The emphasis upon the two aspects of Russian foreign policy has not been constant. In the first years of the Revolution the activities of the Third International were more extensive than they are to-day. More especially in recent years, under the control of M. Stalin, Russian foreign policy has concentrated increasingly upon the security of the U.S.S.R., and the activities of the Comintern and the Third International have fallen into the background. The second point is that, in spite of Marxism, the Soviet has come increasingly to realise that factors other than the purely economic influence foreign policy. One of them is the geographic factor. Russia's relations with Germany and Japan, in spite of occasional fluctuations, have tended to remain hostile, largely because of the respective positions of these three Powers; and for the same reason Germany and Japan have tended to draw progressively closer together. The position to-day is in part due to the situation of these three powerful states. So also is the Grand Alliance at present facing the three dictatorships. That is not to say that more enduring bonds cannot and will not be forged between the present allies. That is, indeed, the main task of the future. But it is important to appreciate that the present groupings of the Powers could have been achieved altogether independently of ideological considerations, although it is not suggested that this has taken place. The doctrines of Naziism and Fascism propagated by Germany, Japan, and Italy have been felt, in varying degrees, to be a threat to the national well-being of all the present allies.

It has already been pointed out that in the last phase of his career Dr. Sun Yat-sen turned to the Soviet for assistance. Looking at the matter from the abstract point of view, this is not at all

surprising. The Russians had conducted a successful revolution against 'imperialism.' China was attempting to do the same. China was also seeking to liberate herself from the treaty system, the benefits of which the Soviet had already renounced. Moreover, China and Russia had a long common frontier, across which Chinese Nationalists could obtain aid. In a way it is rather surprising that Dr. Sun waited for so long before he turned to the Soviet, and when he did it was not a surrender to Communism, for the principles of the Chinese Revolution as set out by him have an unmistakably Chinese character. The Soviet, on its side, had a double motive in aiding the Chinese Nationalists. The ultimate objective was to establish the Chinese Communists in control of China, if this was possible. Even if this was not, the Chinese Nationalists were still fighting a national war, in seeking to bring the regime of the 'unequal treaties' to an end, and thus deserved whatever aid the Soviet could give. Accordingly, at the beginning of 1924, Dr. Sun admitted the Chinese Communists into the Nationalist party, in the hope that they would merge in the party as a whole. Thereafter Soviet military and political advisers, as well as munitions of war, were furnished by the Soviet. For a period the influence of Borodin in Nationalist councils was paramount, and the *Kuo min tang* was reorganised on Communist lines, with the object of working in the closest possible association with the Third International.

This early intimacy was broken when Chiang Kai-shek, after the victorious march to the Yangtse in 1927, expelled his Russian advisers, and at the same time drove the Chinese Communists out of the *Kuo min tang*. For a time this led to strained relations between China and the Soviet. Diplomatic relations were severed, the Chinese Nationalists ceased to receive Soviet support, and in consequence looked increasingly towards Great Britain and the United States, both of which Powers were in an accommodating mood, and finally the Chinese Communists received greater Soviet support than they had previously done.

It was during this strained period in Sino-Soviet relations that the Chinese Eastern Railway dispute arose in 1929. By the treaty of 1924, and the supplementary agreements, the railway was in future to be managed by equal numbers of Russian and Chinese directors, whilst the Chinese resumed control of the administration of the railway area. It was also agreed at the same time that the two contracting parties would not permit, within their respective territories, the existence and activities of any organisations whose aim was to struggle, by acts of violence, against the Governments of either contracting party. Between 1924 and 1929 there was constant friction between the Soviet and the Chinese over the control

of the railway, which in 1926 was seized by the Chinese, on the grounds that Communist propaganda was being spread from the railway zone, in violation of the agreement of 1924. Three years later, in May 1929, Chinese police raided a Soviet consulate in Harbin and obtained full proof of an extensive Communist propaganda organisation working under the cover of Soviet consular offices. For a time it seemed that war would break out between Russia and China, but since both sides had much to lose by hostilities, negotiations for a settlement were initiated, and the Chinese agreed to restore the position which had existed prior to the taking over of the railway in 1926. Further negotiations followed in Moscow, during which the Chinese Government expressed its wish to buy the Russian interests in the railway. The Soviet were not anxious to sell out, however, and the matter was still under consideration when the Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1931. With the completion of the Japanese conquest the position of the railway was obviously greatly changed, and the Soviet and Japan thereupon embarked upon negotiations for its sale. Chinese requests to participate in the negotiations were ignored, and in 1935 an Agreement terminating Russian interests in the railway was signed. Thereafter the Chinese Eastern Railway, which had been intended to be the instrument for the absorption of Manchuria by Russia, became simply the North Manchurian Railway, an integral part of the Japanese railway system in the puppet state of Manchukuo.

The agreement of 1935 was not signed in any spirit of cordiality. The establishment of the state of Manchukuo had, for all practical purposes, brought the Soviet and Japan face to face along the whole of the northern Manchurian frontier. Japan had given too many previous evidences of aggressive intent at Russia's expense for this to be a welcome development. The Soviet remembered Japan's intervention in Siberia, first in favour of the Far Eastern Republic, and later in support of separatist movements in the Maritime Province. Conversely, Japan feared the spread of Communism, not only in Manchukuo and Korea, but also in Japan itself. For these reasons it was not until 1935 that a treaty was concluded between the Soviet and Japan, whereby Japan agreed to withdraw her troops from Northern Sakhalin in return for oil, timber, mining, and fishing rights, and a promise by the Soviet to limit its propaganda to official and semi-official acts.

Consciousness of the potentially hostile attitude of Japan led the Soviet to prepare in good time for emergencies. Extensive schemes for the colonisation of Eastern Siberia were prepared, the task of doubling the track of the Trans-Siberian Railway was begun, and the organisation of a Far Eastern army of formidable proportions, well equipped and as nearly self-supporting as possible, was under-

taken. The lessons of the Russo-Japanese War had been learned. The Soviet was determined that if she had to go to war with Japan again it would be on better terms than in 1905, when the difficulty of communications prevented Russia from bringing her immense resources to bear. Most significant of all, Vladivostok was developed as an air base—a most menacing threat to the densely populated and flimsily constructed industrial centres of Japan, which are within bombing range. The Japanese noted all these developments, and they strengthened their determination to secure complete control of Manchuria at the earliest possible moment. With a strong force stationed on the Manchurian frontier it might be possible to cut off the Maritime Province from the West at the outset of a campaign.

All these factors emphasised to the Soviet the importance of establishing more cordial relations with the Chinese Nationalists than had existed since the expulsion of the Soviet instructors. It therefore happened that although support was not withdrawn from the Chinese Communists, it was not afforded them to an extent which would render them a threat to the Nationalist Government. Meanwhile, neither the Soviet nor China had any difficulty in discovering the identity of the most menacing Power in Eastern Asia, and in taking steps to resist. When Japan attacked Manchuria in 1931, diplomatic relations between China and Russia were resumed, and in 1937 the two countries signed a Pact of Non-aggression, by which each state undertook to refrain from aggression against the other, and from taking any action or entering into any agreement which might be used by aggressors to the disadvantage of the victim of aggression. This Pact has proved to be of considerable importance during China's long struggle with Japan, which began in 1937.

CHAPTER XVII

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE NEW ORDER IN EASTERN ASIA

BETWEEN two o'clock and half-past ten on the night of 18th September 1931 there was an explosion in the vicinity of the South Manchurian Railway, just outside Mukden. It was not a serious explosion, for shortly afterwards the south-bound train from Changchun arrived punctually in Mukden. Whatever the cause (and this has never been finally ascertained) it was as much a surprise to the

Chinese as it apparently was to the Japanese. Nevertheless, during the same night, all the Japanese forces in Manchuria, and some of those in Korea, were set in motion through the whole of the Manchurian Railway zone. Strong detachments, completely on a war footing, captured Chinese barracks at Peitaying, and followed this up with the occupation of Mukden, with its arsenal and aerodrome. Although few people in the West realised it at the time, or indeed for some years afterwards, this trifling incident marked the beginning of the second World War. Equally, it marked the opening of the second stage of Japan's advance to world domination. It led directly to the acquisition of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, to the attack on China, on French Indo-China, on Siam, and finally to the fight to a finish with the Powers of the A, B, C, D front, for nothing less than the complete control of the Pacific, and the domination of areas rich in resources of every kind, of immense extent, and supporting a population of nearly seven hundred millions. Because of the very immensity of these designs they were dismissed as chimerical in the West, mainly because it was not considered possible at that time that Japan, whose Westernisation and whose rise to the rank of a world-Power had been so recent, would deliberately place herself outside the community of nations, and would at the same time challenge Anglo-American conceptions of world order. Such a challenge might well involve Japan eventually in war with the two foremost Powers in the Far East. But recent events have shown that Japan has calculated the extent of the risk, and has prepared with tireless energy and unmatched cunning for the day when deception would no longer be possible. In the meantime, Japan was able to apply pressure alternately to the principal Western Powers with interests in the Far East, and to compel them to retreat to a point where there was no alternative to war.

The reasons for this new move on the part of Japan were complex, and the moment was skilfully chosen. Considerable attention had been paid in Japan to the League experiment. If the League was a working reality, and if the United States, though remaining outside the League, was prepared to work in association with it, then there was an end of Japan's dreams of expansion in the Far East. By 1931, however, the real weaknesses of the League were manifest. It remained simply as machinery for the smoother working of a system of power politics. In 1923 Mussolini, in search of cheap laurels to crown his dictatorship, established a year before, had successfully defied it by bombarding Corfu, and demanding a large indemnity from Greece for the murder of some Italian officials in Albania. He rejected all attempts at League intervention, and was awarded the full amount of the indemnity by the Ambassadors' Conference, which had replaced the Allied

Council. Japan noted the precedent (and there were others), although for the time being she was unable to do anything effective, partly because military adventures were temporarily discredited after the Siberian failure, partly because the party advocating commercial expansion was in power, and partly because the disastrous earthquake of 1923 had weakened Japan rather more than she cared to admit. By 1931, however, the memory of Siberia had faded, the party advocating peaceable commercial expansion were in turn discredited because of the depression and the mounting tariff walls which were progressively excluding her cheaply produced products from world markets, and also because the United States had passed a far-reaching Act excluding Japanese immigration, thereby wounding Japanese susceptibilities. Moreover, the very extent of the economic depression, which had culminated in the autumn of 1931 with the abandonment of the gold standard by Great Britain, made it probable that most Western nations would be disinclined to risk a large-scale expedition to the Far East, whilst Russia would be reluctant to go to extremes, since this would weaken her position in respect of a potentially hostile Europe. There seemed little reason, therefore, to anticipate forcible action from the West. On the other hand, these were cogent reasons, from the Japanese point of view, why Japan should act in Manchuria without further loss of time.

It has been pointed out that from the time of the Chinese Revolution in 1911 onwards Japan took all available measures to prevent the disorder in China proper from spreading to Manchuria, and that this object was substantially achieved through the understanding which existed between the Japanese and Marshal Chang Tso-lin. During the period from 1921 to 1931 Japan pursued a conciliatory policy in China, mainly as a result of the initiative of the Foreign Minister, Baron Shidehara. There was little reason to do otherwise, for China until 1928 progressively disintegrated, and Japan no longer had serious anxiety over Russia's designs in Manchuria. The rise of Chinese Nationalism, however, changed the position considerably from the Japanese point of view. In the first place, there was the close association from 1923 until 1927 between the Chinese Nationalists and the Soviet. In any event, association between China and Russia would have been regarded with suspicion in Japan, but in this case the association was between a Chinese movement with an avowed anti-treaty policy and a state whose ideology was Communism—and the Japanese had recently been showing considerable nervousness over the spread of Communism in Japan. Furthermore, the Soviet's own foreign policy had as its object the liberation of oppressed nationalities from foreign 'imperialism.'

When the Nationalists had brought all China south of the Yangtse under their control, a coalition of northern Chinese generals under the leadership of Chang Tso-lin was hastily formed to bar further progress by the Nationalists, but this proved as ineffective as all other anti-Nationalist coalitions have been, and Chang Tso-lin himself was killed in 1928 by a bomb, which exploded under the train in which he was withdrawing to Manchuria. It was widely assumed that the bomb was of Japanese, and not of Nationalist, origin, and that Japan, fearing Chang would make peace with the Nationalists, were already contemplating the establishment of a separate Manchurian state under someone who was likely to prove more pliable than the old Marshal. With Japanese support, Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang succeeded his father, but the son was already in general sympathy with the objects of the Nationalists, and as early as December 1928 he acknowledged Nationalist control of Manchuria, and in return was confirmed in his administration of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, and was appointed Councillor of State at Nanking. The Japanese, who strongly opposed this step, had overlooked the fact that if Chang Tso-lin was the last (and greatest) of the war-lords, his son belonged to a generation which hoped to create out of the Chinese tangle a powerful modern state in which government by martial law would be an anachronism. From the moment that Chang Hsueh-liang failed to become a Japanese puppet, however, the Japanese conquest of Manchuria could have been predicted with reasonable certainty.

The extension of the authority of the Chinese Nationalists to Manchuria produced a host of problems. Although the Nationalists had by this time expelled the Communists, the Japanese professed to see in their principles no more than the vanguard of Communism. Moreover, it was evident that the Nationalists were prepared to look tolerantly upon Communist propaganda in Manchuria, as an offset to Japanese influence. In any event, Nationalist propaganda itself insisted on the termination of special foreign rights in China, including Manchuria, even though by 1928 Japan had come to regard Manchuria as a necessary source of raw materials and foodstuffs, as a market for Japanese manufactures, and as a possible field for Japanese immigration. On this latter point, however, it should be noticed that of the 1,000,000 Japanese subjects who are alleged to have settled in Manchuria in recent years, no less than four-fifths of them are Koreans. If officials and business men are subtracted from the remainder it will be seen that the number of genuine settlers is very small indeed. Manchuria, in fact, has never been regarded by the Japanese as the solution of the population problem, as the climate is too extreme

for them. The real reasons for Japan's expansion in Manchuria are economic and political. Even before 1931 Japan had built up a vast commercial and industrial network, based on the South Manchurian Railway system. It has increased very extensively indeed since 1931. The real criticism of this enterprise is not that it exists, but that it was, and remains, based on monopoly control, excluding even Chinese competition. Monopoly control in such circumstances sooner or later involves an attempt at political domination. In the case of Manchuria, a further motive prompting Japan's action was the fear that at some later date Russia might resume the interrupted struggle. It was therefore essential to strike at the most opportune moment.

The extent to which the Japanese monopoly had already fastened upon Manchuria was emphasised when the Nationalist Government of China itself attempted some measures of development north of the Great Wall. Ignoring the agreement that China should refrain from building lines competing with the South Manchurian Railway system, the Nationalists encouraged the construction of about 800 miles of railways in competition with the Japanese-owned railways, and then intensified competition by rate-cutting, and by diverting traffic to Chinese ports, to the detriment of Darien, at the same time refusing permission to the Japanese to extend their own system. There were also incessant disputes concerning the extent of the South Manchurian Railway Company's rights in the railway zone. These were extensive, and were pressed by the Japanese to the furthest limits permitted by the treaties of 1915 and beyond. For example, Japanese police habitually operated beyond the railway zone—a practice which had been tolerated during the Chang Tso-lin regime, but one to which the Nationalists could scarcely be expected to give their assent. Similarly, the Company levied taxes in the railway zone in a manner indistinguishable from that of an independent sovereign authority. The policy of the Nationalists was not only to end these usurpations, but also to seek the limitation of admitted special rights. Not having at their command the force comparable with that behind the Japanese Government, it is not surprising that the Nationalists made use of the deadweight of Chinese opposition to Japanese penetration, more especially since the Japanese refused all invitations to withdraw or reduce the number of railway guards, which the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peking in 1905 promised should take place when tranquillity was restored in Manchuria.

A further cause of discord was the status of the 800,000 Korean immigrants. It was partly an economic question. The standard of living of the Japanese is higher than that of the Chinese. Japanese

therefore competed on unfavourable terms in Manchuria, but the Korean's standard of living (as a result largely of Japan's repressive policy) is lower than that of the Chinese. The Japanese therefore encouraged Korean immigration into Manchuria. Not unnaturally the Chinese resisted, more especially as disturbances between Koreans and Chinese, mainly for economic reasons, were not infrequent. There was a further complication in the fact that a number of Koreans, to escape Japanese oppression, sought Chinese nationality. The Japanese refused to recognise such naturalisations and continued to exercise jurisdiction over these Koreans. It was a Sino-Korean disturbance at Wanpaoshan, on 1st July 1931, which furnished one of the proximate causes of the Japanese invasion. The episode was trifling, but it produced anti-Chinese outbreaks in Korea, which the Japanese were slow in suppressing, and these, in turn, produced an anti-Japanese boycott in China. A further factor embittering Sino-Japanese relations was the arrest and murder of the Japanese Captain Nakamura, by Chinese irregular soldiers, in the interior of Manchuria in the summer of 1931. The Chinese took prompt steps to punish the offenders, but the Japanese harboured resentment at this outrage upon an army officer.

The first Japanese steps in the invasion of Manchuria were taken without Chinese opposition of any sort, for Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang had issued orders against resistance in order to avoid a conflict. Within four days, therefore, the Japanese had occupied Antung, Newchwang, Changchun, Kirin, Hsinmin, and Linoyun. Not all these cities were within the railway zone. By the end of the year the Japanese were in possession of every important centre in Southern Manchuria. The Chinese had been quite unable to recover from the swiftness of the Japanese attack, and Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang had retreated into China proper after offering only nominal resistance. During 1932 and 1933 the Japanese consolidated their hold upon the whole of Manchuria, and extended it to Jehol, in spite of stiffening Chinese resistance, which at one time provoked the imminent danger of a Japanese occupation of Peking. Actual fighting was finally ended by the Tangku Force of 31st May 1933 establishing a demilitarised zone inside the Great Wall, between Nationalist territory and Manchuria, but this agreement was provisional only. It did not settle the future status of either Manchuria or Jehol, although by this time the Japanese had taken the decisive step of sponsoring the independence of Manchuria.

The Manchurian problem was the first major issue involving a first-class Power with which the League of Nations was called upon to deal. The circumstances were not propitious. British economic

difficulties were becoming increasingly acute. A Disarmament Conference, after innumerable unnecessary delays, was at last in session, but the prospects of success were non-existent. Europe was in the trough of economic depression; war-debts were still an issue between Europe and the United States, and the ghost of reparations was not yet laid. Rarely have the representatives of so many great nations assembled with so little real power to draw upon. In addition, the scene of hostilities was distant, very few members of the League had considerable interests there, and the U.S.S.R. and the United States, both of whom were vitally interested in the Manchurian problem, were not members of the League.

As early as 21st September 1931 China appealed to the League under Article xi of the Covenant, calling attention to the existence of a state of affairs threatening the maintenance of peace. By 1931 this had become the customary mode of procedure, being less likely to wound the susceptibilities of sovereign states than the more logical procedure under Article xv. The early efforts of the League Council were directed towards securing the cessation of fighting, and the withdrawal of Japanese troops to the railway zone. In reply to the League's communication, China stated that she was willing to assume full responsibility for the protection of Japanese lives and property as soon as she regained control of the occupied areas, whilst Japan stated that she had no territorial designs in Manchuria, and that her acts were governed solely by the desire to protect Japanese subjects and the railway zone. She added that the withdrawal of Japanese troops had already begun, but rejected the proposal that a League Commission should settle the dispute, insisting that it should be settled directly by China and Japan. It will be apparent that the studied moderation of the Japanese reply was designed to test the extent of reactions abroad to her actions, and to leave open a way of retreat if foreign pressure necessitated it. Additional proof that this was the key to the Japanese attitude is furnished by the fact that, foreign reactions being far from unanimous, Japan extended her campaign in Manchuria during October, when it was evident that the League Powers proposed to take no immediate steps. At the same time, Japan adroitly declared that settlement of the Manchurian question must form part of a general Sino-Japanese settlement. In preparation for such a settlement, Japan transmitted to China a statement of five basic principles, which in her opinion ought to govern the settlement. These were: mutual repudiation of aggressive policies; respect for China's territorial integrity; suppression of all anti-Japanese movements in China and Manchuria; the effective protection of Japanese subjects throughout Manchuria; and respect for Japanese treaty rights in Manchuria. The latter were

sufficiently debatable in extent to form the subject of protracted negotiations out of which Japan could scarcely fail to profit.

The League Council had adjourned in the hope that evacuation would be complete when it reassembled. It met again on 12th October at China's request, and passed a resolution asking Japan to complete her evacuation by the 16th. It then adjourned again until 10th November. The brief session, however, had been sufficient to demonstrate that the United States was prepared to work in the closest association with the League in this dispute; and on 20th October the United States reminded both China and Japan of their obligations under the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928, by which no less than sixty-three nations had agreed to renounce war as an instrument of national policy.

The Japanese attitude was steadily becoming more intransigent. A Chinese offer to submit the question to arbitration was refused, and Japan now argued that the continued presence of Japanese troops outside the railway zone was essential for the protection of her interests. When it reassembled, the Council suggested that a neutral zone should be established, but this, too, was refused by Japan. Having failed to secure a cessation of hostilities, the Council contented itself, this time with Japan's consent, with setting up a Commission of Enquiry, under the Chairmanship of Lord Lytton, to proceed to Manchuria and to report on the position. The Commission set out on its journey at the beginning of February 1932.

Throughout the dispute the distance of the area under dispute from the seat of the League's activities was one of the greatest difficulties which the League was called upon to face. So far as the Commission of Enquiry was concerned it was almost decisive, for the position altered very materially for the worse whilst the Commission was on its way to Manchuria. Japanese control over Southern Manchuria was complete in January, and during that month the Japanese were industriously promoting a separatist movement, which met with a complete absence of support amongst the inhabitants of Manchuria. At the end of the month the Japanese had extended the theatre of operations to the Chinese city of Shanghai, where bitter fighting broke out, repercussions of which spread to the International Settlement. Fighting lasted until 5th May.

In view of these developments, when the League Council met again on 25th January, China made a fresh appeal, this time under Article x, which guarantees the territorial integrity of members, and also under Article xv, which is more peremptory than Article xii. Failure to comply with its provisions brings the sanctions article, xvi, into operation. In view of Japan's obvious

intention to detach Manchuria, the dispute had now become a test case, whether the League possessed any effective authority in a dispute involving a major Power. Events were to show that it had not. As the Council appeared to be disposed to take no action at all, China asked, on 12th February, that the dispute be referred to the Assembly. Finally, on 16th February, the League Council addressed a communication to Japan pointing out that no infringement of the territorial integrity of a member, brought about in disregard of obligations under the Covenant, could be recognised by any member. The Japanese reply was unmistakable. On 14th February the alleged state of Manchukuo, at its master's bidding, declared its independence of China.

Meanwhile, the United States had been adopting a policy complementary to that of the League. On 7th January Mr. Secretary Stimson addressed a note to China and Japan, pointing out that the United States would not admit the legality of any *de facto* situation, and would not recognise any agreement between the two states which might impair the treaty rights of the United States in China, or which might be brought about contrary to the League Covenant or to the Pact of Paris. The League Assembly fell into line with the United States by adopting on 11th March a resolution in similar terms.

Unfortunately during this critical period British policy had diverged from that of the United States. At the time of the Stimson Note the United States had invited the British Government to send a note in similar terms to the parties. Great Britain, however, declined to make such a demonstration of solidarity at the last moment when it might have been possible to deter the Japanese from proceeding to extremes; and in an official statement on 9th January the British Government cautiously asserted that as the Japanese had given assurances that they intended to follow the 'open door' principle in Manchuria, it had not considered it necessary to follow the American lead! This act of faith, however, proved insufficient to deter the aggressor. The whole policy of Japan and Russia in Manchuria had been directed in the past to the destruction of the 'open door' principle in Manchuria. It was, in fact, the one point upon which Tsarist Russia and Japan had agreed in their Chinese policies. Moreover, no sooner was the separation of Manchuria from China achieved than Japan set to work systematically to destroy Anglo-American interests there. Whatever the motives for this hesitant policy may have been, it assured the Japanese that they had nothing to fear, either from League action or from Anglo-American co-operation, and the separation of Manchuria immediately followed. Japan recognised her own creation in September after the Lytton Report

had been completed but before it was published or presented to the League Council or Assembly. The Council discussed it between 21st November and 28th November, and in December the League Assembly submitted it to a Committee of Nineteen for consideration. By this time, however, the proceedings of the League were acquiring rather an antiquarian flavour. Not a vestige of Chinese authority remained in Manchuria, whilst the Japanese had dragged from his retirement the harmless but futile Manchu Emperor, whose rule had abruptly ended with the Revolution of 1911, and had declared him Emperor of Manchukuo, in a feeble effort to attach some shadow of spontaneity to the creation of their new dependency.

It has sometimes been urged in additional condemnation of the League in its handling of the dispute that it failed to secure Soviet co-operation in settling it. Unfortunately the dispute arose at a time when the Soviet was still completely estranged from Europe, and drew no distinction between the capitalist Powers, all of which she regarded as potential enemies. Accordingly the Soviet made no effort whatever to collaborate either with the League or with the United States. Lord Lytton, writing of the circumstances in which the Report was compiled, says:

‘It is obvious that in the opinion of the Commission their proposals were practical and capable of being made the basis of a settlement, otherwise they would not have made them, and they were made after some months of study on the spot and after hearing the views of many competent and well-informed authorities. There was one weak spot in them, however, which it was not in our power at the time to remedy. Any settlement in that part of the world must necessarily secure the approval and co-operation of the U.S.S.R., and we were unable to examine any witnesses from that country. In 1932 two of the Great Powers vitally interested in the area of our investigation were outside the League—the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.—but the attitude of these two Powers was very different. The U.S.A., though not a member of the League, was willing throughout to co-operate with it even to the extent of allowing one of its citizens to serve as a member of the Commission. Their diplomatic and consular representatives on the spot co-operated with us fully and gave us much valuable information, and in any subsequent negotiations which might have taken place on the Report of the Commission the United States would have been willing to lend every possible assistance. The U.S.S.R., on the other hand, at that time was unwilling to take any part either in the enquiry or in any negotiations for a settlement. They were frankly hostile to the League of Nations and preferred to keep

aloof. From the Soviet Consular representatives on the spot, therefore, we could get no assistance, and we had no opportunity of finding out what the opinion of the Russian Soviet Government would be towards our proposals.¹

The Report was divided into two parts. The first part contained the findings of fact; the second the suggestions for a settlement. The Japanese had not in any way impeded the work of the Commission in Manchuria, although, as Lord Lytton points out, not a single inhabitant of Manchuria was allowed to give his views on the situation independently of Japanese supervision. The way in which the League handled the Report was not very dextrous. The Report rejected the Japanese submissions on the cause of the outbreak of hostilities, and could not therefore be accepted by Japan. The best method of reaching a solution on a basis other than of force was therefore to dispose of the first part of the Report as quickly as possible and preferably with little discussion, and pass on to the recommendations. The main suggestions were that China should concede to Manchuria a wide measure of autonomy within the framework of the Chinese Republic, and that Japanese rights and interests should be defined and regulated by a series of general commercial and arbitration treaties between China and Japan. The Commission also suggested that the whole of Manchuria should be demilitarised, and that a new Manchurian militia should be raised. There were further proposals for foreign advisers, nominated by the League and by the Bank of International Settlements.

Unfortunately the attention of the League was concentrated upon the first part of the Report.

‘Many weeks were wasted in an acrimonious and quite profitless debate between the representatives of China and Japan, in which no other member of the Council took part. Nothing was gained by this discussion. The relations between the two parties to the dispute were still further embittered and their attitude towards any compromise stiffened. The other members of the Council who listened to it were only wearied, and lost whatever faith they may ever have had in the possibility of reconciling these two antagonists. Much valuable time was thus lost, and finally the Council broke up without having accomplished anything. The discussion was then transferred to the Assembly, where Japan was made to appear like a prisoner at the Bar. Finally, in the month of February 1933 the Assembly adopted unanimously (except for Japan, whose representative voted against it, and Siam, whose representative abstained from

¹ ‘The Lessons of the League of Nations Commission of Enquiry in Manchuria,’ in *The New Commonwealth Quarterly*, December 1937, p. 219.

voting) a Report of its own in which all the conclusions as to facts of the Commission of Enquiry were packed out and arranged in a form which constituted a vote of censure on Japan. Having thus taken three months to adopt the findings of its Commission, which should have been adopted without difficulty in as many days, and having formulated a censure on Japan which the Commission had carefully avoided doing, the Assembly then dispersed, and no attempt was ever made by the League even to examine the proposals of the Commission or to formulate alternative constructive proposals of its own. It is true that the Assembly set up a Committee to examine the proposals made in Chapters ix and x of the Commission's Report, but this Committee had never met. The League did not even try to effect a settlement in the Far East; none of the countries which voted for the resolution in February 1933 made any diplomatic representations to Japan to suggest that the censure embodied in that resolution was to be taken seriously, and all the subsequent acts of aggression committed by Japan in Jehol, in Northern China, and in Shanghai have been tacitly acquiesced in without even a protest.¹

The League members, in fact, were reaping the consequences of earlier irresolution. The Lytton Report had avoided censure, and had suggested a diplomatic settlement. The League Assembly obscurely felt that diplomatic settlements were a poor solution of a clear international wrong, and proceeded to condemnation, without being able to make any effective suggestion, other than the restoration of the *status quo*, and without having the necessary force or resolution to impose this or any other settlement. Great Britain had implied in the clearest possible fashion that she was not prepared to take the leading part in a League War in China, and failed to go even so far as the United States, who equally clearly did not contemplate anything beyond diplomatic remonstrance. The U.S.S.R. remained completely aloof. The result was that the League proceedings were not only ineffective, but provocative. Japan had undoubtedly expected some formula not damaging to her pride. Instead, there was a vote of censure; and accordingly, in February 1933, the Japanese delegation withdrew from the Assembly, and a month later it announced Japan's intention to withdraw from the League. Even upon this episode the League's activities lacked coherence. Article I of the League provides that a state may resign only if it gives two years' notice, and if all its international obligations and all its obligations under the Covenant have been fulfilled at the time of withdrawal. Japan had violated the Covenant, the Briand-Kellogg Pact, and the

¹ Lord Lytton, article cited, pp. 222-3.

Washington Treaties, and had been censured for these violations by the League Assembly. The appropriate action would have been to refuse to accept the resignation, and to expel Japan from the League. Nevertheless, Japan's resignation was tamely accepted, and the question of the Pacific islands which she held under League mandate (and which she had been fortifying in violation of her obligations under the Treaty of Versailles and the League Covenant) was never raised at all. Appropriately, the leading Japanese delegate at the League at the time of Japan's withdrawal was the incorrigible Mr. Matsuoka, whose activities in the sphere of foreign affairs have led Japan successively to adhere to the anti-Comintern Pact, to full military alliance with Germany, to a non-aggression Pact with the Soviet, and finally, to war with China, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States simultaneously. Only an astonishing combination of vanity, unscrupulousness, clumsiness, and duplicity could have achieved such remarkable results in such a short space of time.

CHAPTER XVIII

FIRST STEPS IN CO-PROSPERITY

IN annexing Manchuria, under the thin disguise of an independent Manchukuo, Japan had taken a step from which there was no turning back. She had earned the implacable hostility of 450,000,000 Chinese. She had chosen deliberately to renounce collaboration with the Western Powers, and was steadily driving Great Britain and the United States into reluctant opposition. She had also destroyed the traditional foreign attitude towards China, which depended upon maintenance of China's territorial integrity, in order that all foreign nations should participate on equal terms in the foreign trade of China. The question to which Great Britain and the United States were awaiting an answer from Japan was, what alternative system did she propose to establish in the three Manchurian provinces which, with Inner Mongolia, were now under her control? If Japan's record in Korea, as well as the pronouncements of representative Japanese, had been studied, the answer would have been obvious.

Manchuria is made up of three provinces: Liaoning (Fengtien), Kirin, and Heilungkiang. After the expulsion of Chinese forces from these three provinces the Japanese reconstituted the provincial governments, under hastily assembled Chinese, who were

prepared to work with the Japanese army. In every instance the Chinese officials were under an obligation to work in association with Japanese advisers, and all anti-Japanese officials, no matter how insignificant, were dismissed. All public enterprises previously owned or controlled by the Chinese Government were brought under Japanese control, including the Chinese railways which the Nationalists had constructed in competition with the South Manchurian railway system. Having established suitably subservient provincial governments, the Japanese then proceeded to the next step in uniting them in a single state. They therefore manufactured an independence movement, and it must be clearly appreciated that 'manufacture' is used in its literal sense. As the Lytton Report points out, nothing whatever had been heard of such a movement before September 1931, for the simple reason that Manchuria is not inhabited by Manchus alone. The Chinese vastly preponderate, and in any case, the terms Manchu and Chinese, as racial epithets, had become as destitute of meaning in China and Manchuria in 1931 as the terms Norman and Saxon in Elizabethan England. There was not even an anti-Nanking faction. The whole of the inhabitants of Manchuria had accepted the fact of Nationalist supremacy as the only method of reuniting China and restoring her international position. The so-called leaders of the 'independence movement' therefore represented no shade of Manchurian opinion. They were office-seekers, suffering from some real or imagined grievance against the former administration, with not a few adventurers of dubious reputation.

From these unpromising materials the Japanese organised the self-governing Guiding Board, in which Japanese army officers had a controlling influence, and this in turn gave birth on 14th February 1932 to a North-Eastern Administrative Council, controlling the whole of Manchuria. Four days later this body issued a declaration of independence, and declared its intention to establish the Republic of Manchukuo, with the ex-Emperor, Pu-yi, as its 'Regent.' In order to obtain the support of as many Manchus as possible, the Japanese took every possible opportunity of favouring them at the expense of the general population, and similar steps were taken in respect of the small Mongol and Mahomedan minorities. Pu-yi was inaugurated as President of Manchukuo at the new capital, Changchun, on 9th March, and Japan recognised the puppet-state on 15th September by concluding a treaty of alliance and mutual defence with her. By this treaty Japan retained the right to station whatever forces she deemed necessary in Manchukuo. An Organic Law, or constitution, on the Japanese model, had been promulgated on 9th March, and in every Department of State Japanese advisers were

placed, whilst the Japanese also retained control of the Manchukuo army, the police, the railways, and the banks. On 1st March 1934 Pu-yi was proclaimed Emperor of Manchukuo.

In dealing with foreign rights in Manchukuo, Japan proceeded with caution, in order not to inflame foreign animosity at a time when resentment over recent events was still strong. Extra-territoriality was at first not challenged, but by a treaty of 10th June 1936 Japan announced her intention to abandon her extra-territorial rights by progressive stages. By 8th November 1937, however, she terminated her extra-territorial rights completely, and in announcing this agreement the Japanese explained that since July 1936 other foreigners had been subjected to the jurisdiction of Manchukuoan courts. The extent of the decline of foreign influence in the Far East can be measured by the fact that no treaty Power—not even the United States—deemed it politic to register even so much as a protest at this unilateral destruction of treaty rights. At the same time, and by the same ingenious method, foreigners were fully subjected to local taxation. This, however, was merely a trifle compared with the systematic destruction of foreign interests in Manchuria by the promotion of monopolies in which only Manchurians and Japanese could participate. Thus, the Oil Monopoly Law of 1934 gave the Manchukuo Government a monopoly of retail distribution of oil products, and empowered it to establish quota control of production, refining, and import. The effect of this was to drive British, American, and other foreign firms out of business, and foreign protests were blandly ignored. From 1934 onwards the door in Manchukuo was as firmly closed and bolted as it had been in Korea after the Russo-Japanese War.

The Western Powers were not the only ones to experience the effects of the Japanese advance. The Soviet's negative attitude towards the League in 1931-33 was due to distrust of those who controlled the foreign policies of the principal League Powers, not to any affection for Japan. Unfortunately the record of these Powers indicates that the Soviet's reserve was to some extent justified. Nevertheless, suspicion of the West did not solve any of the Soviet's problems, and in turn the U.S.S.R. was compelled to embark upon a policy of appeasement, for the situation was in the highest degree menacing. The U.S.S.R. and Japan now had a lengthy common frontier along the Manchukuo border extending for 2000 miles, where many unsolved problems survived from an earlier era. Moreover, the Trans-Siberian Railway ran dangerously near to this frontier. There were extremely delicate problems in the affairs of Inner and Outer Mongolia awaiting settlement. There was also the question of the Chinese Eastern

Railway, in 1929 a cause of Sino-Russian friction, and now an immediate issue of Soviet-Japanese relations.

Immediately after the Japanese invasion there were difficulties over the railway, for the eastern section was rendered almost unworkable by the action of bandits, which the Soviet alleged received encouragement from the Japanese. In any event, the value of the railway was now steadily declining in face of Japanese competition, and in 1933 the Soviet opened negotiations with the Manchukuo authorities for its sale. An agreement for the sale was eventually concluded on 23rd March 1935, and although the compensation which the Soviet received was trifling, an important source of friction had been removed at a time when the Soviet was not in a position to risk a war.

That such a war would eventually have to be fought no Soviet official doubted, and the necessary steps were therefore taken to prepare for it. The Trans-Siberian Railway was double-tracked, and greatly improved; steps were taken to end the estrangement with China and to assure the Nationalists of Soviet aid in the event of renewed war with Japan; but most important of all, there was a rapid development of the Soviet's military power in Eastern Asia.

There was need for speed, since between 1931 and 1936 there were no less than ninety-one frontier incidents along the Amur River, of which only four were settled amicably. A number of them arose out of conflicting claims to islands in the Amur River, title to which had been disputed even during Chinese rule in Manchuria. Many of the disputes were caused by the desire of these two formidable antagonists to test one another's strength. That Japan was making preparations at least comparable with those of Russia was shown by the fact that already by 1934 she had constructed nearly six hundred miles of railway and about 1500 miles of roads in the vicinity of the frontier, whilst according to Russian estimates there were 130,000 Japanese troops and over 110,000 Manchukuoan troops permanently stationed in this area. To meet this threat Russia strengthened her Far Eastern army to about 300,000, began the construction of new railways leading to the frontier, took all possible steps to make the Far Eastern army self-supporting, and constructed about 5000 forts along the frontier. In addition, Vladivostok was made a submarine and air base. These preparations continued without intermission, and were intensified right down to the attack of the Nazis on the Soviet Union on 22nd June 1941.

In the period of extreme vulnerability—in December 1931 and also a year later—the Soviet proposed a non-aggression pact with Japan. This was refused. When in 1933 Japan proposed that a demilitarised zone should be established to put an end to frontier

incidents, it was the Soviet's turn to refuse. Between 1934 and 1936 there were prolonged discussions with the object of establishing a frontier commission, to define the boundaries of Russia, Mongolia, and Manchukuo, but these failed to reach any successful conclusion. Meanwhile, relations between the Soviet and Japan deteriorated to such an extent that railway traffic between Russia and Manchukuo was suspended, and many Soviet consulates in Manchukuo were closed.

A further source of Soviet-Japanese friction was their respective activities in Mongolia. Even in the days of the Chinese Empire the Mongolian princes had enjoyed a large measure of autonomy. On the outbreak of the Chinese Revolution in 1911 the princes of Outer Mongolia declared their independence, and following the Russian Revolution, this area became a Soviet dependency, although nominally China's suzerainty is still recognised. There was no similar development in Inner Mongolia, where Chinese control remained effective, and when the Nationalists assumed authority in China there was a good deal of development, accompanied by Chinese immigration, in this area. One of the first acts of the Nationalist Government was to bring about an overdue administrative reorganisation of this area into the four provinces of Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan, and Ningshia. Notwithstanding increasing Nationalist control, however, separatist aspirations of the Mongolian tribes remained strong when Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931. To secure control of Inner Mongolia would place Japan in a position from which to threaten China's communications with the Soviet. She therefore followed her occupation of Manchuria with an occupation first of Jehol, and then of the two other provinces of Inner Mongolia, Chahar and Suiyuan. To support local autonomous movements was Japan's obvious policy, and in spite of the efforts of the Nationalists, Japan was able to secure the establishment of an autonomous Mongol state, with its capital of Changpei. The full occupation of the four provinces was not completed until after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937.

Before these operations were completed Japan was already threatening the Soviet's control of Outer Mongolia. In the summer of 1935 she demanded that a Manchukuo military mission should be established there. The offer was rejected, and there was a succession of frontier incidents between Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia, which continued into 1936. In March of that year, however, the U.S.S.R. informed Japan that a military alliance and treaty of mutual assistance existed between the Soviet and Outer Mongolia, whereupon the frontier incidents diminished in number, although they were by no means at an end. Here, again, such frontier incidents may be regarded simply as a method of testing

the respective strengths of Japan and the Soviet. They were not intended to serve as the pretext for a general war, and have not been so used.

The rapidity of Japan's advance in Eastern Asia, facilitated as it was by the disunion of her potential antagonists, was accompanied by an increasingly assertive tone in her official and semi-official declarations. Prominent amongst these was what is known as the Amau Statement of April 1934. This was one of those periodic, conveniently timed declarations, which could be repudiated for the moment if foreign reactions were too pronounced, but which could always be referred to at a later date as an announcement of policy when Japan made a further forward move. The Statement explained that in future Japan would oppose any Chinese move calculated to threaten the peace of the Orient, and that Japan would also oppose any measures by other Powers having a similar object. In particular, she would object to the supply of loans, war material, or instructors to China. The Statement also emphasised that Japan has special responsibilities in Eastern Asia, that it was her duty to keep peace and order in that area, and that she was prepared to act alone to fulfil this duty.

This enunciation of Japanese policy was transparently intended to be the prelude to the establishment of a protectorate over the whole of China, and to the exclusion of foreign interests there. Henceforth, Eastern Asia (a vague term, which has expanded steadily with the growth of Japanese ambitions) was to be a special area in which the ordinary rules of international intercourse should not apply, because it was being reorganised as a dependency of a master-race. Once again Japan had evolved a conception of regional organisation, which Hitler borrowed a few years later, in proclaiming his 'New Order' for Europe. In both cases the schemes represented the totalitarian reply to half-hearted attempts to solve the problem of international order on a democratic basis. In Japan's case the reply was particularly pointed, as the Japanese delegation at Geneva (the two years' period of notice not having yet expired) indicated that one of the things to which Japan objected was the supply of technical advisers to China by the League, and further proposals for loans, for the sale of aeroplanes, and for the appointment of European and American military advisers.

By this period the Army and Navy were taking increasing control of Japan's foreign affairs, and although Japan's international position was nominally one of great strength, there were dangers ahead, for which it was necessary to be prepared. In 1935 the withdrawal of Japan from the League would take effect. In the same year, the Second Soviet Five-Year Plan would be completed, and Russia's industrial and military strength would then

be increasingly formidable. In the same year, too, there would be a Naval Conference, at which Japan would repudiate the 5 : 5 : 3 ratio to which the Washington Treaties had restricted her in the sphere of capital ships. If such repudiation gave her a temporary advantage, in immediate increases in the construction of naval tonnage, any Japanese who looked ahead could see that it could not fail to bring Great Britain and the United States closer together. It might also mean that Hong Kong and the Philippines, demilitarised under the Washington Treaties, might be developed as advanced striking bases in the Pacific. It therefore became an essential term of Japan's forward policy that the subjugation of China should be completed in the shortest possible time; and this, in turn, implied that the measures contemplated by the League Powers for the rehabilitation of China should not be allowed to be completed. In 1935, therefore, the docile Japanese citizen, whose standard of living was already dropping as a result of the increasing drive for greater armaments, was faced with the bleak prospect of three major wars in the immediate future—against China, against Russia, and eventually against Great Britain and the United States. To prepare for these ordeals, Japanese literature was steadily harnessed to the conception of 'Japan's destiny,' and skilful use was made of the glittering prospect of domination over an area extending from the Arctic to Australia, and from Tokyo to Bombay. No wonder that young Japanese sought refuge in Communism. Within six years the arrogance of Japan's taskmasters has succeeded in uniting all Japan's opponents against her simultaneously.

At the beginning of 1935 China and Japan had reached a provisional agreement not to station their troops at certain points in Inner Mongolia, and their relations had temporarily become less strained than at any time since 1931. In May, however, two Chinese who were editing a newspaper at Tientsin on behalf of the Japanese army were murdered in the Japanese concession, and the Chinese in North China immediately received new demands, which, amongst other things, asked for the cessation of all *Kuo min tang* activities in North China, as well as the termination of all anti-Japanese activities, and the dismissal of the Governor of Hopei Province. The Chinese went some considerable way towards complying with these demands, far-reaching though they were, whereupon, on 9th June, the Japanese presented further demands, which again were accepted as a whole. Not satisfied even yet, the Japanese demanded guarantees that the undertakings would be carried out, whereupon the Chinese authorities in North China refused to go further without express authorisation. At this point a fresh minor incident in Chahar was made the excuse by Japan

for still a further set of demands, and as fast as these were substantially complied with, further Japanese demands were prepared. It should be noticed that throughout these negotiations they proceeded on the Japanese side from the army commanders, representatives of the Japanese Foreign Office being completely ignored.

The reasons for Chinese compliance were not far to seek. Every responsible Chinese official realised that the struggle with Japan would have to be renewed at no distant date. The Government's one object was to postpone it as long as possible, so that Chinese feeling could harden, and Chinese resources could increase. By the end of the summer, however, General Chiang's policy of delay had become more difficult to achieve than before, inasmuch as General Tada, the Japanese commander at Tientsin, had blatantly announced that Japan's policy was to detach the five northern provinces of Hopei, Chahar, Suiyan, Shansi, and Shantung from Nanking, and to organise them into a separate political and economic unit, dependent on Japan. This was followed in October by an announcement that unless the Nationalist Government terminated its non-co-operative policy, immediate steps would be taken to expel all Chinese troops from the five provinces. During November an effort was made by the Japanese to establish such a government, but the Governors of the five provinces refused to co-operate, and the somewhat clumsy efforts of the Japanese proved a complete failure. Immediately afterwards, however, they succeeded in procuring the establishment of the East Hopei Autonomous Council, covering parts of Hopei and Chahar. This was sufficiently successful to compel the Nationalists to negotiate with the Japanese representatives, and a provisional agreement, recognising a body known as the Hopei-Chahar Political Council, was reached in December 1935. Within the area under its control extensive efforts were already being made by the Japanese to link it economically to Manchuria.

Throughout 1936 there were protracted negotiations between China and Japan in an effort to seek a solution of the problem of their relations. In a speech to the Japanese Diet on 21st January, Mr. Hirota, the Japanese Foreign Secretary, had stated that the Japanese policy was based upon three fundamental principles. These were that China should cease all unfriendly activities and should embark upon active collaboration with Japan; that China should recognise Manchukuo, and finally, that China should assist in the suppression of all Communist activities in Eastern Asia. The Chinese reply to this statement was conciliatory to a marked degree. As soon as negotiations opened, however, it was evident that Japan's immediate aim was to complete the separation of the Hopei-Chahar area from Nanking, and at the same time to con-

solidate her control of the resources of these provinces. It is therefore not altogether surprising that little progress should have been made, when anti-Japanese incidents at Canton and Shanghai in the late summer of 1936 brought a fresh crop of Japanese demands, which included a demand for the creation of an autonomous area to include the five northern provinces, and a Sino-Japanese alliance against Communism. To these demands General Chiang Kai-shek quite clearly could not agree, and the continuation of the negotiations was made still more difficult by an attack on Suiyan by a Manchukuo army, assisted by Mongols—an attack which the Chinese were successful in frustrating.

At the end of 1936, therefore, a deadlock had been reached, but the full consequences of this were not immediately experienced, for on 2nd February a new Japanese Government assumed office, and the Foreign Minister, Mr. Sato, adopted a less arrogant attitude towards China. On 31st May, however, this Government resigned, to be succeeded by a Government in which Prince Konoye was Prime Minister and Mr. Hirota was Foreign Minister. The first acts of the new Government were to call for an immediate mobilisation of Japanese industry for war purposes. Quite evidently a new chapter of Japan's policy of expansion in China was about to begin. By July the two countries were again at war. On the night of 7th-8th July the Japanese attacked Chinese troops stationed at Lukouchaio, and this was followed by further clashes between Chinese and Japanese troops in North China. All efforts at a local settlement having failed, Japan launched a general attack upon the Chinese Nationalists, confidently expecting that resistance would not extend at most beyond a few months, and that a quick campaign would at one and the same time destroy Chinese Nationalism and foreign assistance to China, and secure a subservient China which could serve not only as a vast field for Japanese exploitation, but as a base for a future war against the Soviet Union. Instead, the war has already lasted for five years, it has united China with the Soviet on the one hand and with Great Britain, the United States and their allies on the other, and it will go on until the Japanese power in the Pacific has been completely destroyed. When it is concluded, Japan will be a minor Power, probably Communist, with more acute problems than any modern state has had to face. China, on the other hand, will be a world Power, allied with those Powers whom Japan has consistently sought to destroy. For such a result Japan will have to thank her naval and military leaders, allied with her big industrialists, who have deliberately rejected all offers of a peaceful solution by the Western Powers, for a policy of fanatical racial assertion, comparable only with that of Hitler's Germany.

PART THREE

The Second World War and the Future of the Pacific

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CHAPTER XIX

A PANORAMA OF THE PACIFIC

IN order to obtain any idea at all of the conditions of the warfare which is now in progress in the Pacific it is necessary to have some conception of the main geographic factors of this area—its immense extent, resources, and chief natural features. Such knowledge is also essential for any consideration of the problems which will arise at the Peace Conference. This is the first Pacific War. With resolution and far-seeing statesmanship it may also be the last. But the efforts which will be necessary to bring it to a successful conclusion will be vast. In man-power, resources, and staying power the 'United Nations' greatly exceed their opponent, but Japan is resolute, and well-equipped, and she has the immense advantage of concentrating her whole effort in one huge theatre of war, in which, as a result of initial successes, she has started with formidable naval supremacy. The result is that she can swiftly change the point of attack to suit conditions which she had intensively studied in recent years. Moreover, she is striking at large land areas, some of them sparsely populated, and extremely thinly defended. Only strategy on a vast scale can defeat such a determined attack, and that can operate only over a fairly considerable period of time, when superior forces and resources at last begin to have their effect.

The Pacific is the largest of the oceans, and it is studded with over twenty thousand islands of all sizes, from coral reefs to the continent of Australia and the vast islands of Sumatra and Borneo, which contain some of the most valuable of the world's raw materials. The whole of Australia, most of Eastern Asia, and the whole of the west coasts of North and South America lie on its fringes. These facts alone indicate how difficult the problems of modern warfare in this area are. From Auckland, in northern New Zealand, to Panama the distance is 6600 miles. From Auckland

to Sydney the distance is 1280 miles. Darwin is 2440 miles away from Hong Kong and 2130 miles from Batavia, the chief port in Java. From Batavia to Singapore is another 532 miles, whilst Singapore is over 3000 miles away from Yokohama. Yokohama is 4300 miles from Sydney, 3380 miles from Honolulu, 4500 miles from San Francisco, and 4230 miles from Vancouver. Manila, capital of the Philippines, is 1340 miles from Singapore, and 1870 miles from Darwin. From San Francisco to Honolulu is 2100 miles, and from San Francisco to Sydney the distance is 6500 miles. 6850 miles separate Vancouver from Sydney. From Perth, in Western Australia, to Colombo, in Ceylon, the distance is 3100 miles, and from Hobart, in Tasmania, to Cape Town is over 6000 miles. All these distances are matters of first importance to those upon whom falls the responsibility of maintaining supplies or sending reinforcements to threatened areas. They also demonstrate the impossibility of keeping a complete check upon all parts of the Japanese naval forces.

The Japanese islands lie off the Eastern coast of Asia, and are nearest to Korea, Manchuria, and the Russian Maritime Province. In extent they are about twice the size of the British Isles. Climatically they are well within the temperate zone, and although in summer the thermometer may reach the nineties, the climate is dry and sunny, and the heat is not oppressive. The winters are mild; and the consequence of these climatic conditions is that the Japanese are unsuited to be colonists in places where there are great extremes of temperature, more particularly extremes of cold. California, Hawaii, Brazil, and Australia are places where they settle most readily, although considerable numbers have settled in recent years in south-eastern Asia. The population of Japan is about 72,000,000, and it is increasing at the rate of about a million a year. Between 1550 and 1850 it increased by only 3,000,000 to about 33,000,000, the reasons for this slow increase being internal disorder, pestilence, and famine. Thus, in less than a century the population has more than doubled, and although the birth-rate has recently fallen somewhat owing to changing social conditions and later marriages, there has been a still more rapid decline in the death-rate. There is no reason to suppose that the population will stop short of 100,000,000. This is a most serious factor in the Japanese problem, for although the actual density of the population is less than that of Great Britain, the Netherlands, or Belgium, much of the soil cannot be utilised for agriculture, so that the density of population per square mile of arable land is the highest in the world, being 2774, as compared with 2170 for Great Britain, 1709 for Belgium, 819 for Italy, 806 for Germany, 467 for France, and 229 for the U.S.A.

Only 16 *per cent.* of the soil of Japan is classed as arable. Forests cover half the surface of the country, especially the mountainous areas. The staple crop is rice, upon which the diet of the people is based. Since the maximum land capable of producing rice has now been placed under cultivation, Japan has been compelled to rely increasingly in recent years upon imported rice, chiefly from Korea, Manchuria, and China. Nevertheless, about half Japan's population are still engaged in agriculture, mostly in extremely small holdings of about $2\frac{1}{2}$ acres. Another third of the population live in cities. The largest of these are growing very rapidly. The population of Tokyo now exceeds 6,000,000, and that of Osaka 3,000,000. Nagoyo, Kyoto, and Kobe have each about a million inhabitants, whilst Yokohama has another three-quarters of a million. These cities, where industrial workers are crowded together in flimsy dwellings constructed of inflammable materials, are highly vulnerable to air attack.

Industrialisation has been proceeding rapidly in Japan, but there are serious drawbacks. There is a real shortage of coal, iron, and petroleum, although Japan has gone some way towards making up for the scarcity and low quality of coal by hydro-electric power. The presence of coal and iron in North China and Manchuria, and the presence of some oil in Manchuria, explain Japan's determination to bring those areas as soon as possible under her control. The process of industrialisation has resulted in increasing labour costs and a higher standard of living. Both have fallen, however, during the war with China. They will fall still further during the present war, and this, as much as anything, will provoke unrest which will ultimately destroy Japan's military strength. Industrial discontent, due to low wages, overcrowding, and malnutrition, and now denied the normal methods of expression through political and trade union activity, is responsible for the increasing fear of Communism amongst Japan's ruling classes. Communism offers the one intelligible alternative to the evils of the present system, and it is making considerable progress underground among the younger generation, for whom *Bushido* has no appeal.

Contrary to general impression, the Japanese have not emigrated in formidable numbers. Only about 20,000 a year go abroad, and of these something like two-thirds eventually return to Japan. The numbers of Japanese living abroad do not therefore greatly exceed 2,000,000. Of these over half a million are in Korea, about 200,000 more in Manchuria, and another third of a million are in Southern Sakhalin. Formosa now contains about 270,000 Japanese, and Brazil another 200,000. There are about 150,000 in Hawaii, and their presence contributed materially to American difficulties at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour.

In recent years also there has been a noticeable stream of Japanese emigration to the Philippines, to Malaya, and to the Dutch East Indies, in all cases with an ultimate political object. Restriction on Oriental immigration to the United States and the British Dominions has undoubtedly prevented the Japanese from establishing useful colonies there also. The Japanese standard of living, low though it is by Western standards, has prevented them from settling in other Oriental countries as agriculturists or manual workers. Their principal occupations are commerce and fishing. In the Dutch East Indies, until restrictive legislation was introduced, they combined the occupations of general store-keepers and money-lenders.

It was pointed out in an earlier chapter that the principal feudal families, at the Revolution, turned from agriculture to commerce and industry. The result is that both are controlled by small groups of extremely wealthy families. It has been stated that about a quarter of the capital invested in Japanese companies is controlled by Mitsui, and another 35 *per cent.* by Mitsubishi Sumitomo, and Yasuda. There is thus little of an industrial middle class in Japan, and this again indicates the path of future political change, inasmuch as these wealthy combines, which dominated and corrupted the political parties in the Japanese Diet, until the militarists assumed control of the country, can scarcely expect to survive the present war, and Japan's defeat. Any attempt to bolster them up as an alternative regime to that of the army and navy would be doomed to failure from the beginning, since exasperation at this plutocratic control of Japan was one of the reasons for the rise to power of the army and navy.

Besides the steadily increasing quantities of foodstuffs, and virtually the whole of her oil, Japan also has to import the whole of her raw cotton, wood, and rubber, as well as three-quarters of her iron ore, a quarter of her pig iron, and half her scrap iron. She also imports much of her manganese, tungsten, zinc, tin, lead, nickel, and bauxite. It will be shown later in this chapter that many of these necessary raw materials can be obtained within the Pacific area which Japan has euphemistically termed her 'Co-Prosperity Sphere.' Of Japan's imports, an overwhelming preponderance have come from Great Britain, the British Dominions, India, the United States, and Netherlands India. With the exception of trade with China and Manchukuo, the same is also true of Japan's exports, which are made up principally of cotton piece goods, raw silk (virtually all of which went to the United States), rayon and silk piece goods, woollens, machinery tinned goods, potteries and glass. The strains on Japan's economy, due to a total cessation of this trade during the present war, will be severe, and

nake it clear that she must win quickly, if she is to win at all. Now, however, that she has succeeded in occupying Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, her position has been very considerably strengthened so far as essential war materials are concerned. The extent of Japan's dependence upon the British Empire, Netherlands India, and the United States is shown by the fact that in 1938 Japan's total imports amounted to 2,665,000,000 yen, of which 1,503,000,000 came from these countries. Exports totalled 2,689,000,000 yen, of which the share of her present adversaries was 990,000,000 yen. In 1939 the figures were: imports 2,917,000,000 yen (1,573,000,000 from her present opponents) and exports 3,576,000,000 yen (1,240,000,000 to those countries). Whilst the loss in trade to the allied countries is also serious, it is not disastrous, even since the extensive Japanese conquests, and here are possibilities of minimising some of the dislocation by fresh markets in Latin America, which are not available to Japan, and by mutual credit arrangements.

From the outbreak of war with Germany in 1939 the British Empire had adopted the policy of restricting by licence the export of materials to Japan, and the Americans followed suit early in 1941. Continuation of Japan's imperialist adventures in China, Siam, and Indo-China brought drastic new restrictive measures in the summer of 1941, and really made it imperative for her to choose between abandonment of her expansionist policy and war. The militarists chose to risk everything. Before the economic sanctions applied in 1941, Japan had been seeking to accumulate reserves of necessary raw materials, and reliable estimates suggest that she has about two years' stocks of these at most. Once again the position has been materially altered by the occupation of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, more especially as allied resources have been correspondingly and heavily diminished. It should also not be overlooked that in Siam and Indo-China the Japanese have already obtained in fact excellent additions to their supply of raw materials, chiefly rice, rubber, anthracite, tin, and zinc, although a good deal of this was already exported to Japan in normal times.

To the north of Japan is the narrow island of Sakhalin, long the source of dispute between Russia and Japan, and now divided uneasily between them. Apart from its obvious strategic importance, Sakhalin is the centre of an extensive Japanese fishing industry, whilst she operates important oil and other mineral concessions there.

Adjacent to Japan on the Asiatic mainland are the Russian Maritime Province, Manchukuo, and Korea. The development of the Russian Far Eastern Provinces, as has already been pointed out, was a consequence of the Russo-Japanese War, when diffi-

culties of communication proved fatal, and of Russo-Japanese relations since 1920, and more especially since the Japanese conquest of Manchuria. Both Japan and Russia have acted consistently upon the assumption that war between them is inevitable, and have taken the necessary steps to prepare for the day when it breaks out. Russia's aim, therefore, has not only been to maintain in the Far East naval, military, and air forces sufficient to carry on war against Japan, but also to provide suitably for their supply and equipment. Initially they were hindered by an unfavourable climate, and by a scanty population, but far-reaching measures have been taken to overcome both difficulties. The extremity of the cold, with the necessary consequence of perpetually frozen subsoil elsewhere, have meant that colonisation must be confined to the Amur River, the region of the Trans-Siberian Railway, and the Pacific Coast.

The steps taken after 1931 to create the Far Eastern army have already been indicated. In the spring of 1939 the Japanese estimated it to number 400,000 men, and by 1941 the number probably exceeded half a million. Parts of it were undoubtedly used to stem the German advance on Moscow in December 1941, and to press home the Russian advance afterwards, but there can be little question that the full strength in the Far East will be restored at the earliest possible moment. It is equipped with the full quota of tanks and aeroplanes, which proved superior to those of the Japanese in the large-scale operations which were fought in the summer of 1939, nominally between Mongolia and Manchukuo, really between Russia and Japan.

Side by side with the development of the army has gone the growth of the civilian population, special inducements having been offered to colonists, and especially to time-expired army men. The rural population of this area is now about one and a quarter million, and the urban population is rather less. There has been only a slight increase in agriculture, which is carried on by means of collective farms. The chief crops are grain, rice, sugar beet, and soya beans, whilst the fishing industry has been extensively developed, together with canning and shipbuilding. Steady progress is also being made in the development of the mining industry, to meet the demands of a modern mechanised army. Some of the necessary oil is produced in Northern Sakhalin, the rest was imported from the United States *via* Vladivostok.

In recent years the Soviet has constructed important and strongly fortified bases at Pograrishnaya, Blagoveshchensk, and Kharbarovsk, and has developed air bases at Spassk, Vladivostok, and Kharbarovsk, and in Kamchatka, Sakhalin, and other neighbouring islands in the Behring Sea, where they link up with

American air bases from Alaska. There is also a submarine base at Nikolskoe on Behring Island, whilst in the Maritime Province itself, Nikolaevsk and the new port of Soviet Harbour are being rapidly developed as naval bases, in addition to Vladivostok, where the Soviet keeps a Far Eastern navy of considerable size, including light cruisers, destroyers, and many submarines, half of which are of large size. If the map is studied it will be seen that Russia's Far Eastern Provinces form the key to Japan's defeat, and the possibility of a continuous stream of American aircraft reaching this area, which is within easy bombing range of Japan's great cities, is a matter which must afford the Japanese leaders very considerable anxiety.

Manchuria, now the puppet-state of Manchukuo, is almost the size of France and Germany together, and is one of the most valuable undeveloped regions in the world. It has great agricultural, mineral, and timber resources, which have given rise to very considerable economic development in the past thirty years, but which, as yet, is no more than a fraction of what it eventually will be. Manchuria's staple crop is the soya bean, of which increasing quantities have been imported by Japan, and they have been put to a very wide variety of uses. One-third of the country is covered by forests. There are extensive coal deposits, much iron ore, some shale-oil, and a number of other minerals in lesser quantities. Already, under Chinese rule, there had been a steady and increasing development of Manchuria's natural resources. In particular, there had been an extensive inflow of Chinese immigrants, at one time amounting to over a million a year. This was directed mainly to the fertile and empty lands of northern Manchuria. With Japanese encouragement, also, nearly a million Koreans have settled there. Of the total population of about 30,000,000, one-third are recent immigrants from the densely populated areas of northern China. Since 1931 the Japanese have attempted to settle some of their surplus population in Manchuria, but the number who have remained there for agricultural purposes is very small.

Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910. It is about the size of Great Britain and has a population of 25,000,000, mostly engaged in agriculture. The Koreans are a branch of the Mongolian race. The standard of living of the Korean peasant is lower than that of the Chinese, and no efforts are being made by the Japanese to improve it, beyond encouraging emigration to Manchuria. Korea contains deposits of coal and iron, as well as of precious metals. Though deficient in political experience, the Koreans are bitterly anti-Japanese, and there are many underground terrorist and revolutionary movements. The whole problem of Korea needs exhaustive examination at the Peace Conference, and the libera-

tion of Korea from Japanese oppression ought to be regarded as one of the main objects of allied policy.

The real problem in Korea, as in most of the countries of Eastern Asia, is that of agrarian debt. Although the density of the population in Korea is much less than in Japan, and although also a higher percentage of land is capable of being cultivated, and with better yields, nevertheless the Korean peasant's standard of living is lower than that of the Japanese peasant. Three-quarters of the population are engaged in agriculture, and the average size of the farms is less than four acres. Of the seventeen millions who derive a living from agriculture, only just over half a million own their land. Even of these most of the smaller land-owners are heavily and permanently indebted (as are also the tenant-farmers), and since money-lending is almost entirely in the hands of the Japanese, Korean land is passing under Japanese control so rapidly that already practically half of it is owned by Japanese interests. The land yields only a pittance. A farmer with a farm of average size will obtain a cash income of about 100 yen a year. Many farms, however, are smaller than this and the cash income of the cultivator of one of these may not amount to half this miserable sum. The farmer, therefore, except for a brief interval at harvest-time, is perpetually in debt, and interest-rates are high, averaging 3 to 4 *per cent.* per month. Thus, the position of the Korean peasant has steadily deteriorated since the Japanese annexation. It might have done this in any case, unless an efficient and enlightened government had taken control, but as it is, exploitation of the Korean peasant by his own money-lending classes has been replaced by an even more ruthless exploitation by the conqueror. Hence the increasing destitution, bitterness, and terrorism.

Moreover, Japan herself is too poor a country for it to be possible to bring in new capital for development on any considerable scale, except where state-necessity calls for it. Her contribution to Korea's development has been dominated by strategic considerations. Railways, banking, and commerce are exclusively in Japanese hands. In the last decade, however, the Japanese Government has appropriated large sums for the industrialisation of Korea, in preparation for the present war. Thus, between 1933 and 1938, the total of manufactured goods increased from 384,822,000 yen to 1,140,118,000 yen. Textiles showed the most striking increase, with metals, machinery, and chemicals following close behind. Nearly 80 *per cent.* of Korea's exports go to Japan, and over 90 *per cent.* of her imports come from the same source. Thus Korea to-day is a vital element in Japan's war-economy, and efficient control of the country is an essential condition for the successful prosecution of the war by Japan.

Japanese rule in Korea has been rigidly repressive. Less than half the children of Korea attend schools of any kind, and there is only one university for the whole of Korea. This university, at Seoul, has about five hundred students, the bulk of whom are Japanese, the children of Japanese living in Korea. As a rule, Koreans who wish for higher education, possibly for practice as lawyers and doctors, must go to Japan, where no effort is spared to denationalise them. The effort is rarely successful, however, as most Koreans who go to Japan return as Communists. Fear of Communism, indeed, especially in Korea, haunts the mind of the Japanese administration. The Japanese police force in Korea is over 20,000 strong, and the number of political prisoners is at no time less than 6000. For all that, Japan has been unable to check the rising tides of Korean nationalism and Communism.

The policy elaborated by the Japanese in Korea has been followed by them in Manchuria and in the occupied areas of North China. In both areas the Japanese have introduced their complex apparatus of exploitation and oppression, and have sought to develop the industries of these newly acquired territories as part of the Japanese war-machine, whilst at the same time impoverishing the Chinese peasantry with the ultimate object of squeezing them out altogether as proprietors. This is at once a strength and weakness to Japan. It is a strength in so far as it magnifies the Japanese war effort, but it is also a source of weakness, inasmuch as Japan is compelled to rely to a considerable extent upon the resources of areas which are overwhelmingly hostile, and over which, if she suffered reverses, she would rapidly lose control. These are aspects of the problem of defeating Japan which deserve extended consideration by experts of the United Nations. There can be little question that sabotage of war-industries could be organised on a very considerable scale in Korea, Manchuria, and North China.

Stretching from the Manchurian, Russian, and Korean borders in the north to Burma and Indo-China in the south, and from the Pacific in the east to the heart of Central Asia in the west, is Japan's chief problem, China. Within the eighteen provinces of China Proper, which exclude Sinkiang, 'The New Dominion,' and Tibet, are more than seventeen hundred thousand square miles, supporting a population of more than four hundred millions. What the full area and population are has never been calculated exactly, and some estimates place the total population substantially higher, whilst the full extent of China's territory, including Sinkiang, Tibet, and Manchuria, exceeds five million square miles. All these outlying areas, however, are sparsely populated compared with the eighteen provinces, where the population is densest in the north.

Indeed, over-population here has been responsible for considerable numbers of Chinese—nearly quarter of a million a year—going abroad, principally to Manchuria, to Siam (where there are about two and a half millions), to British Malaya (1,700,000), and the Dutch East Indies (1,500,000). But for the restrictive policies of the United States and the British Dominions, there can be little question that the Chinese would have settled there in very large numbers. China's population problem is appreciated in proper perspective only when it is realised that the vast accumulation of people is overwhelmingly agricultural, and has been very large from early times, so that the soil has been intensively cultivated by farmers possessing small holdings which would be regarded as completely inadequate by other nations.

During the five years of war Japan has occupied all the principal ports, all China's railway system, vast stretches of the principal rivers, and all the areas where mining and industry have been developed to any extent. China has very extensive supplies of coal, mainly in Shansi and Shensi. Forty *per cent.* of the present output, however, comes from Hopei. Hence Japan's relentless pressure upon that province, prior to the present war. There are also extensive reserves of iron ore, chiefly in Chahar and the Yangtse Valley. China in normal times also produces half the world's supply of tungsten and antimony, and a substantial quantity of tin. These and other metals are situated in the south. China's principal crops are rice, in which she is mainly self-supporting in spite of her vast population, and cotton, of which she is the third largest producer in the world. Control of this has also been an object of Japanese policy. In recent years there has been some development of manufactures and of the textile industry, even before the loss of her eastern coast had compelled the Chinese to develop small industries by means of the co-operatives.

The nature of Japanese control in China should not be misunderstood. It is confined to the ports, towns, and means of communication. Chinese guerillas operate regularly in the vicinity of centres of Japanese control, even in the outskirts of Peking. Puppet Chinese governments, and in particular that of Wang Chung-wei, of which more will be said in a later chapter, have failed to win the allegiance of the Chinese populations within the area of Japanese control, and they can continue to function only with Japanese military and financial support.

A word must be said upon the position of Sinkiang, China's most westerly territory, and its relations with the Soviet. Tsarist ambitions in this area three-quarters of a century ago have already been described. This area is about twice the size of France,¹ and

¹ It is between 400,000 and 600,000 square miles in extent.

is as yet only incompletely known, owing to its remoteness. Geographically Sinkiang is peculiar in that it has several important rivers, only one of which, the Kara Irtish, reaches the sea—the Arctic Ocean. Another river, the Ili, flows into Lake Balkhash, whilst several others simply disappear into the ground. The climate shows great extremes of heat and cold, and is arid. The result is that much of the territory is steppe and desert, and the population is probably in the neighbourhood of four millions. With irrigation, increased use could be made of this territory for settlement, and at times the Chinese have attempted to colonise it, but their labours have been frustrated by the antagonism of the native Moslem tribes. Where there is water the soil is extremely fertile, wheat, maize, cotton, fruits and other crops being grown. There are also large herds of cattle and horses. Of minerals, there is an abundance of coal, oil and gold, whilst copper, lead, iron, and salt are present in lesser quantities.

For some time during the nineteenth century Russian activities in Sinkiang were regarded with intense suspicion by Great Britain, as a possible threat to India. It is improbable, however, that an invasion of India by this route is practicable. About ten years ago there was a widespread Moslem revolt in Sinkiang, under Ma Chung-yin. As the Nationalist Government could not at that time render any effective assistance, Soviet aid was given, and the revolt was suppressed. In the following years a trade agreement was signed with the Soviet, and commercial relations have been extensively developed, following the opening of the Turkestan-Siberian Railway in 1930. Soviet influence is now extensive, and there are Soviet advisers in all the main departments of administration, as well as many Soviet instructors in the Sinkiang army and air force. The Soviet has also supplied the province with loans and materials, so that some progress in industrialisation has taken place. In view of the present struggle, with its vast operations both in the West and in the East, the importance of Sinkiang's resources has increased. If road communications were improved, oil from this area could reach both the Russian armies in Europe and the Chinese, British, and American armies in the Far East.

With the loss of China's ports, railways, and river communications the problem of land supply routes acquired a new urgency. Prior to the French collapse the easiest route was from Haiphong, in French Indo-China, on the Gulf of Tongking, to Hanoi, and thence either by the Indo-China-Yunnan Railway to Laokai, and so up to Kunming, where it joins the Burma Road on its way to Chungking. A further railway ran from Hanoi to Langson, on the French side of the frontier, and ended at Lyngchon, where a Chinese highway ran to Nanning in Kwangsi. This latter avenue

of supply was closed when the Japanese captured Nanning on 24th November 1939. Until the French collapse, a very considerable quantity of supplies (estimated by the Japanese at 70 *per cent.* of the whole) reached China through Haiphong. When this occurred, all traffic to China was stopped, even before the Japanese occupation of Indo-China.

This meant that the Burma Road acquired an added importance. Supplies destined for China were unloaded at Rangoon and were transported either by railway to Lashio, or by the Irrawaddy to Bhamo, both near the Chinese frontier. From Bhamo and Lashio arms of the Burma Road meet inside the Chinese frontier, and stretch through Kunming to Chungking. The distances are vast. It is 610 miles from Chungking to the Burmese border, and another 116 miles to Lashio. The difficulties of construction were immense, for the road crosses the gorges of the Mekong and the Salween Rivers, as well as a mountain range, whose summits in places exceed 8000 feet. The road on the Chinese side was begun in 1937, and was opened to traffic in January 1939. Over 60,000 men were employed in its construction. The journey from Chungking to the frontier takes from between five and seven days, and the volume of traffic is greatly reduced in the rainy season, for on some parts of the road the annual rainfall (concentrated in the rainy season) exceeds 200 inches. In view of the extremely heavy burden which this road was called on to carry, the Rangoon-Lashio railway was being extended alongside the road to meet at the frontier a Chinese railway from Kunming, which has been under construction since 1940. The cutting of the Burma Road in March 1942 has interrupted these projects.

In February 1942, when the fate of Malaya was already sealed, General Chiang Kai-shek paid a visit to India, and amongst the topics discussed during the visit was the problem of obtaining supplies from India if communications with Rangoon were interrupted. The result of the visit was that a new road from north-eastern India into China was hastily constructed, but it cannot be assumed that this road will be able to bear the traffic which had been concentrated upon the Burma Road for some time yet. In the meanwhile, the task of keeping the Japanese away from this newer supply route is by no means free from difficulty. It may well be that in the last resort the United Nations will be compelled to rely exclusively upon the roads linking China with the U.S.S.R.

Russian communications with Free China now radiate from the Turkestan-Siberian Railway, which runs parallel with the Sinkiang frontier. To protect communications through Sinkiang the Chinese, with Russian assistance, have built air bases at Lanchow, Ansi, Tihua, and Ili. The main avenue of communication is the

'North-west Road,' running from Sergiopol, on the railway, along the old caravan route for some distance, to finish at Chungking. Unfortunately, even the Sinkiang border is remote from Russian industrial centres, whilst the distances inside the Chinese frontiers are well in excess of a thousand miles. Provision of the necessary petrol for these enormous runs is therefore a problem, and it is one of the paradoxes of the twentieth century that the most modern war supplies are travelling from Russia to China by camel and coolie transport.

South of the Japanese colony of Formosa (taken from China after the war in 1894, and possessing a population of Chinese and aborigines, with a sprinkling of Japanese) is the island of Hong Kong, lying at the mouth of the West River, ninety miles away from Canton, the principal city of South China. It has been pointed out that Hong Kong was acquired by Great Britain as a base for the South China trade during the first Anglo-Chinese War. When it fell to Japan on Christmas Day, 1941, it had therefore been in British hands for exactly a century. Only the island itself was acquired by the Treaty of Nanking, but three hundred square miles of the adjacent mainland were acquired in a ninety-nine years' lease in 1898. When the British occupied the island, which is about twelve miles long by about five miles broad, it harboured only fishermen and pirates. Under British rule the attractive modern city of Victoria, with its cathedral and university, grew up, with the complementary city of Kowloon a mile away across the harbour. Within the colony, attracted by its steadily expanding trade, lived nearly two million people, the vast majority of them Chinese. The harbour is a magnificent deep-water roadstead, several miles in length, but vulnerable to an enemy in possession of the hills on the neighbouring mainland. By the Washington Treaties, Hong Kong was demilitarised, and the possibilities of Hong Kong as a main British fortress in the Far East were no longer favoured in comparison with Singapore. It was only when Japan denounced the Washington Treaties in 1936 that preparations for defence were resumed, and they were necessarily of a makeshift character, more especially as it was a common opinion that although Hong Kong was practically invulnerable from the sea, it would be impossible to hold against a numerous and well-equipped enemy on the landward side. When Japan made the attack upon Great Britain and the United States on 8th December 1941 the decision was taken to defend Hong Kong, and from the fact that there were food and munitions sufficient for three months, it may be assumed that the British authorities estimated that that would be a sufficient time to defend it until the Anglo-American Navy sought out and defeated the Japanese battle-fleet. Unfortu-

nately the Japanese got their blow in first. But even if the disasters at Pearl Harbour and off Malaya had not taken place, the defence of Hong Kong would still have been futile, since it could scarcely have been expected that the Japanese fleet would have been seriously crippled within seventeen days. Hong Kong is an extremely difficult island to defend from an attack from the land, as the city runs alongside the harbour. At two points the mainland is less than a mile away, and there are several neighbouring islands which could scarcely be held without substantial forces. In fact, the numbers of the garrison were too slender to be effective, and their loss, coupled with the damage which the city has sustained, may be regarded as a gesture, brave but futile. Even as a delaying action, the defence of Hong Kong lacks real significance; and the future status of the colony, when Japan is defeated, is one that merits serious attention. Something more will be said on this question in the concluding chapter.

Six hundred miles south-east of Hong Kong lies the Philippine Archipelago. To the west of the Philippines is Indo-China, to the east the Japanese mandated islands. To the south are Borneo and the Dutch East Indies, and to the north Formosa. The Philippines represent the farthest extent of the United States advance across the Pacific, for the American naval station at Guam is 1500 miles away, whilst Pearl Harbour, in Hawaii, America's principal naval base in the Pacific, is no less than 5000 miles away. Guam, Midway, and Wake Islands are in fact the stepping-stones to the Philippines and China. The Philippines occupy a key position in the Western Pacific, for they lie in the path of Japan's southward drive. Their future will be one of the most complex problems of the Peace Conference, for events since December 1941 have decisively shown that they are too weak to stand alone.

The Philippines comprise about seven thousand islands, varying greatly in size. They are about the same size as the British Isles,¹ and their population is upwards of sixteen millions, and is increasing rapidly. The largest island, Luzon, is over 40,000 square miles in extent. Mindanao, the second, covers 30,000 square miles. Sixty-three *per cent.* of the land is capable of cultivation, although much of it is still forest and jungle. The climate and the fertility of the islands assure them of a prosperous future if only they are protected from external interference. The inhabitants are a mixture of Malay, Spanish, and Chinese, with the Malay element predominating. At the time of the Spanish conquest they became Roman Catholic. In spite of restrictive legislation there was considerable immigration from China and Japan. The number of Japanese colonists was roughly thirty thousand, being settled

¹ Their area is 115,000 square miles.

chiefly in Davao, in south-eastern Mindanao. There are excellent mineral resources—gold, iron, copper, chrome, and manganese have been found in abundance, and the Japanese have been active in developing mining, as well as the fishing industry, and their knowledge of local navigation has proved of first importance during the present invasion. The Philippines' chief need, however, for industry is coal, of which there appears to be little. Oil deposits exist, but have not yet been worked. Owing to the fact that comparatively little of the land is as yet under cultivation, the Islands are compelled to import a substantial quantity of rice. The principal port and city is Manila, which has a population of 700,000, and a rapidly increasing trade.

Until 1898 the Philippines were a Spanish possession. They were acquired by the United States after the Spanish-American War, with the object of preparing them for self-government. By the Independence Act of 1934 the Philippines were given a self-governing constitution, and full independence was promised for 1946. During the intervening period the United States was responsible for their defence. The Filipinos had always ardently desired independence, but in recent years there have been second thoughts, due to the increase of the Japanese threat, to which they must necessarily fall without external aid, and also to the reluctance to lose the preference which, as an American dependency, they enjoyed in the markets of the United States. In the United States, on the other hand, independence had been welcomed, as in this way Filipino competition, especially in the sugar industry, was excluded.

When the Philippine Commonwealth was established in 1934 the first President was Manuel Quezon. In August 1940 the Philippines Assembly granted him virtually unlimited powers, and Quezon, no doubt adapting himself to what he considered to be the prevailing wind at the time, expressed his intention to establish a one-party system. With the defeat of the totalitarian states, the Philippines will no doubt resume their full democratic institutions, for which they have shown distinct aptitude.

As in Hong Kong, further fortification and development of naval bases in the Philippines was forbidden by the Washington Treaties. When these expired in 1936, however, steps were taken to press forward defence measures. Unfortunately the Philippines have no heavy industries, so that all defence materials had to be imported from the United States. Manila stands on a magnificent bay, amply large enough to accommodate the entire American fleet. It is defended by the rocky island of Corregidor, which is heavily fortified, and which, in peace-time, had a garrison of 4500 men. It was substantially reinforced in 1940 and 1941. South of Manila,

in Manila Bay, is Cavite Bay, with dockyards, naval barracks, and arsenals. Another naval station is Clongapo, in Subic Bay, sixty miles to the north.

The task of training the Filipino army was entrusted by President Quezon to Major-General MacArthur, who had a brilliant record as a junior officer in the American army in the war of 1914-18, and who was seconded for the purpose. The peace-time strength of the Filipino army amounted to no more than 7000 men; but 40,000 conscripts were trained each year, and the number was increased in 1941. In normal times the United States maintained a garrison of 10,000, but this was increased during 1940-41. The Filipino and American forces in the island at the time of the Japanese attack possessed modern equipment, tanks and anti-aircraft defences, and the strength of the American Air Force in the Islands probably amounted to nearly 1000 aircraft. The magnificent defence undertaken by General MacArthur testifies to the thoroughness with which he made his preparations in the limited time available, and also to the steadiness of the Filipino troops.

To the south of China's eighteen provinces lie French Indo-China, Siam, Burma, and Malaya. French Indo-China is a composite area, comprising Tongking—which lies adjacent to the three Chinese provinces of Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung—Annam, Cambodia, and Cochin-China, together with the minor states of the Laos area, in the basin of the Mekong, which were taken from Siam in 1894, and most of which were returned to Siam, under Japanese compulsion, in 1940. The French Empire in Eastern Asia is the creation of the Third Republic. In the middle of the nineteenth century all the states of French Indo-China, as well as Burma and Siam, acknowledged China's overlordship. Siam, however, declared her independence in 1882, and Burma ceased to send tribute when Great Britain annexed it. Culturally, all these states owe a great deal to China, and in varying degrees they are racially allied to the Chinese. The Chinese element is conspicuous in the racial make-up of the Siamese and the Annamese.

On no less than five occasions Annam has been annexed to China, but at the end of the eighteenth century it was reconstituted a vassal state, with Chinese assistance. French interest in this area dates from this time, when the King of Annam appointed a French missionary his ambassador to Paris to solicit French aid against his rebel subjects. In 1858 the French sent an expedition to exact reparation for the murder of missionaries, and by the Treaty of Saigon in 1862 France obtained Saigon and three provinces in Cochin-China. At the same time the French established a protectorate over Cambodia, in substitution for a former Siamese and Annamese joint protectorate. In 1867 the French annexed the

three remaining provinces of Cochin-China, and so controlled the mouth of the Mekong. The French discovered, however, that the Mekong was difficult to navigate. They therefore explored the Red River in Tongking (now part of Annam), and finding this an excellent river for navigation, organised an expedition in 1873. Although the expedition was not a brilliant success, France secured the signature in 1874 of two treaties, the first declaring that Annam was independent of any other Power, and the second granting France extensive commercial privileges. From 1874 until 1883, however, China still claimed overlordship over Annam, and maintained bodies of irregular troops, known as the 'Black Flags' there. In 1883 France proclaimed a protectorate over the whole of Annam, backing up her proclamation by assault upon the principal centres in Annam where Chinese troops were stationed. A year later China agreed to withdraw her troops, but a collision occurred near the Chinese frontier and war broke out. The result of it was that China was compelled to renounce her suzerainty over Annam, and since that date, until 1940, French control of Indo-China was undisputed.

Immediately after the collapse of France in July 1940 Japan began to exert pressure on Indo-China. Simultaneously Siam reclaimed the territory in Laos which she had lost to France in 1894. The French were compelled to suffer the humiliation of a peace, dictated by Japan, in which Siam recovered most of the territory in dispute. This, however, was not enough. In July 1941 France was compelled to admit Japanese troops into Indo-China, and to concert measures for the joint defence of this area. In this way Indo-China passed into Japanese control, and became a base for the Japanese attack on Siam, Burma, and Malaya.

Indo-China is rich in resources which as yet are undeveloped. Rubber, tobacco, sugar, rice, timber, tin, copper, zinc, as well as coal and precious metals, form a tempting bait for the Japanese. French rule has never been popular, and there was a strong independence movement long before the French weakness manifested itself. Since Indo-China will in the future have to rely mainly upon allied protection, and more especially upon Chinese military aid, there seems to be every reason for restoring Annam's independence, and joining it with an allied defence *bloc* in the Far East.

Siam had an area of 200,000 square miles prior to her recent acquisitions from French Indo-China. The total population, which is rapidly increasing, is about 16,000,000, of whom the Chinese and mixed Chinese and Siamese number over two and a half millions. The relations of Siam with China have already been indicated. Since achieving independence, Siam has naturally been under Anglo-French influence, situated as she is between Burma,

Indo-China, and Malaya. Until after the war of 1914-18, Siam was subject to the usual treaty system, applied to Far Eastern nations in the nineteenth century, but extra-territoriality was practically abolished in 1926, following important internal reforms. For some years prior to the present war, however, Siam has lent a willing ear to Japanese propaganda, and has made feeble efforts to play off Great Britain and France against Japan. The refusal of the Siamese to stand up to Japanese aggression in December 1941 need afford no surprise, for they are one of the weakest of Eastern races, lacking both public spirit and military qualities. Here again there is a problem of some importance for the Peace Conference, inasmuch as Siamese duplicity has rendered increasingly difficult the defence of Malaya and Burma, as well as imperilling the transport of materials to China by way of the Burma Road.

The status of Burma in the nineteenth century was identical with that of Annam, although the Burmese were less closely associated with the Chinese Empire, which refrained from interfering in Burmese affairs. British interest in the kingdom culminated in the last Burmese War in 1885, which resulted in the deposition of the last king of Burma, and the annexation of Burma to India. Burma is of vital strategic importance. It covers the approaches to India from Japanese controlled Siam and Indo-China, and it is the channel of communication with China. It also offers the possibilities of offensive action against the Japanese in Siam, Indo-China, and Malaya. The transfer of large bodies of Chinese troops to Burma to co-operate in its defence was therefore an important and significant development, although it proved inadequate to stem the Japanese onrush.

The Burmese occupy an extremely productive territory, which until recently was administered as part of the Indian Empire. The population numbers about 15,000,000, two-thirds of whom are Burmese, about 1,500,000 are Karens, 1,000,000 Shans, and 500,000 Chins. In recent times there has been considerable Indian and Chinese immigration, but there is little intermixture of population, as the Burmese are an exclusive race who regard the invasion of their national life by educated Indians with extreme jealousy. Racially the Burmese are allied to the Chinese, and they are overwhelmingly Buddhist in religion. Burma is rich in oil, rubber, ivory, timber, and tin, and the principal port, Rangoon, has in ordinary times a population exceeding half a million. It is an excellently laid out city, having developed almost entirely since British occupation. Following the Round Table Conferences, Burma was separated from India, and was given limited self-government, Dominion status being declared to be the ultimate goal of British policy. Unfortunately the slowness with which

Dominion status appeared to be obtainable has made the Burmese indifferent to the struggle now in progress in the Far East, and there can be no question that the difficulties of the defending forces were increased by Fifth Column activity, stimulated by Japanese propaganda against the white races.

South of Siam stretches the Malay Peninsula—one of the most productive and valuable regions in the world. Politically, British Malaya comprises three distinct areas. These are: (1) The Straits Settlements, made up of Singapore, Penang, Malacca, and Labuan. These have the status of a British colony, under the rule of a British Governor and Commander-in-Chief, who is also High Commissioner for the Malay States. Christmas Island and the Cocos Islands, south of Java, are dependencies of Singapore. (2) The Federated Malay States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan (itself a federation), and Pahang. The seat of the Federal Government is Kuala Lumpur. (3) Unfederated Malay States under British Protection, viz. Johore, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Trengganu, and Brunei in Borneo. Of these Johore, lying adjacent to Singapore on the mainland, is the largest, wealthiest, and most developed. The existence of British rule in Malaya was due entirely to the foresight and pertinacity of Sir Stamford Raffles, triumphing over the complacent indifference of the Colonial Office of his day. During the struggle with Napoleon the Dutch possessions in the East Indies were occupied by British forces, despatched as a precautionary measure by the Government of India. They were handed back at the conclusion of peace in 1815, but during that time Raffles had seen the possibilities of Singapore as a great commercial port of call at the southern extremity of the Straits of Malacca, and eventually prevailed upon the British Government to acquire what was then an uninhabited island from the Sultan of Johore in 1819. Singapore was thus entirely the product of British commercial enterprise in the Far East.

British and British-protected territory in Malaya stretched for 500 miles from the Siamese frontier to Singapore, and its total area is about the size of England, excluding Wales. The Straits Settlements, smallest in area, have a population of about one and a half millions, of which 250,000 are Malays, and 614,000 Chinese. The majority of the remainder are Indians. The Federated Malay States, in the centre of the peninsula, have an area of 27,540 square miles, and their population now exceeds two millions, of whom 900,000 are Chinese, 870,000 are Malays, and 470,000 Indians. The area of the unfederated Malay States is about 25,000 square miles, and their population comprises 1,200,000 Malays, 415,000 Chinese, 135,000 Indians, and 2000 Europeans. The smaller proportion of Chinese and Indians is due to the fact that the un-

federated States are less developed than the Federated States, where Chinese and Indians have flocked as labourers, traders, prospectors, and mine-owners. The Malays in the past have shown little desire to enter into commerce or industry. Their traditional occupations are agriculture and fishing. In recent years there has been some Japanese infiltration, chiefly by way of the fishing industry.

The vast resources of Malaya are well known, and require little discussion. By far the greater part of the tin and rubber of the British Empire comes from this region. In addition, however, Malaya is rich in coal, iron, gold, tungsten, and other minerals, whilst rice grows abundantly wherever the jungle has been cleared, although as yet Malaya is compelled to import about half her requirements, chiefly from Burma and Siam.

The western side of Malaya is the most developed, and it is also best supplied with roads and railways. The latter run through to the Siamese frontier, linking up with the Siamese State Railways at Pahang Besar, 580 miles from Singapore. From Singapore to Bangkok by railway is 1195 miles.

The main port is Singapore (with a population of 750,000), where the traffic between Europe and the Far East intersects the traffic between Australia and the Dutch East Indies with Eastern Asia, and Penang. Subsidiary ports on the western side are Malacca (in previous centuries the chief port of call, but with a roadstead unsuitable for large vessels) and Port Swettenham. There are aeroplane bases at Alor Star and Sungei Patani (Kedah), Kola Bharu (Kelantan), Bath Bahat and Skudei (Johore), Ipoh and Sitiawan (Perak), Kuala Lumpur and Port Swettenham (Selangor), Bayan Lepas (Penang), and Kallang, Seletar, and Tengah (Singapore). There were also several seaplane bases.

The construction of the great naval, military, and air base on the north side of the island of Singapore was intended to be the symbol of British power in the Far East, and the guarantee of the security of Britain's Asiatic possessions. Began immediately after the Washington Conference, construction was interrupted during the short-lived Labour Government of 1924, but was resumed immediately afterwards. Its importance was fully recognised in all parts of the Empire, and financial contributions were received from New Zealand, Hong Kong, Johore, and the Federated Malay States. With Darwin, the Australian base on the extreme northerly tip of Australia, it was designed to be the pivot of British defence of our East Asiatic possessions, as well as of the Dutch East Indies. To complete the scheme of defence there should have been full collaboration with the United States and with China, but this was unfortunately delayed until the Japanese attack had been made; and then proved to be too late. All future schemes for the control of the

Pacific must have regard to the weaknesses which this lightning Japanese attack revealed. The importance of Singapore is emphasised by the fact that its floating dock, towed from England a few years ago, and sunk at the time of the capitulation, was designed to accommodate 45,000-ton battleships, and that battleships of similar size can now only be accommodated at Pearl Harbour, west of the Pacific coast of the United States. Pearl Harbour, however, is over 6000 miles from Singapore. As a Special Correspondent of *The Times* put it on 9th December 1941:

'Singapore's significance can perhaps best be appreciated if the hypothetical question is asked: What would happen supposing it fell to the enemy? The answer is obvious. Neither the British nor American Navies could operate in the western Pacific, since they would have no base from which to operate. Even Australia, it must be remembered, has no graving-dock large enough for a capital ship. India, Australia, New Zealand, to say nothing of Malaya and the Indies, would be wide open to the invader. With Singapore stand and fall the destinies, not of countries only, but of whole continents.'

The Dutch East Indies or, more accurately, Netherlands India, is the collective name for about two thousand islands of the East Indian Archipelago under Dutch rule. Their total area exceeds 735,000 square miles, *i.e.* about half that of European Russia. Their total population is about seventy millions, but this is unevenly distributed. Nearly forty millions live in the island of Java, which is also the richest in resources, and the most highly developed. From the north of Sumatra Dutch rule extends over a continuous chain of islands to the eastern frontier of Dutch New Guinea, a distance of 3000 miles, *i.e.* the distance from Liverpool to New York, or from Singapore to Tokyo. Their resources are most abundant, more especially in the vital war-materials of rubber and oil. Other valuable products are sugar, coffee, tea, cinchona (from which quinine is prepared), copra, sisal-hemp, kapok, pepper, cassava, maize, and soya beans. A vast crop of rice is also grown, but this is insufficient to feed the population. There are also valuable timber forests, in particular of teak, whilst among minerals, the islands are rich in tin and coal, and there are large deposits of medium-grade iron ore. The richness of the resources of the islands has been the cause of unremitting Japanese cupidity, from a time prior to the war of 1914-18. During the first World War the defence of these islands against a possible Japanese invasion, in the event of a German invasion of Holland, was the source of a good deal of anxiety to Great Britain and the United States.

From earliest times these islands have been the meeting-place of many races. The basic strain is Malay, but it has united with considerable Indian and Chinese strains. In more recent times there has been extensive Chinese immigration, and still more recently Japanese, until the Government of Netherlands India was compelled to pass restrictive legislation some years ago. Dutch rule dates from the establishment of trading ports in Java, Sumatra, and Madura at the beginning of the seventeenth century. In recent years a most enlightened Dutch administration has been progressively developing self-government, somewhat on the lines of British advances towards self-government in India, and the present war has undoubtedly strengthened the desire of the population to complete the process. Loyalty to the Dutch ruling house is, however, unquestioned. In their administration the Dutch have been active in scientifically developing the vast resources of the islands by the most modern methods, and such things as the rotation of crops, irrigation, choice of seed and the use of fertilisers are all carefully watched by the administration.

A glance at the map will show that altogether apart from its vast resources Netherlands India occupies a key-position in the strategy of the Pacific, and that it lies close to Singapore in the west, it approaches the Philippines in the north-east, and it adjoins British New Guinea and the Australian mandates in the south-east. The island of Timor, shared by the Netherlands and Portugal, is 450 miles from Darwin. When, therefore, the Japanese obtained essentially uncommercial facilities in Portuguese Timor in October 1941, the threat alike to Dutch, British, and Australian interests in the Pacific was unmistakable, and the occupation of Portuguese Timor by allied forces was therefore inevitable. Following the fall of Singapore, the Japanese lost no time in wresting control of the island from the allied forces there.

In spite of obvious difficulties caused by the German occupation of the motherland, the Dutch in 1940 and 1941 showed great energy in putting their Far Eastern Empire in a full state of defence. Extra naval vessels and aircraft were built and purchased, and all possible steps were taken to strengthen the army. This consisted of a small and efficient professional army, supported by a militia and a Home Guard. In 1941 the Parliament of Netherlands India extended conscription to the entire male population between 18 and 46. Moreover, diplomatically, the Dutch took all possible steps to secure the formation of the A, B, C, D front. The main Dutch naval base is at Soerabaya, where the Dutch Pacific fleet is normally stationed. Soerabaya is 750 nautical miles from Singapore and 1000 nautical miles from Darwin. There is a smaller base at Amboyna, nearer to Darwin.

The islands of Borneo and New Guinea deserve a word of special treatment. Borneo is one of the largest islands in the world, lying comparatively close to the Philippines, and to Indo-China, now under Japanese control. It is divided into British North Borneo, Sarawak (an independent state under British protection, and governed by the 'White Rajah' Brooke) and Dutch Borneo. Its resources in minerals are enormous, and there are already extensive British and Dutch oil-fields. Their occupation by Japan is a major set-back for the allied cause in the Pacific. Much of Borneo is still jungle, but there can be no question that its resources will make Borneo a country of very great importance, both during the present war and in the future of Pacific development.

New Guinea is also a vast, undeveloped country, with a maximum length of nearly 1500 miles, and a maximum width of 500 miles. Its total area is 300,000 square miles, *i.e.* over three times the size of Great Britain. Lying near the Equator it is wholly tropical in character, with a network of rivers, and mountains rising to 15,000 feet. One of the rivers, the Fly River, flowing into the Gulf of Papua, is navigable for over 500 miles. Along the coasts and river valleys there is soil of extraordinary fertility, although the climate, as a result of swamp and jungle, is unhealthy for Europeans. The native inhabitants are partly Papuans, allied to the Australian aborigines, and partly Melanesians, and whilst the population of New Guinea and the adjoining islands is large, wide areas are uninhabited. Under Dutch, British, and Australian rule a beginning has been made in growing coconuts, rubber, sisal-hemp, coffee, cotton, cocoa, tea, kapok, tobacco, sugar, ginger, bananas, nutmegs, and nipu-palms (from which sago is obtained). Here also are all the more valuable minerals—gold, copper, silver, lead, zinc, graphite, coal, and oil; and the development of New Guinea ought to be one of the responsibilities of any post-war Pacific authority.

Of the two British Dominions in the Pacific Basin obviously no survey, no matter how brief, can be given here. Both are coveted by Japan, not so much for their resources, which are extensive, but as places for Japanese settlement, since climatic conditions are altogether favourable. Few policies have been so fully justified by events as the policy of reserving these areas for white settlement. Had the Japanese been allowed to settle here in considerable numbers the Dominions to-day would have been practically defensible. At the same time, it is well to appreciate that the populations of these Dominions—9,000,000 for Australia, 1,500,000 for New Zealand—are less than a quarter the populations which could be comfortably accommodated there, and that their emptiness and consequent weakness are a standing invitation

to an Asiatic Power with overflowing millions. Until the first World War neither Dominion had either a foreign policy or a defensive policy distinguishable from that of Great Britain. To-day this is no longer true. Since 1920 both Dominions have been conscious of the increasing menace of Japan—far more so than Great Britain. To-day they are facing it at a time when Great Britain is fully occupied in Europe, and when the British Navy can no longer guarantee them full security. Necessarily, therefore, they look primarily to the United States for the bulk of their aid, and at the same time they seek to link up with the defensive measures of Netherlands India, and even of Russia and China. These developments have very important implications indeed, which will be more fully discussed in a later chapter, but they mean that in future the British Commonwealth alone cannot elaborate adequate defence measures for these two Dominions. Either the British Commonwealth in the Pacific must form part of some larger defence unit, or the two Dominions will evolve foreign policies entirely independent of those of Great Britain, and become in fact, if not in name, dependencies of the United States. The time for playing 'Happy Families' in the Pacific has gone for ever.

Of the twenty or thirty thousand odd lesser islands of the Pacific no survey is possible. The map will reveal the vast extent of ocean over which they are spread. Many of them look no more than pin-points on a map, but are really of large extent, with considerable resources and substantial populations. Thus, the Hawaiian Islands cover 7000 square miles, and the Fiji Islands have a population of 160,000. Other islands, again, are no more than coral islands, almost destitute of vegetation. All the islands are now either in the possession of, or under the protection of, one or other of the European Powers, or of the United States, or of Japan, and in the years since 1880 one of the world's greatest divisions, in territorial extent, has taken place, mainly unperceived, because the peoples of the islands have been too weak to resist. It is impossible to defend them. In reality their fate since 1918 has depended on the issue of the struggle now being fought between Japan and her adversaries. Naval mastery, on one side or the other, determines the fate of all of them. Under the system of ownership of groups by a single nation, however, there have been abuses which form one of the blackest chapters in the history of colonisation. In many of these islands in the middle of the nineteenth century there were vigorous and healthy, and in some cases mature, peoples. The white man has brought the vices and the diseases of civilisation. With spirits, and gramophones, clothes, and other products of Western civilisation have come the breaking-down of age-long tribal customs, new conceptions of property and wealth, and above all

tuberculosis, venereal and other diseases, ravaging whole populations and destroying well-established civilisations. Thus, in 1870, Polynesia was estimated to have a population of 690,000 natives. By 1930 the natives had declined to 200,000, but there had been an influx of 145,000 Asiatics and 37,000 whites. In Melanesia, in 1870, there were 3,000,000 natives. By 1930 they had declined to less than 1,000,000, and in the other islands of the Pacific there had been a similar decline. At that time the Marquesas (under French 'protection') supported a population of 50,000. To-day there are less than 5000 natives in the Marquesas, and the population is still declining. In recent years this rapid depopulation has been arrested, but the islanders now have to compete with immigrants from the mainland of East Asia. It is earnestly to be hoped that one result of this first great Pacific War will be to establish an International Board of Control for the Pacific, for without it great shifts of population will occur, and existing difficulties will be intensified.

On the farther side of the Pacific Basin stretches the vast land-mass of North and South America, connected by the narrow land-bridge of Central America, now divided by the Panama Canal. The northern extremity of Alaska, well within the Arctic Circle, is about fifty miles distant from the American Continent, whence the first settlers of North America came, probably in the days before the two continents were finally separated. Virtually the whole of North America is divided between Canada, the United States, and Mexico. In extent, Canada is larger than the United States, but so much of it lies within the Arctic Circle that Canada must be regarded as primarily a wide strip of the Continent, running for over 3000 miles along the United States border. Canada is the third British Dominion which fringes the Pacific. Like the other two, she to-day looks primarily to the United States for defence against the Japanese menace, for her population is thinly spread out across the breadth of the Dominion, and some of her best troops are in Great Britain. Under war-time conditions Canada, like Australia, has been rapidly industrialised. After the war she, with Australia, will be a formidable competitor in manufactures, unless far-reaching international arrangements end the era of national competition. If it is not ended, Canada will be compelled to rely on the United States to an even greater extent than she has already done for capital, settlers, and defence. A co-ordinated Canadian-American defence and foreign policy already exists. It has now been necessary to merge this in a general scheme of allied defence, and after the war this may have to be perpetuated. Meanwhile, a North American high-road runs from the United States border to Alaska, and United States troops may at any moment have to defend

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Canadian soil against Japanese invaders. The signs of closer association are too plain to be ignored. The only question to-day is how much of the British Commonwealth goes with Canada.

South of the United States lies the vast and undeveloped expanse of Latin-America, the modern successor to the Spanish and Portuguese Empires in the New World. Notwithstanding successive Pan-American Conferences, and much discussion on hemisphere defence in the years prior to the attack on the United States, the Latin-American states other than those of Central America, where the influence of the United States is paramount, have been slow to enter the war, in spite of the consistent 'good neighbour' policy of the United States during the regime of Franklin Roosevelt, in spite of the instinctive sympathy of the peoples of South America with the allied cause, and in spite also of the generous financial, economic, and other aid which Roosevelt has given to Latin-America during the war years, in which they have lost the greater part of their European markets. On the other hand, all Latin-American states other than the Argentine and Chile have now broken off relations with the Axis Powers. The reasons for Latin-American hesitations are various. To some extent it is due to their weakness, exposed position, and internal difficulties. Thus Brazil, with a population of 40,000,000, occupying a territory larger than the United States, has populations of Germans, Italians, and Japanese, each running into several hundreds of thousands, all efficiently organised, and in some areas well-armed and disciplined. Partly, too, neutrality is the result of the excellence of Axis propaganda. Moreover, in several of the Latin-American states, there are would-be Hitlers or Mussolinis. In countries where small aristocracies of Spanish origin monopolise most of the wealth, and where large labouring populations of mixed European and Indian blood struggle for conditions of living which more developed countries have long since obtained, it is not surprising that the sympathies of the governing classes are largely pro-Axis, and those of the working classes are pro-Allied. Yet the British Foreign Office and Ministry of Information have addressed themselves exclusively to the governing classes, and have ignored the working classes. In all the Latin-American republics which formed part of the Spanish Empire consciousness of the common cultural heritage is strong, and on this Franco's Spain, at Axis dictation, has consistently played. Again, the Argentine, which is potentially the greatest of the South American republics, seeks to minimise the influence of the United States in South America, as an obstacle to her own leadership. Finally, both Great Britain and the United States mishandled a dispute

with Mexico over the expropriation of English and American oil companies there, pressing claims which savoured rather of 'dollar diplomacy' than of consciousness of a common democratic ideal. With the Japanese advance in Asia, Mexican oil has now a special importance, and the long-standing dispute has at last been closed; and it is to be hoped that Mexico's entry into the war, closely followed as it has been by that of Brazil, marks the beginning of complete continental solidarity against the Axis.

Through the narrowest part of the isthmus of Panama runs the Canal, completed in 1914 on the site of the abandoned labours of de Lesseps. The construction of the canal was due mainly to the determination of the United States to secure closer contact by sea between her eastern and western sea-boards. Its immense strategic importance in the present struggle is manifest. Reinforcements may be transferred from the Atlantic to the Pacific and back again as circumstances may require. The disasters at Pearl Harbour and Singapore have given additional emphasis to its importance, and it may be assumed that no chances are being taken in its defence.

As Japanese expansion has developed there have appeared from time to time more or less explicit statements of what Japan understands by her Co-Prosperity Sphere. There is no need to take them seriously, for the Japanese have a Nazi-like facility for producing new plans for new occasions, and Mr. Matsuoka himself, in a recently published book, has innocently explained: 'I firmly believe that the great mission which heaven has imposed on Japan is to save humanity.' As a beginning, he suggests that Japan should take over Asia, and most of the islands of the Pacific. It will take more than a skilfully timed change of Japan's masters to knock this nonsense out of Japanese heads. It will need, in fact, some years of foreign occupation, and it is to be hoped that the Allied Council are considering this aspect of the matter. However, for Japan's immediate digestion Mr. Matsuoka accommodately suggested early in 1941 Manchukuo, China, Siam, Indo-China, Burma, and the East Indies as far as New Caledonia. In a speech on 24th February 1941 he suggested that the white races should cede their Pacific possessions to Japan within an area extending 1200 miles north to south, and 1000 miles from east to west. This included the whole of Netherlands India and New Guinea, but (no doubt in deference to American and British susceptibilities) excluded Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Hawaii. Admiral Takahashi is more optimistic. He includes Burma, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as most of the Pacific islands. These areas, except the two British dominions, are not regarded primarily as an area for settlement, for the Japanese have shown

no inclination to go abroad proportionately to anything like the extent as the Chinese. Moreover, these areas could not absorb a greater proportion of Japanese exports than they do at present. Ultimately, they are valued because of their resources, which Japan wishes to exploit, whereas to-day she must secure them by commercial means, and under conditions which prevent her reliance on them in case of further aggressive wars. 'On its economic side, the Japanese policy is apparently very closely similar to that of Germany. The unit proposed to be built up by Japan in Eastern Asia and the Pacific is, like German-dominated Europe, an area aiming at self-sufficiency, with an industrial state as the centre and primary producing countries grouped round it. The industrial state, Japan has a far higher standard of living than the satellite states, but a far lower population, and it is clearly very much in her immediate interest, both from the economic and from the military point of view, to prevent them from treading the path of industrialisation by which she herself has advanced from extreme poverty, and which, in view of the extreme agricultural overpopulation existing in most of them, is their most obvious, if not their only, line of escape from their poverty also. The development of China or of Netherlands India, for instance, would probably, under normal circumstances, follow lines somewhat similar to those followed by British India, but India's rapid approach to self-sufficiency in cotton tissues, for instance, is a spectacle which the Japanese must view with dismay. It is little wonder that they wish to prevent it from being repeated elsewhere, within their main trading area. That is not, of course, to say that in the long run the industrial development of, say, China on lines similar to those followed by India, or, at an earlier time, by Japan herself, would be to Japan's economic disadvantage. Probably, indeed, the reverse would be the case, for Japan, for instance, has become a many times better customer to Britain and America than she was, say, fifty years ago, before her industrialisation was fairly begun. That, however, is a fact which is unlikely to appeal to any of the vested interests most firmly entrenched at present, for industrialisation in the "Co-Prosperity Sphere" would mean a decline in the demand for most of Japan's present exports to it, even though it would create more than compensating demand for new goods of many kinds. Moreover—and this is far the more important point—economic development in the satellite states means the development of means of resistance to Japan, and a considerable modification of the position which she has enjoyed hitherto as the only industrial and relatively advanced country in a vast area populated mostly by overcrowded and unresisting peasants.'

The war in the Pacific has at last afforded the opportunity of

destroying the most cynical and ruthless form of exploitation of peaceful peoples in the interests of an alleged superior race with a 'mission' which the modern world has seen, and beside which even Nazi barbarism seems mild. That the war will continue until Japanese armed strength has been destroyed is evident, but the war will have been fought in vain unless for persecution and exploitation by the Japanese there is substituted an enlightened administration of the Pacific under which the peoples of the Pacific at long last enjoy the opportunity for peaceful development and cultural progress.

CHAPTER XX

THE SECOND SINO-JAPANESE WAR

THE incident which was responsible for the outbreak of hostilities between China and Japan in the summer of 1937 was in itself so trifling as scarcely to merit the name of pretext. On the night of 7th-8th July Japanese troops stationed in North China were carrying out manoeuvres in the vicinity of the railway junction of Luchoukiao (Wanping), not far from Peking, when firing broke out between them and the Chinese garrison. The Japanese military authorities immediately accepted this fortuitous occurrence as the excuse for large-scale operations in North China, aiming at finally detaching the five provinces in which they had been intriguing without intermission since the conquest of Manchuria, and setting up another independent state under Japanese protection.

That firing should have broken out on this or any other occasion is in no way remarkable. The Japanese army in China had by this time erected provocation to the status of a fine art. Whenever the situation was difficult, Japanese bombers roared over Peking, and in the streets of the Imperial capital not only Chinese but also foreign residents were treated with every type of insult by the Japanese troops. In any event, these forces, fully equipped for war, regularly carried out military exercises in foreign territory in complete disregard of the civil administration, requisitioning supplies and labour as if they were in conquered territory—as, indeed, they intended it to be. On the other hand, the movements of Chinese troops were controlled by humiliating agreements which Chiang Kai-shek had been compelled to sign in order to gain time, and instructions were precise that all occasions for clashes should be avoided.

The Japanese, however, have never troubled greatly about the

adequacy or inadequacy of excuses once they have decided upon another forward step, as their attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941 showed yet again. Why they chose to move forward in July 1937 is worth a moment's consideration.

For the Japanese North China had become, after Manchuria, another land of promise. In China's north-eastern provinces live upwards of eighty million people, in a land half of which is mountain, and the other half fertile plain. The density of the population is over six hundred to the square mile, yet this area is almost entirely self-supporting in food stuffs, besides having abundant coal, some iron, and other minerals. These, naturally, Japan wishes to exploit, but she desires still more to turn this great plain into a vast cotton-growing area, and at the same time to use the population as a market for her textiles when produced. That was the object of the incessant and complex intrigues carried out after the conquest of Manchuria. By 1937 their futility was apparent. Whereas thirty years before local Chinese officials and militarists might have proved the willing tools of such a policy, in 1937 China had at last become conscious of her national unity, under Nationalist leadership. It therefore followed that if the Japanese were to be successful, Chinese Nationalism must be destroyed. When this had been done, more pliable Chinese would demonstrate their 'sincerity' by aiding in the achievement of the Japanese programme.

From the Japanese point of view it might almost seem that too much time had been lost already. The army's view had not prevailed without opposition from some Japanese, who, by comparison, appeared more moderate, but who, in reality, preferred the longer process of economic penetration and disintegration from within. Some of these moderates had had brief spells of office, but as they had failed to produce results they had been removed, in some cases by the simple expedient of assassination. From 1937 onwards the army and navy have been in control in Japan. Successive governments have done no more than throw a tattered cloak of legality over their successive aggressions.

By the summer of 1937 the army was very seriously concerned. Time was passing, and progress in China appeared to be halted. The five provinces had resisted Japanese blandishments, and the efforts to set up an 'autonomous' regime had been unsuccessful. On the other hand, there were from day to day fresh evidences of the growth in power of the Chinese Nationalist Government. China was making a striking advance towards unity and towards reorganisation. It now appeared that Chiang Kai-shek had at last come to terms with the Communists, and opposition to Japanese encroachments had been put back into the forefront of the

Nationalist programme. Japan, indeed, had come to the conclusion that Nationalist China would never understand the blessings of 'sincerity.' It might even be that it was deliberately playing for time, in order that the struggle might be resumed on more equal terms. German and Italian instructors were making an effective fighting force of the Nationalist armies, which had given the Japanese convincing proof of their individual bravery in the defence of Shanghai during the Manchurian affair in 1932. Strategic roads and railways were being built at maximum speed. Modern aircraft were being bought and Chinese pilots were showing distinct capacity. These were signs which could no longer be minimised.

Moreover, the international situation seemed in 1937 to be entirely favourable. During the conquest of Manchuria it had been necessary to proceed cautiously because of the meddlesome activities of the League, the effectiveness of which might possibly have been under-estimated by Japan. A line of retreat was therefore left open until it had become apparent that the League was no more than a façade covering divergent national policies. Between 1933 and 1937, however, the League had sustained a succession of humiliating reverses, and had even failed to prevent Italy, surrounded by League Powers, from absorbing Abyssinia, in the face of British hostility and the Anglo-French Mediterranean fleet. Great Britain, France, and Russia were now principally concerned with the activities of the Axis, but there was no defensive alliance against it. Its absence necessarily implied that neither Russia nor Great Britain would commit herself to war in the Far East so long as the European situation remained so threatening, more especially as the lack of preparedness of both Great Britain and France was notorious. Japan, on the other hand, was no longer alone. She had understandings with both the Axis Powers, which would mean as much, or as little, as she wanted them to do. That the United States alone would take any active steps to prevent the dismemberment of China at this late hour appeared to be beyond the bounds of possibility.

All indications, therefore, appeared to be favourable for a repetition of the Manchurian adventure. There were few Chinese troops in north-eastern China, and they were not well equipped, nor of the highest quality. A brief campaign, possibly of three months' duration, would serve to overrun the coveted area, which would then be separated, and Japan would make peace with Chiang Kai-shek, if he was still there, on yet more humiliating terms for him than had so far been offered, or, if his regime had not survived this fresh blow, with successors carefully picked over by Japan. In either case there would be an end of China's efforts to achieve unity.

There is a logic and a simplicity in this line of reasoning which recalls similar Nazi schemes for Europe, and it is curious that the world has produced, at the same era, two aggressive races with such an immense capacity for swallowing uncritically their own rather primitive conceptions of international order. The measure of their miscalculation is the fact that they are fighting the greatest alliance of free nations which the world has ever seen, and Japan now finds herself after five years of war, and as a result of her aggressive policy over sixty years, encircled with a ring of powerful, hostile states which may well be a nightmare for any Japanese with the welfare of his country at heart.

Initially, all seemed to promise well in this new adventure. On being informed of the incident at Luchoukiao, the Japanese Cabinet immediately decided to send large reinforcements to China, although there were already 7000 Japanese troops in Hopei province alone, as well as the whole of the Japanese army in Manchuria to call upon in case of need. By 13th July the Japanese army in Hopei had grown to 20,000 men, and reinforcements were arriving daily. Until the military dispositions were complete, Japan made a pretence of negotiating. When they were complete she threw off the mask and started large-scale operations. Peking and Tientsin were quickly secured, as well as the main railway junctions in the north. Late in August the Nankow Pass, controlling the route into Mongolia, as well as Kalgan, were in Japanese hands. From this point the conquest of that part of Inner Mongolia which had remained in Chinese hands after the Tangku truce was pressed rapidly forward; whilst to the south two Japanese armies advanced down the railway lines from Peking to Hankow, and from Tientsin to Pukow.

The Japanese had hoped to confine operations to the war in the north, but in this they were unsuccessful. On 9th August a Japanese officer and sailor were killed whilst mysteriously attempting to enter a Chinese aerodrome to the west of Shanghai. This was the signal for Japanese naval reinforcements to concentrate, whilst the Chinese strengthened their military forces in the city. Fighting broke out on 13th August, the operations being conducted on the Japanese side by the navy. As in the Manchurian affair, the Chinese fought with extreme tenacity, compelling the Japanese to extend their operations to a scale far beyond what they had originally contemplated. No serious impression was made on the Chinese positions in the city until 11th September. Following this, the Chinese withdrew and established themselves in good order in new positions, and continued the struggle until late in November. It was during the fighting at Shanghai that the British Ambassador, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, whilst motoring from

Nanking to Shanghai in a car flying the Union Jack, was machine-gunned and bombed from the air on 26th August, the Ambassador being seriously wounded.

With Shanghai in Japanese hands, the Chinese forces fell back to defend Nanking. It fell to Japanese assault on 12th-14th December. By this time Japanese forces had got completely out of hand. During the attack on Nanking the British gunboat *Ladybird* had been fired upon on several occasions. On the morning of 12th December the American gunboat *Panay* was sunk above Nanking, and her crew were machine-gunned as they struggled to escape. These incidents, carried out deliberately, and not as mistaken activities, were an indication of the contempt and hatred in which the Japanese now held British and Americans, so that not even the fact that these vessels belonged to the two greatest navies in the world deterred the Japanese from attacking them. This was almost a year before Munich; and with appeasement the accepted policy, the most that the Japanese had to fear were stiff notes, which were forthwith despatched. A Far-Eastern policy apt for the times would have recognised the signs, and even if war had then been impossible would forthwith have set to work very strongly to reinforce the precarious Anglo-American position in the Pacific. Instead, that had to be done under far worse conditions four years later. In politics it would appear that it is impossible for peaceful peoples to learn that the evasion of problems is not equivalent to their solution.

When the Japanese entered Nanking the Chinese armies had retreated farther into the interior, and the population were prepared to accept Japanese occupation with the same fatalism which they show in bearing any calamity over which they have no control. They had yet to learn, however, in a city which has experienced many military outrages, the depths of bestiality to which the armies of the Japanese Emperor could descend, and which not even the appalling outrages of the Nazis in Russia have eclipsed. No doubt those armies were under the impression that with the occupation of the Chinese capital all effective Chinese resistance would end, and that the Chinese people were therefore completely at their mercy. The Japanese soldier is at the best of times a swaggering ape. At the worst, as in Nanking, he is the personification of iniquity. There is no crime too filthy, too ignoble, for him to commit, and he shows the cunning of some loathsome reptile in achieving it. It is not only that Nanking was looted and burned, and that murder and rape stalked unchecked throughout the great city, rebuilt under Nationalist rule, but that these enormities were carried out systematically, and with devilish ingenuity. At the Nanking University the Japanese started to register refugees. They

stated that if there were any ex-soldiers among them they would be used in a labour corps. Two hundred and fifty volunteered. They were divided into two sections. The first was machine-gunned; the second was used for bayonet-practice. The full catalogue of the horrors of Nanking will never be compiled, but what is known fills all who read it with loathing of an ingenuity so utterly perverted as that of the race which officially professes the cult of *Bushido*. Nor was Nanking an isolated instance. When other cities fell to the Japanese they encountered a similar fate. Some areas, indeed, were systematically devastated, until scarcely a human being remained alive. Once more the identity of methods between the Nazis and the Japanese appears, and the public conscience of the world demands not only that the fullest retribution shall be meted out to the guilty of both races, but that adequate steps shall be taken to ensure that modern civilisation shall never again be afflicted by such outrages.

The success of operations in North China led the Japanese to resume the attempt to set up suitably servile governments in the areas they had overrun, and these were united into a 'Provisional Government of the Chinese Republics' on 14th December. The seat of this government was Peking.

Meanwhile, Chinese resistance continued, and the Japanese forces, continuously reinforced, were steadily led farther and farther afield. Cities as far away as Sianfu, Changsha, and Canton had been bombed by the end of the year, and during 1938 the Japanese found themselves compelled to undertake the blockade of the entire China coast, and the successive occupation of all the main treaty ports. On the other hand, in the Yangtse Valley, the fall of Nanking was followed by a pause, during which both sides reorganised. The Chinese raised and equipped new armies, and the Government established itself at Hankow, 600 miles farther up the river. The Japanese waited for peace overtures from Chiang Kai-shek, and when these failed to arrive Mr. Hirota, the Japanese Prime Minister, announced that in future the Japanese Government would cease to deal with the Nationalist Government of China, but would 'look forward to the establishment and growth of a new Chinese regime, harmonious co-ordination with which can really be counted upon.' It may therefore be assumed that at this point the Japanese had realised the futility of expecting the Nationalists to consent to the detachment of the five provinces and were beginning to appreciate that their adventure would lead them ultimately on to attempt the impossible, the subjugation of the whole of China.

Early in 1938 the Japanese directed their efforts more particularly towards the conquest of Shantung and Shansi. Considerable

progress was made in the former province, but in Shansi operations ebbed and flowed throughout 1938. By the end of the year much of the province was still in Chinese hands, and guerillas were operating practically at the gates of Taiyuanfu, the provincial capital. Moreover, at the end of March 1938 the Chinese won a victory of first importance at Taierhchwang, in Shantung, where Chinese artillery and aircraft were used with deadly effect. The moral effect of the victory to the Chinese was enormous. It proved that with anything like comparable equipment they could beat the Japanese, and they were accordingly heartened to continue the struggle which increasingly unified them as it progressed. Equally stimulating was an air battle over Hankow on 29th April, when twenty-one Japanese bombers and fighters were shot down for a loss of only five Chinese machines. These things were significant. They told the Japanese that unless they could cut off the Chinese finally from modern equipment they would eventually lose the war. Perhaps after all the foreigner would play a more decisive part in the struggle for Eastern Asia than the Japanese had imagined. Possibly in the late spring of 1938 some glimmering of the shape of things to come first dawned upon the minds of the Japanese higher command.

If the Chinese had won a victory of the first importance at Taierhchwang they were unable to enjoy the fruits of it very long, for although they advanced farther north, early in May they were encircled at Hsuechow, and after a stubborn battle this key city in the north-eastern railway area was occupied by Japanese troops on 15th May. The Japanese had anticipated that their success would be accompanied by the destruction or capture of the Chinese armies, said to number a quarter of a million, but these simply melted away, some to continue operations in Shantung, the bulk of them to reassemble farther west, to continue their rearguard action against the Japanese. Shortly afterwards Japanese forces, under General Doihara, following the retreating Chinese armies along the Yellow River, found themselves face to face with a new obstacle. The banks of the Yellow River were cut, and floods poured down upon the advancing Japanese, affording yet one more proof of the determination with which the Chinese were prepared to resist the invader. 'Scorched earth' and flooded earth alike would be utilised in the effort to preserve national freedom.

The Yellow River floods brought to a halt all Japanese operations in that area. It therefore became necessary to resume operations along the Yangtse, and this was done during the summer of 1938, at a time when conditions are at their worst, so that the toll of disease upon both sides was high. At the same time, in order to divert the minds of the Japanese public from mounting casualties,

periodic reverses, and the lengthening war, a cheap success was registered on 11th May by the occupation of the port of Amoy, which was very weakly held by the Chinese.

Along the Yangtse, Chinese resistance was neither so efficient nor so prolonged as one might have expected it to be, bearing in mind the stubborn defence of Shanghai. By this stage of the war, however, possession of territory had become a secondary matter. The main object, as Chiang Kai-shek pointed out on more than one occasion, was to lure the Japanese on, lengthening their lines of communication, multiplying the hostile populations which they were called upon to control, until at length their military effort was exhausted. In these circumstances Chiang Kai-shek may have considered it scarcely worth while to engage large bodies of troops in attempting to prevent the achievement of objectives upon which the Japanese had already determined. In any event, Kiukiang fell at the end of July, and Hankow itself was occupied on 25th October. Four days earlier Japanese troops had also occupied Canton, the chief city of Southern China. Here again resistance had been much less than might have been expected. The Japanese landed at Bias Bay, on the Chinese mainland a few miles north of Hong Kong, and advanced quickly towards the southern capital, cutting the Kowloon-Canton Railway fifteen miles from the frontier of the British Colony. With the occupation of Canton a most important supply route was closed, since supplies had proceeded from Hong Kong to Canton both by rail and river, and from Canton they had been despatched to Hankow along the Canton-Hankow Railway, completed only a few months before the outbreak of war, and repeatedly bombed by the Japanese.

With the fall of Hankow the first phase of the war was over. The Chinese Government withdrew to Chungking, the third Chinese capital in less than a year, and inaccessible even to Japanese military enterprise. The Japanese now occupied all China's principal ports, and all her main railway and river communications, thereby closing all direct supply routes and vastly increasing the difficulty of giving the new Chinese armies which were springing up adequate equipment. The Chinese, however, remained undismayed by these additional problems. A vast migration of the Chinese population from the Yangtse Valley to escape Japanese persecution was already in progress. Everything that could be considered useful to the enemy had been either transported to the interior or destroyed, and already the long supply routes from Russia *via* Sinkiang and from Indo-China and Burma were being used. 'Scorched earth' was hampering the invader at every turn. That, however, was merely a beginning. Everywhere behind the always-lengthening Japanese lines of communication guerilla

forces were springing up to destroy communications, to overwhelm isolated Japanese detachments, and to wreck all Japanese attempts to exploit the areas which they had overrun. As often as Japan organised punitive expeditions, these highly mobile forces melted away again into the countryside. Yet their existence was a constant reminder to every Chinese farmer of the nature of the struggle which was being waged against the invader, and a promise that the day of deliverance would surely come. Every guerilla leader was reinforced by the machinery of propaganda, knitting up the scattered Chinese populations into a web of resistance, and explaining the methods which the *Kuo min tang* was adopting for the continuation of the struggle. Against this type of resistance the Japanese found that there were no easy and spectacular victories to be won, to be followed by the establishment of docile puppet governments. Such governments were, in fact, called into existence, but they exercised authority only as far as the Japanese army could extend its patrols, and even then only so long as those patrols were present. It was a complete deadlock. Very far from securing payment for the cost of the war from the exploitation of the occupied regions, the Japanese were compelled to pour out vast sums to maintain their army of occupation, now stretched out along lines of communication extending from Canton, and even farther south, to the frontiers of Manchuria, with no prospects of withdrawal. A military episode which had been expected to extend over a few months had now assumed such proportions that it might well last a century. Meanwhile, as guerilla activities have been developed, the Chinese in the areas in which they operate, both east and west of the main railway lines in Japanese hands, have re-created local government, have levied taxation for the prosecution of the war, and have even organised some trade with Chinese in areas directly under Japanese occupation. Guerilla leaders, both Nationalist and Communist, have entered Peking frequently, but have never been captured; whilst in August 1938 a guerilla army of several thousands marched past Peking, well within sight of the walls of the ancient city, unmolested by the Japanese.

Faced with the implacable hostility of an entire people whose sense of national unity has been intensified by the ruthless exploitation and persecution which have characterised Japanese occupation, the Japanese have sought to attack the Chinese political structure at its foundations, in the vain hope that they can cause it to collapse. They have therefore created, for the Chinese in the occupied territory, a fantastic organisation known as the *Hsiu Min Hui*, or People's Renovation Party, copying the organisation of the *Kuo min tang* with slavish detail, even to the adoption of the *Hsin Min Chu Yi*, Principles for the Renovation of the People, as a

typical Japanese imitation of Dr. Sun's *San Min Chu Yi*, or Three People's Principles. In spite of the encouragement given to this foundling by the active support of high Japanese army officials, and by the political bureau of the Japanese army, the *Hsin Min Chu Yi* has been regarded by the Chinese of the occupied areas rather as a diversion than as a serious contribution to political thought; nor is this surprising, when the new party's principal achievement, the newspaper *Hsin Min Pao*, contains only news from Japanese sources, and is prepared by the Japanese army's political bureau.

Quaint though Japan's conceptions of China's political ideology undoubtedly are, however, they have appealed to one Chinese of some standing. Amongst the first of the *Kuo min tang* leaders was Wang Ching-wei, a man of mercurial brilliance and unbounded vanity. At the beginning of 1939 he occupied the position of Chairman of the Central Political Council, and his following was by no means inconsiderable. For some time he had resented the unique position which Chiang Kai-shek holds among all classes of Chinese, and when at the end of December 1938 the Japanese Premier, Prince Konoye, announced the basis on which Japan was prepared to make peace, Wang Ching-wei's party recommended that this should be accepted as a basis for discussion, provided that the Japanese army was prepared to withdraw from China. The terms were as follows:

- (1) China should recognise Manchukuo.
- (2) China should adhere to the Anti-Comintern Pact.
- (3) China should consent to the stationing of Japanese troops at specified points as an anti-Communist measure, and Inner Mongolia should become an anti-Communist area.
- (4) Freedom of residence and trade in the interior for Japanese, with facilities for Japan to develop China's natural resources, especially in North China and Inner Mongolia.

The whole, it is perhaps unnecessary to add, were to be carried out by China, in a spirit of 'sincerity' and 'friendly co-operation.'

The terms have an air of specious moderation about them, and there can be little question that Wang Ching-wei had been in contact with the Japanese prior to this date, and that the terms were so designed that he would be able to represent that Chiang Kai-shek was the principal obstacle to peace.

On 28th December Wang Ching-wei left Chungking for Hong Kong. The statement in favour of negotiation was issued on 30th December, and on 2nd January Wang Ching-wei was expelled from the *Kuo min tang*. His negotiations with the Japanese continued through 1939, and in January 1940 he proceeded to Japanese-occupied China with the object of forming a government

prepared to carry out the peace-terms, and to work in collaboration with Japan. A 'Central Government of China' was established at Nanking in March 1940, with Wang as acting President. This government was intended to control the whole of China under Japanese occupation, although the 'North China Political Affairs Commission' at Peking remains autonomous, as it obviously would do if the Japanese occupation remained permanent. This new government was recognised by the Axis Powers and Manchukuo, as well as by Japan. Since that time Mr. Wang, with consummate effrontery, has claimed to represent the *Kuo min tang*, on the strength of the remnant of his followers who accompanied him to Nanking. Even this betrayal, however, has not noticeably weakened the strength of the *Kuo min tang* in occupied China, and the most striking features of Mr. Wang's government are the dubious political and personal records of the individuals who compose it. That the Chinese people are overwhelmingly against peace on any other terms than the defeat and expulsion of the Japanese is shown by the continuance of operations with undiminished vigour since Wang Ching-wei's defection.

Something should perhaps be added to this sketch of China's struggle with Japan since 1937 of the treatment of the dispute by the League. The helplessness of the League at the time of Japan's invasion of Manchuria has already been described. By 1937 the situation at Geneva had deteriorated to such an extent that membership of the League had become a rather perilous occupation for a small European Power. Germany was no longer a member, nor was Japan. Italy's membership was more of an embarrassment than an asset and was about to be terminated. On the other hand, the Soviet was now a member, prompted no doubt by the hope that out of the wreck of League activities there could still be built a defence front against the increasing aggression of the Powers of the Anti-Comintern Pact. In this campaign of aggression China was a test case. In it, in 1937, the League did nothing of any value. China appealed to the League on 12th September 1937, under Articles x, xi, and xvii of the Covenant. The Council promptly referred the matter to the Far-Eastern Advisory Committee which had been set up in 1933. This prepared a resolution condemning Japanese bombardments of undefended Chinese cities, which was adopted by the Assembly on 28th September, and on 6th October the Assembly adopted the extremely pallid resolution that members 'should refrain from taking any action which might have the effect of weakening China's powers of resistance, and should also consider how far they can individually extend aid to China.' The next step was to assemble the signatories of the Washington Treaties, and this was done at Brussels on 3rd November, the Soviet

accepting an invitation to participate, but Germany and Japan, as before, refusing to accept the League's claim to influence the course of the dispute. The Conference thereupon adopted a resolution asserting Japan's treaty obligations, and declaring that there was no legal justification for the attempt being made by Japan to change the policy of China by force. The resolution added that the parties must consider their common attitude in view of Japan's complete disregard of her treaty obligations. Having passed this resolution, the Conference then adjourned. On any hypothesis, such a conclusion to the labour of the Powers principally interested in the Pacific could scarcely be regarded as very remarkable, bearing in mind the fact that the League had already condemned Japan's action, and continued to do so throughout 1938, periodically drawing the attention of members to the desirability of individually affording aid to China. When the Assembly of the League met on 12th September 1938 the Chinese Government asked that sanctions should be imposed on Japan, and at a meeting of the League Council a few days later it was agreed that Article xvi had now become operative against Japan, but that since it was impossible to take co-ordinated action, any member could now apply sanctions if it so desired. It appeared that no member so desired, for at the meeting of the League Council on 23rd January 1939 the Chinese delegate, Dr. Wellington Koo, asked for the formal imposition of sanctions on Japan, together with assistance for China. The resolution, which was adopted on 20th January, avoided this issue by inviting members to examine what effective measures, and more especially measures to aid China, could be taken, the Russian delegate's statement that stronger measures should be taken to aid China meeting with support only from New Zealand.

It was the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 which had first demonstrated the inability of the League to preserve the territorial integrity of a member; and it was now the renewed onslaught of Japan upon China which demonstrated that the coercive authority of the League was no longer operative. Even first-class Powers were unable to exercise rights, or duties, which the League Covenant expressly conferred upon them to deal with a situation such as that which now existed in China. To understand how it was that the League was so completely powerless to protect one of its members which had occupied a place upon its Council it is necessary to say something of the revolution in world affairs which had been brought about by the signature of the chief product of totalitarian diplomacy, the Anti-Comintern Pact, for at this point the story of China's struggle against Japanese aggression becomes merged in the story of the larger struggle against world-domination by three aggressive Dictatorships.

CHAPTER XXI

THE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT IN ACTION

WHEN Japan renounced the policy of collaboration with the Western Powers in 1931, and took the first forward step in her policy of subjugating China, it was necessary for her to proceed cautiously, lest a coalition should be formed against her. If, indeed, the League was an effective instrument of international government, that coalition already existed, but Japan was under the impression that no really effective action could be expected from this body. Nevertheless, in 1931 Japan acted in isolation, as she had done in 1895 and 1905. By 1937, however, when Japan again had recourse to arms against China, not only had Japan no cause to fear a hostile coalition, but she herself was a member of the most powerful aggressive combination which has ever been fashioned. To understand how this decisive change had come about it is necessary to look briefly at world affairs generally in the period between the two World Wars.

The possibility that Japan and Germany might one day achieve a close understanding must have been frequently present to the minds of British and American statesmen after the rise of Hitler to power in Germany. Japan had been a great admirer of Imperial Germany, and the Japanese army had been built up upon the German model. Nevertheless, the Japanese readily absorb prevailing political ideas, and with the defeat of Germany in 1918 aggressive militarism went out of fashion. Collaboration and negotiation became the keynotes of Japanese policy once the Washington Conference had demonstrated the perils of incurring the joint hostility of Great Britain and the United States, with the lesser Powers who could always be rallied to their side. During the period from 1922 to 1931, therefore, Japan adopted a policy of conciliation towards China, and she worked in closer collaboration with the two Anglo-Saxon Powers than at any other period, more especially as this phase of collaboration coincided with the active international phase of the Russian Revolution, which all three regarded as a threat to their interests in China, at a time when that country showed few signs of recovery, at any rate prior to 1928. This period of collaboration in the Far East coincided with a less strained atmosphere in Europe. The greatest difficulties resulting from Germany's defeat appeared to be solved, and the Locarno Treaties, followed by the entry of Republican Germany into the

League, seemed to suggest that Germany was about to resume her proper place in a revived 'Concert of Europe.' In Japan, therefore, the big business houses controlled the Diet, the army and navy leaders remained in the background, and peaceful commercial expansion was the accepted policy.

For such a policy to be successful, however, it was necessary for increasing industrialisation to bring the promise of reasonable prosperity. Unfortunately it did nothing of the kind. The militarists had fallen into discredit because their Siberian adventure had proved a complete failure. The business men were equally discredited when the depression of 1929-31 provided Japan with more acute problems than she had been called upon to face before, and when one of Japan's main sources of raw materials—Manchuria—appeared to be threatened by the rise of Chinese Nationalism. Moreover, economic depression was giving rise, even in Japan, to extremist doctrines. Japanese students were no more indifferent to the attractions of Communism than their Chinese counterparts, more particularly as none of the main domestic problems resulting from industrialisation—the problems of unemployment, of social services, of housing, of trade unionism, and many others—had obtained even a provisional solution. The Japanese ruling classes have always felt instinctively since 1917 that there is no half-way house between their official imperialism and Communism. The near future will, in all probability, prove the accuracy of this prediction. For all these reasons some fresh departure in Japanese foreign policy had become inevitable in 1931. It remained only to find the most favourable opportunity. This was afforded by the domestic crisis in Great Britain in the summer of 1931, leading to the suspension of the payment of the British instalments of war debts, and Great Britain's abandonment of the Gold Standard. The Japanese decided, and as it appeared correctly, that Great Britain would be unable to pursue any active policy in the Far East, and that without British support the United States would confine herself to diplomatic remonstrance. Association of either with the U.S.S.R. did not at that time appear to be a serious possibility. It therefore only remained to arrange her forward move in such a form that it could be accepted by the Powers principally concerned. The establishment of the independent state of Manchukuo was designed to meet this difficulty, and also the associated difficulty that the League members had guaranteed one another's territorial integrity. As Lord Lytton has pointed out in the article to which reference has already been made, the League's handling of the Manchurian dispute was clumsy. Being unprepared to take any effective action against Japan, it nevertheless condemned Japanese action in such a way that Japan was compelled to take

retaliatory action. Once more Japan found herself facing the hostility of all the principal Western Powers, only this time those Powers could no longer mobilise sufficient force to compel her to disgorge her gains. In fact, her position was now sufficiently strong for her to organise the destruction of the economic interests of those Powers in Manchuria, free from external interference. This was definitely not what had been expected, but it is observable that Japan was doing no more than employ a technique which Hitler subsequently perfected in Europe—that of steadily increasing his pressure against an opponent who is unable to make up his mind at what point he will make a stand. The whole feebleness of Western policy in the Pacific since 1931 may be traced to this initial failure to realise the nature of Japanese aims, and the fact that the Manchurian adventure was merely the first step in a long-meditated policy of expansion, which would not stop until the white races had been expelled from Eastern Asia and the greater part of the Pacific. Even that is not its ultimate limit—but anyone who indicated these things in 1931 was apt to be regarded as an alarmist. Statesmen were already grappling with the problems caused by the marked deterioration in the European situation, resulting from economic instability, the problems of war debts and reparations, and accentuated by the apparent determination of the United States to separate the question of economic recovery upon the international plane from the question of obligations due to her. There was thus very little by way of material assistance which Great Britain or France could give to China. Since it was unthinkable that Japan would attack either the United States or the British Empire there was ample scope for playing the ‘honest broker,’ and smoothing out difficulties. The Japanese, however, had other ideas, and proceeded to wreck British and American trade in the Far East with skill and deliberation. Western statesmen were puzzled, but not discouraged. Perhaps if aid to China were increased a little, and the merest hint of sanctions were dropped to Japan, things would improve. Instead, they deteriorated still further, and Japan made up her mind to secure control of every raw material necessary to her economy at the earliest possible moment. The fact that that moment did not arrive before December 1941 can be attributed not to fear of Great Britain and the United States, but to the relentless and unexpected resistance of the Chinese. The failure of Japan to end the ‘China incident’ has in all probability cost her the control of the Far East. Her fury at Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership may therefore be well understood.

For all that, when the Tangku truce temporarily ended the fighting in 1933, Japan’s position was still perilously isolated, and an alliance of Great Britain, the United States, Russia, and

China in 1933 would have ended the Japanese threat in the Far East as certainly as an Anglo-French Alliance with the Soviet would have ended the pretensions of the Nazis in Europe. The Soviet, however, was quarantined, in spite of its accession to the League of Nations. That made it possible for Germany, Japan, and Italy in turn to bully democracies which were demonstrably not ready for war, and to frighten them with the vision of a Soviet world if the democracies should take firm action against the aggressors. Meanwhile, it was so patently obvious that Germany, Italy, and Japan had everything to gain from concerted action that their association was an irresistible development. All three believed in the application of force for the solution of both domestic and international problems, all three wished to overthrow the Anglo-American system of international organisation, all three were dissatisfied with the Peace Settlement of Versailles, and wished to destroy it at the earliest possible opportunity. A triple alliance between them would therefore have all the merits of a burglars' syndicate.

The imminence of a German-Japanese understanding could be detected in the fact that Japan's withdrawal from the League practically coincided with that of Germany. For both Powers, the League had now come to represent in the international sphere everything to which they were opposed. If Italy remained a member until 1937 it was merely on the footing of the small boy who is a member of one gang but who finds it politic to remain outwardly the member of another, in order that he can tell his real bosses what is going on. On several occasions after 1933 Italy's continued membership was a source of serious embarrassment, and any chance of the League playing any valuable part in international affairs could only have been preserved by expelling Italy at the time of the Abyssinian War. Anglo-French statesmen, however, were completely hypnotised by the idea of restoring the Stresa front against Germany, notwithstanding the fact that Italy's military weakness is proverbial, had nearly brought disaster to the Allied Cause in 1917, and had recently received further emphasis in Spain. Through the tortuous and unsuccessful negotiations of the years 1935-8, however, there appears the theory that, in the event of war against Germany, Anglo-French fleets must not meet with Italian hostility in the Mediterranean. When the day of reckoning eventually came, Great Britain dealt faithfully with Italian as well as German hostility in the Mediterranean, and without French assistance.

The perpetuation of the delusion of Italian friendliness and support was due to the fact that in July 1934, following the murder of Dr. Dollfuss, the Austrian dictator, Italy had moved troops to the

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enner Pass to counter the threat of a Nazi invasion of Austria. The final dissipation was due to Italy's wanton invasion of Abyssinia in 1935, and the consequent imposition of sanctions by the League. The irresolution of the democracies was emphasised by the fact that although no embargo on the supply of oil to Italy was imposed (which alone could have frustrated Italy's intentions), enough was done to alienate Mussolini and drive him to seek an accord with Hitler, thus creating the 'Rome-Berlin Axis.' But it may be questioned whether, in any event, Mussolini's open designs upon Malta, Egypt, Tunis, Corsica, and Nice would not have produced the same result even if the League had never existed, whilst in the long run the mounting military power of Nazi Germany would have compelled Mussolini to relinquish Austria, unless he could have relied upon military aid from Great Britain and France.

From the Japanese point of view there were at first no obvious advantages in closer collaboration with Germany, so long as Germany's military strength remained a doubtful factor. Japan's ultimate opponent was the U.S.S.R., and until Germany could engage Russia with some prospect of success, Japan preferred to remain aloof from European rivalries. In 1934 she denounced the Washington Treaties, and began a policy of unrestricted naval building, with the object of establishing superiority over any naval forces which Great Britain and the United States might be able to concentrate in the Pacific. Meanwhile, in order to secure sufficient foreign exchange to purchase the war materials which she needed in increasing quantities, Japan began a vast export drive, more specially of cheap textiles, which caused Great Britain and many parts of the British Empire, as well as some foreign countries, to adopt a quota system, without which their own products would have been very seriously prejudiced. On the other hand, ill-advised Japanese interest in Africa, and more particularly in Abyssinia, provoked a speech in November 1934 from the Italian under-secretary for the colonies, in which he pointed out that restriction of Japanese expansion in the Far East was now producing the possibility of a Japanese threat in Africa. This suspicion of Japan's designs in Abyssinia was voiced afresh in July 1935, when Japan had sought to fish in the troubled waters of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute.

During the latter part of 1934 and early in 1935, side by side with her denunciation of the Washington Treaties, Japan was looking around for methods of strengthening her international position. The Chinese Eastern Railway dispute with Russia was settled, but otherwise relations with this powerful Asiatic neighbour failed to improve noticeably. At the time of her denunciation of

the Washington Treaties Japan invited both France and Italy to join her, but the invitation was firmly, if courteously, declined. More fruitful was Japan's demonstrative sympathy with Germany in March 1935, when the Nazis reintroduced conscription immediately before the visit of Sir John Simon to Berlin. The real reason for tension in Europe, said the Japanese Press, was the Versailles Treaty, and Germany was to be commended for taking this way of getting rid of it. From that moment cordiality between Germany and Japan increased in proportion to the mounting expenditure on armaments of both nations.

The steadily deteriorating political conditions in Europe, evidenced by Germany's rearmament and the collapse of the sanctions experiment against Italy, enabled Japan to adopt an increasingly bolder tone in her official policy. At the beginning of 1936 she withdrew from the London Naval Conference, assembled for the purpose of exploring any possibilities for naval limitation which might exist. Her attempt to detach the five provinces of North China coincided with the Italo-Abyssinian War, and when it was evident that Italy would not heal the breach which existed between her and Great Britain and France, Admiral Takahashi, in a speech at Tokyo on 23rd January 1936, declared that 'unless America renounced her naval policy aimed at the expansion and protection of her foreign trade, Japan will be forced to extend the fleet's cruising radius to New Guinea, Celebes, and Borneo, and to establish footholds in Formosa and the mandated South Sea islands.' He added significantly that trade advance in Manchukuo would soon reach its limit, and that in consequence Japan would be compelled to turn her attention to the South Pacific. Upon this speech Senator Pittman, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, commented, 'Never in the history of modern times has such an undiplomatic, arrogant, and impertinent statement been volunteered by one holding such a position. Of course Congress will not be bull-dosed into the abandonment of our national defence and the protection of our legitimate commerce with China.'

Close upon the heels of this declaration of further Japanese expansionist plans came the Franco-Soviet pact of mutual assistance, and immediately afterwards, in March 1936, the re-occupation of the Rhineland by Germany. The Franco-Soviet Pact was due to the increased insecurity of Germany's eastern and western neighbours. Constructive statesmanship would have extended it to include Great Britain, and would have sought to establish an Anglo-American Soviet front against Japan in the Far East, for the re-occupation of the Rhineland was as direct a threat as Admiral Takahashi's speech. They threw overboard at once the Treaty of

Versailles and the Locarno Pact, and made further aggression merely a question of opportunity. No positive step was taken, however, and from this time onwards it was no longer disputed that the initiative in international affairs had passed to the three Dictatorships. This was underlined by the abandonment of sanctions by Great Britain in June 1936, with the consequent acknowledgment of the success of Italian aggression in defiance of the League Powers, and the subsequent recognition of the King of Italy as Emperor of Abyssinia. No such humiliating reverse had been suffered by British foreign policy for nearly two centuries, although, in little over two years, it was exceeded by the catastrophe of Munich. Both were due primarily to the unprepared state of Great Britain and France, and their failure to find a more effective way of countering growing Axis demands than by appeasement. Between the two exhibitions of British irresolution lay the long-drawn-out follies of 'non-intervention' in Spain, giving a free hand to the Axis Powers in their self-appointed task of destroying the Spanish Republic in the interests of yet another Fascist movement in Western Europe.

The policy of 'painless sanctions' had done no more than irritate Italians, without saving Abyssinia. Its ultimate effect was to drive Mussolini into the arms of Hitler, the process being accelerated by the prolongation of the Spanish Civil War, leading to Italian intervention on a much larger scale than had first been contemplated, and necessarily increasing Italy's dependence on Germany. A plain foreshadowing of an Italo-German alliance emerged from Count Ciano's visit to Berlin in October 1936, resulting in an agreement between the two Dictatorships, and a declaration that they would collaborate closely in future. This coincided with an inauguration of a Four Years' Plan by Germany, designed to make her self-sufficient in the event of war. Thus encouraged, Mussolini, at a meeting at Milan on 1st November 1936, was able to shout defiance to the British Empire, threatened by the new Fascist empire in the Mediterranean, and to announce that 'the Italo-German *entente*, which has been reduced to writing and signed, forms a vertical line Berlin-Rome. This line is not a partition, but is rather an axis around which all European states, animated by a sense of goodwill for peace, can collaborate.' The first state to express a desire for the blessings of peace, as propounded by the Axis, was Hungary, whose revisionist claims, Mussolini declared at Milan, were very dear to Italy's generous heart. On the other hand, Italy's new-found friendship with France, achieved so recently as January 1935, had been killed by sanctions.

In view of this diplomatic revolution in Europe there was no longer any point in Japan preserving her isolation. On 27th

November 1936 the Anti-Communist Pact between Japan and Germany was signed in Berlin. Article v of this document declared that 'the High Contracting States agree to inform one another of the activities of the Communist International, to consult with one another on the necessary preventive measures, and to carry these through in close collaboration.' The comment of *The Times* upon this pact was shrewd in the extreme, and subsequent events have proved its accuracy. 'The chief effects to be apprehended from the alliance (it said) are a greater liberty of manoeuvre (and probably an accession of ebullience) for Herr Hitler in Europe and for the Japanese fighting services in the Far East. It is the latter which principally affects our interests. There are rumours, probably not without substance, that the agreement provides for the establishment of German and Japanese spheres of economic—and ultimately political—influence in the Dutch East Indies; a development which would certainly react upon our position at Hong Kong and Singapore. Nearer home there is reason to fear that Germany's persistent and inexcusable campaign against the alleged "Bolshevising" of Czechoslovakia may bear unpalatable fruit. It is an ill wind that blows nobody good; but it is not easy to select the beneficiaries from this latest disturbance of the political atmosphere.'

Within the next five years all of these predictions had been fulfilled. The pact had dispersed the efforts of the anti-Fascist states between Europe and the Pacific, and had at the same time gone some way towards dividing the anti-Fascist Powers in Europe. If the pact was really anti-Communist then the principal Power threatened was the U.S.S.R., and Great Britain and France could afford to adopt a non-committal attitude in Europe. If, however, as many thought at the time, and as events have since shown, it was really a guarantee of aggression everywhere at any time by the three Dictatorships, then the sooner all threatened Powers got together the better. The democracies, however, had not yet found any constructive policy, and whilst they doubted and feared, the Powers of the Triangle acted. Italy promptly welcomed the pact, although formal adherence was delayed until November 1937. Italy recognised Manchukuo, and Japan recognised Italy's annexation of Abyssinia. In July 1937 Japan was able to resume military operations in China, secure in the knowledge that German and Italian ambitions in Europe would prevent Great Britain and the United States from taking any action, whilst the Anti-Comintern Pact would immobilise Russia, with its standing threat to the Soviet of a war on two fronts. Whereas, therefore, the Manchurian campaign had been attended by a good deal of risk, the war of 1937 was as free from the element of surprise as diplomacy could make it.

The time for a final settlement with China had come, and there was no Power in the world capable of intervening on China's behalf.

Exactly as the prolongation of the heroic resistance of the Spanish Republic disturbed the time-table of the European partners in the anti-Comintern firm, so did the continuation of Chinese resistance throw Japanese plans for the domination of Eastern Asia out of gear. With so large a part of the Japanese army locked up in China, Japan was not able to stage any diversion in the Far East during 1938, when Hitler first annexed Austria, and then, between September 1938 and March 1939, first vivisected and then swallowed Czechoslovakia, thereby threatening at one and the same time the Soviet Union and Great Britain and France. On the other hand, there could be no question that Japan was pushing forward her naval preparations in the Pacific at maximum speed. An article in the *Giornale d'Italia*, published on 7th November 1937, at the time of Italy's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact, declared that Japan was building three 46,000-ton battleships, armed with 16-inch guns, and that whereas Japan had 200 warships, with a total displacement of 756,800 tons, in 1936, by 1941 her navy would number 289 warships, displacing 1,109,130 tons. This total would include twelve capital ships and ten or eleven aircraft carriers. Moreover, Japan's Pacific Islands, whether held under mandate or not, were being fortified and developed as naval and air bases. Faced with these preparations, the United States pushed on as rapidly as possible with the development of Pearl Harbour, established bases for land and naval aircraft in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, and developed a string of fortified bases from Hawaii, through Wake and Midway Islands and Guam, to the Philippines. It was these bases which were called upon to bear the brunt of the Japanese attack upon America in the Pacific in December 1941, by which date the Japanese naval programme initiated at the time of the denunciation of the Washington Treaties may be assumed to be complete.

CHAPTER XXII

JAPAN'S DOMESTIC PROBLEM

No adequate understanding of Japan's international position is possible without some consideration of her domestic problem, for internal and external problems are closely linked. Side by side with the determination to create a New Order for Eastern Asia is

the effort to produce a new type of internal society—an effort which has many superficial resemblances to Fascism and Naziism, and which has undoubtedly assisted in bringing about a closer association with Italy and Germany, but which is distinctively Japanese in origin. Japan's political education in the West was completed years ago, and secretly she dislikes Germany and Italy as much as Great Britain and the United States, as she showed in China, and later in Indo-China and the Philippines. For the present, and purely for the achievement of her own ends, she finds it necessary to work with them, albeit only on the basis that Eastern Asia is immune from European influences of any kind.

A recent and not unsympathetic writer, Galen M. Fisher,¹ has explained that beneath the conduct of Japan's recent rulers are three main principles. The first of these is *Kōdō*, the Imperial Way, which is at once a cult, an ethical system, and a political principle, and which, in its various manifestations, goes to the very core of Japanese life. It implies the divine nature and illimitable prerogatives of the Imperial Throne, which gather increased force from the fact that the dynasty has remained unchanged since the first Emperor, Jimmu, who reigned in 660 B.C. The present Emperor is therefore the 142nd of the line, and to Japan's ruling classes Japan without an Emperor of the present House is unthinkable. Hence their unrelenting determination to root out all alien influences which would circumscribe the Imperial attributes or, like Communism, would seek to destroy them altogether. To the ordinary Japanese the Communism to which so many students and workers have given their secret allegiance is at once blasphemy and treason, and Communists are hunted down with the utmost ferocity. It is in the Imperial house that the Japanese nation finds its highest expression, and worship of the Emperor forms the foundation of Shintoism. On its ethical side, *Kōdō* embodies a collection of principles teaching the value of a balanced life, avoiding excesses, and cultivating the virtues of courage, loyalty to the throne and nation, and self-sacrifice. It is this code which gives the Japanese soldier his uncritical and unreserved devotion to his cause, leading him to sacrifice himself in a desperate and hopeless adventure at a superior command. It is more dangerous than unreasoning fanaticism, which may spring simply from a mood of exaltation. On the political side *Kōdō* implies a sense of social solidarity seeking to express itself in ways similar to those followed by National Socialism. Like its Western counterpart, it is probably born of a sense of frustration, induced by an atomised society in which the individual has few opportunities to express

¹ *The Main Drive behind Japanese National Policies in Pacific Affairs*, November 1940, p. 381.

himself, and of the determination of the ruling classes to ensure that self-expression shall not assume socially disruptive forms. By focusing all socially significant activities upon the splendour of the Imperial Throne, however, Japan's leaders have placed the Throne in pawn for the success of their tremendous adventure. Failure will involve the elimination not only of the existing ruling classes, but also of the Empire and the dynasty.

The second underlying principle of Japanese policy again has close resemblances with Nazi ideology, but has been adopted by the Japanese independently of Western influence. This principle seeks to establish a New International Order upon the domination of wide areas by a few super-states. In the Far East that super-state must obviously be Japan. It may be that in fashioning this doctrine Japan is merely giving rather crude expression to irresistible inferences from the existing state of international affairs. It is universally admitted to-day that the day of the small, weak state is done, and the progress of the present war has merely emphasised this. Without heavy industries, masses of large tanks and clouds of aircraft, and without great expanses of territory on or over which to deploy them the weaker states continue to exist only on sufferance. They are in the position of clients or vassals, and the suspension of hostilities will not affect this. On the one side, however, we have ranged those states who believe that international order can be secured through co-operation between strong and weak, and on the other, those who believe that co-operation and equality are myths, which are dissipated by a whiff of grape-shot, or its modern equivalent, and who therefore seek to establish their leadership by naked force. The Japanese have a streak of hard realism in them which leads them to probe below the surface, and, like the Nazis, they came to the conclusion that the democracies talked of co-operation as retired burglars talk of respectability—because they are no longer able to depend upon their cunning and power; and they made up their minds to challenge a system which appeared to them to be already in dissolution, even before the emergence of Hitler's Germany. They were deterred only because they sensed a newer, more vigorous and more relentless enemy in the Soviet Union, with whom it might be necessary to deal first. Here, however, the international situation took a turn in their favour. Hitler and Mussolini threatened the democracies and the Soviet in turn, and so long as the logical world-alliance of the Soviet, Great Britain, the United States, China, and their satellites failed to come into existence, Japan had greater scope for the achievement of the policies than had appeared to be within the bounds of possibility so recently as 1928.

The New International Order was sought because its achieve-

ment would free Japan finally of dependence upon the goodwill of other and possibly hostile nations for raw materials. Its achievement, as has been pointed out elsewhere, would involve the subordination of wide areas to Japan's economy. They would remain dependent, economically and politically. And when so much had been realised, would this bring peace? If pressed on this point the Japanese would reply, temporarily perhaps, but in the long run, the whole earth must be brought within the orbit of Japanese civilisation. Already Manchukuo has its own counterpart to *Kōdō*, in *Odo*, the Kingly Way, and in its Chinese form, *Wangtao*, it is already being industriously propagated in North China. Filled with such aspirations, which are as much a part of their make up as parliamentarianism is of successive British Cabinets, Japan's rulers during the last decade have been busily filling the Japanese mind, through Press, wireless, clubs, and public meetings, with a sense of Japan's historic mission, and with an appreciation that the hour of decision is at hand. This is the very moment when an opportunity such as is afforded only once in a thousand years must be firmly seized. Japan must follow her destiny and become everything—or nothing. But no Japanese ever seriously believes that his country could become nothing. In all its history it has never yet been defeated in war, nor has Japan ever been invaded. Even the Mongol hordes halted on the shores of the China sea. And it is because the whole being of the Japanese is so filled with conceptions such as these that he talks so much of 'sincerity' or 'reality,' and of Japan's ceaseless pursuit of peace. His sensitive soul is hurt when foreign nations fail to grasp the sublimity of Japan's purpose and oppose co-operation. No Japanese would act in such a way—from which it naturally follows that all foreigners are rather stupid people—not irreclaimable, perhaps, but in need of a good deal of discipline and education in the beauty of Japanese civilisation. It is necessary to remember these things in the struggle with Japan which we have now undertaken. Japanese resource has already administered salutary lessons to the complacency and superiority of those allied commanders who were taken so completely by surprise on 8th December 1941, and the end of Japan's resourcefulness is not yet. But even when Japan is being irresistibly pressed back by the weight of the allied onslaught there will be few cracks in the unity of the Japanese people until irretrievable disaster stares them in the face. The British are not the only race to whom the thought of defeat has never presented itself.

Moreover, the Japanese have not entered this newer and greater struggle unprepared at any point. Taking the long view in human affairs, their attack upon the A, B, C, D front in December 1941 may be a last gamble, but it has not been undertaken without much

deliberation, accurate calculation, and infinite preparation, as Japan's machine-like advance in the Pacific shows. Japan differs from Germany in that her rulers have not coerced the bulk of the people into reluctant support of the regime, nor have large classes of the people been suppressed, murdered, or alienated. Because a Japanese is a Japanese first, and anything else afterwards, all but the Communists have coalesced as willingly as the various British parties to prosecute the present struggle, and an Imperial Cabinet Planning Board has been engaged for several years in dispersing Japanese heavy industry to reduce its vulnerability, in developing resources, and in fitting every one into his proper place in the national effort. The National Mobilisation Law was passed so long ago as 1938, although it was not fully put into operation until 1941.

Another point which foreign observers often overlook in considering the Japanese threat is Japan's appeal to the races of the Far East. When Japan invited them to expel the white man she is making an appeal which goes to the roots of racial consciousness. The arrogance and insensitiveness of the white man in the Far East during the past century have made him many more enemies than he has previously realised. Many of these are actively helping the Japanese. Many more would like to do so as opportunity offered. When this war is over a radical readjustment in the relation of the white races to the peoples of the Far East will be required if further difficulties are to be avoided. That the Japanese intend an exploitation of the Far East more ruthless than anything the white races have attempted is not generally appreciated, but even if it were, it is not altogether certain that it would counterbalance this deep race-feeling, the product of a century and a half of unrestricted commercialism. To dissipate it the victors in the present war will have to give more tangible proofs of their determination to assist the improvement of the status of the peasant of Eastern Asia than any Occidental nation has done in the recent past. The strength of the appeal of Japan's 'Monroe Doctrine for Asia' to countries such as Siam is the measure of the failure of the Western Powers to understand the workings of Oriental minds in recent years. For this reason, as well as for others, China will occupy a pivotal position after the war in the relations of these states with the Western world. To a British subject or to an American citizen the fact that the British Commonwealth is a free association of self-governing peoples, and that we are determined to foster the development of subject peoples, is as self-evident as that the Good Neighbour Policy of the United States towards Latin-America is founded upon some broad conception of the common interest of all the states of the American continent. To the Japanese,

however, both these systems are based upon force, political or economic, whilst Japan's New Order is based upon the 'sincere co-operation' of the constituent units. Such a subversion of values may seem frivolous to the Anglo-Saxon, but the Anglo-Saxon's conception of the situation appears no less frivolous to the Japanese because, at bottom, the Japanese regards himself as superior to all other men, and his motives must therefore be of necessity much higher.

Although the conviction that the world is destined to be governed by Japanese wisdom and culture has been present in Japanese minds for at least a century, their political philosophy has only assumed its present form by successive stages. When Japan in the second half of the nineteenth century remodelled herself along Western lines, she absorbed Western political ideas, primarily from Germany, because the Second Empire appeared to reproduce the Imperial Constitution of Japan more closely than any other Western system. The sham parliamentarianism of Japan therefore corresponded with the sham parliamentarianism of Imperial Germany, and within this framework a two-party system gradually developed. With the defeat of Germany in 1918, however, Japanese thought responded more readily to Anglo-American influences, and the Japanese constitution began to move cautiously in the direction of a more complete democracy. In 1918 Japan had its first Government selected exclusively from one Party, and depending for its continuance in office upon a majority in the Diet. But the two parties were no more than façades, behind which operated the great family combines dominating Japan. The *Minseito* party was little more than the 'mouthpiece of Mitsubishi, as the *Seiyukai* party was dominated by Mitsui. If the former was more liberal than the latter, it was merely because it relied to a greater extent upon the foreign trade for economic prosperity, whilst within the *Seiyukai* were to be found most of the nominees of the landed interests, reflecting the expansionist ambitions of the military and feudal magnates. Unfortunately for democracy in Japan, this dependence upon the great business houses was generally known, and the widespread corruption in Japanese political life was accepted as a necessary consequence of a democratic regime. What at first was quietly tolerated, however, was regarded by the middle classes with increasing resentment as trustification spread further and further into Japan's economic structure, so that small tradesman and consumer alike found themselves increasingly dependent upon big business. When there was added to this the failure of the policy of collaboration with the Western Powers in China, and the rise of unemployment and agrarian distress as a result of the depression, as well as what were considered in Japan

to be the humiliations imposed upon Japan as a naval Power at Washington in 1922, and at the London Naval Conference in 1930, the collapse even of the limited democratic regime which Japan had possessed may be understood. If it is also appreciated that discredit of parliamentarianism was accompanied by a spread of Communism among students and workers, the determination of the military and naval groups to end at once corruption and inefficiency, the threat of Communism, and a passive foreign policy, falls into place. The recent history of Japan has furnished one more example of the close interdependence of domestic and foreign policy, and of the ease with which a ruling class may use the anti-Communist bogey to frighten a nation into blind acceptance of a totalitarian regime and an aggressive foreign policy leading directly to war. Accordingly, the minds of all Japanese were addressed firmly to the perfection of *Kōdō*, and the imprisonment of all suspected of 'dangerous thoughts' was organised on a comprehensive scale. The people were told that, if once these alien influences were eradicated, and they returned to their traditional ways, all existing evils would disappear, and prosperity would return. Prosperity, however, could not be finally achieved within Japan's existing frontiers, but just as foreign (and, in particular, Occidental) influences were being eradicated in Japan, so also they must be eradicated within Japan's co-prosperity sphere. Only then could all the peoples within this area develop harmoniously together.

Once the decisive change in outlook had taken place, the disintegration of Japan's political life took place with considerable speed. The last purely party cabinet was that of Mr. Inukai, of the *Seiyukai* party, which resigned in 1932. Its fall was hastened by the Manchurian affair, engineered by the army, whom events appeared to prove to be entirely right. In 1931 Japan was still hesitant to adopt an aggressive policy, and a firm stand by the League would probably have enabled the parties to curb the militarists. All that the League did was to make military control of Japan inevitable. When the fighting broke out in 1931 the *Minseitō* party condemned it; but by 1937 the whole nation had been brought round to the point of view that the final settlement of the Chinese problem was essential, even though this involved a break with Great Britain, the United States, and the U.S.S.R. But in 1937 no Japanese seriously believed that either Great Britain or the United States would go to war over China. The appeasers in both countries had done their work too well. Moreover, by 1937 even big business in Japan had reached the conclusion that the only way to break down the trade barriers which had been raised everywhere against them was by force. The army had brought

vast resources of raw materials in Manchuria within their control. It was now about to do the same in North China, and later the navy would do the same in Netherlands India. After 1933, therefore, big business and the army were in agreement, more especially as foreign adventures were affording greater opportunities to repress internal discontent, and were also drawing off the young, upon whom alone Communism had made any appreciable impression, into the services. Coincidentally, a determined effort was made to win back the youth of the nation to its traditional principles. Education was given a nationalist and anti-democratic complexion, and thousands of Young Men's Associations were formed, pledged to foster and spread the national spirit. In 1934 and 1935 the irrepressible Mr. Matsuoka founded a 'league to abolish political parties,' and in an interview he expressed his purpose as follows: 'My appeal is especially to the youth of Japan. The younger generation is tired of party squabbles and corruption. The principle of the league which I have founded is "one nation, one body." The nation does not exist for the convenience of its citizens; on the contrary, the members exist for the sake of the national organism.' Even in 1935 Mr. Matsuoka was no doubt greatly interested in what was going on in Germany, but the appeal here is to something which is ingrained in the national character, and not to any foreign doctrines.

The cabinets which have governed Japan since 1932 have been dominated by the army and navy, and many of them have been formed by generals and admirals. Even so, progress towards authoritarianism has not always been rapid enough for some of the military cliques of which Japan has an abundance. One of these, on 26th February 1936, staged a military coup in which the Premier, Admiral Okada, and several members of his government were assassinated. Such events in recent Japanese history have not been rare, for in 1930 Mr. Hamaguchi, at that time Premier, was assassinated in Tokyo, and Mr. Mukai, another Party Premier, suffered the same fate two years later. The significance of this outrage in 1936, however, was that it was aimed at all moderating influences, such as big business, bankers, and senior statesmen, and although the ringleaders in the plot were either punished or committed *hara-kiri*, there can be little doubt that the revelation of the widespread influence of cliques such as this was not without significance in the decision of the army to resume war in China in July 1937. In February of that year General Hayashi replaced the more moderate Mr. Hirota as Premier, and promptly announced a characteristically Japanese policy, devoted to the following ends:

(1) The clarification of the national structure and the promotion of the spirit of theocracy; (2) the encouragement of constitutional

politics in accordance with the spirit of the Japanese constitution and public opinion; (3) a unified foreign policy aiming at the stabilisation of East Asia and world prosperity; (4) an increase in armaments; and (5) the development of a national plan in industry.

This was in anticipation of the war with China, upon which General Hayashi's successor, Prince Konoye (who was Premier from June 1937 until January 1939), immediately embarked. Prince Konoye had long been associated with Mr. Matsuoka, and was therefore in favour of a one-party state. When the second Konoye Cabinet was formed in July 1940 he immediately announced his determination to establish a new political structure in order to carry the nation through a situation of unparalleled gravity. The enfeebled *Minseito* and *Seiyukai* parties forthwith announced their intention to collaborate, and on 1st August Prince Konoye published his programme, stating at the same time that he intended to work in the closest collaboration with the Higher Command. The chief points were:

(1) The firm establishment of world peace in accordance with the lofty spirit of *Hakkoichiu* (eight corners of the world under one roof), on which the nation was founded and, as a first step, the construction of a new order in East Asia, having for its foundation the solidarity of Japan, Manchukuo, and China.

(2) In national defence and foreign policy the government will strive for armaments adequate for the execution of the national policies. Japan's foreign policy will be directed first towards the complete settlement of the 'China affair' and the advancement of the national fortune by taking a far-sighted view of drastic changes in the international situation and formulating measures both constructive and flexible.

(3) In internal administration the laying of a foundation for a structure of national defence through the complete renovation of domestic administration.

This programme was to be realised with the assistance of far-reaching changes in education, directed towards emphasising service to the state, reform of the administration, and the establishment of a national defence economy, to secure full mobilisation of the resources of Japan, Manchukuo, and China. A ten-year plan to achieve this end was announced in November 1940. On the publication of this programme in August Mr. Matsuoka exuberantly declared: 'The mission of Japan is to proclaim and demonstrate *Kōdō* throughout the world. Viewed from the standpoint of international relations, this amounts to enabling all nations and races to find each its proper place in the world. We should be resolved to surmount all obstacles which lie in our path, and, in

concert with those friendly Powers ready to co-operate with us, strive for the fulfilment of the heaven-ordained mission of our country.'

Shortly afterwards all foreign personnel and influences were excluded from the Christian Church of Japan, which was required to accept and support the ceremonial observances to the Emperor required by the state, whilst in August all the existing political parties were dissolved, being replaced by the 'Imperial Rule Assistance Movement,' intended to carry the new political structure into the farthest corners of Japanese life. At the same time, the creation of two supreme councils was foreshadowed, one controlling industry, labour, and agriculture, and the other controlling education, religion, the Press, and sports. Simultaneously, the Japanese Federation of Labour was dissolved, to make way for the new industrial structure, expressed in the 'Movement for Industrial Service,' in which, as in Germany, the workers have been subordinated to the industrialists, in association with the state. At the end of 1940 two far-reaching ordinances, the first for the control of corporation accounts and the second the Banking and Other Funds Ordinance, established a close state control of commercial companies, limited dividends, as well as the salaries of company officers and directors, controlled borrowing powers, and generally subordinated the activities of companies to the overriding interests of the state.

By the summer of 1941, therefore, Japan had taken all the necessary steps to prepare herself for the task of destroying Anglo-American influences in the Far East, even to the extent of launching a 'National Spiritual Mobilisation Campaign' to maintain morale in home, school, bank, factory, and shop. Every independent activity had been subordinated to state control, industry and man power had been mobilised, all three services had been brought up to full strength, and reserves of food and war-supplies had been secured. With her preparations completed, therefore, and Russia seemingly in her last extremity in the struggle with Hitler, Prince Konoye gracefully withdrew from the limelight in favour of General Tojo, and his pro-German cabinet of admirals and generals. This was in September 1941. A few weeks later the attack on Pearl Harbour had taken place. No move had ever been more carefully planned, and none, not even the attack on the Russian fleet in 1905, has been more brilliantly successful. Japan has embarked upon a long-meditated and carefully calculated policy. What are her chances, so far as internal conditions are concerned, of standing the strain of a total war with a ring of powerful opponents?

An attempt was made to answer this question in a well-balanced

article in *The Times* during January 1942. The correspondent pointed out that Japan's war-economy is comprehensive and efficient, the heavy industries having been greatly expanded in recent years. Reserves of oil sufficient for at least twelve months have been accumulated, but the Japanese opening moves were directed towards securing additional sources of supply, and with the domination of Indo-China and Siam and the occupation of Borneo, Netherlands India, and New Guinea the problem has been solved, temporarily at least. Similarly, Japan dominates ample supplies of rubber in Indo-China, Siam, and Malaya. Japan now produces at least 7,000,000 tons of iron and steel a year, and in recent years she imported about 3,000,000 additional tons of iron ore, chiefly from the Philippines and Malaya, both of which are now occupied by her. Deficiencies in non-ferrous metals can be made good from other occupied areas, as well as from Manchukuo, where supplies are good.

During the five years of war with China the standard of living in Japan has undoubtedly fallen. It will fall further during the new war, and Japan's financial problems, having regard to the scale of the present operations, will be considerable. But sensational early successes have thinned the ranks of those who doubt the future, and it is safe to assume that there are at present in Japan very few who do not feel that present sacrifices will bring abundant rewards in the near future. The Japanese can bear hardened conditions as well as any Oriental people, and their preparations have been thorough. They are probably as united as any nation conducting a large-scale war can ever be, and there are few who question the wisdom of their leaders in provoking it at the present moment. For the Japanese it is a struggle to achieve their national destiny which Great Britain and the United States have consistently sought to thwart. There is not even a potential opposition to the present regime. In any case, the army and the navy are in complete and undisputed control of the country, and there is no prospect of a shortage of war materials for some time—not, indeed, until the United Nations take the offensive on the grand scale in the Pacific. Even then it will not be until American naval guns thunder again in Tokyo Bay that the Japanese will realise they are beaten. Not until then will there be any revulsion of feeling in the Japanese people, and it will not be until then that the power of the military and naval leaders, in alliance with big business, will be broken. If the war is ended before that point it will have been fought in vain, for the Japanese determination to secure world-domination will survive, to strike Great Britain and the United States yet again in their extremity. The present Japanese regime and all associated with it must be destroyed as completely as the Nazi regime in

Germany. If any attempt is made to negotiate peace with so-called 'moderate' elements, who will be in fact no more than the nominees of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Satsuma, and the rest, it will be a tragic blunder. But it should also be clearly appreciated that the destruction of everything which is associated with the present regime, including the dynasty, will mean that some form of Communism will be the only alternative. Knowledge of this will probably lead the Soviet to make a decisive intervention before long-term Anglo-American measures can have brought about the destruction of Japan's military and naval power.

CHAPTER XXIII

JAPAN'S SOUTHWARD DRIVE

IT has been pointed out in earlier chapters how the prolongation of the China War, so unexpected by Japanese militarists, prevented her from reaping an immediate benefit from the state of semi-war which existed in Europe, from the time of the Munich Conference until September 1939. In spite of all Japanese efforts, a considerable quantity of war supplies continued to reach Chungking, even after the occupation of Canton. The principal supply route, as we have seen, was *via* French Indo-China, and on 10th February 1939 Japan felt sufficiently sure of her ground to occupy the island of Hainan, lying off the coast of Indo-China, and dominating the Port of Haiphong. This was the beginning of Japan's vast drive southward. It was particularly provocative, as the status of Hainan was governed by a Sino-French agreement of 1897, whereby China undertook not to cede this island to any third Power. Since that date no Power had challenged France's undeclared protectorate of that island, and the menace of Japan's threat was not diminished by the statement of the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Arita, that it was necessary to strengthen Japan's control of traffic along that part of the coast. Neither France nor Great Britain could take any active step. It was left for the United States to express her displeasure in practical form by announcing a complete ban on the export of aircraft to Japan.

Further point was given to the growth of Japanese ambitions in the Pacific by the announcement in March of a six-year programme of expansion for the Japanese navy, to cost over £120,000,000. Admiral Yonai, the Navy Minister, in presenting this huge bill to the Diet, pointed out that this programme was based on the

following four principles: (1) Japan's navy must equal that of the strongest naval Power; (2) expansions in the American and British navies must be taken into account; (3) the navy must have sufficient power to deal with any international friction arising over the construction of the 'New Order' in Eastern Asia; (4) if Powers whose relations with Japan were important made any further increase in their fleets, the Japanese plans would be revised. These estimates were highly significant. The 'China Incident' was essentially the result of army policy. Between the army and the navy in Japan there has always been intense rivalry, and the navy's plan of campaign involved the elimination of British and American power in the Pacific, and the acquisition of overseas territories, based upon the supremacy of the navy. The failure to end operations in China, coupled with the deterioration of the situation in Europe, offered the Japanese navy the chance for which it had been seeking. Great Britain replied by pushing on the fortification of Hong Kong and Penang. The Singapore base had already been opened, ahead of schedule, and it was understood that most of the new battleships in course of construction would proceed to the Far East on completion. A fresh shock for the democracies quickly followed the announcement of the Japanese naval programme, however. On 31st March the Japanese Government announced the annexation of the Spratley Islands, a group of coral reefs lying midway between French Indo-China and British North Borneo, a French protest that the islands had been annexed by France in 1933 being completely ignored.

Following this successful experiment in testing the reactions of the democracies Japan, in June and July, blockaded the British Concession in Tientsin, subjecting British subjects passing in and out to the grossest indignities. When negotiations on these episodes were opened in Tokyo, the Japanese used them as an excuse for extracting from the British Government a statement recognising 'the actual situation in China,' and 'the special requirements of the Japanese forces in China,' with which the British Government had no intention of interfering. Apprehensions voiced in Parliament that Mr. Chamberlain had 'sold out' in China to Japan, as he had 'sold out' in Central Europe to Germany the year before, were denied, but were too strong and too well-founded to be completely dissipated. Confirmation of this was forthcoming when in August the British authorities in Tientsin surrendered four Chinese to the Japanese army on suspicion that they were implicated in the murder of a Japanese. Conversely, the American attitude to Japan's forward policy in the Pacific was stiffening. In July there were calls for an arms embargo against Japan. Without committing itself to so decisive a step, the United

States Government abrogated the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan, signed in 1911, with the broadly hinted possibility of an embargo to follow, if during the six months' interval before the abrogation became effective Japan failed to give increased respect to American rights in the Far East. By way of reply, in March 1940 Japan signed a trade agreement with the Argentine.

During the summer of 1939, when the increasing Nazi pressure on Poland, coupled with spectacular German and Italian manoeuvres, made it plain that war in Europe was imminent, Germany used every available means of persuading Japan to sign a formal military alliance. Japan, however, remained non-committal, and her attitude became still more detached on the announcement of the Russo-German Non-aggression Pact in August. Accordingly, on the outbreak of war at the beginning of September, Japan declared her neutrality, but promptly requested Great Britain and France to withdraw their troops and warships from China 'in order to avoid incidents.' This hint was duly taken, and some British and French troops and gunboats were withdrawn during October and November. Even this evidence of complaisance, however, failed to abate the rigour of Japanese policy towards Great Britain and France in any particular, and the blockade of the Tientsin Concession continued. The United States, on the other hand, declined to withdraw either its troops or its gunboats, but on the contrary pressed for the redress of American grievances, and the reopening of the China trade to the foreigners. So firm was the American attitude that in November, Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Foreign Minister, announced that the Yangtse would be reopened as far as Nanking, and the Pearl River to Canton. Shortly afterwards, however, there was a change in the Japanese Government, and the new Foreign Minister, Mr. Arita, declared in February 1940 that the Yangtse might not be reopened after all, notwithstanding his predecessor's promise. It would appear that the weakness of British policy in the Far East at this period, as contrasted with increasing American firmness, was due not only to the European war, which at this stage was not absorbing anything like the full British effort, but also to Australian nervousness, in face of the Japanese threat, at a time when Australia and New Zealand were already sending their best troops to the Middle East.

On 15th April 1940, with the German invasion of Holland imminent, Mr. Arita, the Japanese Foreign Minister, made an important statement to the Japanese Press, indicating Japan's policy, in the event of Holland being involved in the war. 'With the South Seas region, especially the Dutch Indies [he said], Japan

is economically bound by an intimate relationship of mutuality in ministering to one another's needs. Similarly, other countries of East Asia maintain close economic relations with these regions. That is to say, Japan and those countries and these regions are contributing to the prosperity of East Asia through material aid and interdependence. Should the hostilities in Europe be extended to the Netherlands and produce repercussions in the Dutch Indies, it would not only interfere with the maintenance and furtherance of the above-named relations of economic interdependence and co-existence and co-prosperity, but also give rise to an undesirable situation from the standpoint of the peace and stability of East Asia. In view of these considerations the Japanese Government cannot but be deeply concerned over any development accompanying an aggravation of the war in Europe that may affect the *status quo* of the Dutch Indies.'

This speech was not only an affirmation of Japan's determination to establish a 'co-prosperity sphere' including the Dutch East Indies, but was a warning to both sides in the European war not to attempt to interfere with its achievement. Neither Great Britain nor France could make any effective reply to this pronouncement, but on 17th April Mr. Cordell Hull made a sharp rejoinder, pointing out the extensive interests of the United States in this area, and affirming American determination to preserve the *status quo* there. Germany ostentatiously disclaimed any interest in the problem, whilst the Dutch Minister in Tokyo informed the Japanese Government that Holland would not seek the assistance of any third Power in the defence of the Dutch East Indies. There were two further hints of things to come in June, at the time of the French collapse. The Siamese Government signed a treaty of friendship with Japan, and on 20th June, in compliance with Japanese pressure, France undertook to prohibit the transport of materials of all kinds to China by way of French Indo-China, and to admit Japanese inspectors to ensure that the agreement was properly carried out. At the same time, the Japanese Government informed Germany and Italy that no alteration in the status of Indo-China which prejudiced Japanese interests would be tolerated. Immediately afterwards Japan, going beyond the terms of the agreement, despatched naval units to Indo-China, and at the same time established a close blockade of Hong Kong. On 29th June the Japanese Foreign Minister made a speech in which he claimed that Japan was establishing a 'Monroe Doctrine' for Eastern Asia and the South Seas. 'These countries,' he said, 'are very closely related to one another. Japan expects that the Western Powers will do nothing that will exert any undesirable influence on the stability of East Asia.' At the same time, the Japanese Government

asked Great Britain to close the Burma Road to Chinese traffic—a request which the British Government was compelled to grant. A fortnight later Admiral Yonai's Cabinet resigned, under pressure from the army, and a new cabinet was formed with Prince Konoye as Premier, General Tojo as Minister of War, and Mr. Matsuoka as Foreign Secretary. Prince Konoye was the leader of a movement aiming at an authoritarian regime and a one-party state. In a broadcast to the Japanese people shortly after taking office the new Premier warned them that they must look, not to immediate gains, but to their position fifty or one hundred years hence when they should have achieved complete self-sufficiency. At the same time, the new Government made a clumsy effort to secure Australian acquiescence in its expansionist policy by inviting them to co-operate in Japan's mission to improve the human race—a curious misunderstanding of Australia's position and policy, based, no doubt, upon Australia's known desire to avoid driving Japan to extremes at a time when Great Britain was fighting so desperately for survival, and when Australian forces were serving in Great Britain and the Middle East.

By the end of July the Japanese Government felt sufficiently strong to order the arrest of a number of British subjects in Japan. In reply, Japanese subjects were arrested in London and in various parts of the British Empire. It was clear by this time that the new Japanese Ministry was in favour of closer collaboration with the Axis, in anticipation of a German victory, and about this time there was a notable increase in German penetration of Japan, the number of German technicians and press agents being considerably increased, and a number of Germans being appointed as advisers in various departments of state. In view of these developments, it came as no surprise when, in August, the Japanese demanded naval, military, and air bases in Indo-China, as well as the right to station troops there. These demands were backed up by the appearance of considerable naval forces in Indo-Chinese waters, and although the French authorities sought to delay signature as long as possible, a seventy-two-hour ultimatum on 20th September left them with no option but to comply, and the agreement was signed at Hanoi on 22nd September. The Japanese occupation of Indo-China was accompanied by Siamese demands upon the French authorities for the rectification of the Indo-Chinese frontier along the Mekong and in the north-east. These were instigated by Japan, in order to establish her control of Siam more firmly, by appearing as benevolent arbitrator in the dispute, and as a method of destroying French prestige still more completely. In November and December a frontier war broke out between Siam and Indo-China, which was settled early in 1941, by Japanese arbitration, awarding the

territory in dispute, and annexed by France from Siam at the beginning of the century, to Siam.

At the end of September 1940 the pro-Axis policy of the Konoye Cabinet culminated in the signature of a ten-year Pact of Mutual Assistance with Germany and Italy. At this stage of the second World War the Axis Powers apparently suffered from the delusion that nothing could shake their hold on Europe, except, perhaps, full American participation. Japan was equally sure that nothing could now prevent her domination in Eastern Asia and the Pacific except, perhaps, a full-scale war with the United States. The main object of the pact was therefore to immobilise the United States, and its principal terms were:

(1) Japan recognises and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

(2) Germany and Italy recognise and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Eastern Asia.

(3) Germany, Italy, and Japan agree to co-operate their efforts to achieve these ends. They further agree to assist one another with all political, economic, and military means if one of them should be attacked by a Power at present not involved in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict.

(4) With a view to implementing the present pact, joint technical commissions, the members of which are to be appointed by the respective Governments, will meet without delay.

(5) The three states affirm that the pact does not in any way affect the political status which exists at present between each of the contracting parties and Soviet Russia.

(6) The pact will last for ten years, but may be renewed.

Thus, the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 had now been turned inside out, for the purpose of destroying the British Empire and the United States. As a threat to the latter Power it badly misfired, for American aid to Britain was intensified, and the United States redoubled her efforts to complete her defence preparations, and her programme for a two-ocean navy, to include no less than thirty-five new capital ships, originally scheduled for completion in 1946-7; whilst Anglo-American conversations for joint action in the Pacific, for the maintenance of aid to China, and for the defence of Singapore were initiated in Washington. Finally, American relations with Russia noticeably improved. Following these discussions, Great Britain reopened the Burma Road on 17th October, and the United States at the same time called up her naval reservists, and brought up the Pacific Fleet to its full strength. America also opened consultations with Australia and New Zealand for common defence.

Profiting by the pact, Japan immediately despatched an economic

mission to the Dutch East Indies, with the object of securing supplies of oil and other materials to replace those previously obtained from the United States, but upon which the United States had now laid an embargo in order to supply Great Britain. The negotiations were closely watched by the United States and Great Britain, and were subject to considerable delay. On 17th November an agreement was signed between the Royal Dutch Shell and the Standard Oil Corporation on the one hand and Japanese oil interests on the other, providing for a total supply of oil to Japan of 1,800,000 tons annually. This amount, however, did not include aviation spirit, on the grounds that all of it was needed for the air force of Netherlands India; and in other respects the Japanese trade mission made little progress.

This manoeuvre of appeasement proved to be totally inadequate to satisfy the growing Japanese appetite. In a speech in the Diet on 21st January 1941 Mr. Matsuoka declared that war with the United States could be avoided only if the United States refrained from interfering with Japanese policy, ended her support of China, and agreed to Japan's claim to dominate the mainland, and to enjoy a preferential position in Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies. If America were determined to oppose Japanese plans, Japan would take a firm stand, even if it meant entering the European war. Four days later Mr. Matsuoka amplified these observations in an even more provocative fashion, declaring that the American talks with New Zealand and Australia were an abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine, and that Japan was indisputably resolved to dominate the Western Pacific. Americans could hardly object to this as the United States herself dominated the American continent. The United States, therefore, if she wished for peace, must keep out of Japan's co-prosperity sphere in Eastern Asia and the Pacific. These speeches produced from the Netherlands Indies a firm declaration that they would resist aggression, whilst the Australian Prime Minister and the Australian Minister for External Affairs both drew attention to the deterioration of the situation in the Pacific, and called for an intensification of Australia's mobilisation of her resources and man power. Close contact was maintained in Washington between Mr. Cordell Hull, Lord Halifax, and the Australian and Dutch Ministers, whilst in the Pacific the British military authorities at Singapore began discussions for joint defence with the military authorities in the Dutch East Indies, Australia, and New Zealand. From this time onwards both British and Australian reinforcements began to arrive in Singapore. These unequivocal measures caused the Japanese to temporise, and on 18th February Mr. Matsuoka stated that although the United States must recognise the Japanese

point of view, there was no reason to regard war as inevitable or imminent.

No one was seriously deceived by these protestations, and in view of Japan's increasingly hostile attitude, President Roosevelt's administrative assistant, Mr. Currie, went to Chungking in February to study China's economic problems, and to report what further aid might be necessary. The results of his mission became apparent in April, when both Great Britain and the United States granted additional credits to China for the purpose of stabilising the Chinese currency. These credits had no doubt been hastened by the visit of Mr. Matsuoka to Moscow and Berlin in March, as a result of which Japan and Russia signed a treaty on 13th April, whereby 'should one of the contracting parties be the object of military action by one or more states, the other contracting party will observe neutrality throughout the whole duration of the conflict.' Neither party appeared to attach undue importance to the treaty, which left all the fundamental issues between Japan and Russia unsolved, but it appeared to guarantee Japan from Russian attack if she decided to risk war with Great Britain and the United States, and at the same time it absolved Japan from the necessity of going to Germany's assistance, if Germany launched an attack upon Russia.

In May, Siam, at Japanese dictation, stationed twenty-five battalions on the Malayan frontier, at the same time exchanging military attachés with Germany and Japan, and at the end of the month Japan broke off her protracted trade negotiations with Dutch East Indies, during which she had asked for increased Japanese immigration, mining rights, extended fishing rights, increased air transport, the laying of a cable to Japan, and greatly increased supplies of oil, rubber, and tin. Had these demands been granted, the transition to political control would have been no more than a step, but with British and American support they were resisted, even though it was clear that resistance to Japanese demands would almost certainly mean war.

In June and July 1941 the Japanese Government appeared to have made up its mind that the decisive moment to intervene in the World War had arrived. For some time the Japanese press had been filled with denunciations of Great Britain and of the United States as obstacles to the settlement of the China incident and as disturbers of the peace in Eastern Asia. In July the Japanese Government demanded that the Vichy Government in Indo-China should accept Japanese troops and place its ports and air bases at the disposal of the Japanese army and navy, in order to 'protect' it from danger threatening from China, Great Britain, and the followers of General de Gaulle. The Governor of Indo-China made

no effort to resist, and before the end of the month the Japanese had taken control of the whole of the French possessions in the Far East. The move was well timed. France was irretrievably beaten, and could obviously offer no assistance to her distant possessions, and the Triple Alliance appeared to immobilise the United States, whilst Hitler's invasion of Russia removed all threat of interference on the part of the U.S.S.R.

If Japan's mind was made up, so was that of Great Britain and the United States. The move into Indo-China was at once a threat to the Burma Road and to Singapore—how serious a threat to the naval base emerged six months later. For some time past, the two Anglo-Saxon Powers had been steadily increasing their aid to Chiang Kai-shek, and had been concerting joint defence measures with Netherlands India. After the Japanese occupation of Indo-China the alternatives were clear. The two Powers could stand idly by with the certain knowledge that all aid to Free China would be interrupted, and when Chinese resistance was either overcome or diminished, Siam, Burma, Malaya, and Netherlands India would then be attacked; or they could make a stand at this point, whilst there was still a possibility of building up a coalition against Japan. Clearly, the initiative lay with the United States, the only one of the possible Far Eastern coalition not engaged in war; and Mr. Churchill announced publicly that whatever course the United States might choose, Great Britain would follow. The United States elected to face the Japanese menace at this point, and economic reprisals of a drastic kind were organised against Japan. Japanese assets in British, American, and Dutch territories were frozen, and existing commercial treaties with Japan were denounced. Had these measures been applied rigidly, they would have brought Japan's overseas trade practically to a complete standstill. So much was broadly hinted, but for the moment the measures were applied with comparative leniency, although a complete commercial embargo was threatened. At the same time, President Roosevelt incorporated into the American armed forces all Philippine forces serving under General MacArthur.

That the Japanese were to any considerable degree surprised by these measures is doubtful. The implications of the policy they were pursuing had long been apparent to them, and the economic reprisals of July and August could only have reminded them of the extent to which they were still dependent upon supplies under Anglo-American control. Both sides must clearly have appreciated that a further step by either must precipitate war, and in any case, the slowing-down of supplies to Japan, especially from the East Indies, imperilled her accumulated stocks, and made some further move inevitable.

The immediate problem was Siam, occupying a key position for Japanese operations by land against Burma and Malaya. At the beginning of August Japan began to move troops towards the border of Indo-China and Siam, a press campaign was instituted, and Japanese agents began the usual process of penetration. The threat to Singapore was now so obvious that in a speech in the House of Commons on 7th August Mr. Eden declared that any Japanese intervention in Siam would inevitably give rise to a very serious situation; and the United States Government expressed itself in almost identical terms. It appeared that Japanese pressure was relaxed as a result of the stand taken by Great Britain and the United States, but subsequent events clearly demonstrated that Japan had already undermined whatever independence the Siamese Government may originally have possessed, and that a close understanding existed between the two countries, which was put into force when Japan at length threw off the mask. Unfortunately, these developments seem to have completely escaped the notice of British and American representatives in Siam, and a special article in *The Times* of 19th August 1941 stated categorically that 'Thailand will fight to preserve her independence,' and went on to declare that the Siamese had no sympathy with Dictatorships, and nourished a strong dislike of Japanese expansionism. A leading article on the same day reiterated this view. The full co-operation of Siam with Japan since December 1941 emphasises how wide of the mark these assertions were.

The final moves in the Far Eastern diplomatic conflict were now about to be made. On 18th October General Tojo, the War Minister of Prince Konoye's second cabinet, replaced Prince Konoye as Premier, retaining the War Ministry, and assuming also the post of Minister for Home Affairs. As General Tojo was still on the active list, it was obvious that the army had now taken complete control. One immediate consequence of the change of government was the establishment of a Japanese air line to Portuguese Timor, barely 450 miles from Australia, and the opening speech of the new Premier hinted that some great move was imminent. For some time past there had been conversations in Washington with the Japanese ambassador, Admiral Nomura, in an effort to avoid the final breach, and with a similar object Sir John Latham had been sent as the first Australian Minister to Tokyo. Nothing of value emerged from these prolonged discussions, but the Tojo Cabinet reinforced their diplomatic representation in Washington by a special envoy with special instructions to the American President. Much speculation was aroused by this move, the explanation of which was forthcoming on 7th December. With a cynicism and contempt for public morality

which not even Hitler has exceeded, and without either ultimatum or declaration of war, Japan, following her tactics in the Russo-Japanese War, unleashed a devastating attack by air and sea upon the American Fleet and naval base at Pearl Harbour in the Hawaiian Archipelago.

Looking back over the successive moves which led to the present conflict between Japan and the United Nations in the Far East, one can trace a number of factors which led to this result. Until the beginning of the present century the lead in relations with the Far East had been taken by Great Britain. Previously, the United States had been too absorbed in her own development to pursue an active or even a consistent policy in the Far East. In general, British and American diplomatic action aimed at similar ends, but Great Britain was always at a disadvantage in that she knew that she could not rely on American armed support if hostilities threatened. After the beginning of the present century, British preoccupation with German expansion in Europe, and with Russian expansion in Asia, left her with no alternative but to make an alliance with Japan, and this uneasy association endured until 1922, by which time the true nature of Japanese expansionist policy in Asia had made itself apparent. In the meanwhile, the United States had been compelled to take a more active share in Far Eastern affairs, partly by her acquisition of the Philippines, and partly by her increasing need of raw materials from Netherlands India, and the drift of events steadily brought the United States and Japan into sharp antagonism. At the Peace Conference in 1919 the United States strove to the utmost to block Japan's aims in Asia and in the Pacific Islands, and the Washington Conference may be regarded primarily as an American effort to solve the Pacific problem by preserving the integrity of China whilst at the same time granting Japan security through non-fortification of Anglo-American outposts. These efforts proved insufficient to solve Japan's domestic problems, and in particular those of her rapidly expanding population and of her need for assured supplies of food and raw materials. Down to the time of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria there was always a real chance that these problems could be solved peacefully, if only Japan's militarists could be kept in check. Afterwards, the policies of the two rivals were bound to lead to an explosion in the not-too-far distant future, being based on conflicting basic principles, and Japan's foremost aims then became the paralysis of Chinese efforts to recover, and the immobilisation of Russia until Anglo-American power in the Far East should be destroyed.

It will also be apparent that from the time of the Washington Conference onwards, and more particularly since 1937, the lead

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Eastern policy has passed from Great Britain to the United States, and apart from the temporary interlude during the invasion of Manchuria, when we failed to go as far as the United States desired, the United States has usually been able to rely on our support in the event of a rupture, even though we could never take the initiative ourselves. In the concluding phases of negotiations in 1941, the American State Department acted on behalf of the British Commonwealth as it did on behalf of the United States.

If the United States wished, if possible, to secure a peaceful settlement of the Pacific problem cannot be disputed. Nor can it be questioned that she went to considerable lengths in the hope of averting war. She tried a generous measure of appeasement, both by supplying raw materials and by way of accepting without recourse to successive Japanese forward moves. But a glance at the two statements of the American and Japanese Governments will show diametrically opposed they were in outlook and policy. In the summer of 1941 Japan had openly committed herself to an alliance with Germany in the hope of frightening the United States by the threat of a war in the Atlantic and in the Pacific together. This was a serious Japanese miscalculation, and when the tone of the American notes showed that it had failed, Japan took the alternative of striking at the United States before she could assemble immense resources. It was a blow which the United States could not necessarily expect, for her statement of 26th November in which she asked Japan to call off the China war, respect Chinese independence, return to an orderly and peaceful way of conducting international affairs, jettison the 'New Order in Eastern Asia,' and renounce her association with the Axis. From the Japanese point of view, such a price was too outrageous even to form a basis for negotiation, and they took the only remaining way out. They accepted the American terms involved abandoning everything which they had achieved abroad since the beginning of the war, and it meant a new search for the solution of her perpetual need for raw materials and an expanding population, which remained when the present war is over. The chief criticism which has been made of Anglo-American policy in the Far East is that its alternative proposals were offered too late and too half-heartedly. In a system based on power-politics, there is probably no alternative. Something much more fundamental than a return to a futile game of diplomacy and conflicting national interests must be initiated when the Japanese menace has been removed.

EAST INDIES, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND



MILES 0 400 800 1200 1600 2000 MILES

CHAPTER XXIV

BLITZKRIEG IN THE PACIFIC

ON the evening of 4th December 1941 the American naval base of Pearl Harbour, in the Hawaiian Islands, presented its customary appearance of activity and gaiety. The American Pacific Fleet was in port, strongly reinforced, as a precautionary measure, in view of the steady deterioration of relations with Japan; and the garrison of this main American base in the Pacific had recently been increased. But there was no sense of impending disaster. Admiral Kimmel, the Commander-in-Chief of American naval forces in the Pacific, and Lieutenant-General Walter Short, Commander of the shore defences, were both dining out, each assuming that the other had taken certain necessary precautionary measures. In reality, neither of them had done so, in spite of the fact that in the preceding months, warning after warning of the imminence of a Japanese attack had been sent from Washington.

An insufficiently manned anti-aircraft warning system functioned in the islands from 4 a.m. until 7 a.m. On the morning of 7th December an N.C.O. who was receiving training asked leave to continue at his post. At two minutes past seven he reported to a lieutenant a large flight of war planes about 130 miles from Oahu. The officer decided that they could only be American planes, and took no action. Unknown to them, shortly after six o'clock the same morning, a small Japanese submarine had been detected and sunk in the prohibited area off Pearl Harbour. A destroyer was sent to investigate, but no alert was sounded, and the submarine net, which had been opened at 5 a.m., was not closed. At 7.55 a.m. a fleet of between 150 and 200 Japanese fighters and bombers launched a devastating attack upon Pearl Harbour, simultaneously with a full-scale naval attack, in which the Japanese did heavy destruction to the American fleet, with the aid of 40-foot two-men submarines working at the shortest range. At the time of the attack several thousands of soldiers, sailors, and marines were on leave in Honolulu, together with 40 *per cent.* of the officers of the navy, and of the 75 commanding officers of the American navy only 49 were on their ships at the time of the attack. In this way, the Japanese repeated, with even greater effect, their deadly attack upon the Russian fleet at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. What the full extent of the destruction caused by this attack was, will not be known until the end of the war, but it is

known that it was heavy, one 32,000-ton battleship, the *Arizona*, being sunk, and others damaged; and the success of this opening attack gave Japan for the time being unchallenged mastery of the Pacific, paving the way for further disasters, which have undoubtedly added two years, and probably longer, to the war in the Pacific.

In this way, ruthlessly and with precision, Japan threw down the challenge to the Western world, and made her supreme bid for world mastery, for which she had been preparing for at least thirty years, and for which she had achieved the maximum degree of preparedness internally, militarily, and diplomatically. Once again, all the other major Powers were occupied by a war in Europe. Japan plays exclusively for herself, although for the time being she finds it convenient to work in association with Germany; but her aim is to expel or destroy all non-Japanese influences in Asia, and then, with the resources and man power at her command, to prepare herself for the final stage in world conquest, for which alone the Japanese race is fitted, being descended from the Gods, and superior to all others.

Unfortunately, American blunders were quickly followed by new ones committed by Great Britain. To reinforce Anglo-American naval power in the Pacific, the new 35,000-ton battleship, the *Prince of Wales*, and the 32,000-ton battle cruiser *Repulse*, had reached Singapore in November. Scarcely had the world recovered from the shock of the American disaster, when these two warships set out on 9th December to repel an attempted Japanese landing on the east coast of Malaya, without any escort of fighter aircraft, and apparently without covering naval aircraft. The object of sending these vessels to Singapore, as Mr. Churchill explained in the House of Commons on 29th January 1942, was to form the nucleus of a battle fleet in the Far East, to act in co-operation with the American fleet, and to deter Japan from sending convoys into the Gulf of Siam. Neither objective was achieved. Convoys were sent at the very outset of the war. On 9th December Admiral Phillips risked these two key vessels without protection, relying on co-operation from shore-based fighters. After setting out, he learned that this would not be available, but decided to continue on his course. The weather clearing, however, he withdrew, and in his retirement he was attacked by long-range Japanese bombers, and within a very short time both vessels had been sunk, and an irremediable loss had been inflicted on the British Navy, postponing still further the day when Anglo-American naval superiority in the Pacific would be restored. That the adventure, if successful, would have postponed Japanese landings in Malaya is evident, although it may be questioned whether, in view of the Japanese advance through Siam, it would have delayed the siege

of Singapore very long. In any event, to rely for the protection of two battleships upon air co-operation from shore-based aircraft only was a risk which the desperate situation alone warranted. It would appear that British intelligence had grievously underestimated the power, resolution, and accuracy of the Japanese air arm, although the events at Pearl Harbour ought to have supplied a sufficient warning.

There can be little question that both the British and American official services have consistently underestimated the extent of the Japanese menace. British broadcasts and newspaper articles in the months preceding the Japanese attack abounded with complacent assessments of Japanese strength which events have proved to be utterly inaccurate. The idea that we were fighting a species of extended colonial war in the Far East died hard, and even a month after Pearl Harbour, the loss of the British warships, and the fall of Hong Kong, British officials of all degrees of eminence were still annoying the British public—both at home and in the Dominions—by the assertion that, after all, Hitler is the real enemy. Such observations could only possibly be the result of profound ignorance of Japanese policy, resources, and ability. Hitlerism is a disease which has temporarily placed a resourceful European people outside the bounds of European civilisation. Even the amazing successes of Hitler since 1933 have been unable to permit him to burst farther out of Europe than North Africa, whatever his ultimate aspirations may have been. Moreover, there are sufficient elements in Germany and among Germans in exile who detest Hitlerism, and its parent, Prussian militarism, to warrant the assumption that, after the madness which has afflicted Germany since Hitler came into power has gone, reason will return to the German people. The assumption that Germany will eventually break from within is widespread and probably well-founded, for ultimately Germany can never finally repudiate the European tradition. Since the time of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, on the other hand, Japan has been fanatically race-conscious, and as fanatically anti-Western. Whatever policy Japanese governments may for the time being have adopted, her military and feudal classes—the real rulers of Japan from time immemorial—have had one object, and one alone—to drive all foreign interests out of Eastern Asia, as the first step to world domination. Foreign and domestic policies have been closely integrated with this end alone in view. In the pursuit of it, infinite cunning and patience have been employed, and the entire race has been subordinated to the achievement of this purpose. As the American report on the disaster at Pearl Harbour showed, virtually every Japanese in Hawaii was a spy, under the control of 200 consular agents, and

the minutest detail of the movements of naval, military, and official persons was promptly transmitted to Tokyo. Espionage and 'fifth column' tactics have been developed by the Japanese to such a pitch that Hitler's efforts appear to be crude and sporadic by comparison. There is nothing new in this. The Japanese applied precisely the same tactics in Manchuria before the Russo-Japanese War; they repeated them in Manchuria before the conquest in 1931. They used them again in North China prior to the outbreak of war in 1937; and they have employed them in British possessions in Asia, in Siam, in Burma, in India, in Afghanistan, and in Persia. Even Africa and South America have not been immune from their assiduous attentions. All this has long been known to British and American authorities, but they have taken no effective steps to check it. Unfortunately, so far as propaganda is concerned, there has been sufficient in the attitude of Europeans and Americans to the races of Asia to furnish an excellent peg upon which to hang the great design of an Asia in which the races of Asia decide their own destinies and are free from the arrogant assertion of superiority of the white races. That these races will exchange King Log for King Stork is by no means so apparent to them as it is to us. Hampered by racial differences, by ignorance of Eastern languages, and by unfamiliarity with difficult geographical conditions, the A, B, C, D Powers will find it no easy task to dislodge the Japanese from the positions they have already taken. Of the Western peoples, the Dutch, of necessity, have made themselves most familiar with Far Eastern problems, and their original defence dispositions have been shown to be the soundest. But included in the A, B, C, D front are the Chinese, whose patience exceeds that of the Japanese, and whose knowledge of Eastern peoples is at least as great. That is a factor of greatest importance, which must be utilised to the full.

President Theodore Roosevelt once declared that the middle of the twentieth century would see the first of the major Pacific Wars, and he urged his countrymen to prepare for it. In so far as the United States is prepared for this struggle, that is due to President Theodore Roosevelt's greater relative and successor, President Franklin Roosevelt, whose Presidency has coincided with the maturing and prosecution of the gigantic Japanese war plan at a time when another bid for world power was being prosecuted in Europe. The only satisfactory feature of the Japanese attack was that it ended all doubts and hesitations in the United States about entry into the second World War, and that it at last welded the Grand Alliance, the formation of which, though necessary in view of the double and concerted threat to world peace, had seemed impossible, even so late as the summer of 1939.

Before discussing the progress of the war in the Pacific it is first necessary to look a little more closely at the final moves in the diplomatic struggle which preceded it, in order properly to appreciate the Japanese technique. Almost immediately after the accession to power of the Tojo Cabinet in October 1941, the Japanese press assumed a more bellicose tone, and on 5th November the *Japan Times Advertiser*, the organ of the Japanese Foreign Office, stated that America must forthwith end all aid to China, stop the encirclement of Japan, acknowledge the 'co-prosperity sphere,' and recognise Manchukuo. She must also cancel all restrictions on Japanese trade. This was an unofficial ultimatum, but its effect seemed to be softened when Japan despatched a special envoy to Washington, Mr. Kurusu, in order to press on the negotiations which the Japanese ambassador, Admiral Nomura, had initiated some months earlier. Significantly Mr. Kurusu was the agent through whom the Tripartite Pact had been signed in September 1940. This was a characteristic touch which did not escape the notice of Washington; nor did familiar denunciations in the Japanese press, concluding with the observations that Japanese patience was exhausted, that the China incident must be settled, that the Burma Road would shortly be attacked, and that Japan must advance southwards at all costs. Further significant facts were the withdrawal of Japanese subjects from the United States, and the withdrawal of American marines and subjects from North China. By way of response to Japanese threats the Chinese Foreign Minister, on 7th November, advocated linking the A, B, C, D front with the Soviet for the purpose of ending Japanese aggression. Three days later, Mr. Churchill, in announcing that strong naval reinforcements had been sent to the Indian and Pacific Oceans, declared that if the United States was attacked by Japan, a British declaration of war would follow within the hour.

The Japanese envoy reached Washington on 15th November, and negotiations continued until 7th December. During that time the Japanese Government advanced troops to the Siamese border in Indo-China, announced that America and Great Britain must accept her policy in Eastern Asia and leave the Chinese to their fate, and declared that Japan was preparing to co-operate more closely with the Axis. The meaning of these moves could scarcely be in doubt. Nevertheless the President and Mr. Cordell Hull struggled to find a means of averting war, taking care to keep in close touch with the British, Dutch, and Chinese ambassadors. On 26th November Mr. Hull delivered to the Japanese representatives a note setting out the American position. It was extremely conciliatory in tone, and it suggested that the two states

should issue a joint declaration of policy, based on the following principles:

(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.

(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

(4) The principle of reliance upon international co-operation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

The note also suggested the adoption of the following principle in the economic relations of the two states, and in their relation with others:

(1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

(2) The principle of international economic co-operation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.

(3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.

(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

The United States also proposed a multilateral non-aggression pact between all the principal Pacific countries.

In spite of the fact that Japan's hostile moves in the Far East continued, the Japanese Cabinet was reported to be studying the American note, and on 1st December it was declared that the Japanese Government wished to continue the negotiations for 'at least two weeks.' The next day, however, President Roosevelt called attention to the fact that large reinforcements were reaching Indo-China, and on 6th December he despatched a personal appeal to the Japanese Emperor, urging him to co-operate in removing the menace of war in the Pacific. The reply was delivered from bombers and submarines at Pearl Harbour the following morning. On the same day the Japanese representation in Washington handed to Mr. Cordell Hull a document which was alleged to be a reply to the American note, and of which Mr. Hu

declared to the Japanese ambassador: 'In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions—infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until to-day that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them.'

Nothing in the hysterical ravings of Hitler and Goebbels equals in concentrated venom and immorality this amazing production which, it should be remembered, is no propaganda speech, but a diplomatic document, addressed to the head of a great sovereign state. In order that there may be no misconception of the malignity, arrogance, and cynicism with which the A, B, C, D Powers are battling in the Pacific, this document is reproduced in full in an appendix.¹ Bearing in mind that when it was presented, Pearl Harbour had already been bombed, and that Guam, Midway Island, Wake Island, the Philippines, and Hong Kong had already been attacked, there is no record in history, ancient or modern, of perfidy on so colossal a scale, and it ought to be the first war aim of the United Nations to obliterate, at whatever cost, the Japanese state as it has existed since 1905. To say that Hitler is the principal opponent is a grotesque underestimation of the forces of evil now let loose across the whole Pacific. Since 1868 the entire Japanese people has been bullied and regimented for the day which has now dawned. At least quarter of a century of foreign occupation will be required before the Japanese people are fit to play any part in international affairs again. The problems facing the Allied Powers after victory in the Pacific are stupendous. They ought to begin thinking them out at once, and in their discussion of the Pacific in the peace settlement they ought to exclude all well-meaning dilettantes who think that Europe is the main problem, and to prepare an exhaustive survey of the Pacific and its problems which will serve as a starting-point for the reign of law in an area where law has recently been very little in evidence, and where the ruthless barbarities of the Japanese have been condoned or minimised, because Japan has acted in isolation, and the rest of the Great Powers have been preoccupied with the rise of Hitlerism in Europe.

Victory as yet, however, is distant. In the meantime there is a war to be fought against an opponent who has planned the war for thirty years, who has surveyed the ground with exhaustive thoroughness, and whose penetration of Far Eastern nations is more complete than Hitler's of Europe. The war will be long and difficult. In all probability it will continue after the Hitler regime

¹ The American Note of 26th November and the Japanese reply of 7th December are set out in full in the Appendix.

has collapsed; for the Japanese people have never known anything else but hardships, and their unity, even if imposed by an unscrupulous ruling class, exceeds that of any other nation. The Japanese can take severe punishment, and reverses will only spur them to fresh efforts. For them it is world power or catastrophe for if they fail, it is not even certain that they will remain a single nation. Prior to 1868 the country was divided into great fiefdoms, intercourse between them being small. When the ruling class was involved in disaster it will be swept away, taking with it monarchy, army, navy, political structure, and big business. Recognising kinship with no other people, the Japanese will be forced back upon themselves, and unless Communism spreads or some allied control is imposed, the immediate future for Japan will be civil war, disruption, economic chaos, and starvation. Since the Japanese are not ignorant of these things, they will fight with the courage born of despair to avert them. Moreover, it ought to be clearly stated by the Allied Powers at the earliest possible opportunity that they will prosecute the struggle in the Far East to complete victory, and that they will never negotiate with the existing Japanese regime, or with any puppets installed by it in the hour of defeat. To give a race of 73,000,000 people, destitute of the least vestiges of moderation or generosity, and intent only on world domination, the means to make a bid for world power has been a tragic mistake. It would be repeated if negotiations were opened with alleged 'liberal' big business interests, professing a desire for economic collaboration. These interests are simply the old feudal rulers in a moderate dress, and they have merely assumed prominence at times when the strength of other Far Eastern Powers has made military adventures temporarily dangerous. A 'compromise' peace is merely preparing for the second Pacific War.

Once the attack upon Great Britain and the United States had been made, Japan moved with speed and resolution. Her immediate object—the achievement of naval superiority in the Pacific—had been achieved. That gave her the necessary freedom to move large forces to her immediate objectives. Her further purpose was to divide the Anglo-Dutch forces in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies from American supplies and reinforcements, to cut the Burma Road, and to occupy Malaya, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies, so obtaining vital war supplies of rubber, tin, oil, and metals. When these objectives were gained, Japan could proceed at leisure with the invasion of Australia, New Zealand, Burma, and India. The scale of the enterprise was so vast that it is doubtful whether it had ever been comprehensively studied in Great Britain or the United States, but the Japanese speedily began to demonstrate that it was well within the range of

accomplishment unless the most energetic counter-measures were taken.

The American advanced posts at Guam and Wake Island fell in December after heroic resistance. Their existence had been based on the assumption that the American Navy would be able to prevent an attack in force upon them, and after the disaster at Pearl Harbour this was no longer possible. Within a month the Americans were forced back to Hawaii. Simultaneously, the Japanese invested Hong Kong, and here again it was evident that there had been miscalculations, which were probably due to a similar assumption—that the Anglo-American navies would be able to keep open the supply route from Singapore to Hong Kong. Even without this naval support, it seems to have been assumed that Hong Kong would be able to hold out for three months. Actually, the siege lasted seventeen days, the tiny garrison (recently reinforced by a Canadian brigade) capitulating after an heroic resistance, which had continued even after considerable Japanese forces had landed on the island. Whether so short a resistance was worth the sacrifice of some five or six thousand men cannot be determined without fuller information than is at present available; but it should be mentioned that many people had long been of the opinion that Hong Kong could not withstand a determined attack from the land, and that refortification had been hastily resumed only after the expiration of the Washington Treaties, and that it was necessarily improvised. In view of the horrible atrocities committed by the Japanese troops and announced in Parliament by Mr. Eden on 10th March 1942, these considerations are of added weight.

The only point at which the early Japanese moves were foiled was in the Philippines, where General MacArthur had made a most exhaustive survey of local conditions, with the probability of an overwhelming Japanese attack always in view. Even here the process of training the Filipinos for defence was only in its early stages, and Japanese naval superiority prevented any possibility of American reinforcements reaching these vitally important islands. Nevertheless, General MacArthur fought a rearguard action of the very highest quality, inflicting heavy Japanese losses, and postponing the inevitable reduction of the islands. Prolongation of resistance undoubtedly delayed the Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies, although the value of this was minimised by the rapid fall of Singapore.

In Siam and Malaya the Japanese advance met no unexpected obstacle until the British forces retired to the island of Singapore. From the British offer of assistance to Siam to defend herself from Japanese aggression, and from flattering articles upon Siam's

'democratic' leaders, and her distrust of Japanese aims, it would appear that the British Government had expected that Siam would resist the Japanese attack. If this is indeed the case, the British Government had been very seriously misled, and it is very difficult to discover evidence upon which such a miscalculation could have been based. For the past ten years the Siamese have made no effort whatever to resist Japanese infiltration, and during this period the inevitable Japanese-small-trader spies and fifth columnists had installed themselves in strategic positions throughout the country. The Siamese Government has been well aware of this, but took no steps whatever to stop it. On the contrary, the foreign policy became more and more subservient to Japanese interests, as was demonstrated by the refusal of Siamese representatives at Geneva to vote in a way which would offend Japan. Finally, the Siamese Government, far from having developed along democratic lines, as the British press blithely declared, has assumed a steadily more authoritarian and anti-Western character—a fact which was clearly apparent at the time of the abdication of the previous king of Siam in 1935. After the collapse of France and the Japanese occupation of Indo-China, it was always clear that the Siamese would follow the Japanese lead. The Siamese race is one which has many characteristics of little merit. It is weak, indolent, and lacking in energy, and these factors alone should have placed Western diplomatists upon their guard and should have warned them that they would follow whatever Power is for the time being strongest in Eastern Asia. When China is at length victorious, they will follow the Chinese lead as docile as they now co-operate with the Japanese. In the past, the Chinese have had ample acquaintance with Siamese double-dealing, and they are not likely to make the same mistakes in dealing with them that Great Britain and the United States have recently done.

The British withdrawal from the Siamese frontier to the island of Singapore occupied the whole of December and January. Together with the fall of Hong Kong it marks the end of an epoch—the epoch during which remote British possessions were inadequately defended by odd battalions of regular troops, and the long arm of the British Navy. Unless at the end of this war Anglo-American naval power dominates the oceans of the world as completely as the British Navy did in the nineteenth century, this war will have been fought in vain, for without that control Britain's Asiatic possessions are now untenable, and Australia and New Zealand are constantly threatened. Moreover, unless some general overriding control over the development of the peoples of the Pacific is established, others in the future will attempt on a more limited scale what Japan is now attempting on the grand scale.

Even the Siamese, degenerate though they are, have already demonstrated their nuisance value, equipped with tanks and dive-bombers. Disarmament and control of the vanquished must be just as much a part of the Asiatic as of the European settlement. In the bitter months following Japan's entry into the war, however, and the succession of defeats and withdrawals unparalleled in the history of the Empire, there arose both in Great Britain and in Australia and New Zealand a chorus of criticism of the inadequate preparations which had been made for facing the Japanese. The criticism attacked at once the British war plan, the inefficiency of colonial officers and local commanders, and the inability of the British Foreign and Colonial Offices to adjust themselves to changed Far Eastern conditions. It is probable that there was some justification for all these criticisms. British statesmen were trying to do a deal with Japan as late as 1936. The failure of such an effort might have been foreseen had due weight been given to Japanese ambitions and the Japanese outlook; and however painful a war in 1931, 1933, or 1935 may have been, it could scarcely have found us less prepared or more preoccupied than we were in 1941. On the other hand, Australian critics would do well to remember that their influence in the appeasement of Japan in the recent past has been considerable, and that there have been times when Great Britain would have encouraged the United States to make a firmer stand but for Australian prompting. Moreover, Australia was rather slow to awake to the importance of Singapore, as is evidenced by her failure to contribute to its cost as New Zealand did; although it must be added that Australia always expressed herself willing to aid in its defence, and Australian troops have played a conspicuous part in the recent defence of Malaya. Australian indignation at the reverses in the Far East following the outbreak of war there is probably the natural result of achieving a separate foreign policy. In the past, the Australian press and Australian Government have tended to emphasise their remoteness from the world's storm centres, and have rightly stressed that this gave them the right to separate judgment upon world issues. Their security, however, has always depended upon the British Navy, and now that the British Navy alone cannot guarantee that security, Australian policy must be framed in different terms. That it must seek the closest possible understanding with the United States is obvious. But that is merely saying that the democracies must be more vigilant in future, and must be prepared to face a present evil of limited dimensions in order to avoid a greater evil in the future. The whole world to-day is learning what ought to have been learned quarter of a century ago—that toleration of lawlessness in one area will unquestionably

lead to an outbreak of lawlessness in another area. On the whole the British Dominions have been readier than most nations appreciate that fact, as is evidenced by their immediate participation in two World Wars, both of which started in Europe—even they appreciate the interdependence of security much better to-day than they did in 1919.

The rapidity of the Japanese advance in the Pacific produced a strongly voiced call from Australia for Australian representation in an Imperial War Cabinet, and for the maximum aid from Great Britain and the United States for defence against invasion. Both Australian requests were immediately granted, and in addition Pacific Councils, to include the representatives of those allied states with considerable interests in the Pacific, were established in London and Washington. In both these councils Australia, New Zealand, and Canada were separately represented. Meanwhile important steps were taken towards the unification of command in this area. General Wavell was appointed Commander-in-Chief of all allied forces—military, naval, and air—in the South-West Pacific, his command stretching from Burma to New Guinea. This command was short-lived, for it lapsed with the fall of Japan in March. In China, Indo-China, and Siam, General Chiang Kai-shek is the allied Commander-in-Chief, and it is an important indication of the degree of co-operation which now exists between the Indian, South-West Pacific, and Chinese Commands that large bodies of Chinese troops participated in the defence of Upper Burma, that General Wavell has participated in staff talks in Chungking, and that in February 1942 General Chiang Kai-shek paid a highly important visit to India for political and military talks. These moves indicate the evolution of grand strategy on a scale which the world has not hitherto seen, not even during Hitler's gigantic onslaught on Russia in the summer of 1941.

The Australian and New Zealand commands were created distinct from that of the South-West Pacific, and General MacArthur was invited to take charge of land operations, whilst the allied fleet based on Australia and New Zealand operates under the command of a United States Admiral.

These are merely the opening moves in a vast plan of encirclement which will steadily develop during 1942, and which will contain every phase of the Japanese expansionist drive. It will be completed only when American naval and air units are operating from the Aleutian Islands, and when Russian naval and air forces strike from Vladivostok. Once the circle is established allied pressure can manifest itself from those points upon the circumference from which operations can be most successfully initiated. This, however, can scarcely be in the immediate future.

Bases of first-class importance such as Hong Kong, the Philippines, Amboyna, and Singapore and Soerabaya are already lost to the allied cause. Moreover, Japan already holds those areas whose resources will enable her to conduct a war of almost indefinite duration, whilst local allied naval inferiority will not permit operations for the recapture of these areas at present. The nearest first-class naval base to the Pacific theatre of war is now Hawaii. The only first-class British naval base east of Suez was Singapore, and with its loss the whole defensive position in the Pacific has become more vulnerable. In the large-scale Pacific naval war which will develop, there is urgent need for new British bases, in which 45,000-ton battleships can be dry-docked and repaired, and in which large fleets can find secure anchorage. It is true that bases of this kind cannot be prepared in a few months, especially under the stress of war, but war in the Pacific will continue sufficiently long for large-scale developments to be a possibility—and they are urgently needed. The extent of our handicap may be appreciated if it is realised that at present there is only a small naval dockyard at Bombay, and not a single other naval establishment in India, and that the only other British naval bases in the Indian and Pacific Oceans are Simonstown and Durban in South Africa, Trincomalee in Ceylon, and Darwin and Cockatoo Island (Sydney Harbour) in Australia. A first-class naval base is urgently needed on the west coast of Australia, and another in the north island of New Zealand is equally vital. During the past twenty years the British Commonwealth has suffered from a Singapore complex, and has never even considered the situation which would arise if Singapore fell, or was rendered useless. To win the war in the Far East we shall have to perform miracles under every conceivable disadvantage.

There is no point in describing in detail the successive phases of the tremendous Japanese onslaught in the Pacific and in Eastern Asia—an onslaught which has made the end of this war exceedingly remote. Singapore capitulated on 15th February—one of the most humiliating capitulations in modern history, and a capitulation which included the Commander-in-Chief and over 73,000 Imperial troops—British, Australian, and Indian. The fall of Singapore was immediately followed by energetic Japanese moves in Sumatra and Burma, and by 10th March both Rangoon and Java had fallen, and New Guinea had been occupied. The Burma highway—(the vital link between China's man power and those supplies from the outer world which alone could convert the Chinese into a force capable of striking Japanese military power where it is most vulnerable)—was irreparably overrun, and Sino-British forces were again in full retreat into Upper Burma. In

Netherlands India the Dutch heroically carried out a 'scorche earth' policy beside which that of Russia in the autumn of 1941 fades into insignificance. With the collapse of British resistance in Lower Burma two further Japanese objectives loomed into view India, where a political problem of bewildering complexity limited her war effort until the enemy was at the gate, and Australia, where an heroic people who have never spared themselves in British struggles await the Yellow Plague which now gibbers at them across the Torres Strait. In three months Japan has caused all Hitler's achievements to sink into obscurity, and the end is not yet. In March 1942 a Japanese special mission was despatched to Moscow, the ordinary ambassador—significantly, a high army officer—being recalled. The technique follows faithfully that which preceded Pearl Harbour. No doubt the ambassador-spies faithfully reported on the strengths and weaknesses of the Russian army, now facing Hitler's onslaught. Doubtless the Soviet will be invited to give proofs of 'sincerity' by surrendering control of the Maritime Provinces. No doubt also the invitation will be refused, and Japan will strike in Siberia when Russia is least able to resist. To-day, the phrase 'world war' has acquired a new meaning, for the whole world is at stake as never before.

The landslide in Eastern Asia and the Pacific can be traced directly to the failure of Great Britain and the United States correctly to assess Japan's military strength. This error was intensified by initial errors such as Pearl Harbour and the loss of the British warships. Public opinion in Great Britain correctly regarded it as the greatest disaster which had befallen the British Empire since the loss of the American colonies. Under adverse conditions, the consequences might even be greater, for the miscalculation has not only involved the loss of Burma, but it has placed India, Ceylon, Australia, and New Zealand in jeopardy, whilst if these were lost, and Germany remained undefeated in Europe, it is difficult to see how the war could be won. Defeat in a war so ruthless as the present one would not only involve the loss of all our overseas possessions, but also our virtual elimination as an independent people.

Realising these hazards, perhaps for the first time, but with sound instinct, the British people sought to probe for an explanation. In this they were not assisted by the British Government, which steadfastly refused all demands for an enquiry; yet an enquiry was granted in respect of the Dardanelles campaign, where the failure was limited, and the issues at stake were incomparably less. It may be that those in authority feared that the wrong people would be pilloried; but there is no reason to assume that an enquiry,

once constituted, would not range widely over the entire field of our Far Eastern policy since 1919. Nothing less would be adequate, for our shortcomings have been many and grievous.

In an historic despatch from Batavia, dated 19th February, the Special Correspondent of *The Times* dispassionately analysed the causes of the disaster. The first reason was undoubtedly the 'fortress' mentality. Singapore was a naval base, not a fortress, and it always assumed naval control of the neighbouring seaways. With the loss of supremacy at sea, there remained no alternative but to attempt to defend an island unsuitable for prolonged defence by land, with too few troops, and with pathetically inadequate air support. Of that air support most of the British aircraft were destroyed on the ground. Secondly, the greater part of the British troops had already taken part in the exhausting 500 miles retreat from the Siamese frontier. Thirdly, many of the white troops (the Australians excepted) were unable to accustom themselves to the hot, moist climate. Fourthly, in waiting for the Japanese to attempt the crossing of the Johore Straits, the troops were subjected to a merciless bombardment of artillery of all kinds. Fifthly, and perhaps most important, the complete air ascendancy of the Japanese adversely affected the morale of the British troops.

These considerations, however, were not all. There was a lack of forceful leadership, from the top downwards, whilst 'the same lack of dynamism, of aggressive energy, characterised the upper ranks of the civilian administration,' which had no roots in the country, and which failed to inspire in the Asiatic races the will to resist. The result was that they remained for the most part passive and indifferent spectators of the Japanese onslaught—an attitude which, it might be added, was the result of years of patient Japanese infiltration and unscrupulous propaganda to which the Imperial authorities at no time attempted any effective rejoinder.

The Times despatch is, in effect, the indictment of a nation, but it is the British nation which is indicted—for sloth, for self-deception, for carelessness, for complacency, and for lack of foresight. The fault must not be laid at the door of the troops who fought under such appalling conditions, nor even at the door of merchants and planters who lived as the system directed, neither better nor worse. The blame must be laid primarily upon the British people as a whole, whose indifference to Far Eastern problems can be traced to a failure to realise the new forces stirring in Eastern Asia. Further, the blame must be laid upon an Imperial system which made a fetish of precedent, birth, rank, and make-believe. In the nineteenth century the 'old school tie system' was largely responsible for the growth and development of the British Empire. In the twentieth it has limited our native talent for developing

new methods to meet new situations. As *The Times* Special Correspondent put it, 'the British must exercise to the full those qualities of vigour and ruthlessness which made them great in the past.' That means a break with the habits of the last century, and a revolution in English social life which will result in the overthrow of privilege, and the substitution for it of energy, daring, and intelligence.

If by the end of 1942 both Australia and New Zealand are still held, and if, further, Pearl Harbour is still firmly protected by the United States, and is a usable base, it may reasonably be considered that the year has not closed too badly for the allied cause and that the prospects of ultimate victory have been improved. The following year should then see major operations by the Chinese to expel the Japanese from their own country, from Indo-China, and from Siam, whilst the Maritime Powers might reasonably anticipate the recovery of some of the Dutch islands in the Far East. Even with these tasks accomplished, however, victory will not be 'just around the corner.' It will not even be within sight until the Anglo-American battle fleet, operating from bases closer to Japan than any now available, seeks out and destroys the Japanese battle fleet in Asiatic waters. There can be no end to the Pacific war until an allied army occupies Tokyo, and dispels the universally accepted Japanese legend that they are superior to all other peoples. To predict that the war in the Pacific will last for four years may not perhaps be over-optimistic, provided that within that period the Nazis have been destroyed in Europe, and Russia has completed the circle enclosing the Japanese. But a few bombs from Vladivostok or Manchuria (when the Japanese have been expelled) will neither wreck the Japanese war industry, which has been dispersed to meet such a threat, nor destroy Japanese morale, as many arm-chair critics seem to assume. In facing Japan, the allies are facing a first-class Power, excellently prepared. They are also reaping the consequences of thirty years of neglect of the Far Eastern problem. Foresight of no very remarkable quality could have predicted this war, but to avert it has proved impossible because of the lack of a common policy amongst those states which were threatened by Japanese aggression.

CHAPTER XXV

THE ESSENTIALS OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE PACIFIC

It is some evidence of the extent of the unpreparedness of the British Commonwealth and the United States for the war which they are now prosecuting in the Pacific that as yet no public pronouncement of any kind has been made in either country concerning the necessary factors in any Pacific Peace Settlement; whilst unofficial peace advocates have been hesitant to apply their nostrums to this vast theatre of war in which the ideologies of 'League,' federation, Rights of Man, or any other generally supported cure for war somehow seems inappropriate. We have not even had the customary pronouncements that we shall go on until Japanese militarism is finally smashed—possibly because statesmen are by no means clear how far Japanese militarism can be dissociated from the Japanese administrative system, or what the alternative would be. This is not, they would say uneasily, a war to make the world safer for Bolshevism. That is a side of the problem which deserves careful attention; but it must never be permitted to be used as any argument for 'letting Japan down lightly,' in the vain hope that a 'liberal' Japan can somehow be used as a counterpoise to Russia's influence in the Far East. There are no 'liberal' Japanese in the sense that those who use the phrase would wish to imply. When it was convenient to talk in soothing terms to democracies, Japan's feudal industrialists, working in full accord with her militarists, manipulated docile puppets for the purpose of throwing sand in the eyes of foreign observers. As soon as the puppets began to show signs of life, and as soon as the international situation no longer made their antics desirable, they were suppressed, and some of the more contumacious were assassinated.

The allies have therefore a clear choice of alternatives in this war which has been adroitly forced upon them by Japan. They can go on to the bitter end, and destroy the Japanese menace once and for all, in the hope of making a fresh beginning in the Pacific, or they can make a 'compromise' peace with alleged 'liberal' interests, with the certain knowledge that immediately afterwards Japan will seek to recover the lost ground, and will prepare to renew the struggle, exactly as Germany has done since 1919, although with greater resolution. It is not even a matter of choice for the

Japanese. Their population is 73,000,000, and it is expanding at the rate of a million a year. They cannot support themselves or their islands, and they must find overseas markets. As the world is at present constituted, that means war. It must be borne in mind that to continue the struggle to a decisive military victory is a great and long enterprise. There will be many difficulties, and many people will suggest an earlier peace, more especially if the war in Europe has subsided. Moreover, astute Japanese propaganda and diplomacy will no doubt point out at the appropriate moment that there is plenty of room in the Far East for Japan, Great Britain, and the United States, that the Chinese never could govern themselves, and that Russian power in the Far East is a greater menace than Japanese power ever was. For the allies to pay the slightest attention to any of these propaganda devices would be both moral and political bankruptcy. It would also permit the Japanese to claim that they had faced a world-wide coalition and had remained undefeated, and that their subtlety had again outwitted the despised Occidental. The Japanese conviction of race superiority would be further strengthened. The task which the allies have undertaken, and must complete, is to destroy the Japanese fleet, to destroy Japanese military power, and to compel them to relinquish all their conquests since 1895. In so doing, the allies will also destroy the Japanese political system, and in the process they will confer lasting benefits upon the world, and ultimately upon Japan herself.

The war in the Pacific has many far-reaching implications. It is the final act in the great drama of European and American expansion into the Far East in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is also the long-predicted struggle between the United States and Japan for naval mastery in the Pacific. It is the crisis in the development of the three British Dominions bordering on the Pacific. It is again the decisive phase in the conflict between two philosophies of change—the Japanese and the Chinese. Above all things, it is the first opportunity which has ever presented itself for a consideration of the problems of the Pacific basin as a whole, in such a way that the future development of the scattered peoples of the Pacific may be secured, free from the twin evils of exploitation and political oppression. If a great advance towards the solution of most of these problems is not made at the Peace Conference, deep-rooted racial antagonisms, liberated and intensified by the war, will be added to the existing difficulties of the twentieth century. If the treaty port system is dead, it is appropriate that the uncontrolled exploitation of the Pacific Islands should be interred along with it.

In view of the fact that the war in the Pacific has really developed

out of China's magnificent resistance to Japanese domination, it is appropriate that China's position at the end of the war should receive first consideration. Assuming that the necessary supplies are forthcoming, China can and will mobilise an army well exceeding ten millions. If necessary, double that number could be raised, but those numbers will scarcely be required. Of this army, a number will be veterans of five to ten years' standing. For the first time in modern history China will be a considerable military Power. In fact, she will be the leading land Power in the Far East. That is going to necessitate profoundly different habits of thought about China, her future and her place in a world system. The treaty port system will have gone for ever, and with it the special foreign rights, such as extra-territoriality, upon which the foreigner's position was built up. Even the problem of the Shanghai International Settlement is now solved. The Japanese have destroyed the foreign position there, and only the Chinese can retake the city. Quite clearly, the International Settlement is now only a special area of a great Chinese city, and although it may perhaps be found desirable, both by the Chinese and by Great Britain and the United States, to establish a transitional period, during which the foreign community may adjust itself to Chinese control, that period cannot be lengthy, and the restrictions upon full Chinese jurisdiction should be as few as possible.

It need scarcely be added that the expulsion of Japan from China necessarily involves the return of Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, and Formosa to full Chinese sovereignty. All these territories have been Chinese from time immemorial, and even during the troubled period between 1900 and 1931 Manchuria was on the whole well governed, and the Chinese Government initiated a considerable amount of economic development. Moreover, Manchuria is the principal outlet for China's expanding population. Without it, the problem of finding homes for this increase becomes much more acute. As for the Japanese colonisation of Manchuria, it was a failure, as it was always bound to be. The Japanese leave home with extreme reluctance, and the climate of Manchuria is too extreme for them. Less than 300,000 ever settled there, the inflated figures sometimes produced by Japan being explained by the fact that there had been included the million-odd Koreans who had been induced to cross over into Manchuria, and whose presence was always resented by the Chinese immigrants, as the Koreans were the tools of Japanese imperialism. In the past, Manchuria has been the battle-ground of rival Russian and Japanese imperialisms, with Great Britain and the United States making patient but futile efforts to obtain substantial commercial concessions. In the future, Manchuria offers a great field for

constructive development, but that can only take place under the control of the Chinese Nationalist Government.

There are three other territorial questions affecting China which will require consideration at the Peace Conference, and all three are questions of some delicacy, affecting China's allies. The first is the question of Outer Mongolia, the status of which at the present time is anomalous. Though technically subject to Chinese suzerainty, this area is completely autonomous, is organised as a Soviet Republic (though it is not federated with the U.S.S.R.), and it has entered into a full defensive alliance with Russia. If the status of this area is not clarified at the Peace Conference, it may quite well be a source of future friction between the U.S.S.R. and China. Possibly the best solution of this problem would be by a joint guarantee of Outer Mongolia by the U.S.S.R. and China.

The second problem, that of Sinkiang, also concerns the Soviet and China. It is well known that during the last decade, Soviet influence in Sinkiang has been steadily increasing. As was pointed out in an earlier chapter, this wide area has extensive resources, and is capable of considerable development. Some Chinese colonisation has already taken place there, and it may be necessary to use this area still further in the future as an outlet for China's expanding population. Some declaration that the Soviet has no desire to expand into this area would therefore be a stabilising factor.

The third territorial question is that of Hong Kong. The British Colony of Hong Kong is made up of two distinct areas. The islands, and a very small part of the adjacent peninsula, upon which the town of Kowloon is built, are held by the British Crown in absolute sovereignty. Behind this area are the New Territories, stretching to the frontier thirty miles away, and held by the British Crown on a ninety-nine years' lease, granted in 1898. In view of China's recovery, it is unlikely that this lease will be renewed. Without the New Territories, and in all probability even with them, Hong Kong is indefensible against a strong land attack, as the events of December 1941 showed with painful clarity. Hong Kong was acquired in 1842 as a place of refuge for foreign merchants trading with Canton, and its prosperity has always been bound up with the fortunes of Canton. It is suggested that with a strong Chinese central government adequately protecting the interests of foreign traders, and with the necessary concentration of British naval, military, and air forces at Singapore, Hong Kong might return to Chinese sovereignty, provided that arrangements were made for its use as an Anglo-American-Chinese base in the event of future hostilities in the Pacific. In considering these suggestions

it should be borne in mind that in all probability Hong Kong will be recaptured by Chinese forces.

A cardinal allied war aim ought to be the liberation of Korea. These twenty-five millions of Orientals are of Mongol race, and their civilisation is principally of Chinese origin. Few peoples have been oppressed and exploited so ruthlessly as the Koreans. They have been used as beasts of burden, to perform all menial tasks, but every official post in Korea, no matter how small, is occupied by a Japanese. Koreans are shipped to Japan like cattle to build roads and railways, and their womenfolk are constantly raided to supply recruits to Japanese brothels. At the time of the earthquake in 1923, panic took possession of the Japanese, with the result that thousands of Koreans in Japan were massacred, on the pretext that they were about to revolt. At the end of the nineteenth century the Koreans were a degenerate people, passive to foreign penetration. Although the Japanese have cut them off from all contact with the outer world, and have denied them education, the Koreans have learned through suffering not only to hate the Japanese, but also to desire freedom as never before.

This hatred of the Japanese has expressed itself in many revolutionary organisations, the chief of which are strong and experienced in revolutionary activities. In Manchuria, where nearly a million Koreans have settled, there have long been Korean guerillas, who are now learning to co-operate with the Chinese. It must also not be overlooked that in Japan itself there are nearly 500,000 Korean labourers, many of whom are pledged to revolutionary activities, whilst there are 200,000 more in Siberia, drawing support and inspiration from the U.S.S.R. As in most other Asiatic countries, the revolutionary movement is divided between the orthodox middle-class reformers, looking to a state on Western lines, and the younger Left Wing, whose ultimate objective is Communism. The latter, in Korea, have always worked in close association with the Japanese Communists, since both are seeking the overthrow of the present regime, the Koreans to recover their independence, the Japanese to make a fresh beginning in their own country. The middle-class revolutionaries used to have the chief seats of their activities in the French Concession at Shanghai, in Hawaii, and in America. American interest in the Korean independence movement has always been strong, and a leading Korean revolutionary, Rhee Syngman, was a friend of President Wilson, whose sympathies with the Koreans were well known. After the Peace Conference the three thousand odd Koreans in Shanghai organised a Provisional Government, and prepared a democratic constitution. When the French collapsed, this government moved to Chungking, where it serves as a rallying-point for

all Koreans in China. Already there are Korean units serving side by side with the Chinese Nationalists. Meanwhile, the Koreans have organised a headquarters in Washington, where Rhee Syngman is seeking to obtain American support for the Koreans.

Altogether apart from these activities are those of the Korean Communists, who have organised an unending series of terrorist activities inside Korea itself. The Korean Communists receive support both from Moscow and from the Chinese Communists, and it cannot be questioned that the attraction of Communism for the young Koreans is very great. In 1936 a common front of all Korean revolutionary parties was established, aiming at the creation of an independent republic and the nationalisation of all state-owned and monopoly enterprises. As these are all in Japanese hands, there will be few obstacles once Japan is defeated.

That Korea will recover her independence when Japan is beaten seems obvious. How it will be preserved and what Korea will do with it are difficult problems. Much will presumably depend upon which of the allied Powers takes the lion's share in the work of liberation. At present, all the indications are that this will be the Chinese. Agrarian reform and a lightening of the burdens upon the peasantry are heavily overdue, and no Korean government can survive which does not tackle these problems. Korea, however, could possess a well-balanced economy, as she is rich in metals, but the problem of markets for manufactured goods will be a difficult one, unless China is prepared to absorb a substantial proportion of them. At present, practically their only outlet is to Japan. In any event, the economies of China, Korea, and Japan will have to be linked, if acute distress is to be avoided.

In the recent past, Korea has been the cause of two wars. She may well be the cause of more unless her international status is clarified and made secure. That her ties with China will be close cannot be questioned. Perhaps this might lead to a customs-union. In the future, too, there may be further emigration of Koreans to Manchuria. If misunderstanding amongst Russia, the United States, and Great Britain is to be avoided, it seems essential that the independence of Korea should be guaranteed by all three Powers, and that China's enjoyment of Manchuria should be similarly protected.

To the south of China are Indo-China and Siam, whose rulers have done very serious damage to the allied cause. It is increasingly evident, as the second World War progresses, that modern France has ceased to be a World Power. For the past twenty years she has occupied a position unwarranted by her population, political insight, or her resolution, and her collapse in 1940 brought with it

the disintegration of an empire which could only have been saved by a withdrawal to North Africa, and the most resolute prosecution of the war. Whatever may be the position with regard to France's African Empire, there is no case whatever for the preservation of her brief rule in Indo-China. Acquired in 1883, Indo-China has steadily become more intensely nationalist as the years have passed, and the establishment of Cambodian independence is a development which the Peace Conference ought to achieve. To preserve nominal French control, after the object-lesson afforded by this area since the French collapse, would be to introduce an element of instability into the Far Eastern settlement; besides preserving the interests of a state which has shown abundantly since July 1940 what wide differences of thought divide France from the Anglo-Saxon peoples. There is also a further point of first importance. In the later stages of the war Indo-China must necessarily be the scene of extensive fighting between Chinese and Japanese armies. It can scarcely be assumed that the Chinese will liberate a people, racially closely akin to them, and subject to Chinese suzerainty until 1883, for the purpose of restoring them to French rule afterwards. There is a great deal to be said for a customs-union between Indo-China and China, whilst Haiphong and Saigon ought to be naval and air bases, which would be available to France, to China, to Great Britain, and to the United States in time of war.

Much the same considerations are applicable to Siam, the moral weakness of whose people places them necessarily within the Chinese orbit when the war is over. There is, however, one further point of importance with regard to Siam. Recent events in the Far East have shown the overwhelming dangers to the allied cause resulting from the possession of the Kraa Isthmus by this vacillating people. It is essential for the security alike of Malaya and of Burma that the Siamese frontier should be adjusted to exclude this isthmus, so that British communications by land between Burma and Malaya are unimpeded.

The status of the Philippines may be regarded as unaffected by this war. With the disappearance of the Japanese menace, the case for immediate independence will doubtless be strengthened, although joint defence arrangements with the United States will no doubt be concluded, and the Anglo-American navies will need dock and harbour facilities in Manila Bay, and at Cavite. As for Netherlands India, the present war has shown how closely their defence problems are bound up with those of Malaya, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. Defence arrangements between these countries must be developed further in the future. Politically, there can be no doubt that the Governments of Netherlands India and of Australia will work in much closer contact in the future.

The present war has brought about revolutionary changes in the habits of thought of Australia and New Zealand. Both Dominions are as yet in the early stages of their development, but to both have come a major peril, and their closeness to modern world problem has been plainly demonstrated. The first lesson of these difficult years is that the time available for the development of these Dominions is much shorter than they thought it was. There will have to be far-reaching changes in the early post-war years, and the flow of immigration must be greatly enlarged in volume. The limits of the defensive powers of the Commonwealth are now plain. Until the population of Australia exceeds twenty millions, and that of New Zealand five millions, neither Dominion can consider itself secure, in face of the rising racial feeling in the Pacific. Meanwhile both Dominions, as well as Great Britain, must have the closest possible association with the United States in the Pacific. In future there must be only one Pacific policy for the English-speaking peoples. Without such a result any Peace Settlement will rapidly drop to pieces. This is no one-sided bargain, for without the British Dominions, and the British and Dutch possessions in the Far East, the security of the United States in the Pacific is precarious, as the opening moves of the war with Japan clearly showed.

Consideration of the Philippines, of Netherlands India, of Australia, and of New Zealand leads naturally to a consideration of the 20,000-odd islands of the Pacific. Interesting developments have been taking place amongst these since 1914. A beginning was made in undoing the Partition of the Pacific, accomplished during the eighties, by the expulsion of Germany at the end of the war of 1914-18. At the conclusion of the present war, it may be assumed that Japan will have been expelled from all the islands of the Pacific except those which go to make up what may be termed Japan Proper. The situation which will then exist will be that all the islands of the Pacific will be under allied control. Those which are already the possessions of allied Powers, *e.g.* Netherlands India, New Guinea, Hawaii, the Fiji Islands, and many others, will presumably retain their present status, as they are too weak, and too scattered, either to stand alone, or to support the complex machinery of modern government unaided. But for many of these, as well as for the islands formerly under Japanese control, a Pacific Control Board might well be set up, comprising representatives of all the allied Powers, charged with the duty of administering these islands in such a way as to interfere as little as possible with native aspirations. It has already been pointed out that contact with more developed civilisations, Oriental as well as Occidental, has worked a great deal of harm to these islanders, and that

native populations in many islands have been very greatly reduced. It is essential that this process should be arrested, and if possible reversed, and that the infinite variety of cultures existing in these islands should be preserved, and the inhabitants spared all the miseries which follow in the wake of uncontrolled and unprincipled exploitation. Such a Control Board might very well set up what is very badly needed in the Pacific—a controlling organisation for the centralisation of research into the resources and cultures of the Pacific Islands, with the object of preventing undesirable development and stimulating the growth of self-reliance among the native peoples. Something has already been attempted by the British, Dutch, and Australian administrations in New Guinea, but there is a great deal more to be done, and over a much wider area.

There are two general questions in connexion with the future of the Pacific area which will require attention at any Peace Conference and afterwards. Political changes, even if they take the form of liberating oppressed peoples, do not settle international problems, as the history of the world since Versailles has shown. Behind all political settlements lies the problem of the welfare of the peoples for whom states exist. If this is ignored, then unrest and wars necessarily follow. We are fighting to end Japanese exploitation of the Far East. It will not be enough, even if it is possible, to return to Western exploitation, no matter in what attractive garb it may be dressed. In one vast area—China—that is already happily a thing of the past. It is doubtful, however, whether Western peoples have as yet appreciated that exploitation of other areas is equally obsolete. It is not enough to draw materials from these heavily populated areas, and to salve one's conscience for swollen dividends by a little popular education, decent sanitation, and impressive public works. As we have seen since December 1941, populations subject to these conditions are apt to have their own views about them and to remain indifferent when we are attacked. Throughout the East there is a tremendous problem to be faced—probably the greatest social problem that human brains have been called upon to tackle. The problem forces itself upon the attention in Burma, in Annam, in Tonquin, in Siam, in Korea, in Malaya, in Netherlands India, in the Philippines, and in the Pacific Islands. It is the problem of the appallingly low standard of living of hundreds of millions of cultivators of tiny holdings, always living near the starvation line, and who may drop below it if there is a drought, a typhoon, or a flood. For centuries these Asiatic peasants have been crushed by debt and bond-slavery, and their natural increase has been thinned by wars, famine, and pestilence, yet they have borne these evils patiently, not conceiving that any other was possible. To-day

they know better, and it is impatience with the conditions under which they are called upon to live out their miserable lives, and determination to secure control of the development of their countries, that turns the younger generation in such formidable numbers to Communism. That is a challenge which must be faced. It can be met only by development of the resources of these areas for the benefit of the inhabitants, and under their own control. The same problem is being faced in Latin-America, and has been responsible for friction with the United States and with Great Britain, but there the problem is not complicated by dense populations and tiny, over-cropped holdings. This calls insistently for the victorious Powers at the end of this war to consider Eastern Asia and the Pacific Islands as a single problem, and to consider in time the linked problems of agrarian reform, industrialisation, and migration. The alternative is to face a future in which explosions in the Pacific occur with increasing frequency.

The second general question is that of education among the races of Eastern Asia. This is simply one aspect of the world-problem of education, but it presents one or two special difficulties. In many parts of the Far East two or more races live side by side in separate communities which have few, if any, points of contact with one another. This is necessarily a cause of friction, even where it is not complicated by additional religious differences; and education, as it has existed in the recent past, has intensified friction rather than minimised it. It has created new wants, which colonial and semi-colonial regimes could not satisfy. It has given Oriental peoples a distorted view of Western civilisation, and it has created large student bodies who could not return to the land, but who could be absorbed, if at all, only into subordinate positions in industry and public life. The remedy is not to limit opportunity for education, as some have suggested, but to change its character. We need more educational experiments of the type which the Chinese Nationalists have undertaken. We need much more adult education, and above all, we need a greater sense of responsibility and service from those Europeans whose labours bring them to the Far East.

Two problems have been reserved until the last for treatment, on account of their complexity. The first is the problem of Japan; and the second is that of maintaining the peace settlement which is ultimately reached. The first penalty for unsuccessful aggression is forfeiture of territories wrongfully taken, and Japan will have to pay that penalty. Not one of her acquisitions prior to December 1941 solved Japan's population problem. They were either areas for exploitation, or positions of strategic value for future expansion. Japan, like Germany, has yet to learn that a cynical disregard for

the usages of civilised society cannot pay in the long run, and that the Powers in opposition to her, though they do not always act from purely altruistic motives, do nevertheless in their external relations follow a code of conduct which makes modern international intercourse tolerable. As in the case of Germany, however, defeat of Japan will not solve all problems. It may solve one set, but it will also create others. To begin with, the shock of defeat will destroy the Japanese political structure, as it has existed since 1868. As we can now see, the events of 1868 were a potential revolution, skilfully deflected by the Japanese ruling classes towards external expansion as a means of solidifying the community. Success in that adventure is symbolised by the present regime, with the Emperor at its head. So long as the Empire remains, so long will the army and the navy chiefs occupy a privileged position, and prosecute their expansionist and anti-Western policies, under the convenient cloak of *Kōdō*, co-prosperity sphere, or some other attractive catch-phrase of the moment. Complete defeat will involve the resumption of the revolution which was frustrated in 1868, as well as a triumph for democratic, as distinct from authoritarian, organisation. Monarchy, military and naval control, and Japan's semi-feudal 'big business' will therefore all be swept away at once. Since there are no alternative groups, and since even the corrupt puppet parties have been dissolved, there exists no possibility of an alternative system of government, and if left to herself it is highly probable that Japan would tend to disintegrate, through apparently purposeless civil wars, in the way that China did between 1911 and 1928. The most probable result of that would probably be the emergence of a new group of Japanese militarists, who would again seek to consolidate national unity through foreign adventures. The only apparent alternative to this would be the establishment of a species of Japanese Communism. This would be essentially an agrarian Communism, as it is in China, representing basically the protest of the small farmers against the rigours of life and existing uncertainties. Such a development might be the response of the depressed classes to recent conditions, but it would not solve individual or population problems. With Anglo-American support, a democratic regime might be established, based upon the trades unions, the smaller traders, and the professional classes, but such a regime would need continued support, and sympathetic treatment of the extremely difficult problems which will have to be faced, and all recent educational tendencies must be reversed.

A further reason why Japan cannot be left to herself after defeat is that it will not be until foreign troops are actually stationed in Japan's main cities that the certainty of his superiority over all

other races will desert the Japanese; and if he is ever to be made a useful member of international society, it is essential that he should make that discovery.

A third reason for foreign occupation is the necessity for superseding the existing system of education by one less virulently anti-foreign, which at the same time makes some pretence of giving the Japanese some elementary acquaintance with the essentials of decent public conduct. From the beginning of Western intercourse with Japan it has been difficult for the foreigner to acquire any proper appreciation of the Japanese character. The cherry-blossom and geisha-girl phase has long been replaced by the conception of the Japanese as an orderly, self-contained but self-reliant Eastern counterpart to the European citizen—efficient, thrifty, and possessed of reasoning powers which govern his public conduct. Such an estimate is very wide of the mark; and well-meaning but misguided Europeans and Americans have increased the confusion by talking of the 'Britain of the East.' Judged by all Western standards, the Japanese have very much still to learn. Their international record proves them to have erected deception and treachery into a fine art; and the official Japanese exhibits qualities of brutality, opportunism and dissimulation which are directly opposed to Western notions of morality. He is completely materialistic, and his emotions are of the crudest. Japan's progress has been built upon the ruthless subordination of individual welfare to national greatness, and by the sacrifice of the lives and happiness of all who stood in the way of its achievement. The Japanese is as much an alien to the rest of the world as the Martian in Mr. H. G. Wells' *War of the Worlds*. He is too dangerous to be left to his own devices, and under modern world conditions he cannot be isolated. The task of educating an entire nation in accordance with entirely different ethical standards from those at present existing will therefore have to be undertaken by the allied Powers, and the task will be successfully completed only when the Japanese is prepared to co-operate peacefully and honestly with other races in the task of establishing world order.

Whatever government assumes power in Japan when the war is over will face problems of staggering magnitude. Her financial system will have collapsed, and her resources will be exhausted. Much of her most valuable man power will be destroyed, and her economic system will have broken down. A population of 73,000,000 will be at starvation level, and it will be necessary to import food to avoid widespread famine. It will be as if Japan had suddenly slipped back several centuries. No doubt immediate relief measures will be undertaken by the Allies, but this will be a temporary measure only. Long-term plans will have to be

elaborated to solve Japan's population problem; more especially if it be agreed that a revival of the pre-war 'dumping' of cheap Japanese products cannot be permitted. So long as every Japanese who goes abroad is simply a spy and a fifth columnist for a military oligarchy whose appetite for territory is insatiable, and whose ultimate object is world domination, there can be no solution to Japan's population problem. Once the outlook and education of the Japanese have been changed, however, a Pacific Control Board, with the information which would then be at its disposal, could direct Japanese emigration to areas where they could usefully and peacefully participate in the development of the Pacific Basin. Unless it is proposed to stifle Japanese emigration altogether, however, that implies that the allied Powers will have a continuing interest in the character and policy of the Japanese Government. It also means that Japan cannot be permitted a second time to build up the mighty armaments which she at present possesses, if there is to be peaceful development in the Pacific.

That leads necessarily to a consideration of the means by which a peace settlement in the Pacific can be maintained. Unless at the expiration of the war Anglo-American naval power in the Pacific is unchallenged, peace in the Pacific will be merely an armistice. In the vast spaces of the Pacific, among the innumerable islands, the Anglo-American navies must bring and preserve order, discharging important if unspectacular police work; and in the maintenance of that power a greatly enlarged Australian navy, possibly including capital ships, must play its part, assisted by the considerable forces of the Netherlands East Indies. These naval forces must have the use of a chain of bases, stretching from the Australian coast, through the East Indies (with its bases at Amboyna and Soerabaya) to Singapore, Saigon, Manila, Hong Kong, and Port Arthur, and across the Pacific from the Philippines, through Guam, Wake Island, and Midway Island, to Hawaii. Within this vast area no potentially hostile bases should be permitted.

On land, the guarantors of the Peace Settlement are obviously China and Russia, although it is not overlooked that both these Powers may in the future possess considerable naval forces also. An armaments race among the present allies could be, and ought to be, prevented by a treaty, limiting the size and quality of armaments to the necessities of police work, and by developing the system of unified commands in particular areas which now exists. Moreover, the Peace Settlement should include multilateral treaties, guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Japan (as delimited by the treaty), Korea, Indo-China, Siam, Netherlands India, and the Philippines.

It is not suggested that these proposals cover the whole field of a Pacific Peace Settlement, for the problems are so vast that those of Europe appear simple by comparison. The war in the Pacific has ended an entire system of international relations. It can never be restored, and the allied Powers must therefore take the initiative in ordered and controlled development. At the end of this war, which will necessarily be long and bitter, they will have the power to do so. What are required are resolution and courage commensurate with that power. Round the Pacific Basin live over 800 millions of people of all races, and at every stage of development. In the Indian Ocean are 400 millions more. As the tide is now flowing in the Far East, these will not remain in subjection to any Power. Nor are they by any means convinced that Western civilisation is necessarily the ultimate product of human wisdom. Yet from that Western civilisation there have painfully evolved certain ideas of justice, and certain principles of international intercourse, which offer reasonable hopes for future human happiness, and which await objective realisation in the Peace Settlement which will follow the first, and by the exercise of wisdom possibly also the last, of the major Pacific wars.

Appendix

THE AMERICAN NOTE TO JAPAN OF 26TH NOVEMBER 1941

26th November 1941

THE representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement, if possible, of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order, and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equity, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international co-operation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed towards a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful towards creating an atmosphere favourable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary *modus vivendi* could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing. On 20th November the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated.

The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed towards working out a broad-gauge programme of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented

by the Japanese Ambassador on 20th November contain some features which, in the opinion of this government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order, and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.

With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a programme which this government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.

The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of 21st June 1941 and the Japanese draft of 25th September by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worth-while international relations. We hope that in this way progress towards reaching a meeting of minds between our two governments may be expedited.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL—TENTATIVE AND WITHOUT COMMITMENT.

OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

SECTION I

Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed towards lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighbouring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national

olicies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.

(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

(4) The principle of reliance upon international co-operation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that towards eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

(1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

(2) The principle of international economic co-operation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.

(3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.

(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

SECTION II

Steps to be taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

(1) The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavour to conclude a multilateral non-aggression

pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and the United States.

(2) Both governments will endeavour to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of French Indo-China, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the governments' party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indo-China and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indo-China.

(3) The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air, and police forces from China and from Indo-China.

(4) The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China, with capital temporarily at Chungking.

(5) Both governments will give up all extra-territorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Both governments will endeavour to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extra-territorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

(6) The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favoured-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk of the free list.

(7) The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

(8) Both governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilisation of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

(9) Both governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third Power or Powers shall be interpreted

by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

(10) Both governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.

THE JAPANESE REPLY OF 7TH DECEMBER 1941

MEMORANDUM

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute towards the realisation of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment of Japanese-American relations and the stabilisation of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honour to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken towards Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to ensure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.

Ever since the China affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy.

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours towards the stabilisation of East Asia. Exerting pressure on the Netherlands Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to the ideal of common prosperity with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan

in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defence of French Indo-China, both the American and British Governments, wilfully misinterpreting it as a threat to their own possessions, and inducing the Netherlands Government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the Empire.

Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, the American Government, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental questions.

3. Subsequently, on 25th September, the Japanese Government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American Government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present Cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American Government, adhering steadfastly to its original assertions, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

Therefore the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on 20th November still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to despatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the South-Eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both governments shall co-operate with the view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as 'introducer' of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American Government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as so-called 'introducer' of peace between Japan and China, pleading that the time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on 26th November, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese Government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American Government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

4. From the beginning of the present negotiations the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties. As for the China question which constitutes an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. As for the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third Powers pursued on an equitable basis. Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese Government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American Government.

On the other hand, the American Government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delay in the negotiations. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American Government, and the Japanese Government desires to call the attention of the American Government especially to the following points:

1. The American Government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favourable to it and urges upon the Japanese Government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

Of the various principles put forward by the American Government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese Government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual condition it seems only a Utopian ideal on the part of the American Government to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

2. The American proposal contained a stipulation which states: 'Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third Power or Powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.' It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligation under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilising the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defence,

Germany and Italy, two Powers that are striving to establish a New Order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

3. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settle international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned, as it is at times more inhumane than military pressure.

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in coalition with Great Britain and other Powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia for the past hundred years or more have been compelled to observe the *status quo* under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. Thus the six countries—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China, and Thailand—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity, and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing the territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese Government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the Nine Power Treaty structure which is the chief factor responsible for the present predicament of East Asia.

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government regarding China, such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, ignored the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilising factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American Government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically, or

economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking Government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American Government, falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American Government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

6. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items, such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilisation of yen and dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China affair, menaces the Empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

7. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed, simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements to be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However, since the American Government has made the proposal of 26th November as a result of frequent consultation with Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, and Chungking, and presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime in the questions of China, it must be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

8. Obviously, it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts towards the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through co-operation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

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